VZCZCXRO3012
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #0188/01 0491258
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181258Z FEB 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8326
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000188 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2020 
TAGS: PREL XA ZI AO SF MA SU NI CG FR
SUBJECT: AF DAS PAGE'S PARIS CONSULTATIONS (FEBRUARY 10-11) 
 
REF: A. LUANDA 69 
     ¶B. LUANDA 71 
     ¶C. LONDON 360 
 
PARIS 00000188  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Andrew Young, Acting Political Minister-Counselor, 1.4 ( 
b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  AF DAS Susan Page met with French 
officials at the Presidency, MFA, and MOD during her February 
10-11 consultations in Paris.  She also met with Angola's 
Ambassador to France Miguel da Costa.  Discussions with the 
French focused on Zimbabwe (France favored lifting certain 
sanctions as a means of supporting the MDC while maintaining 
the broader sanctions regime to continue pressuring ZANU-PF); 
Angola (relations complicated by the Falcone Affair and also 
the alleged presence of FLEC members in France who support 
Cabinda's independence); South Africa (France sees a need for 
enhanced South African engagement in regional issues); 
Madagascar (France wants the four factions to take a 
consensus-based approach to the way forward and for Rajoelina 
to compromise with the others and accept AU Jean Ping's 
suggestions); Sudan (the U.S. shares France's concerns about 
the potential difficulties should South Sudan secede in 
2011); and French priorities in the southern Africa region 
(building partnerships with South Africa and  Angola, along 
with Nigeria, with a long-term goal of enhancing stability in 
the Great Lakes region, particularly in the DRC).  In her 
meeting with Ambassador da Costa, DAS Page raised a number of 
key governance and bilateral issues.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  During her February 10-11 consultations in Paris, 
AF DAS Susan Page met with Presidential Advisors for Africa 
Remi Marechaux and Clement Leclerc; MOD Strategic Affairs 
Delegation Africa experts Colonel Denis Opplert, Elodie 
Riche, and Gregory Chauzal; MFA AF A/S-equivalent Stephane 
Gompertz and AF PDAS Olivier Chambard; Angolan Ambassador to 
France Miguel da Costa; and the Africa Regional Service 
staff.  Africa Watcher and Africa Assistant accompanied DAS 
Page.  The following report is organized by topic rather than 
by meeting. 
 
ZIMBABWE 
-------- 
 
¶3.  (C)   Presidential Advisor Clement Leclerc said there had 
been some progress in stabilizing Zimbabwe but that it was 
necessary to maintain pressure to ensure compliance with 
earlier GOZ commitments.  He noted the need for a "careful 
balance" in maintaining this pressure but also in recognizing 
progress.  He reviewed the EU sanctions issue, referring to 
close France-UK consultations.  While remarking on the 
possible delisting of several entities and individuals, 
Leclerc stressed that other firm EU sanctions would be 
extended.  A/S-equivalent Gompertz echoed this approach, 
claiming that offering these "carrots" should strengthen the 
MDC's position in the coalition.  He also stated that this 
incremental lifting of sanctions could "encourage a broader 
split" within ZANU-PF between hard-liners and those who 
recognize that a change in course is needed by demonstrating 
that "there are benefits to progress."  DAS Page explained 
that a partial lifting of sanctions was likely to reduce our 
leverage in view of ZANU-PF's lack of meaningful progress, 
thereby encouraging continued ZANU-PF obstinacy in 
implementing the Global Political Agreement. (NOTE:  The EU 
on February 15 delisted nine parastatals and six individuals. 
 END NOTE.) 
 
¶4.  (C)  Leclerc said that the GOF had just learned that a 
Zimbabwe delegation scheduled to meet with the EU in Brussels 
and possibly continue to Paris had canceled its travel plans. 
He was not sure why but he indicated that the GOF was thus 
relieved of having to figure out how to meet with the mixed 
(ZANU-PF and MDC) delegation had it come to Paris. 
 
