VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPO #0005/01 0541812
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231812Z FEB 10 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0267
INFO EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0013

UNCLAS PARAMARIBO 000005 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR S/CIEA SPECIAL ENVOY DAVID GOLDWYN, S/CIEA PAUL HUEPER, 
S/CIEA JOE WANG 
DEPT FOR WHA/CAR VELIA DEPIRRO AND SEAN WHALEN 
USAID FOR  MARK SCHLAGENHAUF 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DEPT OF INTERIOR FOR USGS CRAIG WANDREY 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DEPT OF INTERIOR FOR MMS KEVIN KUNKEL 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DEPT OF TREASURY FOR MIKE RUFFNER AND JANE ANTONOVICH 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EPET EAID ECON ETRD PGOV NS
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for Special Envoy David Goldwyn and EGCI 
delegation's Visit to Suriname, March 4-7, 2010 
 
¶1.       (SBU) SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TRIP AGENDA:  Everyone at 
Embassy Paramaribo joins me in welcoming Special Envoy David 
Goldwyn and the Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative 
delegation to Suriname. Although we cannot yet provide a confirmed 
schedule, we expect our Ministerial-level and working-level meeting 
requests to be accepted and arranged for March 4 and March 5 
respectively. We have also requested a March 6 visit to 
Staatsolie's Tambaredjo/Calcutta oil field site. All decisions are 
currently pending at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hotel 
reservations and motorpool arrangements have been made for the 
delegation. Post will provide additional updates and briefing 
materials through email to S/CIEA's Joe Wang and WHA/CAR's Sean 
Whalen. END SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TRIP AGENDA; FOLLOWING TEXT 
PROVIDES SCENESETTER INFORMATION. 
 
 
 
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Visit of EGCI Could Broaden US-Suriname Relations 
 
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- 
 
¶2.       (SBU) We expect that your visit will provide a new area of 
potential cooperation between the U.S. and Suriname. Expectations 
should be measured, however, due to Suriname's upcoming national 
elections and to Suriname's track record of making foreign policy 
decisions cautiously and deliberately, especially when dealing with 
the U.S. in a bilateral capacity. Engaging the government-owned 
company Staatsolie will be as important as engaging the government. 
Initial EGCI buy-in by the GOS will be more likely if support for 
Suriname first focuses around technical assistance. We welcome your 
visit. 
 
 
 
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Suriname Overview and International Relations 
 
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¶3.       (SBU)  Suriname, formerly known as Dutch Guiana and 
independent from the Netherlands since 1975, lies on the 
northeastern coast of South America.  It is approximately the size 
of Georgia, has a population of less than half a million, and has 
traditionally been the Dutch-speaking misfit of the Western 
Hemisphere.  A member of the UN, OAS, CARICOM, G77, UNASUR, and the 
Islamic Conference, Suriname's political traditions, culture, 
history, and immigration ties are neither Spanish/Portuguese (like 
most of South and Central America), nor British/French (like most 
of the Caribbean).  Although migration trends, economic assistance, 
and remittances still keep Surinamers looking to the Netherlands 
(home to an estimated 300,000 Dutch-Surinamers), historic 
resentments and ethnic and cultural differences also mean that 
Suriname does not align easily with Europe.  Consequently, it 
engages actively with China, India, and Indonesia as part of a 
foreign policy initiative to reduce dependency on the Dutch. The 
post-independence Netherlands' donor aid, known as "Treaty Funds" 
ends this year, and the Netherlands wants to re-make its 
historically colonial relationship with Suriname into a 
partnership. 
 
 
 
¶4.       (SBU)  Surinamers enjoy good relations with Brazil and 
France (French Guiana), although cross-border issues and 
territorial border disputes with both neighbors have occasionally 
caused tensions. Suriname and France are currently in the process 
of agreeing on demarcation of their shared maritime and riverine 
border. More serious border disputes complicate Suriname's 
relationship with Guyana, and remain an emotional issue for many 
Surinamers.  The maritime territory dispute between Suriname and 
Guyana was resolved in September 2007 by an Arbitral Tribunal 
convened pursuant to Annex VII of the United National Convention on 
 
 
the Law of the Sea. However, former President and current National 
Assembly member Jules Wijdenbosch's unexpected, politically charged 
statement in Parliament on February 8 that he had prepared to 
invade the Tigri area in southwest Suriname during his tenure in 
1999 to drive out the Guyanese military that had "illegally 
occupied" the area since 1969 has sparked recent diplomatic 
tensions. (Note: Given the tensions surrounding the borders, in 
March 2007 Post worked with the State Department Office of the 
Geographer to ensure that all official United States Government 
(USG) maps of Suriname (which invariably depict the borders to 
favor Guyana and French Guiana) include the following standard 
policy disclaimer: "Boundary representation is not necessarily 
authoritative.")  In part due to the border dispute, an anti-Guyana 
bias permeates Suriname society. 
 
