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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000216 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2030 
TAGS: PREL EAID SENV MOPS SG GB RW FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE/GABON (SENEGAL)/RWANDA:  PREVIEW OF 
PRESIDENT SARKOZY'S FEBRUARY 24-25 VISITS 
 
PARIS 00000216  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Wallace R. Bain, Political Officer, 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  French President Nicolas Sarkozy visits 
Gabon (February 24) and Rwanda (February 25), spending about 
24 hours in the former and about three in the latter.  His 
Africa advisors told us on February 23 that in Gabon, he will 
sign a renegotiated defense agreement that will include a 
continuing military basing arrangement in Gabon.  France and 
Senegal have agreed to end the basing agreement in Senegal, 
with the French retaining a residual presence in Senegal. 
The decision -- which our contact described as "as good an 
outcome as we could have asked for" with respect to Senegal 
-- about the bases will allow the rapid conclusion of a new 
defense agreement with Senegal.  France views relations with 
Gabon entering a new phase, with the passing of Omar Bongo, 
the elections of Ali Bongo, the need for Gabon to restructure 
its economy because of its dwindling oil resources, and 
France's interest in developing more efficient commercial and 
banking arrangements, in part to respond to China's way of 
doing business in Africa.  Following shortly after the 
renewal of France-Rwanda diplomatic relations in November, 
Sarkozy will make a three hour visit to Kigali on February 
25, in a visit best described as a confidence-building 
exercise.  Sarkozy will likely acknowledge that France, as 
part of the international community, bears some 
responsibility for the 1994 genocide, but cannot be singled 
out for blame.  He will press the idea that France and Rwanda 
must remember the past, but now look to the future.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Overview 
-------- 
¶2.  (U) According to an official Presidential announcement, 
Sarkozy will arrive in Mvengue-Franceville, Gabon, at 0800 on 
February 24, where he will be greeted by President Bongo. 
They will pay their respects to the late President Bongo at 
his mausoleum,  hold discussions, and then visit the Centre 
International de Recherches  Medicales de Franceville.  The 
parties will then proceed to Libreville, where they will 
visit the Rougier plywood factory.  Sarkozy will then deliver 
a speech at the Cite de la Democratie, followed by a 
reception for the French community in Gabon, followed by a 
dinner hosted by Bongo.  Sarkozy will leave the next morning 
(February 25), arriving in Kigali at 1315, where President 
Kagame will greet him.  They will hold discussions, after 
which there will be a press conference, a lunch hosted by 
Kagame, a visit to a memorial to genocide victims, and 
finally Sarkozy's departure at 1620 on February 25. 
 
Gabon (and Senegal) 
------------------- 
¶3.  (C) Presidential AF Advisor Remi Marechaux on February 23 
briefed Africa Watcher and Africa Assistant on the Gabon 
portion of the visit.  He began by discussing the military 
bases issue and how, in 2008, an intra-GOF defense review 
concluded that France needed only one military base on the 
Atlantic side of Africa.  This suggestion coincided with 
Sarkozy's policies on Africa and the need for France to 
rationalize its presence there and to seek greater 
efficiencies and cost effectiveness.  There were once three 
French military bases, in Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gabon. 
The base in Cote d'Ivoire effectively closed during the 
recent political turmoil there, leaving the bases in Senegal 
and Gabon.  Marechaux said there was much back-and-forth 
within the GOF on which base to close.  France, he noted, has 
had a military presence in Senegal, of one sort or another, 
since 1659. 
 
¶4.  (C) Defense Minister Morin did not make things easier by 
suggesting not long ago that France would keep both bases. 
Marechaux said that Morin (whom Marechaux described as a bit 
gaffe-prone) was mis-interpreted in that the 2010 French 
budget included provisions for both bases as the decision to 
close one had not been made by the time the budget was made. 
In the meantime, Senegal's President Wade had made several 
statements about wanting the bases returned to Senegal, in 
part because they occupy very desirable land in Senegal that 
could be put to other lucrative uses. 
 
