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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000075 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO 
PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: GOB'S BORDER GUARD FORCE PROPOSAL FALLS FLAT 
 
REF: A. (A) 09 RANGOON 447 
     ¶B. (B) 09 RANGOON 567 
     ¶C. (C) 09 RANGOON 704 
     ¶D. (D) 09 RANGOON 478 
     ¶E. (E) 10 RANGOON 57 
     ¶F. (F) 10 RANGOON 53 
 
RANGOON 00000075  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Marc Shaw for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  Speculation continues to mount about how the 
Government of Burma (GOB) will respond to ceasefire groups 
(CFGs) that refuse to sign on to the GOB's Border Guard Force 
(BGF) proposal.  Another deadline for accession to the BGF 
passed on December 31, with no apparent consequences.  Of the 
approximately 20 CFGs in Burma, only three -- the New 
Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K); Myanmar National Democratic 
Alliance Army (MNDAA); and Karenni State Nationalities 
Peoples' Liberation Front (KNPLF) -- have transformed their 
forces into BGF elements.  A fourth CFG -- the Democratic 
Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) -- has not yet joined the BGF, but 
effectively has allied with the government. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Talks between the government and the two largest 
CFGs, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and United 
Wa State Army (UWSA), are stalled with no resolution in 
sight.  The New Mon State Party (NMSP), Shan State Army-North 
(SSA-N), Karen National Union Peace Council (KNU-PC), and the 
remaining smaller and relatively minor groups are not 
actively negotiating with the government and appear not to 
have any immediate plans to join the BGF.  Although motives 
vary, most CFGs are unwilling to cede their arms to the 
regime in the absence of a GOB commitment to some measure of 
autonomy within each ethnic region.  Ethnic groups, 
especially those like the USWA and KIO with large, well-armed 
militias, are potential spoilers for the regime's carefully 
planned elections.  While it appears both the GOB and the 
ethnics want to avoid open conflict, that sobering option 
remains a possibility.  End Summary. 
 
Joining the Fold:  BGF Believers 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  The regime's 2008 constitution (Chapter VII, Article 
337/338) subjects all armed groups in the country to Burma 
Army control:  "All the armed forces in the Union shall be 
under the command of the Defence Services."  This 
constitutional clause presumably is an impetus for the 
current effort to unite ceasefire groups' armed elements into 
the BGF.  In an April 2009 letter to KIO/KIA and UWSA (the 
two largest CFGs) leaderships,  Lieutenant General Ye Myint, 
chief of military intelligence, requested that the groups 
convert to the BGF, according to Kachin community leader 
Labang Gam Awng.  The regime initially gave the UWSA and 
KIO/KIA a deadline of June 2009.  When that date slipped, the 
generals subsequently conveyed verbal deadlines of October, 
then December.  Smaller CFGs tell us the regime never gave 
them a firm deadline and the GOB has not publicly revealed a 
timeframe for BGF accession. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Currently, three small CFGs have agreed to join the 
BGF:  the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K), Karenni State 
Nationalities Peoples' Liberation Front (KNPLF), and Myanmar 
National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), representing the 
Kokang.  There is no common underlying reason why these three 
groups have joined.  Labang Gam Awng told us the NDA-K joined 
because of its relatively weak troop strength (approximately 
1300) and limited arms.  In addition, the regime provided 
NDA-K's leadership with permits to extract gems, timber, and 
gold, which they sell at a profit to China, and with permits 
for previously unregistered cars.  Reportedly, after joining 
the government, the regime gave each officer a house -- at 
the expense of Kachin business owners who were "taxed" to pay 
for the endeavor.  The MNDAA acceded to the BGF only after 
the Burma Army attacked in late August 2009 (Ref B).  It is 
still unclear why the KNPLF joined the BGF. 
 
RANGOON 00000075  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C)  The current CFG forces will comprise six BGF 
battalions -- three from the NDA-K, two from the KNPLF, and 
one from the MNDAA.  Press reports state that 326 soldiers 
comprise each battalion, with Burma Army soldiers occupying 
key positions -- administration, personnel, and material 
support.  Embassy sources who have observed these battalions 
in full force at ceremonies, however, believe the strength to 
be slightly smaller. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Despite the DKBA's alliance with the GOB, that CFG 
has yet to join the BGF.  According to Karen community leader 
Rebecca Htin -- who has contacts with various Karen groups -- 
 certain battalions within the DKBA are willing to accede to 
the BGF, but other DKBA units oppose integration.  The DKBA 
continues to mount offensives in coordination with the Burma 
Army against the KNU, most recently in late January (Ref F). 
 
