VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0108/01 0401543
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 091543Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1185
INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 6100
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS RABAT 000108 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR H AND NEA/MAG 
H PLS PASS TO CODEL CARDIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP PREL PGOV PTER ECON MO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL CARDIN 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  Senator Cardin, we look forward to your 
arrival in Morocco, a long-standing U.S. ally and model in 
many respects for other Arab, Muslim and African countries. 
The U.S. mission's goals in Morocco are promoting economic 
growth, enhancing democracy and governance through political 
and economic reform, resolving regional conflicts while 
maintaining close strategic cooperation by promoting 
U.S.-Moroccan partnership in diplomacy, military engagement 
and countering terrorism.  Morocco itself is undergoing 
far-reaching transformations, albeit unevenly, addressing 
economic development, political reform, gender equality and 
religious tolerance.  Morocco has made strides in freedom of 
the press and remains a leader in the region, but those who 
cross redlines still face jail and/or the closure of their 
offices.  Other human rights have grown as well, although 
Morocco remains very much under the control of a monarchy. 
Morocco's top foreign policy priority is winning U.S. and 
other countries' support for its position on the Western 
Sahara territorial dispute and for North African integration. 
 A bumper crop in 2009 buttressed growth against the backdrop 
of reduced exports, lower investment and declining 
remittances. Thus, despite the global economic crisis 
Morocco's economy grew by over five percent in 2009.  Slums 
are coming down and so is unemployment.  We believe expanding 
Morocco's economic base will do as much to address popular 
dissatisfaction with the political system as will 
strengthening democratic institutions.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Government and Political Reform 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Government:  Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi's 
government, formed after the September 2007 legislative 
elections, represents a three-party coalition.  On January 4, 
King Mohammed VI appointed five new ministers, the second 
cabinet reshuffle in six months.  The new ministers are 
Minister of Interior, Minister of Justice, Minister of 
Tourism, Minister in Charge of Relations with the Parliament, 
and Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister in Charge of 
Modernizing Public Sectors.  The changes at Interior and 
Justice were significant and will potentially impact major 
Moroccan initiatives including regionalization, judicial 
reform and Western Sahara policy.  The way in which the King 
imposed the changes on a weak government does not necessarily 
represent a step forward in the democratization process. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) At the same time, internal democracy is growing 
within political parties.  A political formation founded by 
Fouad Ali El Himma, an intimate of the King, has evolved into 
a new Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) by grouping 
several smaller parties.  It now constitutes the largest 
political bloc in Parliament, and could lead should the 
current coalition falter.  In addition to the PAM, the 
leading parties are El Fassi's Istiqlal, the 
Islamist-referent Party of Justice and Development (PJD), the 
pro-Berber Popular Movement (MP), the National Rally of 
Independents (RNI) and the Socialist USFP, which has seen its 
support decline steadily since 2007. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Parliamentary Reform:  Despite the emergence of the 
PAM and the increasingly democratic internal structures of 
the parties, we currently see no prospect for a significant 
shift in Morocco's foreign and security policies, nor in the 
way in which policy is formulated.  Neither Parliament nor 
the Prime Minister has much say in these issues, which the 
King manages directly with the concerned ministries. 
Morocco's political parties and the bicameral parliament are 
weak and structurally hamstrung from taking legislative 
initiatives or strongly articulating dissent.  Changing the 
Constitution would be necessary in order to change the power 
imbalance, but both Parliament and parties will have to 
improve their capacity and performance first.  Nonetheless, 
the parties and Parliament have made some technical 
improvements, largely thanks to USG-funded programs from the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the State University 
of New York (SUNY), which have modestly improved the body's 
administrative capacity.  These include establishment of a 
budget analysis office, a verbatim transcription service, a 
consistent forum for training and debate among parliamentary 
members and staff, and the introduction of question time. 
This innovation has required the Government to answer over 
2,800 questions in the last two years, with the PAM posing 
over 1,000, and focusing on the work of the Ministries of 
Interior, Education, Health, Agriculture, Transport, 
Employment, Justice and Communications, in that order. 
 