ANGOLA 
------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  Leclerc said that France was striving to return 
relations with Angola to normal but that the Angolan side was 
still bothered by the Falcone Affair (involving extensive and 
illicit arms sales by several prominent French citizens 
during Angola's civil war) and the recent conviction of 
several of them, including ringleader Falcone, who is 
imprisoned in France.  (NOTE:  No Angolans were accused in 
the case, a point the GOF reinforced with Angola to show that 
the prosecution was not directed at Angola.  END NOTE.) 
Leclerc said the Angolans remained highly irritated by the 
case, despite continual GOF reminders about judicial 
independence in France. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Leclerc noted another significant irritant -- 
Angola's belief that France had not done enough to arrest or 
 
PARIS 00000188  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
otherwise go after members of FLEC (supporters of an 
independent Cabinda) allegedly residing in France (refs A and 
B).  Certain FLEC supporters had expressed support and even 
taken credit publicly for the recent attack on the Togolese 
national soccer team as it was traveling to Cabinda to take 
part in the African Cup of Nations.  (NOTE:  The Angolan 
Embassy in Paris in January sent a packet of information on 
FLEC, the bus attack, and what the GOA perceives as France's 
failure to take action against FLEC members believed to be in 
France.  We have forwarded this information, which the 
Angolans furnished to other diplomatic missions in Paris, to 
Embassy Luanda and to AF.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶7.  (C)  DAS Page said that Washington was disappointed by 
recent legal and constitutional changes in Angola that 
represented backsliding on democratic principles, a point DAS 
Page had been stressing in her contacts with Angolans.  This 
was an unfortunate reversal that was a cause for concern. 
She indicated that the USG would continue to convey this 
message to Angolans. 
 
¶8.  (C)  On February 11, DAS Page called on Angola's 
Ambassador to France, Miguel da Costa, whose welcoming 
remarks included the observation that in a recent discussion, 
Portugal's Ambassador to France commented on the good 
relations between the U.S. and Angola.  Ambassador da Costa 
remarked that relations between the U.S. and Angola are 
"excellent," and noted that "we are counting on the U.S. to 
help us diversify our economy."  During the course of the 
meeting, DAS Page, as she had indicated to the French, raised 
a number of key issues:  U.S. disappointment that the GOA 
stopped its national dialogue on the new constitution more 
than two months early; the new constitution's elimination of 
direct presidential elections; the need to re-set  dates for 
the now postponed inaugural TIFA Council meeting; that the 
U.S. is waiting for a letter from the GOA agreeing to 
establish the Peace Corps in Angola; and that the U.S. wants 
to deepen our engagement with Angola on good governance 
within the extractive sectors, including the Kimberley 
process and through the Strategic Partnership Dialogue. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Delivering his remarks in both French and English, 
da Costa responded that the constitutional consultation 
process had completed its work; there wasn't really anything 
more to be discussed; and, "in the end, you can't consult 
forever; there's not time to ask 14 million people." 
Regarding the new constitution, da Costa stated that Angola's 
Constitutional Court had "helped" by placing presidential 
candidates at the head of the electoral lists and by 
insisting that the appointed Vice-President could only assume 
the powers of the President for the time needed to organize 
new elections.  Da Costa asserted that a young democracy 
needs time to establish "a strong foundation," that Angola is 
progressing "step by step," but that "stability" is vital. 
Regarding the U.S. agenda, he opined that the TIFA 
discussions should be able to move forward because he 
expected that Minister of Commerce and Tourism Maria Idalina 
de Oliveira to remain in place at least until the 2012 
elections.  The Ambassador appeared not informed on Peace 
Corps, but was pleased to learn that the volunteers can bring 
technical capacity-building skills to poor, rural villages. 
Da Costa was not well-briefed on our extractive industries 
dialogue, but did launch into a long discourse on Angola's 
development progress since 2002, while also noting the need 
to create a diversified economy and a strong middle class. 
He offered as an area for U.S. assistance the exploitation of 
what he claimed were Angola's significant reserves of fresh 
ground water. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Turning to France-Angola relations, da Costa 
admitted that difficulties remain from the fallout of the 
Falcone Affair.  He was also disappointed that France was not 
helping TAAG, Angola's national airline (of which Da Costa 
was previously  Director General) gain a foothold in Europe 
beyond Lisbon.  Da Costa also complained that France was not 
being helpful in arresting members of FLEC who might be 
living in France, particularly Rodrigues Mingas, a prominent 
FLEC supporter, perhaps with French nationality, who 
reportedly expressed support in various French media for the 
terrorist attack on the Togolese soccer team. 
 