KIO/KIA Talks with Burma Government Remain at Impasse 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Ongoing GOB talks with the Kachin Independence 
Organization (KIO) and its armed wing, the Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA), are at a standstill.  Kachin peace 
negotiators Saboi Jum and his daughter Ja Nan conveyed to us 
over the course of several conversations that the KIA will 
not relinquish arms until the government clearly defines BGF 
roles and responsibilities.  The KIO/KIA will have played 
"all its cards," Ja Nan admitted, if the GOB does not accept 
the group's latest proposal, which requests that the 
government abide by the Panglong Agreement (a power-sharing 
arrangement signed in 1947 giving the Shan, Kachin, and Chin 
ethnic groups autonomy over their own territory).  The 
government reportedly now calls the Panglong Agreement 
"history."  Ja Nan told us a political advisor to the GOB 
said in December that "time is running out," but did not 
elaborate.  Labang Gam Awng claimed in a separate 
conversation that at a meeting with the KIO/KIA, held on 
December 28 and 29, Burmese generals verbally extended the 
BGF deadline to March 2010.  Ja Nan assumes the regime 
expects the KIO/KIA leadership to cave to government pressure 
as happened immediately before the 2008 constitutional 
referendum, but Ja Nan believes that is unlikely.  The Kachin 
negotiators still have some optimism and consider the ongoing 
negotiations themselves to be a "positive sign." 
 
¶8.  (C)  Labang Gam Awng said that, in a situation 
reminiscent of the Kokang incident from August (Ref B), the 
GOB may be employing a divide-and-rule strategy against the 
KIO/KIA.  Top-level leadership -- including KIO Chairman 
Zawng Khra, Vice-Chairman Gauri Zaw Seng, Secretary Dr. La 
Ja, and Central Executive Committee member Lamar Gaphang -- 
reportedly bought off on the idea of joining the BGF after a 
May 2009 meeting with General Ye Myint and Bureau of Special 
Operations (BSO) Commander Lieutenant General Tha Aye.  But 
other Kachin leaders opposed the idea -- including KIA 
Generals Inban La and Gam Shawng; all KIA battalion leaders; 
KIA soldiers; and the Kachin people. 
 
¶9.  (C)  To force a split within KIO ranks, the government 
appears to be offering lucrative incentives to individuals. 
Former KIO Vice Chairman Tu Ja recently set up his own 
political party -- the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), 
an idea Labang Gam Awng believes the government encouraged. 
(Note:  The press reported that Dr. Tu Ja has already opened 
KSPP offices in Kachin State, illegal until an election law 
is promulgated, but the government has allowed the offices to 
remain open.)  It is rumored within the Kachin community that 
lead KIO negotiator Saboi Jum, whom Labang Gaw Awng refers to 
as a "pawn of the Nay Pyi Taw generals," has been offered the 
position of deputy minister of Kachin State if the KIO/KIA 
agrees to join the BGF.  Nay Pyi Taw reportedly has 
approached Saboi Jum about starting a political party of his 
own, and has offered similar incentives to others. 
 
Several CFGs Reject BGF Outright 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
RANGOON 00000075  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶10.  (C)  Several groups clearly oppose BGF integration and 
report that talks with the government have gone nowhere.  The 
UWSA is arguably the strongest and most well-equipped CFG 
with an estimated 20--30,000 troops (Note:  The Wa told us in 
October they have 30,000 active duty troops with an 
additional 10,000 reserves; observers believe the actual 
number may be less.  End note.)  UWSA Deputy Liaison Officer 
Soe Than told us in October that UWSA Central Executive 
Committee members find the GOB's proposal "unacceptable" (Ref 
C).  In a January 14 meeting, Soe Than repeated that message, 
adding that UWSA leaders have determined it will be 
"impossible" to join the BGF under the terms laid out by the 
GOB.  The UWSA has no intention to undermine its current 
autonomy by subjecting its troops to Burma Army control. 
However, the UWSA has opted to "not answer" the GOB regarding 
the BGF proposal, rather than deliver a firm "no," which the 
GOB might interpret as a direct challenge to its authority. 
According to Soe Than, the Wa are not anxious to renew active 
hostilities.  Nevertheless, he said, the UWSA is "on edge," 
hoping the status quo will prevail but prepared to fight if 
necessary.  The UWSA already has undertaken "protective 
measures," which Soe Than would not define, and he expressed 
confidence the UWSA would have the upper hand in any battle 
with the SPDC. 
 
