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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000103 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25 
TAGS: ECON EFIN PREL PGOV KJUS KCRM KTFN PTER SNAR EC
SUBJECT: Ecuador Rejects FATF Decision to Place it on High-Risk List 
 
REF: QUITO 101 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: ...



id: 250884
date: 2/25/2010 23:07
refid: 10QUITO103
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 10QUITO101
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000103 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25 
TAGS: ECON EFIN PREL PGOV KJUS KCRM KTFN PTER SNAR EC
SUBJECT: Ecuador Rejects FATF Decision to Place it on High-Risk List 
 
REF: QUITO 101 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher A. Landberg, Economic Counselor, U.S. 
Department of State, Economic Section; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
Summary 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) The Ecuadorian government has reacted vehemently against the 
February 18 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) statement that 
Ecuador has not committed sufficiently to addressing strategic 
deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism 
finance regime.  President Correa and senior GoE officials 
characterized the FATF decision as unjust, argued it ignores 
Ecuador's counter narcotics achievements, and alleged it is 
punishment for Ecuador's ties with Iran.  On February 25, Foreign 
Minister Patino questioned the legitimacy of FATF and said that 
Ecuador will not ask FATF to reconsider the decision.  In contrast, 
Central Bank officials and private sector leaders are concerned 
about possible repercussions and want to play a constructive role 
in getting Ecuador off the FATF high-risk list.  Based on the 
initial reaction and the Rio Group's recent declaration of 
solidarity with Ecuador, it appears that the GoE aims to push FATF 
to reconsider the decision, while building support within the 
region.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
FATF Groups Ecuador with North Korea, Ethiopia, Angola 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) The FATF plenary announced on February 18 that Ecuador 
(along with Angola, Ethiopia, and North Korea) had not "committed 
to an action plan developed with the FATF to address key 
deficiencies" in its anti-money laundering and combating the 
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and had not "delivered a 
clear high-level political commitment to address these 
deficiencies" going forward, thus posing a risk to the 
international financial system.  It called on Ecuador to work with 
the FATF and FATF-Style Regional Body GAFISUD in adequately 
criminalizing money laundering and terrorism finance and addressing 
other deficiencies.  FATF did acknowledge that Ecuador has engaged 
with FATF and GAFISUD (unlike the other three countries cited). 
 
 
 
Correa Rejects FATF Determination 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) President Correa spent much of his weekly address on 
Saturday, February 20, denouncing FATF's statement.  He framed the 
FATF decision as an attack on Ecuador's sovereignty.  While not 
directly naming the United States, Correa referred to the FATF 
"blacklisting" as a sign of the "arrogance of imperialism."  Correa 
declared that the FATF decision "has to do with the fact the 
Ecuador has relations with Iran," an assertion he repeated several 
times during the address. 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) In a preview of what has become the GoE's party line, 
Correa said that contrary to FATF's findings Ecuador has achieved 
extraordinary results in combating drug trafficking (Ecuador 
doubled narcotics seizures in 2009, compared to 2008).  He also 
stated that there was no money laundering in Ecuador, adding that 
"[the imperialists] need to check where the money laundering is: in 
the United States and Switzerland, but instead of checking their 
own countries they condemn us." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Correa's efforts to protest the FATF decision at the 
February 23 Rio Group Summit in Cancun, Mexico, resulted in the 
group releasing a public declaration of solidarity with Ecuador. 
The Rio Group declaration expressed the "deep concern" of its 29 
member states (including FATF members Brazil, Argentina, and 
Mexico) over FATF's statement on Ecuador and decision process.  The 
Rio Group declaration also reinforced the GoE's party line, noting 
that President Correa "totally rejected the actions of FATF," which 
are "not consistent with the evident efforts and initiatives in all 
areas that Ecuador has carried out to fight money laundering and 
the financing of terrorist activities." 
 
 
 
Senior Officials Follow Correa's Lead 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Coordinating Minister for Economic Policy (and Acting 
Central Bank President) Diego Borja stated February 19 that FATF is 
"not official, nor does it represent the members of the G-20." 
Minister of Government Gustavo Jalkh, who oversees Ecuador's police 
forces, publicly labeled the FATF move an "injustice" and explained 
that Ecuador was a model country in the region in terms of fighting 
organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering. 
Jalkh stated that "terrorism" was considered an "illicit activity" 
under the Penal Code, and Ecuador's money laundering legislation 
addressed all illicit activities (i.e., including terrorism).  Both 
officials, as well as Foreign Minister Patino, also repeated 
Correa's allegation that the real reason for the FATF determination 
was to retaliate against Ecuador for developing a close 
relationship with Iran. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Finance Minister Maria Viteri forcefully rejected FATF's 
designation of Ecuador as high-risk during a February 24 meeting 
with EconCouns and Treasury's visiting Ecuador desk officer. 
Viteri said the FATF assessment was out of date because it was 
based on a 2007 GAFISUD review, did not reflect Ecuador's positive 
record in prosecuting AML/CFT cases, and did not recognize 
Ecuador's previous efforts in building its AML/CFT regime. 
Regarding the latter, she noted that the ongoing process of passing 
laws required under the new constitution had overtaken further 
review of AML/CFT regulations.  (Comment: Viteri's claim that 
Ecuador's FATF listing was based on a 2007 report is misinformed. 
Ecuador's FATF listing is the result of a 2009 review conducted by 
a FATF working group staffed by officials from member countries. 
The working group measured progress in Ecuador's AML/CFT regime 
since 2007, and used a Mutual Review (MER) of Ecuador's AML/CFT 
regime conducted by GAFISUD in 2007 as a baseline for assessing 
Ecuador's progress. End Comment.) 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Viteri expressed concern that the FATF report had political 
aims and undermined the positive international image the Correa 
Administration has sought for Ecuador.  She characterized as 
incredulous the report's inclusion of Ecuador -- itself a "victim 
of terrorism" in its northern border region -- as being soft on 
terrorism.  Viteri also openly questioned the efficacy of promoting 
AML/CFT laws, when many countries do not enforce them. 
Nevertheless, she recognized that more work may be needed to 
improve Ecuador's AML/CFT regime, and noted that Foreign Minister 
Patino and Solicitor General Diego Garcia Carrion will lead the 
 
