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PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #0172/01 0431404
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P 121404Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8307
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000172 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO CT CD CG FR
SUBJECT: MINURCAT/MONUC: URGENT NEED TO BEGIN PLANNING NEXT 
PHASE OF OPERATIONS 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 70 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 63 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶C. PARIS 84 
 
Classified By: Wallace R. Bain, Political Officer, 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  French MFA officials on February 11 
stressed the need to begin planning for the end of MINURCAT's 
current mandate in Chad/C.A.R. on March 15 and for the end of 
MONUC's current mandate in the DRC on May 31.  France is 
operating on the assumption that Chad's President Deby will 
not be persuaded to accept the renewal of MINURCAT's mandate. 
 We should instead be working toward a year-long drawdown and 
withdrawal process during which we should try to enhance the 
DIS's capabilities so that it can assume MINURCAT's core 
functions (protecting refugees and humanitarian workers) 
after MINURCAT's drawdown and withdrawal.  Concerning MONUC, 
the French would like to see a successor mission that would 
focus on the protection of civilians, DDR, and improving the 
DRC's military.  This mission could be a restructured and 
possibly reduced version of the current MONUC.  The French 
suggested close P-3 cooperation in managing the transition of 
both UN missions into whatever will take their place.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  MFA IO desk officer Jeanne Simon, Chad/C.A.R. desk 
officer Vincent Alexandre, and DRC desk officer Frank 
Marchetti met with Africa Assistant on February 11 to discuss 
the future of MINURCAT (reftels) and MONUC in view of the 
imminent expiration of their mandates (March 15 for MINURCAT, 
May 31 for MONUC). 
 
MINURCAT 
-------- 
¶3.  (C)  Alexandre referred to Deby's January 19 letter to 
the UN which stated Deby's desire not to have MINURCAT 
renewed but his willingness to enter into negotiations on how 
to drawdown MINURCAT.  Alexandre said that Deby's letter 
meant that we should not be thinking in terms of MINURCAT's 
renewal but how to negotiate the most favorable exit plan. 
The GOF would like to see a year-long drawdown and withdrawal 
phase that would terminate with MINURCAT's closing down on 
March 15, 2011.  He noted that UNSCR 1861, para 29, mentions 
March 15, 2011, as a target date for meeting the benchmarks 
set forth in UNSCR 1861.  This would lend support to allowing 
the drawdown phase to continue until that date. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Alexandre was critical of the Cammaert Mission (ref 
A), which he said went to Chad with the wrong mind-set, 
focusing on renewing MINURCAT's mandate rather than on 
seriously negotiating with Deby.  Alexandre observed that the 
UN delegation was not well conceived in that Cammaert himself 
could not speak French and that the team did not contain the 
right mix of personnel.  (NOTE:  It is difficult for us to 
judge whether Alexandre's criticism of the Cammaert Mission 
was justified or was off-base, given what appears to have 
been a serious effort by the Cammaert Mission to engage with 
Chad on MINURCAT, as reported ref A.  END NOTE.)  Alexandre 
and Simon said that the UN needed to begin a serious 
negotiating process with the Chadians, as soon as possible. 
The negotiation should seek a one-year drawdown phase and 
begin identifying MINURCAT elements that could be 
progressively withdrawn, starting with the least important 
first. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Alexandre, making points he had made earlier (ref 
C), said that Deby was justified in complaining about 
MINURCAT's shortcomings.  One of Deby's criticisms focused on 
MINURCAT's failure to carry out promised infrastructure 
improvements.  Alexandre said that during the drawdown phase, 
both for practical reasons and to mollify Deby, MINURCAT 
should make an effort to carry out infrastructure projects 
that would help the DIS, the Chadian security force the 
training of which has been one of MINURCAT's main functions. 
The UN could, for example, build field offices/stations for 
DIS units. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Alexandre said that the international community 
should assist the DIS in developing its capabilities so that 
the DIS would be able to assume MINURCAT's core functions -- 
protecting displaced persons as well as humanitarian workers 
-- once MINURCAT is disbanded.  A one-year drawdown phase as 
he had described it could provide enough time to develop the 
DIS to the point that it could be able to carry out those 
core functions.  The DIS might not be in optimal form by the 
end of that year but it could do an acceptable job if all 
parties -- the UN, Chad, and interested parties -- worked 
hard enough to develop it during the next year. 
 
PARIS 00000172  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C)  Alexandre stressed the importance of retaining a 
presence in C.A.R. for as long as possible within the 
framework of MINURCAT's drawdown.  He said that C.A.R. 
President Bozize favored MINURCAT's presence in Birao but was 
not vocal because he did not want to offend Deby.  Alexandre 
said that Togo's unit in Birao was doing a good job and that 
an absence of a force there could prove destabilizing. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Alexandre and Simon hoped that the P-3 would work 
closely with each other in managing this phase of MINURCAT 
and whatever might follow it. 
 
MONUC 
----- 
¶9.  (C)  DRC desk officer Frank Marchetti and Simon said that 
the UN would send an evaluation team to the DRC during the 
February 28-March 5 period that would yield a report to the 
UNSYG on April 1.  They also noted a discussion of MONUC at 
the UN on February 16.  They hoped that these activities 
would help focus attention on MONUC and the issue of what to 
do when its mandate expires on May 31.  Marchetti and Simon, 
without providing details, said that the GOF would like to 
see a UN Security Council visit to Africa, including 
especially the DRC, perhaps in April.  This would allow 
Security Council members a close look at MONUC and the 
situation in the DRC and help Security Council members to 
identify priorities for the post-May 31 phase. 
 
¶10.  (C)  For France, MONUC's priorities should remain as 
articulated in UNSCR 1906 -- protection of the civilian 
population, DDR (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration), 
and reform of the DRC military.  Marchetti commented that 
MONUC had been in the DRC in such numbers and for such a long 
time that it was beginning to become part of the landscape 
and was suffering from continual mission creep as a result of 
the tendency of others to find solutions to various problems 
by "letting MONUC do it," whatever the problem might be. 
Marchetti thought that a new mandate for MONUC could refocus 
energy on its essential functions.  Such an approach could 
lead to a restructuring that might even allow for a less 
expensive operation. 
 
¶11.  (C)  All that said, Marchetti said the GOF was still in 
a thinking mode.  He welcomed an exchange of views with the 
U.S. and UK, particularly as to what DRC President Kabila 
might actually find acceptable.  Kabila's vagueness had not 
helped others to discern what might be the best acceptable 
formula for a successor mission to MONUC.  Marchetti added 
that it would be well to maintain an international presence 
in the DRC to enhance stability during the upcoming DRC 
elections. 
 
¶12.  (C)  COMMENT:  GOF concern about the end phases of these 
two missions was evident.  Our interlocutors stressed the 
need for DPKO, and the UN more generally, to begin serious 
work on how the drawdown mechanisms would work and what the 
UN intended to do in terms of successor missions.  The French 
emphasized their desire to work closely with the U.S. and UK 
and stated several times that they would welcome our thinking 
on both MINURCAT and MONUC. END COMMENT. 
 
¶13. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered. 
RIVKIN