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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 24 PRISTINA 000077 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR G/TIP, G-Laura Pena, EUR, EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, PRM, EUR/PGI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM KTIP KJUS EAID KDEM KCRM KWMN SMIG KFRD ASEC
PREF, ELAB, KMCA, KV 
SUBJECT: TENTH ANNUAL TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (TIP) REPORT FOR 
KOSOVO 
 
REF: STATE 132759 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  001.2 OF 024 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Embassy Pristina's submission for the Tenth 
Annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report follows.  From 1999 to 
2008, Kosovo was administered by the United Nations Interim 
Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) under the authority of UN 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244.  On February 17, 2008, the 
Kosovo Assembly declared Kosovo's independence.  On June 15, 2008, 
Kosovo's constitution entered into force; from that point the 
Government of Kosovo (GOK) assumed full responsibility for the 
country's civil administration and increasing responsibility for law 
enforcement, including anti-TIP efforts.  The European Union's 
Rule-of-Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) began operations in December 
2008 and replaced UNMIK rule-of-law structures throughout the 
country.  EULEX provided advice, mentoring, and monitoring to Kosovo 
rule-of-law institutions during the reporting period and possessed 
limited executive authority.  The GOK, with limited resources, 
demonstrated the political will and social commitment to address 
trafficking, and took positive steps to prevent trafficking, 
prosecute traffickers, and provided assistance to Victims of 
Trafficking (VOT).  Kosovo's unique political situation, which 
restricts the effectiveness of law enforcement institutions in the 
northern portion of the country, constrained police from combating 
trafficking in minority Serb communities.  Cooperation with 
international police networks is incomplete due to the fact that not 
all of Kosovo's neighbors recognize the country's independence. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY CONT:  Kosovo possesses one of the more 
sophisticated and progressive anti-trafficking legal frameworks in 
the region, and law enforcement institutions did a good job of 
applying the law.  During the rating period, the GOK assisted 29 
victims of trafficking; the judiciary worked on 31 cases of 
suspected trafficking which resulted in 22 convictions.  The GOK 
supported educational programs from secondary school to university 
education levels designed to inform and prevent trafficking in 
persons.  The Kosovo Police (KP) continued its program of 
instruction to new recruits on identification and proper treatment 
of suspected trafficking victims.  Of particular significance, the 
GOK's work with shelters for VOT was noteworthy:  the GOK partially 
funded two and wholly funded a third.  In January 2010, the GOK, 
seeking to improve coordination and effectiveness of its police 
anti-TIP efforts, centralized the Trafficking in Human Beings 
Section, and upgraded it to Department status.  This action promises 
to improve the coordination and effectiveness of the KP.  Challenges 
remain, and the GOK must intensify its anti-TIP efforts over the 
coming year.  The KP must increase its focus on reducing demand by 
raiding brothels and arresting traffickers and clients.  Prosecutors 
must aggressively work towards convicting them in court.  The 
National Anti-Trafficking Coordinator (NATC) must ensure that the 
database to track victims and their traffickers is properly 
utilized.  Finally, the GOK must make greater efforts towards 
educating civil society about TIP.  END SUMMARY 
 
Question 25A: What is (are) the source(s) of available information 
on human trafficking?  What plans are in place (if any) to undertake 
further documentation of human trafficking?  How reliable are these 
sources? 
 
¶3. (SBU) The sources of available information on trafficking in 
persons came primarily from VOT assisted and identified by the  KP 
Trafficking in Human Beings Section (THBS), international 
organizations such as the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), the NGO Terre Des Hommes (TDH), and shelters. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Efforts to improve documentation of VOT were ongoing. In 
2008, the International Center for Migration Policy Development 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  002.2 OF 024 
 
 
(ICMPD) donated a computer and associated software system to the GOK 
to track VOT from identification through repatriation or 
rehabilitation.  The system was also able to track arrested 
traffickers through each stage of the criminal system.  Throughout 
the year, the National Anti-Trafficking Secretariat struggled to 
obtain the necessary data from various branches of the GOK.  On 
January 29, the Secretariat signed MOUs with the Kosovo Judicial 
Council, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and KP 
designed to improve the flow of information. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Detailed, reliable statistics were difficult to collect and 
often misleading because organizations active in counter-trafficking 
efforts relied on different definitions of trafficking, employed 
uneven statistical analyses, and overlapped in data collection. 
There was no single data collection point for all TIP stakeholders. 
Statistics on trafficking came primarily from trafficking victims 
whom the police or IOM identified or came to social workers' 
attention.  Many victims were never identified due to  social stigma 
and the hidden nature of the crime. 
 
Question 25B: Is the country a country of origin, transit, and/or 
destination for men, women, or children subjected to conditions of 
commercial sexual exploitation, forced or bonded labor, or other 
slave-like conditions?  Are citizens or residents of the country 
subjected to such trafficking conditions within the country?  If so, 
does this internal trafficking occur in territory outside of the 
government's control (e.g. in a civil war situation)?  From where 
are people recruited or from where do they migrate prior to being 
subjected to these exploitative conditions?  To what other countries 
are people trafficked and for what purposes?  Provide, where 
possible, numbers or estimates for each group of trafficking 
victims.  Have there been any changes in the TIP situation since the 
last TIP Report (e.g. changes in destinations)? 
 
¶6. (SBU)  Kosovo remained a source, transit point, and destination 
for trafficked persons.  Internal trafficking remained a problem. 
The KP, IOM, and the majority of other government agencies, 
international organizations, and NGOs reported that most of the 
identified victims were women and girls trafficked for the purpose 
of sexual exploitation.  TDH identified 304 child victims trafficked 
for begging purposes during the reporting period.  TDH's numbers 
marked the only significant change in the TIP situation. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Overwhelmingly, foreign and local older minors (16-17 years 
old) and adult VOT were trafficked to Kosovo as their final 
destination and for the purposes of sexual exploitation.  Only one 
case of labor exploitation was confirmed during the reporting 
period.  On February 5, Kosovo Border Police discovered an Albanian 
woman, age 20, trying to enter Kosovo on false travel documents. 
Further investigation revealed the victim was going to be exploited 
to work as a waitress in a coffee shop in Prizren.  The KP arrested 
two Albanian women, one of them the owner of the coffee shop, on 
trafficking charges.  They remain in pre-trial detention.  TDH 
reported that large numbers of foreign and local children (under 
fifteen years old) were trafficked to and within Kosovo for begging. 
 Neither the KP nor the IOM uncovered any cases of VOT transiting 
through Kosovo, but both suspected it existed.  The Turkish male 
trafficked to Kosovo for organ harvesting in December 2008 remained 
the only known case of trafficking for illegal medical practices. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Kosovo Police speculated that internal trafficking could 
occur in the northern part of Kosovo, a region above the Iber/Ibar 
River and beyond the government's effective control.  The KP was one 
of the few GOK organizations operating in Kosovo Serb areas, but 
because the police did not have a THBS office in the northern part 
of Kosovo, only limited information exists on the extent of the TIP 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  003.2 OF 024 
 
 
problem in the northern part of Kosovo.  Underlying political 
tensions have made it difficult for the KP to recruit any Kosovo 
Serb police officers for the THBS, which operated throughout the 
southern part of Kosovo.  The KP reported that it advertised 
positions in the anti-trafficking unit in Serbian but did not 
receive any applications.  Without a Kosovo Serb officer, the KP was 
unable to mount undercover operations or gain an accurate picture of 
TIP issues in Kosovo Serb communities.  International organizations 
also had a limited presence in the northern part of Kosovo.  The IOM 
closed its branch office in the northern part of Mitrovica in 2009. 
Anecdotal reports indicated VOT may have transited through the 
northern part of Kosovo en route to Serbia and Montenegro. 
 
¶9. (SBU) KP and IOM statistics illustrated trafficking trends for 
adult and older minor VOT.  During the reporting period, the KP 
identified 29 trafficking victims: 18 Kosovo Albanian women and 11 
foreign female victims.  Of the foreign victims, six were from 
Moldova, five were from Albania, one was Bulgarian, one was Serbian, 
and one refused to reveal her country of origin.  Eight trafficking 
victims were minors: five Kosovo Albanians, one Kosovo Serb, and two 
Albanian.  From February 2009 to February 2010, the IOM reported 
eight foreign VOT: six from Moldova, one from Albania, and one from 
Serbia.  All were women trafficked for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation.  The Albanian VOT was a minor.  The IOM reported 33 
internal VOT: 32 women, and one Kosovo Roma boy, a minor.  Of the 
women, 29 were Kosovo Albanian, two were Kosovo Roma, and one was a 
Kosovo Bosniak.  Fourteen were minors.  The Roma minor and his 
sister were exploited to commit thefts; the others were exploited 
sexually.  IOM reported that 2009 was the fourth year in a row in 
which it assisted more internally trafficked than foreign victims in 
Kosovo. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The VAAD reported assisting 23 victims of trafficking in 
2009, 12 of whom were internally trafficked.  VAAD noted that all 
the internally trafficked victims were Kosovo Albanians.  Of the 
foreign victims, seven were from Moldova, two were from Albania, one 
came from Serbia, and one was from Slovakia.  All the victims were 
female.  Four victims were minors: two internally trafficked Kosovo 
Albanians, one foreign VOT from Albania, and one Serbian. 
 