¶11.  (C)  The New Mon State Party (NMSP) and its military 
arm, the Mon National Liberation Front (MNLF) with an 
estimated 7,000 troops, have resisted GOB overtures to join 
the BGF.  According to the exile press, the NMSP sent an 
official letter to the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC) in August 2009 explaining that while it wants to 
continue the ceasefire agreement -- signed in 1995 -- it will 
not accept any attempt to dismantle its armed units at this 
time.  NMSP Central Executive Committee member Nai Tha La Nyi 
told Poloff the GOB annually increases the number of Burma 
Army troops it sends to Mon state.  The government's 
explanation for the increase is ostensibly border protection. 
 In total, there are 10 Burma Army battalions operating in 
Mon state, including a battalion of heavy artillery. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Similarly, the National Democratic Alliance Army 
Eastern Shan State (NDAA-ESS), Karen National Union Peace 
Council (KNU-PC), and the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) also 
have rejected the GOB's proposal.  Several Embassy sources 
told us that reasons for rejection include opposition by 
these groups to government efforts to assign Burma Army 
military officers to key positions in each BGF battalion. 
 
What's Next? 
------------ 
 
¶13.  (C)  The latest GOB-imposed deadline for accession to 
the BGF passed December 31.  The GOB appears committed to the 
proposal for now, at least in part because of the stipulation 
in the new constitution -- which will take effect after 
parliament convenes following elections the government has 
publicly announced will be sometime in 2010 -- that there be 
only one national military force.  The regime appears to be 
ratcheting up pressure on the ethnic groups as elections 
approach.  Many here interpret the regime's rout of the 
Kokang and its orchestrated change in the MNDAA leadership -- 
which subsequently reversed the MNDAA's opposition to the BGF 
-- as, at least in part, a signal to other CFGs:  play ball 
or risk attack (Ref B).  Media reports indicate a possible 
increase in Burma Army troops within ethnic areas along the 
borders.  Pressure on some of the smaller CFGs has been less 
overt.  The GOB reportedly has cut off rice rations and 
supplies to the NMSA, according to Nai Tha La Nyi. 
 
¶14.  (C)  In sum, many CFGs appear determined to oppose the 
BGF proposal, at least in its current form.  Saboi Jum and Ja 
Nan noted that the GOB's mistake is trying to solve its armed 
ethnic group problem with a one-size-fits-all approach.  They 
stress that integration into the BGF will not work for all 
ethnic CFGs because they do not share the same grievances or 
objectives.  While nearly all CFGs desire to have some sort 
of autonomy and a respect for ethnic rights enshrined in the 
constitution, there are differences among, and often within, 
 
RANGOON 00000075  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
the groups' approaches to the central government.  One result 
over the years has been a proliferation of ethnic splinter 
groups; notable examples include the NDA-K's break from the 
KIO and the DKBA's secession from the KNU. 
 
¶15.  (C)  The GOB states that it does not plan to engage the 
CFGs militarily.  The two largest CFGs --  the UWSA and 
KIO/KIA told us that they will not shoot first, but would 
respond with force if necessary to protect their interests. 
The UWSA, KIO/KIA, MNDAA, NDAA-ESS, and SSA-N reportedly have 
had a standing verbal agreement to come to one another's 
defense should the Burma Army attack, although the other 
groups failed to assist the Kokang in August.  Explaining 
that lack of intervention, UWSA Liaison Officer Soe Than told 
us the Wa viewed the Kokang episode as an MNDAA "internal 
power struggle" unrelated to the BGF issue.  Despite stated 
pledges to avoid violence, tensions are reportedly high on 
all sides. 
 
¶16.  (C)  The outcome of the GOB's efforts to integrate the 
CFGs under the new constitution remains unclear but it could 
potentially affect the scheduling and conduct of the 2010 
elections.  One possible explanation for the delay in 
publication of the electoral laws and election date is the 
failure to resolve the BGF issue satisfactorily.  Khin Maung 
Gyi, Joint Secretary of the National Unity Party, which is 
closely allied with the government, told us he is "100 
percent" convinced elections will not occur without CFG 
participation.  He says CFGs will either fall in line or be 
"dealt with" by the government.  He suggested the recent 
actions against the Kokang sent a signal that CFG 
participation is mandatory. 
 
¶17.  (C)  The GOB does not appear to have easy options. 
Political opposition to the current BGF plan remains high 
among many CFGs.  The regime may look for opportunistic 
scenarios to divide and conquer some smaller CFGs, as it did 
with the Kokang.  But military action against the large, 
well-armed militias would present significant battlefield 
challenges and could have serious regional repercussions. 
That is particularly true in the case of the Wa, who are 
ethnic-Chinese and have close links to PRC communities across 
the border. 
DINGER