¶5.  (C) Marechaux said the decision almost "made itself" 
because the Senegalese told the French that if France wanted 
to maintain a base in Senegal, it could do so but would have 
 
PARIS 00000216  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
to construct a new base in a new location, with the old bases 
reverting to Senegalese control.  Marechaux said the French 
told the Senegalese that that would be a factor in French 
decision-making.  In the end, France chose Gabon.  Morin went 
to Senegal to assuage the Senegalese, telling Wade that 
"we've done what you asked for, we are returning this 
valuable land."  Marechaux expressed relief, saying that Wade 
took the same line, saying that France had given Senegal back 
her lands.  Marechaux said that the outcome was about as good 
as France could have expected.  Marechaux said that France 
would retain a couple of hundred troops in Senegal, to man 
two small bases (more like offices) near the port and airport 
in Dakar.  These would not be operational bases but rather 
communications and logistics coordination hubs that could 
facilitate French deployments in West Africa if necessary. 
The details had not yet been worked out. 
 
¶6.  (C) The decision on the bases will allow France and 
Gabon, during Sarkozy's visit, to sign a new defense 
agreement, the first revision since the immediate 
post-independence period.  Marechaux explained that the 
existing defense agreement was simply obsolete, as it 
provided, among other things, for France to provide internal 
security in Gabon during political unrest.  The resolution of 
the base issue will allow France to sign a new defense 
agreement with Senegal, "within weeks," Marechaux predicted. 
 
¶7.  (C) Aside from these pol/mil issues, Marechaux said that 
Gabon was entering a new phase, with the passing of Omar 
Bongo, the election of his son, and the prospect of dwindling 
oil reserves forcing Gabon to seek avenues for diversifying 
its economy.  Marechaux said that France wants to play a 
close, cooperative, and helpful role as Gabon transitions. 
Marechaux mentioned China as an impetus for change, both for 
Gabon and France.  He said that France, through the French 
Development Agency (AFD) would establish new mechanisms for 
project financing to make implementation more efficient. 
French projects "sometimes take years to conclude," whereas 
the Chinese projects can happen very quickly.  Marechaux said 
that France would still try to maintain a strong sense of 
transparency, "good governance," and "virtue" (as he put it) 
even if China only cared about winning project and speed. 
"We will try to show them that our method will provide 
ancillary benefits to Gabon," he said. 
 
¶8.  (C) Marechaux also explained that AFD is also going to 
pilot a new project of guaranteeing bank bonds as a way to 
generate investment funds for local enterprise.  He mentioned 
efforts to develop Gabon's mining sector, in which the French 
government, via its involvement with an AREVA subsidiary, is 
working with Gabon on manganese extraction.  France hopes 
that Gabon will exploit other mineral wealth, in an 
environmentally friendly way, as its oil supply is exhausted. 
 
¶9.  (C) Sarkozy will try to advance France's dialogue with 
Gabon on global issues, such as the Copenhagen process on the 
environment, the MICOPAX arrangement in C.A.R, and Gabon's 
role on the UN Security Council (noting in particular that 
Gabon will hold the Chair in March, which will likely be a 
critical time for decisions on Iran sanctions).  Sarkozy will 
also visit the Rougier plywood operation, which, Marechaux 
said, uses wood from a French-supported sustainable forestry 
project.  Rougier is also a model company in terms of its 
labor policies.  Marechaux said that Sarkozy wants to use 
Rougier as a model of a modern company with true "green" 
credentials that could be emulated in Gabon and elsewhere. 
 
¶10.  (C) Marechaux said that Sarkozy was willing to meet with 
Gabon's political opposition group.  He said that the 
opposition was being very sly, expressing an interest in 
meeting with Sarkozy but wanting Sarkozy to ask for the 
meeting.  He said that after much to-an-fro, the meeting had 
been arranged but that the opposition was still trying to 
make it appear that it would take place at Sarkozy's request. 
 