¶11. (SBU) During the reporting period, TDH reported it identified 82 
child VOT from Albania and 222 internally trafficked VOT.  Of the 
foreign victims, 52 percent were Albanian Roma, 32 percent Albanian 
Egyptian, and 16 percent Albanian.  Ages ranged from two to 15 years 
old.  Fifty-seven of the victims were boys, and 23 were girls.  Of 
the domestic victims, 81 percent were Kosovo Roma, Egyptian, or 
Ashkali, and 19 percent were Kosovo Albanians.  Ages ranged from 1 
to 15 years old.  One hundred and forty-seven were boys; 75 were 
girls.  From February 14, 2008 to February 13, 2009, TDH identified 
16 child VOT from Albania and 183 internally trafficked victims. 
The foreign victims were 50 percent Albanian Roma, 32 percent 
Albanian Egyptian, and 19 percent Albanian.  Ages ranged from less 
than a year to 15 years old.  Eleven were boys; five were girls.  Of 
the domestic victims, 81 percent were Kosovo Roma, Egyptian, or 
Ashkali, and 19 percent were Kosovo Albanians.  Ages ranged from 1 
to 15 years old.  One hundred and nine were boys, 74 were girls. 
 
¶12. (SBU) TDH estimated that of the foreign VOT, approximately half 
were deported back to Albania and returned the next day.  TDH had 
more success with internally trafficked VOT and  returned 120 
victims to their families.  (Note: TDH's numbers were vastly higher 
than any other organization reported.  The IOM expressed skepticism 
about the accuracy of TDH's data, arguing that the children were 
more likely to be victims of child labor law violations than actual 
VOT.  TDH attributed its ability to identify child VOT to an 
aggressive identification campaign ran year-round, with seven 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  004.4 OF 024 
 
 
three-person teams constantly deployed throughout Kosovo.  End 
note.) 
 
¶13. (SBU) From 1999 through December 31, 2009, the IOM assisted 630 
mainly international victims of trafficking.  Moldovans accounted 
for 51 percent of the victims, followed by about 19 percent from 
Romania, 13 percent from Ukraine, seven percent from Albania, six 
percent from Bulgaria, one percent from Russia and Serbia, and less 
than one percent from Nigeria and Slovakia.  The majority of foreign 
victims were between the ages of 18 and 25 years.  Internal VOT were 
typically between 16 and 18.  IOM reported that almost 82 percent of 
the victims from Kosovo were internally trafficked.  IOM, like the 
KP and other NGOs and international organizations, lacked sufficient 
information to determine what countries Kosovo Albanians were 
trafficked to and for what purpose. 
Question 25C: To what kind of conditions are the trafficking victims 
subjected? 
 
¶14. (SBU) There was disagreement among TIP organizations, including 
the KP and international organizations like the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and IOM, regarding the 
conditions trafficking victims face.  The KP reported traffickers 
have changed their methods of controlling VOT, favoring 
psychological pressure over physical abuse.  The KP stated that 
traffickers allowed victims some freedom of movement, acceptable 
living conditions, and a portion of their earnings.  The KP did not 
see any evidence that rape was a method of control or punishment in 
¶2009.  The KP reported that foreign victims typically lived in or 
adjacent to the bars and nightclubs where they worked; internal VOT 
lived in or near the coffee shops, restaurants, or the hotels that 
employed them. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The OSCE and IOM disputed the KP's description, stating 
that traffickers still used violence to control VOT, confiscated 
passports, permitted victims only limited trips into town under 
careful escort, and allowed VOT a share of the earnings only after 
the victims had fully paid their 'debt' to the trafficker.  Both 
organizations reported rape was sometimes used by traffickers to 
control and punish victims.  Neither the OSCE nor the IOM saw 
evidence of a difference between the work places of foreign and 
domestic VOT.  All saw evidence of wire transfers from foreign 
victims to their families back home. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Counter-trafficking organizations continued to report that 
traffickers were shifting the commercial sex trade into private 
homes and escort services to avoid detection, a result of the KP's 
frequent bar and restaurant checks, as well as changing client 
demand.  KP reported that traffickers were asking that clients pay 
the women directly so it looked more like prostitution than 
trafficking if they were caught. 
 
¶17. (SBU) TDH reported that child VOT tended to live with the 
trafficker who was responsible for their care.  Reportedly, the 
traffickers did not treat child VOT well.  The children were beaten 
at times, and when ill, were not always permitted to receive medical 
help because sick children could collect more money.  Victims 
typically worked ten to 12 hour days begging for money.  They were 
typically stationed in one spot for hours while the trafficker 
observed them from a nearby location and collected the money 
throughout the day.  Boys were more often forced to wash car 
windshields at traffic lights, while girls were compelled to beg for 
money at hotels and restaurants.  TDH reported that child victims 
were generally unnoticed by the KP and, when noticed, were often not 
treated well. 
 
Question 25D: Vulnerability to TIP: Are certain groups of persons 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  005.4 OF 024 
 
 
more at risk of human trafficking (e.g. women and children, boys 
versus girls, certain ethnic groups, refugees, IDPs, etc.)?  If so, 
please specify the type of exploitation for which these groups are 
most at risk (e.g. girls are more at risk of domestic servitude than 
boys). 
 
¶18. (SBU) Adult and older minor victims in Kosovo continued to be 
almost exclusively women.  Foreign VOT come from Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans.  Victims were overwhelmingly trafficked for purposes of 
sexual exploitation.  (Note: See paragraphs six through 13 for a 
detailed description of VOT statistics.  End note.)  The KP, IOM, 
and others involved in counter-trafficking work in Kosovo believed 
that most victims were young women from families with a high level 
of poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy.  IOM statistics for the 
period June 1 to December 31 indicated that six percent of local 
victims were not enrolled in school, 54 percent attended primary 
school, 15 percent attended elementary school (ninth grade), and 24 
percent attended secondary education (high school).  None attended 
or completed university.  TDH reported that child VOT -- both 
internal and foreign -- were exploited for begging purposes, and 
tended to be from under-educated and financially desperate families 
 
¶19. (SBU) Foreign victims tended to be 18 to 24 years old, while 
internal victims were generally 16 to 18 years old.  IOM records 
indicated that traffickers most often recruited poor women and girls 
from rural villages and small cities where economic opportunities 
were limited.  According to IOM, traffickers particularly targeted 
those who had sick family members or were from abusive families. 
Trafficked minors tended to be locals from dysfunctional, possibly 
abusive families.  They were sometimes orphans. 
 
Question 25E: Traffickers and Their Methods: Who are the 
traffickers/exploiters?  Are they independent business people? 
Small or family-based crime groups?  Large international organized 
crime syndicates?  What methods are used to gain direct access to 
victims?  For example, are the traffickers recruiting victims 
through lucrative job offers?  Are victims sold by their families, 
or approached by friends of friends?  Are victims "self-presenting" 
(approaching the exploiter without the involvement of a recruiter or 
transporter)? If recruitment or transportation is involved, what 
methods are used to recruit or transport victims (e.g., are false 
documents being used)?  Are employment, travel, and tourism agencies 
or marriage brokers involved with or fronting for traffickers or 
crime groups to traffic individuals? 
 
¶20. (SBU) There was disagreement among people working in the 
counter-trafficking field regarding the background of traffickers. 
The KP and OSCE believed organized crime elements -- working in 
small groups and recruiting through personal contacts -- were mostly 
responsible.  The KP believed Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb 
organized crime elements collaborated in the trafficking of women, 
but there was no hard evidence.  The IOM and TDH disputed the 
involvement of organized crime.  They reported that the traffickers 
worked in small groups and through personal contacts.  There were 
reports that some traffickers were former trafficking victims who 
returned to their countries of origin to recruit new victims.  In 
2009, the KP arrested 31 men and three women on trafficking charges; 
the majority were Kosovo Albanians. 
 
¶21. (SBU) The KP and IOM reported that the vast majority of 
trafficking victims stated that someone they knew recruited them 
with a false job offer, false travel arrangements, or false promise 
of marriage.  The OSCE believed that many VOT were introduced to 
traffickers through family or friends.  OSCE said that there was no 
evidence VOT were sold by their families.  There were no reports of 
self-presenting VOT.  The IOM reported that of the 630 mainly 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  006.4 OF 024 
 
 
international victims it assisted between 1999 and December 2009, 72 
percent fell prey to traffickers after accepting a bogus job offer 
abroad, eight percent were deceived through false travel 
arrangements, and two percent were promised marriage.  IOM records 
indicated that some recruiters were female. 
 
¶22. (SBU) The KP reported that most trafficking victims entered 
legally.  Few used false documents.  The majority of trafficking 
victims possessed valid passports and employment contracts for work 
as waitresses and dancers.  The contracts were registered by Kosovo 
law firms and stamped by municipal authorities.  According to the 
KP, some victims received pay only for performing sexual services 
and not for the work stated in their employment contracts.  The KP 
also reported that in some cases, the girls were only paid through 
collecting a portion of the money clients spend on drinks with them. 
 IOM also said that most victims had their documents in order, but 
they still found some cases of victims coming to Kosovo on false or 
expired documents. 
 
¶23. (SBU) The KP reported that many victims arrive via Pristina 
Airport, especially if they were not from a country bordering 
Kosovo.  The KP stated that employment, travel, tourism agencies, 
and marriage brokers were generally not involved.  The majority were 
promised jobs in coffee bars, night clubs, restaurants, and hotel 
massage parlors. 
 
¶24. (SBU) TDH reported that in most cases, traffickers took child 
VOT with the permission of their parents, who collected a percentage 
of the earnings.  TDH noted this could be their only source of 
income.  (Note: The Center for the Protection of Women and Children 
(CPWC) also reported that in some cases, family members were 
traffickers.  End Note.)  Traffickers were mostly male relatives, 
but recruiters tended to be female.  According to TDH, traffickers 
operated independently and were not linked to organized crime.  TDH 
noted that crossing from Albania to Kosovo was very easy; children 
were trafficked across the border mostly because Kosovo used the 
Euro currency, allowing children to collect far more money than they 
could have in Albania. 
 