¶5.  (U) Political Reform:  Although the September 2007 
parliamentary elections were the most transparent in the 
country's history, record low participation (37 percent of 
registered voters) reflected the lack of voter confidence in 
the institution.  Despite this challenge, the State 
Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) funded 
NDI to run the first ever international election observation 
in Morocco.  MEPI also supported an ambitious training 
program for women running for municipal councils in June 
after a quota was established reserving 12 percent of the 
seats for women.  Voter turnout in the June municipal 
elections was approximately 54 percent, and women captured 
nearly 13 percent of the seats, exceeding the number reserved 
for them.  The USG had also sponsored the training of over 
3,500 women via an unusual collaborative project between the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International 
Republican Institute (IRI).  The entry into politics of over 
3,000 elected women office holders and many thousands more 
candidates may have a potentially transformational impact. 
 
------------- 
Social Reform 
------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Human and Women's Rights:  King Mohammed VI has 
embarked on a determined and continuous program of human 
rights reforms that include the Arab world's first truth 
commission and a revised Family Code (Moudawana), granting 
expanded legal rights to women, growing government 
transparency, accountability and rule of law.  Palace support 
has produced more elected women officials than in any other 
Arab country.  Women now serve as policymakers and religious 
leaders, instructing women about their new-found legal 
rights, and advocating a more moderate view of Islam. 
Although Morocco has become the leader of reform in the 
region, the reforms are still not deeply rooted in law, 
tradition or the Constitution and could be rolled back. 
Continued support and encouragement from partners like the 
United States and Europe are essential.  Another recent 
development has been the expansion of cultural rights and 
outlets for Berbers, one of the largest groups in Morocco and 
perhaps the largest. 
 
¶7.  (U) Religious Freedom:  The Moroccan Constitution 
provides for the freedom to practice one's religion, although 
Islam is the official state religion.  The GOM tolerates 
several small religious minorities but prohibits the 
distribution of non-Muslim religious materials and bans all 
proselytizing.  It also occasionally restricts Islamic 
organizations whose activities have exceeded the bounds of 
"acceptable religious practice" and become political in 
nature, lately targeting Shi'a. Morocco has become protective 
of and even positive toward the tiny remnant of its once 
substantial Jewish minority. 
 
¶8.  (U) Social Reform:  Morocco benefits from several MEPI 
programs, including country-specific projects and inclusion 
in regional efforts.  Recent and ongoing programs include the 
above- mentioned program for women candidates, breast cancer 
awareness, sustaining civil society and youth associations, 
developing freedom of expression via the Internet, supporting 
development of democratic leaders, supporting technical 
assistance to meet environmental obligations under the FTA, 
political party training and capacity building, and the 
Financial Services Volunteer Corps, efforts to expand access 
to banking and to venture capital.  Other USG-funded projects 
support anti-corruption efforts (with the American Bar 
Association) and prison reform to undermine the foundations 
of extremism. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Recent Developments:  Over the past several months, 
there have been some setbacks on the human rights front.  The 
Aminatou Haidar case represented an extreme example of the 
difficulties those Moroccans who advocate the independence of 
Western Sahara or the right to self-determination of the 
Sahrawi people face when they seek to express their views 
publicly either domestically or internationally.  On November 
13, the GOM refused to allow Haidar, a prominent Sahrawi 
pro-independence activist and human rights defender, to enter 
Morocco, confiscated her passport after she began the process 
of renouncing her Moroccan citizenship and sent her to the 
Canary Islands.  Once there, she embarked on a 34-day hunger 
strike until the GOM relented and allowed her to return on 
December 18.  The case attracted significant international 
attention and widespread accusations that the GOM had come 
dangerously close to forced exile.  Likewise, there have been 
several recent incidents of limitations on the free press, 
including court cases in which journalists and bloggers have 
been sentenced to jail terms.  Most recently, the GOM shut 
down the French language weekly publication "Le Journal," 
ostensibly over non-payment of taxes, in a move widely seen 
as the latest effort to rein in the independent media. 
 