¶11.  (C)  After meeting with Ambassador da Costa, DAS Page 
met with MFA A/S-equivalent Gompertz and PDAS Chambard, who 
said that France's efforts to improve relations with Angola 
have "not been easy."  Gompertz expressed exasperation with 
the FLEC controversy, claiming that the GOF has requested any 
evidence Angolan authorities could provide in order to 
advance a judicial process.  Gompertz said that with sound 
evidence, France would not hesitate to arrest Mingas. 
According to Gompertz, Mingas's connection with France took 
the GOF by surprise.  French intelligence services took more 
than three days to obtain even basic information on Mingas. 
 
PARIS 00000188  003 OF 004 
 
 
Chambard observed that "it was crazy" to hold international 
soccer matches in Cabinda.  It was "strange," he added, that 
attackers fired a huge number of rounds into the Togolese 
bus, but did not fire at the Angolan police escort.  Gompertz 
remarked that Angola seems to believe that France somehow 
supports Cabindan independence, but there is no truth in that 
assertion -- for France, "Cabinda is Angola."  Regarding 
TAAG, Gompertz asserted that there are viable safety and 
security concerns about the airline, but that it is an issue 
Angola needs to address through European Union offices. 
 
SOUTH AFRICA 
------------ 
 
¶12.  (C)  Presidential Advisor Marechaux regretted that 
France had not been able to develop a rapport with South 
Africa's President Zuma similar to the one that existed with 
his predecessor Mbeki.  President Sarkozy had developed a 
good personal relationship with Mbeki, which had contributed 
to Sarkozy's successful visit to South Africa in February 
2008, where he gave a major policy speech on France-Africa 
relations; his choice of South Africa as a venue for the 
speech was an indication of the importance France was placing 
on South Africa as a continental leader. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Marechaux identified an even more important concern 
-- what he described as South Africa's failure, under Zuma, 
to play much of a leadership role in Africa.  He cited the 
absence of South Africa with respect to Madagascar, its 
diminished role in C.A.R., and its failure to engage in any 
number of other regional or African issues.  He noted that 
bilateral relations were generally good (despite the lack of 
rapport with Zuma) and that South Africa was a "reliable 
partner" on most global issues (G-20, the environment, etc.). 
 He repeated that Africa needed South Africa to play a more 
active role in Africa's many problems and crises. 
 
MADAGASCAR 
---------- 
 
¶14.  (C)  Marechaux said that France had to play a "careful" 
role in Madagascar, similar to the "care" the U.S. had to 
take whenever it became involved in Latin America.  That 
said, Marechaux reminded that France had always supported the 
UN, AU, and SADC in their efforts to find a solution to the 
crisis in Madagascar.  He said that France had tried to 
facilitate the Maputo I and II processes by offering 
transportation services to the parties and defraying some of 
their expenses.  He said that both Mediator Chissano and the 
Malagasy parties had made mistakes and he regretted the 
unraveling of the Maputo and Addis Ababa agreements.  (In her 
later meeting with Gompertz, DAS Page asked if South African 
President Zuma was playing any role in resolving the 
conflict.  Gompertz acknowledged Zuma's role only in the 
early stages of the process.) 
 
¶15.  (C)  Marechaux explained that France was now urging all 
parties to reach a consensus agreement on a way forward that 
would lead to transparent and fair elections.  This message 
had been conveyed in direct terms to de facto President 
Rajoelina by Sarkozy's Chief of Staff Claude Gueant, 
Cooperation/Francophonie Secretary of State Alain Joyandet, 
and Chief Presidential AF Advisor Andre Parant and Marechaux 
at meetings with Rajoelina during his recent visit to Paris. 
France's bottom line was that Rajoelina had to accept having 
two co-presidents, should form a national unity government 
that would oversee legislative elections, possibly in May, 
and then, under the direction of a government formed as a 
result of the legislative elections, move towards a 
presidential election. 
 