 
 
¶5.       (SBU) Suriname receives high-level attention from China, 
Cuba, and Venezuela. Suriname opened a diplomatic mission in Cuba 
in December 2008, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs officially 
opened Suriname's Embassy in Havana in 2009. Several high level 
official delegation visits to Cuba have occurred in the last two 
years. The Cuban Embassy in Paramaribo reopened in April 2006 after 
a two decade absence. Suriname's links with Cuba are primarily 
medical programs and educational exchanges.  Venezuela is trying to 
garner support in Suriname with programs such as offering 
scholarships, providing eye care through a joint program with Cuba, 
and of course, PetroCaribe (While no PetroCaribe shipments have 
been received by Suriname, the agreement itself remains in force.) 
Venezuela's Ambassador to Suriname was recalled after President 
Venetiaan reportedly complained to President Chavez at the April 
2009 Summit of the Americas about the Venezuelan Ambassador's 
inappropriate outreach to the opposition political party. 
 
 
 
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U.S. -Suriname Bilateral Relations 
 
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¶6.       (SBU)  Suriname is set to hold national elections on May 
25, 2010; Suriname's opposition coalition is led by Desi Bouterse, 
an individual who led previous coups, has ties to narcotraffickers, 
and is currently on trial for murder in relation to the 1982 
killing of 15 prominent democracy advocates. Such a development 
could lead to an increase in corruption and narcotrafficking. 
Except in the 1980's when then-military dictator Bouterse's 
friendly relationship with Daniel Ortega and Fidel Castro kept 
Suriname on the map of U.S. foreign policy priorities, in recent 
years the country has received scant attention from U.S. policy 
makers.  Nor does Suriname receive appreciable development 
assistance from the United States. 
 
 
 
¶7.       (SBU)  For its part, the Government of Suriname (GOS) 
often demonstrates a lack of affinity for USG foreign policy 
priorities.  Although the U.S. Embassy appears to enjoy some level 
of popular support among the people of Suriname, official USG-GOS 
relations are "cordial and correct,' but they are not "warm."  The 
situation has the potential to improve because of the noted 
outpouring of Surinamese good will towards President Obama and 
because of Suriname's pragmatic approach to its foreign policy, 
based on self interest and complex identity.  U.S.-Suriname 
relations have been strongest in our defense relationship with the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Suriname Defense Forces (SDF), 
and with the law enforcement community of the Ministry of Justice 
and Police.  Not coincidentally, these are the only two Ministries 
that in the past could regularly count on USG development 
assistance (modest amounts of IMET, FMF, and INCLE).  Cooperation 
with the Ministry of Health has been steadily increasing, as 
evidenced by Suriname's quickly and readily accepted participation 
in PEPFAR II. The Embassy also has a strong relationship with the 
cultural community and with Suriname's lone University. 
 
¶8.       (SBU) The United States government's highest priority 
interests are to ensure the continuance and strengthening of 
democracy, to advance good governance, and to promote transparency. 
Other significant U.S. interests in Suriname include cooperation on 
law enforcement issues; promoting strong environmental protection 
and practices in a country still mostly covered by rain forest; 
working closely with the GOS to advance the fight against malaria, 
HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis and to ensure unpolluted water is 
available; promoting U.S trade, investment, and business links in 
this resource rich small country; improving GOS military 
professionalism and interoperability; and protecting U.S. citizens. 
Without a well-functioning, democratic, friendly government in 
Suriname, however, advancing each of those interests would be much 
more difficult. 
 
 
 
¶9.       (SBU) The Unites States and Suriname already have a 
successful bilateral relationship in many respects, but we would 
like to see the relationship also take the form of a positive 
partnership, whereby the United States can count on Suriname as a 
friendly partner in international forums such as the UN and OAS, 
and Suriname can count on the Unites States to recognize that this 
small country is relevant to U.S. strategic interests in both the 
Caribbean and on the South American continent. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Elections 2010 
 