------------------------ 
Regional Security Issues 
------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (U) Algeria:  Moroccan foreign policy is dominated by 
defending and seeking international recognition of its 
sovereignty claims over Western Sahara.  The issue remains 
the most visible source of tension with long-time rival 
Algeria, which has historically supported the POLISARIO 
Front's quest for independence by way of an UN-sponsored 
referendum.  Algeria closed the border between the two 
countries, and it remains closed.  While the King and other 
GOM officials have publicly proposed opening the border and 
upgrading bilateral relations between the two countries, 
their entreaties have been repeatedly rebuffed.  The 
Government of Algeria (GOA) has linked progress on the border 
to all issues, particularly the Western Sahara.  The issue 
led Morocco to leave the African Union and has been an 
obstacle to regional integration through the Arab Maghreb 
Union. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Western Sahara:  In April 2007, Morocco proposed a 
new autonomy plan for Western Sahara, and a series of 
UN-sponsored negotiations with the POLISARIO have taken place 
in Manhasset, New York.  The Moroccan proposal would provide 
Sahrawis, the indigenous people of Western Sahara, autonomy 
in administering local affairs under Moroccan sovereignty. 
In April, the UN renewed the mandate of the UN peacekeeping 
operation MINURSO until 2010.  Following the controversial 
lapsing of the contract of the former UN Secretary General's 
Personal Envoy, the UN selected retired U.S. Ambassador 
Christopher Ross to be the new Personal Envoy, and he made 
his first visit to the region in February 2009 and his second 
in July.  He hosted informal talks near Vienna in August; 
while they produced no breakthroughs, the parties agreed to 
continue negotiations.  The next round of informal talks is 
scheduled to take place February 10-11, 2010, in New York. 
 
¶12.  (U) Western Sahara Continued:  Western Sahara 
experienced gross violations of human rights from 1975 until 
the end of King Hassan II's regime, and repression 
intensified after the short-lived Sahrawi uprising of 2005. 
Since late 2006, Morocco has improved the human rights 
situation in the territory.  Arbitrary arrests have sharply 
diminished and beatings and physical abuse by security forces 
have all but disappeared.  However, dissenters still face 
harassment and sometimes even criminal charges if they 
publish or speak too publicly in support of independence or 
on a vote for self-determination. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Economic Development and U.S. Assistance 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (U) The economy is relatively healthy, although marred 
by disparities in wealth.  Moroccan authorities are 
concerned, however, by the impact of the global recession on 
important export, tourism and remittance earnings.  Growth is 
expected to continue, despite the global economic slowdown, 
thanks to a record agricultural harvest in 2009.  Since 
implementation of our Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on January 
1, 2006, bilateral commerce has more than doubled.  A number 
of U.S. firms have increased their investment in Morocco, 
seeing new markets develop as a result of the FTA.  The 
Department of Commerce's Commercial Law Development Program 
and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency conduct capacity 
building and technical assistance projects to assist Morocco. 
 Both agencies help the Kingdom to create an open and 
transparent trading environment and to fully develop its 
trading potential.  However, significant export growth to 
U.S. and other markets will also depend on Morocco's ability 
to capture a larger share of value added in its export 
products. 
 
¶14.  (U) Millennium Challenge Account:  In 2007, building on 
decades of USAID and Peace Corps efforts, the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC) signed a five-year, USD 697.5 
million Millennium Challenge Account Compact with Morocco in 
order to reduce poverty and increase economic growth. 
Currently, through the MCC the USG is advancing programs in 
Fruit Tree Productivity to stimulate growth in the 
agricultural sector and reduce volatility of agricultural 
production.  It is also working on an Artisanal Fisheries 
Program to modernize the means of catching, storing and 
marketing fish, thereby improving the quality of the catch, 
maintaining the value chain, and increasing fishermen's 
access to both local and export markets.  It seeks to 
stimulate growth by leveraging the links between the craft 
sector, tourism and the Fes Medina's cultural, historic and 
architectural resources.  The Compact will also increase 
financial services for micro-enterprises in Morocco by 
addressing key constraints to the development of the broader, 
market-based financial sector.  Moreover, it will help reduce 
high unemployment among young graduates and encourage a more 
entrepreneurial culture through two existing Moroccan 
government initiatives, Moukalawati (a program for supporting 
small businesses) and the National Initiative for Human 
Development (INDH), a framework of efforts aimed at creating 
opportunities for the poor, vulnerable and socially excluded. 
Finally, the program is investing approximately USD 40 
million in functional literacy. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Military and Counterterrorism Cooperation 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (U) Military Cooperation:  The GOM has been formally 
invited to participate in the Global Peace Operations 
Initiative (GPOI).  Under the GPOI program, the U.S. intends 
to provide peace operations training and other support to the 
Moroccan military so that it can continue to develop and 
sustain peace operations capacity.  The current plan is to 
provide training and facilities refurbishment to a peace 
operations training center in Morocco.  In order to ensure 
long-term sustainability, the GPOI program incorporates 
train-the-trainer elements into its training events.  The 
Mission is working with the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation, which will coordinate Morocco's GPOI 
request, to finalize the program.  In addition, the Embassy 
is currently engaged in negotiations with the GOM on a Status 
of Forces Agreement (SOFA). 
 