Question 26A: Does the government acknowledge that human trafficking 
is a problem in the country?  If not, why not? 
 
¶25. (SBU) The GOK acknowledged that human trafficking was a problem 
and demonstrated the political will to address it.  The GOK reported 
an 80 percent completion rate for all TIP activities required by the 
Kosovo Action Plan (KAP) in 2009.  The NATC continued the 
Inter-Ministerial Working Group on trafficking in persons and 
regularized their meetings.  Additionally, the NATC supported the 
efforts of three working groups to tackle prevention, protection, 
and prosecution.  The fourth working group, intended to focus on 
trafficking in children, did not meet in 2009.  The GOK also 
conducted training sessions and anti-trafficking campaigns with its 
own resources and at times with the support of NGOs and 
international organizations.  According to the IOM, the GOK was 
adequately combating trafficking. 
 
Question 26B: Which government agencies are involved in efforts 
to combat sex and labor trafficking -- including forced labor -- 
and, which agency, if any, has the lead in these efforts? 
 
¶26. (SBU) The NATC had the lead on anti-trafficking work.  Other 
agencies involved in counter-trafficking work included the Ministry 
of Education and Technology; the Ministry of Culture, Youth and 
Sports; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Welfare (MLSW); the Ministry of Public Services; the Ministry of 
Local Government and Administration; the Ministry of Finance; the 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  007.4 OF 024 
 
 
Ministry of Trade and Industry; and the Ministry of Communities and 
Returns.  International organizations and NGOs also played active 
roles in counter-trafficking efforts in Kosovo. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Kosovo also had an Inter-Ministerial Working Group on 
trafficking issues, chaired by the NATC.  The GOK tasked the 
Inter-Ministerial Working Group with implementing and monitoring the 
Kosovo Action Plan.  It included members of the GOK, international 
organizations, and local NGOs.  Additionally, the Inter-Ministerial 
Working Group had sub-working groups on prevention, protection, 
prosecution.  Their work continued during the reporting period. 
 
Question 26C: What are the limitations on the government's 
ability to address these problems in practice?  For example, is 
funding for police or other institutions inadequate?  Is overall 
corruption a problem?  Does the government lack the resources to aid 
victims? 
 
¶28. (SBU) The hidden nature of the problem, reluctance of witnesses 
to come forward, lack of resources, porous borders, and inadequate 
training of judges and prosecutors hindered the GOK's ability to 
address the trafficking problem.  The IOM emphasized that the 
absence of a witness protection program was a serious impediment to 
convincing victims and witnesses to testify against traffickers in 
court.  The KP disputed this.  Unlike in previous years, the KP 
reported improved cooperation and information sharing within the 
counter-trafficking community.  Some interlocutors believed 
corruption was a problem, particularly at the borders.  Low salaries 
for local law enforcement officials and a still-developing 
rule-of-law system created conditions that made corruption a 
concern.  There were signs of improvement:  Transparency 
International's 2009 Global Corruption Barometer reported that that 
only 13 percent of Kosovo respondents reported paying a bribe to 
obtain a service.  In 2007, about 67 percent of Kosovo respondents 
reported paying bribes.  There was no 2008 report. 
 
¶29. (SBU) Resources were scarce for all Kosovo government services. 
KP operations also suffered from a lack of equipment.  Donations 
from the international community during the reporting period 
partially alleviated this problem.  The KP reported improved access 
to funds for undercover operations.  This enabled undercover 
officers to operate more easily without detection by traffickers 
when collecting information in bars and restaurants.  In previous 
years, undercover operatives often did not have the resources to 
order food and drinks and were often identified as police. 
 
¶30. (SBU) The KP reported myriad obstacles to fighting trafficking. 
Traffickers were growing more sophisticated and were getting better 
at making trafficking look like prostitution.  Officers complained 
that women or girls whom they suspected of being trafficking victims 
often denied that they were victims, and the police suspected that 
fear of the traffickers was to blame.  The IOM argued that social 
stigma and a lack of an effective victim rehabilitation program also 
persuaded victims to remain silent. 
 
¶31. (SBU) The KP's THBS was understaffed, with only 32 of its 38 
officer positions filled.  Eight officers worked at the Pristina 
headquarters, and KP THBS had seven female officers stationed in 
Pristina, Prizren, Peje, and south Mitrovica.  The KP attempted to 
recruit more female officers because of the advantage female 
officers had in gaining the trust and confidence of female 
trafficking victims. 
 
¶32. (SBU) In prior years, a decentralized THBS found it difficult to 
coordinate anti-trafficking police efforts and ensure the 
cooperation of regional police officers.  On January 27, the 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  008.2 OF 024 
 
 
Director General of the KP signed an order centralizing the THBS and 
promoting it from a Section to a Department.  These changes will 
enable the Trafficking in Human Beings Department to better use its 
resources and combat trafficking more effectively. 
 
¶33. (SBU) Another human resources problem was the lack of Kosovo 
Serb officers in the anti-trafficking unit.  The KP said it was 
difficult for a Kosovo Albanian officer to mount a surveillance or 
undercover operation in a suspected trafficking bar or restaurant in 
a Kosovo Serb enclave, or in a Kosovo Serb majority area of northern 
Kosovo.  The KP reported that it continued its efforts to recruit a 
Kosovo Serb officer and ran vacancy announcements in Serb 
publications, but without result. 
 
Question 26D: To what extent does the government systematically 
monitor its anti-trafficking efforts (on all fronts -- prosecution, 
victim protection, and prevention) and periodically make available, 
publicly or privately and directly or through regional/international 
organizations, its assessments of these anti-trafficking efforts? 
 
¶34. (SBU) The GOK monitored its anti-trafficking efforts and, 
through the NATC in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA), was 
willing to make information on its efforts available publicly or 
privately.  One method the NATC and his Anti-Trafficking Secretariat 
used to monitor anti-trafficking programs was through monthly 
Inter-Ministerial Working Group meetings open to some NGOs and 
international organizations to coordinate efforts and share 
concerns.  A second method was the KP's yearly TIP report, which was 
issued for the fourth consecutive year in 2010.  The report analyzed 
trends and described the trafficking situation in Kosovo. 
 
¶35. (SBU) Not all international organizations and NGOs were 
satisfied with the GOK's efforts.  In private meetings, the IOM 
stressed that the GOK suffered from a lack of effective 
self-evaluation programs.  Additionally, some international 
organizations and NGOs reported greater difficulty in obtaining 
cooperation from the government than in prior years.  GOK offices 
continued to cooperate openly with Embassy and most international 
organizations in sharing information on trafficking.  The KP 
received particular praise from every international organization and 
NGO -- without exception -- for its collaborative approach, 
responsiveness to requests, and willingness to meet. 
 
Question 26E: What measures has the government taken to establish 
the identity of local populations, including birth registration, 
citizenship, and nationality? 
 
¶36. (SBU) The GOK took effective measures to establish the identity, 
birth registration, citizenship, and nationality of residents in 
Kosovo.  All newborns were registered at hospitals and received high 
quality birth certificates with multiple security features.  At 16 
years old, all Kosovo citizens are required to have biometric 
identity cards, which record the person's personal details, as well 
as a photo and index finger prints.  The fingerprints are verified 
against a central database to ensure that no one has multiple 
identities.  The GOK also issued secure passports which also possess 
multiple security features. 
 
Question 26F: To what extent is the government capable of 
gathering the data required for an in-depth assessment of law 
enforcement efforts?  Where are the gaps?  Are there any ways to 
work around these gaps? 
 
¶37. (SBU) The GOK was capable of gathering data for an in-depth 
assessment of law enforcement efforts.  The GOK had multiple 
agencies and investigative bodies to monitor its performance and 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  009.2 OF 024 
 
 
report on failures.  They include the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency 
(KAA) (see paragraph 59), the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK), 
the Directorate for Internal Investigations (discussed in paragraphs 
60-62), the Ombudsman, and parliamentary committees.  The PIK did 
not have a permanent director, and this affected its ability to 
pursue investigations.  Additionally, the KAA and Ombudsman did not 
always receive sufficient support from the GOK.  These gaps did not 
prevent the KAA, PIK, or Ombudsman from carrying out their 
responsibilities. 
 
Question 27A: Does the country have a law or laws specifically 
prohibiting trafficking in persons -- both sexual exploitation and 
labor?  If so, please specifically cite the name of the law(s) and 
its date of enactment and provide the exact language [actual copies 
preferable] of the TIP provisions.  Please provide a full inventory 
of trafficking laws, including non-criminal statutes that allow for 
civil penalties against alleged trafficking crimes (e.g., civil 
forfeiture laws and laws against illegal debt). Does the law(s) 
cover both internal and transnational forms of trafficking?  If not, 
under what other laws can traffickers be prosecuted?  For example, 
are there laws against slavery or the exploitation of prostitution 
by means of force, fraud, or coercion?  Are these other laws being 
used in trafficking cases? 
 
¶38. (SBU) The Criminal Code of Kosovo (CCK) which came into effect 
on April 6, 2004, covers internal and external trafficking, 
including myriad activities related to trafficking.  Its provisions 
included Article 137 on slavery and forced labor, Article 138 on 
smuggling of migrants, Article 139 on trafficking in persons, 
Article 140 on withholding identity papers of trafficking victims, 
Article 201 on facilitating prostitution, Article 183 on violating 
employment rights, Article 193 on rape, Article 195 on sexual 
assault, Article 196 on degradation of sexual integrity, Article 197 
on sexual abuse of persons with mental or emotional disorders or 
disabilities, Article 198 on sexual abuse of persons under the age 
of 16, Article 236 on misuse of economic authorizations, Article 274 
on organized crime, Article 303 on failure to report preparation of 
criminal offenses, Article 304 on failure to report criminal 
offenses or perpetrators of criminal offenses, Article 305 on 
providing assistance to perpetrators after the commission of 
criminal offenses, and Article 310 on intimidation during criminal 
proceedings for organized crime. 
 