GoE's official response to FATF.  EconCouns highlighted that the 
FATF determination had been supported by all member countries and 
encouraged the GoE to work with FATF and GAFISUD to address the 
deficiency areas highlighted in the statement. 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ecuador's National Counsel on Money Laundering (NCML), an 
inter-ministerial body in charge of  Ecuadoran AML/CFT policies and 
headed by Solicitor General Garcia, announced it would send letters 
to FATF and GAFISUD objecting to the listing.  Garcia, who has been 
personally engaged in GoE exchanges with FATF, has made the most 
moderate comments of all GoE officials.  In both his public 
comments and his statements in the diplomatic note sent February 19 
to the Treasury Department and all other FATF member countries, in 
which he protested the FATF decision, Garcia highlighted the GoE's 
commitment to complying with FATF AML/CFT recommendations and 
expressly avoided linking the FATF determination to Iran.  In 
contrast, Foreign Minister Patino seems to be hardening his 
position.  He stated February 25 that the GoE "will not ask that it 
[FATF] reconsider anything, since that organization does not have 
the right or the authority to put Ecuador, or any other country, on 
lists of any sort."  He added that the 29 members of the Rio Group 
had supported Ecuador's position in this matter. 
 
 
 
Regulators and Private Sector Eschew Politics and Focus on Solving 
the Problem 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) During separate February 24 meetings with EconCouns and 
TreasOff, Central Bank General Manager Christian Ruiz and private 
bank association President Fernando Pozo (also General Manager of 
Ecuador's largest bank, Banco Pichincha) expressed deep concerns 
about the FATF characterization of Ecuador.  Both highlighted the 
strict controls that Ecuadorian banks have in place, arguing that 
these measures met or exceeded international standards.  They 
worried that the determination could make it more difficult and 
costly for the GoE and the private sector to access international 
capital markets.  Both admitted that neither institution had been 
included in the GoE's past discussions with FATF and GAFISUD, and 
asked for Embassy guidance on how to engage. 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) Members of Ecuador's four American Chambers (Quito, Cuenca, 
Ambato, Guayaquil) noted similar concerns during a February 24 
meeting with the Ambassador and Embassy staff, and noted their 
interest in supporting efforts to remove Ecuador from the current 
FATF grouping.  Emboffs' consistent response to all these parties 
was that Ecuador needed to work with FATF and GAFISUD (and not via 
individual FATF members).  Emboffs also recommended they focus on 
FATF's statement, which highlights the lack of political will on 
Ecuador's part, implying that these institutions could play a 
useful role in encouraging GoE officials to develop a more 
constructive and proactive response to FATF/GAFISUD. 
 
 
 
¶12. (C) During a February 23 meeting, Wells Fargo/Wachovia 
representatives told Emboffs that they will increase scrutiny of 
their clients in Ecuador, which will result in higher costs. 
(Wachovia, soon to complete the full transfer to Wells Fargo, is 
the largest player in cash management services in Ecuador and one 
of the largest in providing trade financing).  They agreed with 
Central Bank/Pichincha statements that Ecuadorian banks are 
 
committed to meeting international AML/CFT standards, and commented 
that they are not as worried about the local banks as they are 
about how U.S. regulatory agencies will react.  They have called on 
their local clients to strengthen controls and for the time being 
do not have plans to reduce exposure to the market.  However, 
decisions going forward depend on U.S. regulators' actions and, if 
costs increase significantly, reducing the size of their Ecuador 
portfolio is an option (as Wachovia has done in Venezuela). 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
 
 
¶13. (C) Correa and his ministers' statements, combined with 
Correa's successful lobbying efforts at the Rio Group Summit, 
indicate that the GoE does not intend to accept the FATF judgment 
without a fight.  However, given that Ecuador has limited ability 
to influence FATF positions, the real result of the GoE's 
government wide outburst is to paint Correa into a corner.  Seeing 
as the President has termed the FATF statement as an attack on 
Ecuador's sovereignty, and especially in light of Foreign Minister 
Patino's latest hardening of Ecuador's public position, Correa 
would lose face if he were now to reverse course and make a clear 
political commitment to a FATF-action plan.  Nevertheless, the 
interest of the Central Bank and private sector actors to pursue a 
more constructive path could gradually bear fruit.  The question is 
whether these interested parties can help the GoE move past its 
initial rejection of the determination and work with FATF to 
address problem areas.  The FATF decision is one of the few 
instances where the GoE has experienced adverse consequences as a 
result of its actions (or inactions). 
HODGES 

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