¶16.  (C)  Marechaux said that Rajoelina "didn't want to hear 
any of this."  While in Paris, Rajoelina met with a 
parliamentary friendship group that naively made certain 
public statements supportive of Rajoelina.  Marechaux said 
that Rajoelina's recent call for a "supervisory council" to 
oversee the transition was another "gadget."  Marechaux 
remarked that the French repeatedly told Rajoelina to forget 
about unilateral action.  He had to operate cooperatively and 
should accept at least the core elements of what the AU's 
Jean Ping had been suggesting.  Marechaux said that Rajoelina 
had, the previous day (February 9) expressed some intention 
to compromise but Marechaux did not know the specifics. 
 
¶17.  (C)  In a short exchange on Madagascar at the MOD 
Strategic Affairs Delegation, Colonel Opplert, head of the 
Africa unit, was generally more pessimistic, expressing 
strong suspicion of Ravalomanana and stating that the most 
important concern was to ensure the military's agreement to 
any plan that developed.  There was a risk of violence should 
the military not be kept on board, he warned.  MFA 
A/S-equivalent Gompertz later noted that finding a solution 
 
PARIS 00000188  004 OF 004 
 
 
in Madagascar is "very complicated." 
 
SUDAN 
----- 
 
¶18.  (C)   When French officials raised Sudan, they focused 
on the worrisome instability that could arise should Southern 
Sudan secede and form a new independent nation following the 
2011 referendum.  DAS Page explained the importance of an 
immediate "diplomatic and developmental surge" for Southern 
Sudan, with additional confidence-building measures and 
conflict prevention. Gompertz confirmed that France maintains 
a diplomatic "bureau" in Juba, but that its assistance to 
Southern Sudan is "not a lot."  DAS Page noted that the 
relatively easy step of converting the bureau into a 
Consulate would be helpful, as would providing relatively 
inexpensive technical assistance and training for Southern 
Sudanese civil servants. 
 
¶19.  (C)  Leclerc observed that there were many unanswered 
questions about how the 2011 referendum would take place and 
many issues that North and South had to resolve either before 
or as an immediate result of the referendum.  He was not 
certain that they would do so.  DAS Page agreed with 
Leclerc's additional assessment that there were many problems 
endemic to the South, such as ethnic tensions and conflicts 
over limited resources, that would plague the South 
irrespective of the referendum and its result. 
 
¶20.  (C)  The Africa experts at the MOD's Strategic Affairs 
Delegation (Opplert, Riche, Chauzal) echoed the Presidency's 
and MFA's concerns about North/South Sudan issues.  Riche 
commented that France was not heavily present in Sudan 
(although French engagement in Chad and C.A.R. remained 
high).  She expressed concern about an independent Southern 
Sudan's "capacity as a state" and about "demarcation issues" 
that, if left unresolved, could create a host of problems 
post-independence.  Riche noted another uncertainty -- 
whether the most recent Chad-Sudan rapprochement would hold 
and, if it did, whether either side would take advantage of 
the improved relationship to undertake projects that had been 
put on hold because of previous bilateral friction.  Riche 
mentioned, for example, the possibility that Khartoum might 
use a lull in tensions with Chad to take an aggressive 
approach to its Darfur problem. 
 
PRIORITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
----------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (C)  MOD DAS expert Chauzal, whose specialty is the 
southern Africa region, provided a brief overview of France's 
priorities in that zone.  He noted that France was seeking to 
strengthen ties with three countries in Africa -- South 
Africa, Angola, and Nigeria -- as cornerstones of the 
partnership France was trying to develop across the 
continent.  Two of these (South Africa and Angola) were in 
the southern region.  Much of France's strategic thinking 
concerned the resolution of the broader Great Lakes cluster 
of problems, with the ultimate goal being the stabilization 
of the DRC and its transformation into a productive state. 
Thus, he said, France's relations with countries such as 
Angola and South Africa (and Nigeria as well) in part 
involved the extent to which these countries could effect 
positive change in the Great Lakes region and in the DRC. 
Angola also played an important role in the Gulf of Guinea, 
he observed. 
 
¶22.  (U)  DAS Page has cleared this message. 
 
RIVKIN