¶39. (SBU) The CCK is sophisticated legislation for the region and 
fully addresses trafficking and trafficking-related crimes.  Some 
believed it was under-implemented.  Unlike in previous years, the KP 
reported that prosecutors were much more aware of the legislation 
and used it more effectively. 
 
¶40. (SBU) There have been some unintended consequences of CCK 
Articles that were meant to curb trafficking and protect victims. 
For example, under UNMIK Regulation 2001/4, trafficking victims are 
not required to testify against their exploiters in order to receive 
assistance and are entitled to repatriation without delay. 
Consequently, some victims leave Kosovo before their traffickers go 
to trial.  The KP noted that without such testimony, trials were 
unlikely to result in conviction.  The Law on Foreigners and the Law 
on Granting Permits for Work and Employment of Foreign Citizens 
require documentation from would-be workers in Kosovo.  It helped 
Border Police officers identify and curb trafficking at border entry 
points, but the KP, international organizations, and NGOs reported 
that it led traffickers to provide employment contracts for victims 
to work as waitresses or dancers.  Finally, Article 139 provides for 
the prosecution of persons who knowingly use or procure the sexual 
services of a victim of trafficking.  This article punishes clients 
of trafficking victims, but its deterrent effect was limited due to 
 
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the difficulty in proving that a client knew he or she was procuring 
the services of a trafficking victim.  The IOM noted that this was a 
significant failing in the law. 
 
41.(SBU) No new anti-trafficking laws were passed during the 
reporting period.  Kosovo law permitted civil claims for criminal 
offences and allowed compensation for material, emotional, or moral 
damage.  There were no non-criminal statutes specifically designed 
to enable civil penalties against alleged trafficking crimes. 
Question 27B: Punishment of Sex Trafficking Offenses: What are the 
prescribed and imposed penalties for the trafficking of persons for 
commercial sexual exploitation, including for the forced 
prostitution of adults and the prostitution of children? 
 
¶42. (SBU) CCK Article 139 on trafficking in persons provides for two 
to 12 years imprisonment for engaging in trafficking in persons 
(three to 15 years if the victim is a minor), seven to 20 years plus 
a fine of up to 500,000 Euros ($692,352 USD) for organizing a group 
to commit the offense, six months to five years for negligently 
facilitating trafficking in persons, three months to five years for 
procuring sexual services of a known trafficking victim (two to 10 
years if the victim is under the age of 18), and three months to 
five years for persons who knowingly use or procure the sexual 
services of a victim of trafficking.  If a person knowingly uses or 
procures the sexual services of a victim of trafficking under the 
age of 18, Article 139 mandates punishment of two to ten years 
imprisonment. 
 
¶43. (SBU) Public officials convicted of trafficking offenses are 
subject to greater sentences.  Under Article 139, when an official, 
in the exercise of his or her duties, engages in trafficking in 
persons, they will receive five to 15 years imprisonment.  If 
responsible for organizing a group to commit the offense, the 
official will receive at least a ten year sentence, and, if 
convicted for negligently facilitating trafficking in persons or 
procuring sexual services of a trafficking victim, the official will 
receive two to seven years imprisonment.  If the VOT is a minor, 
Article 139 requires the official receive five to 12 years. 
 
¶44. (SBU) CCK Article 140 provides for punishment of one to five 
years imprisonment for withholding identification documents of 
victims of trafficking.  If the perpetrator is an official in the 
exercise of his or her duties, the punishment is three to seven 
years imprisonment. 
 
Question 27C: Punishment of Labor Trafficking Offenses:  What are 
the prescribed and imposed penalties for labor trafficking offenses, 
including all forms of forced labor?  If your country is a source 
country for labor migrants, do the government's laws provide for 
criminal punishment -- i.e. jail time -- for labor recruiters who 
engage in recruitment of workers using knowingly fraudulent or 
deceptive offers with the purpose of subjecting workers to compelled 
service in the destination country?  If your country is a 
destination for labor migrants (legal/regular or illegal/irregular), 
are there laws punishing employers or labor agents who confiscate 
workers' passports or travel documents for the purpose of labor 
trafficking, switch contracts without the worker's consent as a 
means to keep the worker in a state of compelled service, or 
withhold payment of salaries as means of keeping the worker in a 
state of compelled service? 
¶45. (SBU) CCK Article 137 on establishing slavery, slavery-like 
conditions and forced labor provides for imprisonment of two to 10 
years for general cases, three to 10 years if the perpetrator has a 
domestic relationship with the victim, three to 15 years if the 
victim is a child, and five to 12 years if the perpetrator is an 
official (five to 20 years if the victim is a child). 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  011.2 OF 024 
 
 
 
¶46. (SBU) Trafficking in persons for other than sexual exploitation 
was rare in Kosovo, and statistics on imposed punishments for forced 
labor and involuntary servitude did not exist.  There were no 
records of such cases ever being tried in Kosovo. 
 
Question 27D: What are the prescribed penalties for rape or forcible 
sexual assault? (NOTE:  This is necessary to evaluate a foreign 
government's compliance with TVPA Minimum Standard 2, which reads: 
"For the knowing commission of any act of sex trafficking... the 
government of the country should prescribe punishment commensurate 
with that for grave crimes, such as forcible sexual assault (rape)." 
 END NOTE) 
 
¶47. (SBU) CCK Article 193 covers rape and forcible sexual assault. 
It provides for prison sentences of two to 10 years imprisonment for 
rape (five to 20 years if the victim is under 16); three to 10 years 
if the victim is unprotected or his or her security is in danger; 
five to 15 years if the victim is tortured or injured or if a 
dangerous weapon is used, if the perpetrator has caused the victim 
to become intoxicated, if the offense is committed by more than one 
person, or if the perpetrator knows the victim is vulnerable because 
of age, a handicap, illness or pregnancy, or if the perpetrator has 
a domestic relationship with a victim between the ages of 16 and 18; 
and five to 20 years if the perpetrator has a domestic relationship 
with a victim under the age of 16.  If the victim dies, the minimum 
sentence is 10 years in prison. 
 
Question 27E: Law Enforcement Statistics: Did the government take 
legal action against human trafficking offenders during the 
reporting period?  If so, provide numbers of investigations, 
prosecutions, convictions, and sentences imposed, including details 
on plea bargains and fines, if relevant and available.  Please note 
the number of convicted trafficking offenders who received suspended 
sentences and the number who received only a fine as punishment. 
Please indicate which laws were used to investigate, prosecute, 
convict, and sentence traffickers.  Also, if possible, please 
disaggregate numbers of cases by type of TIP (labor vs. commercial 
sexual exploitation) and victims (children under 18 years of age vs. 
adults).  What were the actual punishments imposed on convicted 
trafficking offenders? Are they serving the time sentenced?  If not, 
why not? 
 
¶48. (SBU) In 2009, the KP arrested 31 men and three women on 
trafficking charges.  From January 1, 2009 through December 31, 
2009, the Kosovo judiciary worked on 31 trafficking in 
persons-related cases as defined by Article 139 of the CCK. 
Twenty-four were unresolved cases from previous years.  During 2009, 
nine cases were completed involving 25 individuals. Twenty-two 
received prison sentences: four received sentences over five years, 
six over two years, five over one year, four received sentences 
between six to 12 months, three received two to six months, and 
three individuals were acquitted.  None received fines or suspended 
sentences.  Two traffickers were serving their sentences (both 
received over five year sentences).  The remainder were at liberty, 
pending appeal.  In 2008, only 15 traffickers were convicted in the 
24 cases heard. 
 
¶49. (SBU) Limiting factors on effective prosecution included complex 
and inefficient judicial system composed of both international and 
local judges and prosecutors, and a weak witness protection system 
that inhibited more extensive undercover operations.  The IOM 
emphasized that the absence of an effective witness protection 
system was a serious impediment to convincing victims and witnesses 
to testify against traffickers in court.  The KP argued otherwise, 
stating that no VOT or witnesses refused to testify in 2009 based on 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  012.2 OF 024 
 
 
the lack of effective protection program.  Victims returning to 
their homes without testifying against their traffickers or refusing 
to testify for other reasons also weakened prosecutions. 
 
¶50. (SBU) There was little evidence to suggest that Kosovo was a 
destination for forced laborers, other than TDH's reports on child 
VOT.  The KP reported that no forced labor cases came to its 
attention in 2009. 
 
Question 27F: Does the government provide any specialized training 
for law enforcement and immigration officials on identifying and 
treating victims of trafficking?  Or training on investigating and 
prosecuting human trafficking crimes?  Specify whether NGOs, 
international organizations, and/or the USG provide specialized 
training for host government officials. 
 
¶51. (SBU) The GOK provided training on recognizing and investigating 
trafficking in persons to law enforcement and border police 
officials.  KP Training Department officers provided specialized and 
Balkans-specific training to KP and Border Police recruits at the 
Kosovo Center for Public Safety, Education, and Development 
(KCPSED).  During the reporting period, KP Training Department 
officers at the KCPSED provided anti-TIP training to 62 police 
recruits and officers.  The KP THBS section, in cooperation with 
NGOs and other government institutions, conducted three training 
sessions at the KCPSED. 
¶52. (SBU) A number of international and national training 
organizations also provided comprehensive training programs on 
trafficking in persons to the KP and social workers.  The United 
States Government embedded a Resident Legal Advisor in the Kosovo 
Special Prosecutors Office (KSPO) in 2007.  Among her duties were 
training, monitoring, mentoring, and advising a prosecutor dedicated 
to TIP cases.  Nevertheless, many involved in counter-trafficking 
work say that judges and prosecutors would benefit from more 
training. 
 