¶16.  (U) Military Cooperation Continued:  The Moroccan 
military has undertaken a sweeping effort to modernize a 
military force that fields predominantly Korean and Vietnam 
War-era equipment.  While F-16 and T-6 sales form the bulk of 
the dollar figure for this modernization, the total Foreign 
Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing portfolio 
totals some 120 cases in excess of USD 3 billion.  Military 
modernization further strengthens the Moroccan military by 
continuing and expanding exposure to U.S. doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, procedures and personnel.  The expanded 
requirement to train operators and maintenance staff for the 
F-16 and T-6 aircraft alone will practically equal the 
current annual training allocation for all Moroccan personnel 
across all the services and government organizations. 
Moreover, the integration of a fourth generation fighter into 
the Royal Moroccan Air Force will stimulate a full spectrum 
modernization approach from operating and sustaining such 
aircraft, maintaining facilities, logistics and aerial 
deployment to command and control.  This provides an 
unparalleled opportunity to shape our engagement with the 
Royal Moroccan Air Force.  A superb boost this year was the 
selection of Morocco to participate in the Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force Counterpart Visit program, as well as Morocco's 
decision to send an observer to AMC's Airlift Rodeo.  These 
engagement activities add to a robust exercise program that 
includes AFRICAN LION, PHOENIX EXPRESS, SAHARAN WIND, AFRICAN 
PARTNERSHIP STATION, AFRICAN ENDEAVOR and FLINTLOCK, in 
addition to at least two annual Joint Combined Exercise and 
Training activities (JCETs). 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Counterterrorism:  The terrorist threat in Morocco 
emanates especially from small grassroots radical Islamic 
cells, which have shown some capacity to attack.  In 2008, 
security forces disrupted six terrorist and foreign fighter 
cells, prosecuting 100 people.  In 2009, the security 
services disrupted five terrorist and foreign-fighter cells 
totaling 50 people, including one group of 24 who were 
detained in September.  The biggest threat is that attacks 
could deter tourism, an important component of the economy. 
The GOM's implementation of a comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy emphasizing vigilant security measures, 
counter-radicalization policies, and robust international 
cooperation has been largely successful in containing the 
threat.  Economic disruption, whether from attacks or the 
global economic crisis, remains the principal threat to 
stability here, but most observers believe Morocco will 
manage to contain the threat. 
 
¶18.  (U) Counterterrorism Continued:  In early-October, a 
multi-agency mission team participated in two days of 
wide-ranging, frank discussions with representatives of the 
Moroccan Ministry of the Interior.  Those discussions 
addressed issues including counterterrorism, trafficking in 
persons, illegal migration, drug 
trafficking/counternarcotics, regional threats and stability, 
human rights and assistance/development efforts.  Designed as 
a strategy session to share information and lay the 
groundwork for future engagement, both sides agreed that the 
talks were useful and could lead to substantive programmatic 
and other collaboration.  Under the King who as "Commander of 
the Faithful" leads Moroccan Muslims and Jews, Morocco has 
standardized religious doctrine, consolidated control over 
religious schools and sent specially trained imams to Europe 
to preach moderate messages to the Moroccan Diaspora.  The 
vast majority of Morocco's population rejects Salafist and 
Wahhabist approaches to Islam and does not support terrorist 
groups. 
 
 
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Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco 
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