 
¶11.  (C) FM Kouchner, Secstate for Cooperation and 
Francophonie Joyandet, the Presidency's Africa cell, and a 
host of business leaders and members of the press will 
accompany Sarkozy to both Gabon and Rwanda.  Marechaux, 
expressing a bit of disdain, noted that businessman and 
lawyer Robert Bourgi, was in the official party.  Marechaux 
 
PARIS 00000216  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
(PROTECT) described Bourgi as a "mercenary" interested only 
in his own well-being.  But he will nonetheless be on 
Sarkozy's plane, to Marechaux's apparent displeasure. 
 
RWANDA 
------ 
¶12.  (C) Sarkozy's short visit to Rwanda is both simpler and 
more complex, as described by the Elysee's junior AF Advisor, 
Clement LeClerc.  The underlying goal is to reinforce the 
recently renewed (November 29, 2009) diplomatic relations 
between France and Rwanda, and, more importantly, turn the 
page away from the 1994 genocide and towards a new era of 
cooperation.  LeClerc stated that Sarkozy will again 
acknowledge that France, along with the entire international 
community, must recognize some responsibility for mistakes 
made before and during the genocide, but that France was 
neither the cause nor the enabler.  During his January visit 
to Kigali, FM Kouchner did not face any significant criticism 
from the local press or politicians asserting France's 
culpability, and therefore LeClerc did not expect Sarkozy 
would have to address these old accusations.  Interestingly, 
LeClerc digressed to assert that most of the French NGOs and 
other voices that continue to claim French culpability in the 
genocide are aligned politically with parties on the left, 
and therefore they are trying to keep this a pertinent issue 
to be addressed by Sarkozy's center-right government. 
Sarkozy's core message is "don't forget the past, but 
likewise, don't be paralyzed by it -- don't let the past 
become a barrier to progress on our relations." 
 
¶13.  (C) A French President has not visited Rwanda in 25 
years, but Sarkozy has pursued this trip as a foreign policy 
goal since 2007.  Sarkozy's 3-hour visit to Kigali is 
expected to be almost exclusively an engagement with 
President Kagame, including a short meeting, a joint press 
conference, and a lunch.  Finally, and most symbolically, 
Sarkozy will lay a wreath at the genocide memorial.  The trip 
will be short on "deliverables," in part because France's 
foreign assistance budget for the coming year was calculated 
before the restoration of relations took place and therefore 
did not assign additional funds for Rwanda-related projects. 
LeClerc expects that France will be able to offer 
significantly more assistance in the future.  One goal of the 
visit is to speed the resumption of cultural ties, including 
setting in motion the reestablishment of a French Cultural 
Center and a French school, and allowing Radio France 
International to recreate its Rwandan bureau. 
 
¶14.  (C) According to LeClerc, Sarkozy is unlikely to raise 
delicate national or regional political issues on order to 
focus the visit towards enhancing the bilateral relationship. 
 At the same time, France continues to search for a role in 
helping bring peace to the broader Great Lakes region, mostly 
via the efforts of Special Envoy Christian Connan, by 
creating cross-boarder economic projects with some financial 
and technical support from the French Development Agency. 
 
¶15.  (C) We asked LeClerc about press reports stating that 
France was going to try to organize a two-part Great Lakes 
donor's conference in May/June 2010.  While LeClerc said that 
that remained an objective, he acknowledged that there were 
many unresolved obstacles that had to be overcome.  The 
conference would not be a certainty until such issues as 
venue, participants, format, agenda, and other such matters 
were resolved.  LeClerc noted that Kabila, Kagame, and the 
other leaders of the broader Great Lakes community all had 
their preferences, and they all were suspicious of each other 
and were wary about ending up with the short end of the 
stick.  Leclerc repeated that organizing such a conference 
could be difficult and he could not state with certainty that 
it would come about.  (COMMENT:  Our own take, after speaking 
with LeClerc, is that the article in Le Parisen, which we 
circulated to the Department and to posts in the region, may 
have been excessively optimistic and presumptive.  However, 
the French clearly would like to see the conference take 
place, and we will continue to monitor their thinking.  END 
COMMENT.) 
PEKALA