Question 27G: Does the government cooperate with other governments 
in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases?  If 
possible, provide the number of cooperative international 
investigations on trafficking during the reporting period. 
 
¶53. (SBU) The NATC reported good cooperation with some of his 
counterparts in neighboring countries.  Kosovo continued to pursue 
international agreements combating TIP and participated in regional 
fora when diplomatic conditions allowed.  In 2009, the MOIA signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Macedonia to coordinate 
QQB/ an ICMPD 
National Anti-Trafficking Coordinator conference in October, along 
with ten regional countries.  The conference focused on exchanging 
best practices. 
 
¶54. (SBU) The GOK was still developing regional law enforcement 
relationships since declaring independence in February 2008.  Kosovo 
was not able to join Interpol, Europol, or the Southeast European 
Cooperative Initiative (SECI) due to some countries' resistance to 
recognizing Kosovo's independence.  (Note:  The GOK sent 
representatives under UNMIK's authority to the regional SECI 
conference in 2009.  End Note.)  Kosovo cooperated with Interpol and 
Europol during the reporting period and these competencies remained 
under UNMIK's authority.  The Ministry of Justice reported that in 
2009, Kosovo processed thousands of requests for international legal 
assistance from neighboring countries, approximately 50 of which 
dealt with trafficking.  The KP reported that it exchanged 
information with regional countries on specific police cases in 
¶2009.  Additional regular working level meetings were held between 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  013.4 OF 024 
 
 
the KP and their counterparts in the Albanian, Macedonian, and 
Montenegrin police departments. 
 
¶55.  (SBU) The KP reported five cooperative international 
investigations of trafficking cases during the reporting period: two 
with Serbia, one with Albania, one with Germany, and one with 
Macedonia.  KP officers reported good cooperation with their 
Albanian counterparts with their Albanian, Croatian, Macedonian, and 
Montenegrin counterparts. 
 
Question 27H: Does the government extradite persons who are charged 
with trafficking in other countries?  If so, please provide the 
number of traffickers extradited during the reporting period, and 
the number of trafficking extraditions pending.  In particular, 
please report on any pending or concluded extraditions of 
trafficking offenders to the United States. 
 
¶56. (SBU) Prior to independence Kosovo was unable to enter into 
formal extradition treaties because it lacked status as a sovereign 
state.  Instead, the UN Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), which was responsible for administering Kosovo, possessed 
the authority to enter into international agreements to transfer 
Kosovo citizens to other countries on a case-by-case basis, and 
extradite foreign nationals under UN Security Council Resolution 
¶1244.  During the reporting period, Kosovo continued to review its 
treaty obligations and had not yet negotiated any new extradition 
treaties.  In October, the GOK assumed extradition competencies from 
UNMIK.  No persons were extradited for trafficking during the 
reporting period, nor were there any extraditions pending.  No 
traffickers were extradited from Kosovo to the United States during 
the reporting period. 
 
Question 27I: Is there evidence of government involvement in or 
tolerance of trafficking, on a local or institutional level?  If so, 
please explain in detail. 
 
¶57. (SBU) There was evidence that individual government officials 
could be involved in trafficking.  For example, the KP reported that 
foreign trafficking victims often arrived in Kosovo with valid 
documents and employment contracts registered by local attorneys and 
stamped by municipal authorities.  They believed the attorneys and 
local authorities could be aware that the girls were being 
trafficked into Kosovo to work as prostitutes, despite the fact that 
the traffickers were asking them to draft and register employment 
contracts stating the girls will be waitresses or dancers. 
 
Question 27J: If government officials are involved in human 
trafficking, what steps has the government taken to end such 
complicity?  Please indicate the number of government officials 
investigated and prosecuted for involvement in trafficking or 
trafficking-related criminal activities during the reporting period. 
 Have any been convicted?  What sentence(s) was imposed?  Please 
specify if officials received suspended sentences, or were given a 
fine, fired, or reassigned to another position within the government 
as punishment.  Please indicate the number of convicted officials 
that received suspended sentences or received only a fine as 
punishment. 
 
¶58. (SBU) The GOK was aware that individual government officials 
could be involved in trafficking and took steps to address this 
concern.  For example, on March 3, GOK authorities suspended five 
police officers, with pay, on suspicion of abuse of authority, human 
smuggling, and facilitating prostitution.  Two of the officers 
worked at the Pristina airport in coordination with the border 
police.  The others worked at the Office for Immigration and 
Foreigners; all were in regular contact with known smugglers through 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  014.2 OF 024 
 
 
text messages.  At year's end, the Special Prosecutor's Office had 
completed its investigation and was preparing final indictments but 
no arrests had been made. 
 
¶59. (SBU) The GOK continued to tackle corruption.  It established 
the KAA and the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK) in July 2006, 
and the KSPO in September 2006.  The KAA began its operations in 
February 2007.  According to its head, Hasan Preteni, during the 
reporting period, it submitted 31 corruption cases to EULEX 
prosecutors, 19 cases to local prosecutors, and four cases to the KP 
for further investigation. 
 
¶60. (SBU) The PIK operated as an independent body under the Internal 
Affairs Ministry and had a mandate to promote police efficiency and 
effectiveness, hold police accountable for their actions, and 
investigate alleged legal violations.  The inspectorate forwarded 
the results of investigations revealing violations to a disciplinary 
committee for possible further action. 
 
¶61. (SBU) During 2009, the PIK investigated 1,647 cases, of which 
742 were citizen-initiated complaints and the remaining 905 were 
initiated by the police.  Of those cases, the inspectorate pursued 
further investigation into 1,062 cases and turned 585 cases over to 
the directorate for internal investigations.  Court decisions were 
pending in 155 cases.  Of the 1,062 cases investigated, 465 were 
allegations of serious police violations.  Of the serious 
violations, 22 percent were for serious cases of conduct unbecoming 
a police officer, 17 percent involved allegations of inappropriate 
use of force, nine percent involved criminal offenses, eight percent 
were for serious insubordination, and two percent concerned 
complaints of corruption.  In early June the head of the 
Inspectorate resigned, leaving the organization without a permanent 
leader.  No replacement was appointed. 
 
¶62. (SBU) Additionally, the Directorate for Internal Investigations 
investigated minor police offenses and imposed administrative 
penalties for infractions.  Between January and November, the unit 
opened 821 cases, including investigations for minor insubordination 
and damage or loss of police property.  As of November, the 
directorate completed 706 investigations, 438 of which were deemed 
to have merit.  The directorate closed five cases without 
investigation due to insufficient evidence.  Sanctions ranged from 
decreased pay (eight cases) to verbal warnings (322 cases).  One 
hundred and fifteen cases remained under investigation. 
 
¶63. (SBU) According to the KSPO, the EULEX Justice component 
receives all trafficking cases, and then assigns cases to the KSPO. 
The most complex and sensitive cases were handled under the tutelage 
of international prosecutors.  Eventually, Kosovo nationals at the 
KSPO will take full responsibility for all cases.  There were 
currently six special prosecutors on staff with plans to add four 
more.  The KSPO also had ten legal officers.  One prosecutor 
specializing in TIP cases began work in February 2007 but did not 
prosecute any TIP cases during the reporting period.  The KSPO's 
authorized strength was ten special prosecutors. 
 
Question 27K: For countries that contribute troops to international 
peacekeeping efforts, please indicate whether the government 
vigorously investigated, prosecuted, convicted and sentenced 
nationals of the country deployed abroad as part of a peacekeeping 
or other similar mission who engaged in or facilitated severe forms 
of trafficking or who exploited victims of such trafficking. 
 
¶64. (SBU) Kosovo did not contribute troops to international 
peacekeeping operations. 
 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  015.2 OF 024 
 
 
Question 27L: If the country has an identified problem of child sex 
tourists coming to the country, what are the countries of origin for 
sex tourists?  How many foreign pedophiles did the government 
prosecute or deport/extradite to their country of origin?  If your 
host country's nationals are perpetrators of child sex tourism, do 
the country's child sexual abuse laws have extraterritorial coverage 
(similar to the U.S. PROTECT Act) to allow the prosecution of 
suspected sex tourists for crimes committed abroad?  If so, how many 
of the country's nationals were prosecuted and/or convicted during 
the reporting period under the extraterritorial provision(s) for 
traveling to other countries to engage in child sex tourism? 
 
¶65. (SBU) There was no evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, that child 
sex tourism existed in Kosovo.  On December 19, the KP, acting on an 
international arrest warrant issued by Belgian authorities, arrested 
and detained a suspected pedophile.  On January 16, the Pristina 
District Court extended the detention order for another two months. 
As of January, the Ministry of Justice was preparing to extradite 
him. 
 
Question 28A: What kind of protection is the government able under 
existing law to provide for victims and witnesses? Does it provide 
these protections in practice? 
 
¶66. (SBU) Protection and assistance to trafficking victims were 
governed by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that were 
designed with the help of UNMIK, international organizations, and 
NGOs in 2006.  The GOK further updated the procedures in October 
2008 to include Transnational Referral Mechanisms (TRM) and 
establish common procedures for communicating and interacting with 
other countries.  Both foreign and local VOT were eligible for the 
same benefits, although foreign victims who wished to return to 
their countries of origin also had a right to IOM repatriation 
assistance.  Under the SOPs for VOT, when police or social workers 
suspected that someone was a trafficking victim, a KP officer must 
call a victims' advocate from the Ministry of Justice Victims' 
Assistance and Advocacy Division (VAAD), or if a minor, a 
representative from the MLSW's Centers for Social Work (CSW) must be 
present.  Only then could the KP complete a Basic Data Form for the 
victim.  In general, the KP ensured the VAAD or CSW representative 
was present when appropriate. 
 
