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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000200 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2030 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCOR PINR IV MR FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA OFFICIAL ON COTE D'IVOIRE:  TIME FOR A 
POWER-SHARING DEAL 
 
REF: PARIS 109 
 
PARIS 00000200  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Following his recent visit to Cote 
d'Ivoire, Laurent Bigot, MFA DAS for West Africa, believes 
that a new approach for resolving the country's political 
crisis is needed and he is developing a policy proposal 
involving a negotiated agreement among the parties in advance 
of contested elections.  Bigot admits this scenario would be 
a major concession to Gbagbo, who would gain a recognized 
mandate as president.  It would, however, also give the 
opposition factions a significant role in a restructured 
government prior to elections.  Given that the main 
opposition parties appear powerless to stop Gbagbo from 
interminably delaying elections, they should be willing to 
consider this solution, Bigot believes.  ECOWAS mediator 
Compaore would need to play a key role in obtaining the 
Ivoirians' agreement.  Bigot also believes that the GOF needs 
to take a much less visible role in Cote d'Ivoire, both to 
facilitate a transition and to reduce the likelihood of 
anti-French violence.  Bigot was struck by how comfortably 
Cote d'Ivoire appears to have settled into two separate 
geographic entities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
RESOLVE IMPASSE WITH NEGOTIATED GOVERNMENT 
----------------------------------------- 
¶2.  (C) French MFA DAS for West Africa, Laurent Bigot, who 
visited Cote d'Ivoire in early February, shared on February 
18 his views with Africa-watcher on the need for France to 
significantly modify its approach to Cote d'Ivoire. 
Following President Gbagbo's February 12 dissolution of the 
cabinet and dismissal of the country's independent electoral 
commission, Bigot is convinced that Gbagbo will never 
implement fully the Ouagadougou Agreement and permit 
presidential elections, as long as there remains any chance 
that he could lose.  Bigot believes that Gbagbo will continue 
to create excuses for postponing the elections "for years." 
 
¶3.  (C) Therefore, Bigot believes a new, "pragmatic" approach 
is needed to overcome the present impasse and create genuine 
momentum for elections.  Central to Bigot's thinking is to 
encourage the major parties to negotiate a new, consensus 
government that would allow Gbagbo to remain as president for 
some formal mandate in advance of elections.  The other 
parties would be represented at high levels in the 
government, with, in Bigot's assessment, RDR Leader Alassane 
Ouattera as Prime Minister (or some other party 
representative since Ouattara might not want to return to the 
PM's office), current PM and FN leader Guillaume Soro could 
be President of the National Assembly, and Bedie's PDCI Party 
could have some other high position.  Other ministerial slots 
would also be negotiated. 
 
¶4.  (C) In Bigot's opinion, obtaining the parties' agreement 
may be possible.  He thinks that Gbagbo would accept a mixed 
government under his continued presidency.  Bigot reiterated 
(Reftel) that Ouattera, while remaining hugely popular in 
northern Cote d'Ivoire, likely does not actually want to be 
president since he knows his election could lead to national 
violence and likely attempts on his life.  Therefore, it 
might be possible to get the RDR on board.  Bigot mentioned 
that Ouattera had met in Paris with the Africa advisors at 
the French Presidency on February 12, but the GOF was not yet 
ready to propose the negotiated government Bigot described to 
us. 
 
¶5.  (C) A model for this type of political resolution can be 
found in Mauritania whereby, Bigot asserted, a power-sharing 
government was instituted that legitimized the electoral 
process.  Bigot believes that SRSG Choi could accept Bigot's 
scenario, but that the key player is ECOWAS Mediator 
Campaore, who, in Bigot's view, should be supportive and 
whose ability to obtain the Ivoirians' agreement would be 
essential.  Overall, according to Bigot, it is time for all 
the actors to be "realistic" about Gbagbo's position and 
pursue a new solution. 
 
FRANCE NEEDS TO GET OUT OF THE SPOTLIGHT 
---------------------------------------- 
¶6.  (C) Bigot's second major proposal for France-Cote 
d'Ivoire is that the GOF must visibly recede into the 
background.  France should stop "naming and shaming" Ivoirian 
political actors, including Gbagbo, should be very 
circumspect in its public pronouncements, and should avoid 
 
PARIS 00000200  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
any suggestion of favoritism among the factions.  (Note:  The 
MFA's public statement following Gbagbo's February 12 actions 
was markedly restrained.  End note.)  Bigot admitted that 
France is viewed, with some reason, as being anti-Gbagbo, but 
this must change.  In addition, Bigot will recommend that 
Ouattera, and others, no longer be granted secret audiences 
at the Elysee or MFA.  With Gbabgo again proving his 
entrenched position, the GOF must establish a more "low-key" 
attitude, both to help move the political discussion forward 
and also to "protect" the 14,000 French citizens in the 
country who remain at risk should new violence break out. 
Bigot suggested that as long as France plays a visible role, 
its interests are vulnerable to militants who will try to 
blame France for Cote d'Ivoire's problems. 
 
IMPRESSIONS OF "TWO COUNTRIES" 
------------------------------ 
¶7.  (SBU) During his week-long mission to Cote d'Ivoire in 
early February, Bigot met with senior officials from the 
major political parties and came away with the impression 
that they are ready for a new approach.  Bigot traveled as 
far north a Bouake and was struck by how completely and 
comfortably divided into "two countries" Cote d'Ivoire had 
become.  While admitting there are many indications of 
increasing poverty in both the north and south, the country's 
two halves appeared to be operating parallel economies. 
Those making money, including legitimate and black market 
businesses as well as "fee" collectors along the main roads, 
are very content with the status quo.  He fears that without 
a near-term political solution this division could become 
permanent. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶8.  (C) It is not at all certain that Bigot will succeed in 
significantly altering France's approach to Cote d'Ivoire. 
His boss, AF A/S Gompertz, as well as FM Kouchner, are 
probably not ready to give up the democratic ideal, but an 
increasingly "realist" Elysee could well agree.  Bigot's 
position, perhaps a product of his own frustration with the 
continuously postponed elections, would represent a major 
concession to Gbagbo, but French officials are obviously 
losing patience with the current impasse.  France is 
hamstrung as well on removing expensive Operation Licorne 
forces until an "acceptable" transition is in place, and seem 
increasingly willing to trade-off questionable democratic 
credentials for stability and security. 
 
¶9.  (U) Conakry minimize considered. 
RIVKIN