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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000142 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020 
TAGS: PREL PINR CN XA FR
SUBJECT: CHINA/AFRICA:  FRENCH THINK-TANK DIRECTOR WANTS TO 
DELIVER "TOUGHER MESSAGE" TO CHINESE 
 
REF: A. STATE 10152 
     ¶B. BEIJING 146 
     ¶C. 06 PARIS 5733 
 
PARIS 00000142  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Kim Krhounek, Acting Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C/NF)  SUMMARY:  French think-tank director Francois 
Gere (PROTECT) wants to deliver a "tougher message" to 
Chinese interlocutors during his regular consultations in 
Beijing on foreign policy issues.  Gere said that Chinese 
behavior in Africa typifies an increasingly aggressive 
Chinese pursuit of its own objectives with little regard for 
problems it may cause abroad, or potential damage to its own 
image in the countries where it is invested.  Gere's 
exchanges with the Chinese often occur during "private" 
meetings on the margins of conferences he attends in China, 
characterized by detailed questioning by Chinese officials 
who he believes are intelligence officers, in sessions that 
can continue into the following day.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Francois Gere (PROTECT) is the Director of the 
Paris-based "Institut francais d'analyse strategique" (IFAS, 
or French Institute for Strategic Analysis).  A foreign 
policy expert with particular expertise in pol/mil and 
trans-Atlantic security issues, Gere also teaches courses in 
international relations for select members of France's senior 
officer corps.  During a meeting on January 26, Gere 
explained that he regularly attended conferences in China at 
the invitation of organizers to offer French and European 
views on a range of subjects, and that he was preparing for 
one such conference.  He sought U.S. views on China's role in 
Africa.  We shared our general outlook, derived largely from 
the analysis contained in ref C, a 2006 cable on China in 
Africa whose themes remain current. 
 
China Needs to Practice Good Citizenship Abroad 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶3.  (C)  Gere said that he had come to similar conclusions 
about China's Africa policy.  He noted China's aggressive 
pursuit of resources; its packaged deals that use almost 
exclusively Chinese materials, manpower, and technology in 
carrying out a project (with a resulting loss of local 
employment opportunities and technology transfer); Chinese 
indifference to host-country political and human rights 
concerns (under the guise of "non-interference"); the 
development of a Chinese diaspora in Africa with potentially 
significant effects on local populations; and China's cynical 
attempts to exploit Third World solidarity with its African 
partners even though China is now a global superpower.  Gere 
went on to mention the apparent wealth China is willing to 
spread among Africa's elite to ensure attainment of its 
objectives, even if very little of this wealth trickles down 
to the general population. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Gere noted that there have already been several 
African backlashes in response to China's increasing presence 
in Africa, and he predicted that more could well follow if 
China continued its present methods, which did not, in Gere's 
view, include a "social consciousness" component.  The 
Chinese did not seem to realize that they risked being viewed 
as a new type of colonizer and that resentment against them 
could build quickly and could turn a lot uglier than had 
anti-colonial movements of earlier times, especially 
considering the leverage enjoyed by Africans (over raw 
materials coveted by China) as well as a possible lack of 
inhibition among many Africans to resort to violence directed 
against "outsiders" like the Chinese. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Gere said that he intended to tell the Chinese 
during his next visit that, using Africa as an example, China 
had to develop relations that involved a "give" element to 
balance out the already healthy "take" aspect of China's 
presence abroad.  This message, he would stress, would be for 
China's own long-term good if it wanted to remain welcome in 
places like Africa.  To counter the Chinese claim that it 
"gives" as much as it "takes," Gere said he would advise them 
that paying a national leader a large sum for a raw materials 
concession or building a new sports stadium or concert hall 
did not then give China license to do whatever it wanted. 
China had to act as a responsible citizen with respect to a 
range of issues -- labor, environment, anti-corruption, rule 
of law -- if it wanted to maintain a semblance of good 
 
PARIS 00000142  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
relations with the African people. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The message about being a better citizen in Africa 
was part of a larger message Gere said he felt increasingly 
obliged to make.  He said that the self-confidence China had 
developed during the early part of its recent boom was now 
turning into arrogance and an attitude that China could do no 
wrong and owed no one an explanation or an apology.  This was 
not healthy, for either China or the rest of the world.  Gere 
said he would try to tell the Chinese that its aggressive 
approach on all fronts and the umbrage it took if it 
perceived even the slightest criticism were major turn-offs 
that could cause people everywhere to view China more as a 
"problem" than as a helpful and useful "partner."  Gere 
conceded that if he conveyed this message to the Chinese it 
would likely have little real effect (other than to 
antagonize his interlocutors) but he said it was a message he 
felt compelled to send.  The Chinese might begin to listen if 
other outside parties (whom the Chinese considered worthwhile 
enough to invite to their conferences) conveyed similar 
messages. 
 
Long Discussion Sessions 
------------------------ 
¶7.  (C/NF)  Gere said that his discussions in China had taken 
on a familiar form.  He usually goes to China to participate 
in formal conferences where he gives a presentation on a 
given subject (which can vary widely from conference to 
conference).  Then, after a conference session concludes, his 
interlocutors suggest an off-the-record discussion.  Gere 
said he was convinced that these sessions were conducted by 
members of China's intelligence services.  The talks can go 
on well into the early morning hours, fueled on the Chinese 
side by large quantities of cigarettes.  The discussions 
consist almost entirely of Gere being questioned about a 
subject and can resume the next day (often in a morning 
session if the conference has ended).  As Gere described 
these sessions, it appeared that they are quite one-sided, 
with Gere doing most of the talking and the Chinese doing 
most of the questioning.  He said that the discussions are 
always in English, with an interpreter translating for the 
Chinese present who do not know English.  He has never had a 
discussion in French.  Gere observed that he knows when a 
subject is exhausted when his interlocutors stop asking him 
about it and move on to another topic.  He also commented 
that when a morning session follows a late-night session on 
the same topic, his interlocutors at the morning session ask 
follow-up questions that indicate that what he said at the 
preceding late-night session had been carefully analyzed.  He 
commented that "in China, the machinery of state never stops." 
 
¶8.  (C/NF)  Gere remarked that, while his Chinese 
interlocutors are pleasant, they are all business.  Not once, 
he said, has a Chinese interlocutor relaxed, suggested they 
have a beer together, or converse as one individual to 
another.  There has been no attempt to develop a personal 
rapport with Gere, who commented that the Chinese do not seem 
to understand that establishing a friendship could increase 
one's willingness to open up to them.  That too, he observed, 
was an element of their single-mindedness and also one of 
their blind spots. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RIVKIN