¶67. (SBU) Victims' advocates assisted trafficking victims with legal 
advice and support from identification through reintegration. 
Victims' advocates also gave victims information on legal rights, 
administrative processes, and support services available to them. 
In the case of minors, social workers from the CSW were required to 
be present for any questioning of the victim.  The CSW 
representatives assisted minors from identification through 
reintegration. 
 
¶68. (SBU) If the KP determined that the person was a victim of 
trafficking, and the victim agreed, they placed him or her in the 
MOJ-run Interim Security Facility (ISF) for high-risk VOT until the 
KP completed their risk assessment, typically about 72 hours.  Low 
to medium risk VOT were moved from the ISF to other shelters once 
their risk assessment was completed.  In 2009, the KP reported 
placing 22 VOT at the ISF.  If the victim was a child, police were 
required to seek agreement from a representative of the CSW.  On the 
second or third day, IOM discussed repatriation options with foreign 
victims.  If the victim was from Kosovo, the IOM discussed 
reintegration options.  At that point, if the victim was not high 
risk, he or she would normally go to a local NGO shelter to await 
repatriation or social reintegration within Kosovo. 
 
¶69. (SBU) UNMIK Regulation 2001/4 protects trafficking victims from 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  016.2 OF 024 
 
 
being charged with prostitution or illegal entry, as well as from 
being deported.  It also provides for review of requests for refugee 
status and for approval of residency permits, if appropriate. 
Victims who did not wish to accept assistance are released, but they 
could be subject to re-arrest and deportation if they voluntarily 
work as prostitutes.  The KP reported there were no cases of this 
happening in 2009. 
 
Question 28B: Does the country have victim care facilities (shelters 
or drop-in centers) which were accessible to trafficking victims? 
Do foreign victims have the same access to care as domestic 
trafficking victims?  Where are child victims placed (e.g., in 
shelters, foster care, or juvenile justice detention centers)?  Does 
the country have specialized care for adults in addition to 
children?  Does the country have specialized care for male victims 
as well as female?   Does the country have specialized facilities 
dedicated to helping victims of trafficking?  Are these facilities 
operated by the government or by NGOs?  What is the funding source 
of these facilities?  Please estimate the amount the government 
spent (in U.S. dollar equivalent) on these specialized facilities 
dedicated to helping trafficking victims during the reporting 
period. 
 
¶70. (SBU) The country had nine victim-care facilities accessible to 
VOT.  Three of them sheltered the majority of VOT in Kosovo:  the 
ISF, the Center for the Protection of Victims and Prevention of 
Trafficking in Human Beings (PVPT), and Hope and Homes for Children 
(HAH).  The ISF and PVPT specialized in assisting VOT.  HAH also 
sheltered victims of domestic violence.  During 2009, the ISF 
assisted 23 VOT; PVPT assisted eight; and HAH did not assist any 
victims.  CPWC assisted 17 VOT in its two shelters, all internally 
trafficked.  All trafficking victims -- foreign or interval -- were 
accorded shelter and access to legal, medical, and psychological 
services.  Foreign victims received the same care as domestic 
trafficking victims.  Most medical and psychological services were 
provided through the shelters. 
 
¶71. (SBU) Child VOT were treated in accordance with the SOPs 
described in paragraphs 66-69 and could take refuge at HAH, which 
was designed solely for children and did not accept adults.  Foster 
care was an option for long-term care for child VOT.  The two other 
shelters, PVPT and the ISF, specialized in protecting adults.  HAH 
accepted boys until the age of 18.  There were no shelters that 
accepted men.  The victim of organ trafficking identified in 2008 
remained at Pristina University Hospital until he was repatriated. 
 
¶72. (SBU) The ISF was the only government-run facility dedicated to 
trafficking victims and was operated by the Ministry of Justice's 
(MOJ).  It provided high-security temporary shelter, medical care, 
clothing, counseling, educational assistance, recreational 
activities, and other services to victims while they considered 
whether to be repatriated or waited to testify against traffickers 
in criminal proceedings.  There were no limitations on how long 
victims could remain at the ISF or any of the shelters.  In 2009, 23 
victims (including 11 foreigners, two of whom were minors) stayed at 
the ISF.  It was supervised by Ministry of Justice Victims 
Assistance and Advocacy Division (VAAD) staff and funded by the 
Kosovo Consolidated Budget at a cost of 45,000 Euros ($63,603). 
 
¶73. (SBU) PVPT and HAH provided the same services as the 
government-run ISF, but they did not provide the same high level of 
security.  PVPT operated a rehabilitation center focusing on 
long-term treatment designed to reintegrate VOT into ordinary life. 
PVPT also ran a shelter with five beds.  PVPT's rehabilitation 
center and shelter served only VOT.  Hope and Homes operates one 
shelter, and, like many shelters in Kosovo, accepted both VOT and 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  017.4 OF 024 
 
 
domestic violence victims. 
 
¶74. (SBU) HAH and PVPT were run by independent NGOs which received 
significant government funding.  In 2009, the GOK provided HAH 100 
percent of its funding from January to July 2009 -- permitting the 
shelter to remain open -- and 60 percent of its funding from July to 
December, for a total of 80,861 Euros ($114,288 USD).  PVPT received 
22,066 Euros ($31,188 USD), or 20 percent of its budget from the GOK 
in 2009. 
 
¶75. (SBU) Shelters were insufficiently regulated, and the GOK does 
not yet have minimum standards or regulatory requirements for 
shelters.  In spite of this, most shelters appeared to be 
competently managed.  The GOK was aware of the need for adequate 
licensing requirements and, together with the IOM and other NGOs, 
was in the process of establishing minimum standards and a licensing 
regime for shelters throughout Kosovo. 
 
Question 28C: Does the government provide trafficking victims with 
access to legal, medical and psychological services?  If so, please 
specify the kind of assistance provided.  Does the government 
provide funding or other forms of support to foreign or domestic 
NGOs and/or international organizations for providing these services 
to trafficking victims?  Please explain and provide any funding 
amounts in U.S. dollar equivalent.  If assistance provided was 
in-kind, please specify exact assistance.  Please specify if funding 
for assistance comes from a federal budget or from regional or local 
governments. 
 
¶76. (SBU) Through the ISF, PVPT, HAH and other shelters, the GOK 
provided VOT with access to legal, medical, and psychological 
services.  Most shelters provided refuge, medical care, counseling, 
educational assistance, recreational activities, and other services 
to victims.  KP officers performed risk assessments of all 
trafficking victims.  They referred the high-risk victims to the 
ISF, a high security shelter that offers 24-hour protection.  They 
referred the low- and medium-risk victims to PVPT, HAH, or other low 
risk shelters, which allowed more freedom of movement and were 
generally more conducive to longer stays and reintegration. 
 
¶77. (SBU) The GOK provided funding for all three VOT shelters.  In 
2009, the GOK provided HAH 100 percent of their funding from January 
to July 2009 - permitting HAH to remain open - and 60 percent of 
their funding from July to December, for a total of 80,861 Euros 
($114,288 USD).  PVPT received 22,066 Euros ($31,188 USD), or 20 
percent of its budg 
shelter, received 100 percent of its funding from the GOK at a cost 
of 45,000 Euros ($63,603). 
 
Question 28D: Does the government assist foreign trafficking 
victims, for example, by providing temporary to permanent residency 
status, or other relief from deportation?  If so, please explain. 
 
¶78. (SBU) The GOK assisted foreign VOT with the same care that 
domestic victims received.  UNMIK Regulation 2001/4 protects 
trafficking victims from being charged with prostitution or illegal 
entry, as well as from being deported.  It also provides for review 
of requests for refugee status and for approval of residency 
permits, if appropriate.  Victims who did not wish to accept 
assistance were released, but they could be subject to re-arrest and 
deportation if they worked as prostitutes. 
 
Question 28E: Does the government provide longer-term shelter or 
housing benefits to victims or other resources to aid the victims in 
rebuilding their lives? 
 
 
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¶79. (SBU) The GOK provided rehabilitation services in cooperation 
with international organizations and NGOs, but these were limited 
and offered through the shelters and PVPT's Rehabilitation Center. 
There was no time limit to how long VOT could remain at the 
shelters, and all shelters provided access to legal, medical and 
psychological services, educational assistance, recreational 
activities, and other services.  Only the PVPT provided long-term 
reintegration care through its Rehabilitation Center. 
 
¶80. (SBU) Minors could be sent to the ISF, PVPT, HAH, or other 
shelters depending on their risk level.  Local CSW representatives 
handled the minors' cases, and reported directly to MLSW.  A foster 
care option existed, but UNICEF was concerned that insufficient 
opportunities existed for girls who did not want to return to their 
families.  They reported some victims returned to dysfunctional 
families that contributed to their initial trafficking, thus 
increasing their potential for re-victimization. 
 
Question 28F: Does the government have a referral process to 
transfer victims detained, arrested, or placed in protective custody 
by law enforcement authorities to institutions that provide short- 
or long-term care (either government or NGO-run)? 
 
¶81. (SBU) Law enforcement officers in Kosovo received training on 
identifying possible victims of trafficking.  As soon as they 
encountered a possible victim of trafficking, they followed Kosovo's 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), which were designed with the 
help of UNMIK, international organizations, and NGOs in 2006.  The 
GOK further updated the procedures in October 2008.  See paragraphs 
66-69 for more details. 
 
Question 28G: What is the total number of trafficking victims 
identified during the reporting period?  (If available, please 
specify the type of exploitation of these victims - e.g. "The 
government identified X number of trafficking victims during the 
reporting period, Y or which were victims of trafficking for sexual 
exploitation and Z of which were victims of nonconsensual labor 
exploitation.)  Of these, how many victims were referred to care 
facilities for assistance by law enforcement authorities during the 
reporting period?  By social services officials?  What is the number 
of victims assisted by government-funded assistance programs and 
those not funded by the government during the reporting period? 
 
¶82. (SBU) As discussed earlier, there was no single database to 
track all VOT or determine how many took refuge in shelters.  From 
February 14, 2009 through January 31, 2010, the KP assisted 29 
victims, and the IOM assisted 41. In 2009, the CSW assisted 12 
victims of trafficking.  Of these victims, two were exploited for 
theft; the remainder were sexually exploited.  TDH identified an 
additional 304 child VOT, all exploited for begging.  (See 
paragraphs six to 13 for a more detailed discussion of the numbers.) 
 During the reporting period, the ISF (a GOK funded shelter) 
sheltered 23 VOT, and PVPT (partially funded by the GOK) provided 
shelter for eight VOT.  HAH, a GOK funded shelter solely for 
children, did not shelter any VOT during the reporting period.  CPWC 
assisted 17 VOT in its two shelters, all internally trafficked.  The 
KP referred 22 VOT to the ISF.  It was not clear how many of the 
remainder were referred by the IOM or other organizations. 
 
Question 28H: Do the government's law enforcement, immigration, and 
social services personnel have a formal system of proactively 
identifying victims of trafficking among high-risk persons with whom 
they come in contact (e.g., foreign persons arrested for 
prostitution or immigration violations)?  For countries with 
legalized prostitution, does the government have a mechanism for 
screening for trafficking victims among persons involved in the 
 
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legal/regulated commercial sex trade? 
 
¶83. (SBU) Law enforcement officers, immigration, and social services 
personnel in Kosovo received training on identifying possible 
victims of trafficking.  When they encountered a possible victim of 
trafficking, they followed Kosovo's Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs), which were designed with the help of UNMIK, international 
organizations, and NGOs in 2006.  The GOK further updated the 
procedures in October 2008. (See paragraphs 66-69 for more details.) 
 
 
¶84. (SBU) Kosovo did not have legalized prostitution. 
 
Question 28I: Are the rights of victims respected?  Are trafficking 
victims detained or jailed?  If so, for how long?  Are victims 
fined?  Are victims prosecuted for violations of other laws, such as 
those governing immigration or prostitution? 
 
¶85. (SBU) According to the IOM and others involved in 
counter-trafficking work in Kosovo, victims' rights were generally 
respected.  Some international organizations disagreed, citing poor 
conditions at the ISF, the government-run VOT shelter.  TDH noted 
that children, once identified as VOT, were correctly treated, but 
stated that children were often not identified as VOT.  Problems 
have been reported in the past where VOT were jailed or deported, 
but allegations of such treatment did not resurface during the 
reporting period.  Deportations of foreign VOT could occur when 
victims arrested for prostitution vehemently deny being victims. 
The KP reported that in such cases they have little choice but to 
deport the individuals in the absence of evidence of trafficking. 
There were no reports that VOT were fined or prosecuted for 
violations of other laws. 
 
¶86. (SBU) Other problems in previous years included victims who 
wished to remain anonymous coming into contact with their 
traffickers in courts due to lax security procedures.  There were no 
examples of this occurring in 2009.  Private interview rooms for 
victims existed at police stations in Ferizaj, Gjilan, Peje, 
Pristina, and Prizren, where victims could make their statement in a 
more secure environment. 
 
Question 28J: Does the government encourage victims to assist in the 
investigation and prosecution of trafficking?  How many victims 
assisted in the investigation and prosecution of traffickers during 
the reporting period? May victims file civil suits or seek legal 
action against traffickers?  Does anyone impede victim access to 
such legal redress?  If a victim is a material witness in a court 
case against a former employer, is the victim permitted to obtain 
other employment or to leave the country pending trial proceedings? 
Are there means by which a victim may obtain restitution? 
 
¶87. (SBU) Victims were encouraged to assist in the investigation and 
prosecution of traffickers, but Kosovo authorities did not pressure 
victims to do so.  Victims' advocates assisted victims  from 
identification through reintegration and explained their rights 
during each step of the process.  There were no reports of victims 
assisting in the investigation or prosecution of their traffickers 
during the reporting period. 
 
¶88. (SBU) In addition to testifying against their traffickers, 
victims could file civil suits or seek legal action against their 
traffickers.  Victims, as injured parties, could seek damages in 
criminal trials and could pursue their claims in civil litigation. 
Under Kosovo law, if the court orders confiscation of material 
benefit in a criminal case, injured parties could be entitled to 
seek compensation from the confiscated property.  According to the 
 
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IOM, no one impeded victims' rights to such legal redress during the 
reporting period.  Victims who were material witnesses in court 
cases against former employers were permitted to obtain other 
employment and could leave Kosovo if desired. 
 
¶89. (SBU) The VAAD reported that a VOT restitution program exists, 
but has never been used.  The Asset Seizure Law, which will allow 
the GOK to seize the assets of traffickers for the benefit of VOT, 
was still in the drafting phase and had not yet been submitted to 
the Assembly, Kosovo's legislative body. 
 
Question 28K: Does the government provide any specialized training 
for government officials in identifying trafficking victims and in 
the provision of assistance to trafficked victims, including the 
special needs of trafficked children?  Does the government provide 
training on protections and assistance to its embassies and 
consulates in foreign countries that were destination or transit 
countries?   What was the number of trafficking victims assisted by 
the host country's embassies or consulates abroad during the 
reporting period?  Please explain the type of assistance provided 
(travel documents, referrals to assistance, payment for 
transportation home). 
 
¶90. (SBU) The GOK trained government officials and anti-trafficking 
partners on recognizing trafficking and providing assistance to 
victims, including minors, mostly in cooperation with its 
anti-trafficking partners in the NGO and international organization 
communities.  During the reporting period, the KP Training 
Department officers provided anti-TIP training to recruits at the 
Kosovo Center for Public Safety, Education, and Development. 
Additionally, KP Training Department officers provided basic and 
advanced TIP training to 62 police recruits and officers.  Further 
TIP training was provided by international organizations and NGOs 
like the IOM, TDH, and Save the Children, as well as by neighboring 
and other countries. 
 
¶91. (SBU) Kosovo declared independence in February 2008, and was 
still in the process of establishing embassies and consulates.  None 
of Kosovo's embassies or consulates provided protection or 
assistance to victims of trafficking during the reporting period. 
 
Question 28L: Does the government provide assistance, such as 
medical aid, shelter, or financial help, to its nationals who are 
repatriated as victims of trafficking? 
 
¶92. (SBU) The VAAD reported that the GOK provided assistance to 
repatriated Kosovo citizens who were trafficking victims.  If they 
were placed in a shelter, they received the same services available 
to victims identified in Kosovo.  IOM reported that there was, 
however, limited support for internally trafficked victims once they 
left the shelter.  After departure, victims relied on support from 
Centers for Social Work, or in some cases, PVPT's Rehabilitation 
Center.  In the case of minors, social workers were involved with 
family mediation and school re-insertion and could point victims in 
the direction of other assistance. 
 
Question 28M: Which international organizations or NGOs, if any, 
work with trafficking victims?  What type of services do they 
provide?  What sort of cooperation do they receive from local 
authorities? 
 
¶93. (SBU) While many international organizations and NGOs worked on 
the trafficking issue, IOM and TDH were the only ones working 
directly with victims.  Hope and Homes for Children and PVPT were 
originally international NGOs, but have since spun off and become 
local NGOs. 
 
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¶94. (SBU) For foreign victims, IOM provided case screening and 
management, medical assistance through its partners, in-depth needs 
assessments, travel arrangements, travel documents for victims whose 
passports have been confiscated by traffickers, travel supplies, 
organization of safe transportation to departure points (in 
cooperation with KP and based on medical and security concerns), 
coordination with receiving IOM mission, and, when necessary, 
offered escorts for minors and medical cases. 
 
¶95. (SBU) For local victims, the IOM provided, in cooperation with 
local NGOs, short and medium-term sheltering in preparation for 
family reunification or independent living, family mediation (in 
cooperation with social workers when victims were minors), 
psychological counseling and psychiatric assistance, material 
support for victims and/or families, access to education, 
education-related expenses, vocational training, job placement, 
awareness-raising, monitoring, and follow-up. 
 
¶96. (SBU) TDH's seven, three person teams sought to identify child 
VOT, but did not offer any additional assistance.  TDH, IOM, HAH, 
and PVPT all reported good cooperation with the government. 
 
Question 29A: Did the government conduct anti-trafficking 
information or education campaigns during the reporting period?  If 
so, briefly describe the campaign(s), including their objectives and 
effectiveness.  Please provide the number of people reached by such 
awareness efforts, if available.  Do these campaigns target 
potential trafficking victims and/or the demand for trafficking 
(e.g. "clients" of prostitutes or beneficiaries of forced labor)? 
(Note: This can be an especially noteworthy effort where 
prostitution is legal.  End Note.) 
¶97. (SBU) Most anti-trafficking campaigns information and education 
campaigns were run by international organizations and NGOs with the 
GOK's support and under the auspices of the KAP.  The MEST, with the 
aid of the OSCE, conducted two group anti-TIP training sessions for 
117 teachers and professors from Ferizaj, Gjakove, Gjilan, and 
Prizren.  The training covered TIP issues and the role of the school 
in preventing TIP.  The MOIA held multiple TIP discussion sessions 
with students at high schools and the University of Pristina.  The 
Ministry of Culture conducted two TIP training sessions for youth 
organizations and student in October.  Additionally, during 2009, 
the Ministry broadcast 20 radio sessions designed to inform 
listeners about Human Trafficking issues. 
¶98. (SBU) International organizations and NGOs supported the GOK's 
efforts throughout the year with their own educational campaigns. 
The best example was the OSCE-sponsored "Rock to Break the Silence - 
Report Trafficking" campaign.  An intensive 14-day campaign 
organized with the support of the GOK, it was designed to increase 
awareness of TIP and inform vulnerable populations of their options 
as well as how to protect themselves.  The campaign consisted of 
advertisements on television, radio, billboards, posters, leaflets, 
press conferences, and ended with rock concerts held in Prizren 
(with approximately 400 people attending), northern Mitrovica 
(approximately 600 attendees), and Pristina (5,000 attendees). The 
NGO Save the Children also conducted training for government 
officials at the municipal level. 
Question 29B: Does the government monitor immigration and emigration 
patterns for evidence of trafficking? 
 
¶99. (SBU) KP and Border Police Intelligence Units monitored 
immigration patterns for evidence of trafficking.  Foreigners 
staying in Kosovo more than 60 days were required to register with 
the Department for Migration and Foreigners unless they were 
employees of KFOR, international organizations, or foreign 
diplomatic missions. 
 
PRISTINA 00000077  022.2 OF 024 
 
 
 
¶100. (SBU) The KP and Border Police officers also reported that they 
routinely looked for potential victims of trafficking entering 
Kosovo's border and the Pristina Airport.  When they suspected a 
woman or girl was a victim or potential victim of trafficking, they 
separated her from those she was traveling with, questioned her, 
warned her of the risks of trafficking, and gave her information on 
what to do if she became a victim of trafficking.  The KP noted 
better cooperation with the Border Police, who were becoming more 
effective at identifying potential VOT and refusing entry to 
traffickers.  The IOM also noted the increasing effectiveness of the 
Border Police. 
 
¶101. (SBU) The Border Police monitored emigration patterns to try to 
understand possible criminal networks that were engaged in 
trafficking women and girls from Kosovo to other European countries. 
 
 
Question 29C: Is there a mechanism for coordination and 
communication between various agencies, internal, international, and 
multilateral on trafficking-related matters, such as a multi-agency 
working group or a task force? 
 
¶102. (SBU) The Inter-Ministerial Working Group coordinated and 
communicated between the various agencies of the GOK.  Meeting once 
a month, the Group was chaired by the NATC and was composed of 
members of the MLSW, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Economics and 
Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 
(ICITAP), OSCE, IOM, HAH, and PVPT.  There were also three other 
working groups to tackle prevention, protection, and prosecution. 
 
Question 29D: Does the government have a national plan of action to 
address trafficking in persons?  If the plan was developed during 
the reporting period, which agencies were involved in developing it? 
 Were NGOs consulted in the process?  What steps has the government 
taken to implement the action plan? 
 
¶103. (SBU) The National Strategy and Action Plan Against Trafficking 
in Human Beings (abbreviated Kosovo Action Plan, or KAP) was adopted 
in July 2008 and widely disseminated.  All relevant ministries, 
international organizations, NGOs and civil society representatives 
participated in the process.  Implementation of the KAP was ongoing 
and responsibilities were delegated to the various ministries. 
 
¶104. (SBU) The NATC held monthly meetings with the Inter-Ministerial 
Working Group to review the implementation of the KAP and discuss 
areas needing more effort. 
 
Question 29E: What measures has the government taken during the 
reporting period to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts? (see 
ref B, para. 9(3) for examples). 
 
¶105. (SBU) In 2009, the KP took vigorous action to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts.  During the year, the KP arrested 31 men 
and three women on trafficking charges, seven women and two men for 
prostitution, and two men and one woman for facilitating 
prostitution.  They also conducted 521 searches of bars/coffee 
shops/nightclubs for various reasons, 70 of which were closed as a 
result. 
 
¶106. (SBU) Additionally, on December 3, the Kosovo Police launched a 
first-ever series of nighttime, simultaneous anti-TIP raids in 
Pristina, Peje, Gjilan, Prizren, Ferizaj, and South Mitrovica. 
Thirty-five bars/coffee shops/nightclubs were raided throughout the 
country.  Twenty-five were shuttered on various grounds.  One 
 
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hundred and seven potential VOT were identified and 336 men were 
searched for weapons and other illicit material.  Six men were 
arrested, all on weapons charges. 
 
¶107. (SBU) In the evening of February 1, the KP launched a second 
major raid. Forty bars/coffee shops/nightclubs in six regions 
(Pristina, Peje, Gjilan, Prizren, Ferizaj, and South Mitrovica) were 
simultaneously raided.  Twenty-five were closed.  Eighty potential 
VOT were identified and interviewed.  Two hundred and six possible 
clients searched.  Three persons -- two Moldovan women and one 
Kosovo Albanian man -- were arrested for facilitating prostitution. 
 
 
¶108. (SBU) The GOK also conducted awareness campaigns designed to 
reduce demand, including radio advertisements in October and 
January.  The IOM noted that the GOK had provided community based 
training to teach possible victims and clients of the dangers. 
During the year, the GOK also tightened the regulatory requirements 
for opening restaurants, bars, and nightclubs. 
 
Question 29F: What measures has the government taken during the 
reporting period to reduce the participation in international child 
sex tourism by nationals of the country? 
 
¶109. (SBU) Tourism -- both incoming and outgoing -- in Kosovo was 
very limited.  There was no evidence that Kosovo nationals engage in 
sex tourism, and Kosovo passports were only valid in a limited 
number of countries. 
 
Question 30A: Does the government engage with other governments, 
civil society, and/or multilateral organizations to focus attention 
and devote resources to addressing human trafficking?  If so, please 
provide details. 
 
¶110. (SBU) The GOK engaged with other governments and multilateral 
organizations to help focus attention and resources on human 
trafficking.  The Ministry of Justice reported that in 2009, Kosovo 
processed thousands of requests for international legal assistance 
from neighboring countries, approximately 50 of which dealt with 
trafficking.  The KP reported information exchange on specific 
police cases occurred in 2009 between the police departments of 
Kosovo and regional countries.  Additional regular working level 
meetings were held between the KP and their counterparts in the 
Albanian, Macedonian, and Montenegrin police departments. 
 
¶111. (SBU) The KP reported five cooperative international 
investigations of trafficking cases during the reporting period: two 
with Serbia, one with Albania, one with Germany, and one with 
Macedonia.  KP officers reported good cooperation with their 
Albanian counterparts with their Albanian, Croatian, Macedonian, and 
Montenegrin counterparts.  The KP also reported good information 
exchange with the Serbian police.  Kosovo cooperated with Interpol 
and Europol during the reporting period although these competencies 
remained under UNMIK's authority.  The GOK also received assistance 
from multilateral organizations and NGOs, such as the OSCE, IOM, and 
ICMPD. 
 
¶112. (SBU) Not all international organizations and NGO's were 
satisfied with the GOK's efforts.  In private meetings, the IOM 
stressed that the GOK suffered from a real lack of effective 
self-evaluation programs.  Some NGOs expressed concern that the GOK 
was not identifying VOT as aggressively as it could.  Additionally, 
some international organizations and NGOs reported greater 
difficulty in obtaining cooperation from the government than in 
prior years.  One notable exception was the KP, which received 
universal praise for its openness and responsiveness.  The GOK did 
 
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not effectively engage with civil society, which continues to have 
little to no interest in TIP issues. 
 
Question 30B: B.  What sort of international assistance does the 
government provide to other countries to address TIP? 
 
¶113. (SBU) The GOK responds to information requests from other 
countries, and reported effective working level relationships with 
its neighbors.  The KP participated in five international 
cooperative investigations.  Please see paragraph 111 for more 
details. 
 
Question 34: HEROES:  The introductions to the past five TIP 
Reported have included sections honoring Anti-Trafficking "Heroes" 
These individuals or representatives of organizations demonstrate an 
exceptional commitment to fighting TIP above and beyond the scope of 
their assigned work.  The Department encourages post to nominate one 
or more such individuals for inclusion in a similar section of the 
2010 Report.  Please submit, under a subheading of "TIP Hero(es)," a 
brief description of the individual or organization's work, and note 
that the appropriate individual(s) has been vetted through databases 
available to post (e.g. CLASS and any law enforcement systems) to 
ensure they have no visa ineligibilities or other derogatory 
information. 
 
¶114. (SBU) Embassy Pristina nominates the new head of the 
Trafficking in Human Beings Section of the Kosovo Police, Captain 
Arben Pacarizi, who took command of the section on October 12, 2009. 
 During his tenure, Pacarizi oversaw the first two major anti-TIP 
raids, the combined results of which closed 50 suspected bars/coffee 
shops/nightclubs, identified 187 potential VOT, and searched 542 
possible clients.  His aggressive actions sent a powerful message 
that the GOK will not tolerate trafficking, and will help reduce 
demand for sexual exploitation.  Additionally, Captain Pacarizi 
maintained and improved the reputation of the KP's THBS among 
international organizations and NGO's which universally praise the 
KP's collaborative approach, responsiveness to requests, and 
willingness to meet.  In 2009, Captain Pacarizi demonstrated 
tremendous dedication and achieved notable results. 
 
¶115. (SBU) Arben Pacarizi has not received Leahy Vetting to ensure 
he has no visa ineligibilities or other derogatory information. 
 
¶116. (SBU) Embassy POC is Liam O'Flanagan.  Telephone: 
00(381)-38-5959-3110.  Email: O'FlanaganLJ@state.gov. 
 
¶117. (SBU) Hours spent per officer on TIP report: 
     Pol/Econ Section Head: 2 hours 
     Political Officer: 90 hours 
     FSN: 10 hours.