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¶10.   (U)  With an area previously noted as roughly equal to the 
state of Georgia and a population of only 492,000, Suriname is one 
of the least densely populated countries in the world.  It is an 
ethnically diverse land with people of East Indian, African, 
Indonesian, Chinese, and European descent whose constant wrangling 
for pieces of the pie color Suriname's economic and political 
atmosphere.  Built on personal relationships and not political 
platforms, slowed by a bias for strong consensus, typified by a 
spoils-system favored by the entrenched ethnic parties, Suriname's 
political environment is difficult to read. On May 25, 2010 
Suriname will hold elections. Political parties, including those in 
President Ronald Venetiaan's ruling New Front coalition, are 
currently occupied in selecting their coalition partners and it is 
simply too soon to predict whether the negotiated alliances and 
backroom deals will keep a version of the New Front coalition in 
power, led by either the current National Assembly Speaker or Vice 
President, or whether the current opposition, led by Bouterse's 
NDP, as the single strongest party, will capitalize on its populist 
message. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Economic Overview 
 
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¶11.   (SBU) Suriname's predicted growth rate for 2010 is 4 percent. 
This Economic Council for Latin American and the Caribbean estimate 
leaves Suriname with the highest predicted growth rate for the 
Caribbean, since the average rating for the region is not expected 
to surpass 1.8 percent. Suriname is a minerals-based economy with a 
very high dependence on the commodities oil, bauxite, and gold. 
While high world market prices for these commodities proved 
 
 
instrumental in the recovery of the economy after years of decline 
and high inflation in the late 1990's, the fluctuation of 
commodities prices has also shown the vulnerability of the 
Surinamese economy. Decreasing demand and world prices for aluminum 
along with major changes for this sector in 2009 resulted in almost 
no income from this sector for the government. Suralco, wholly 
owned subsidiary of U.S. ALCOA, is the 100 percent owner of all 
activities and major assets in Suriname's bauxite sector. The loss 
in income from alumina was made up by a significant increase in 
Suriname's gold exports. Through a significant increase in world 
market prices for gold and record production in the official gold 
sector of 365,000 troy ounces from the Rosebel Gold Mines owned by 
the Canadian based IAMGOLD, gold has officially become the largest 
contributor to Suriname's GDP. The GOS is currently negotiating 
with SURGOLD, a joint venture between the U.S.-based Newmont Mining 
Corporation and Suralco, on developing a new mine and refinery in 
Suriname's Eastern region. Activities in both this sector and 
construction fed the 2.5 percent growth of the GDP in 2009. 
 
 
 
¶12.   (SBU) Although earnings in Suriname's oil sector decreased by 
35 percent in 2009 to US 375 million (compared to the record US 
$576 million in 2008), oil remains the most important source of 
income for the GOS because the sector is 100 percent 
government-owned. The State Oil Company of Suriname, Staatsolie, 
has embarked on a US $1 billion expansion project that includes the 
US$ 550 million expansion of its refining capacity to 15,000 bpd. 
The company has also launched a bio-fuels initiative by acquiring 
12,000 hectares for planting sugarcane for ethanol production. 
Staatsolie is seeking to expand its oil reserves by 64 billion 
barrels through intensified exploration research. The company has 
further invested US$ 25 million to double the capacity of its 
electricity plant to 28MW in its offshore activities partners 
Murphy Oil and Inpex Corporation have acquired 3D seismic data that 
they will study further for planned test drilling in either 2010 or 
2011, while Repsol YPF and Noble Energy are re-evaluating data from 
their first test drill for a possible second test frill. 
 
 
 
¶13.   (SBU) Suriname's economy has undergone some diversification. 
Growth was reported in the tourism, ICT, transport, construction, 
telecommunications, and offshoring from the Netherlands.  The GOS 
has made improvements in liberalizing the market, but significant 
improvement is still need in the tax system, market 
standardization, and market competitiveness. The IMF has urged the 
GOS to intensify diversification efforts and improve the business 
environment in order to promote greater private sector led growth. 
Lumber, fishing, and agriculture are other major industries. 
 
 
 
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Military Coups, Desi Bouterse, and the 
 
December Murders of 1982 Trial 
 
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¶14.   (SBU)  Independent in 1975, Suriname suffered military coups 
in 1980 and 1990; civilian rule was re-established in 1992.  Under 
the control of Desi Bouterse, who led the first military coup, the 
military government executed 15 prominent citizens in 1982 for 
their opposition to the regime.  Bouterse, who was elected as a 
member of the National Assembly, remains active in politics and 
chairs the opposition party National Democratic Pary (NDP), though 
he was relieved of his seat in the Parliament in March 2009 by the 
Speaker due to non-attendance at National Assembly meetings. In 
November 2007, the long-anticipated legal proceedings against those 
accused of participating in the brutal December 1982 murders of 15 
political opponents began with the issuance of summons to 25 
defendants, including Desi Bouterse. Initially, Bouterse announced 
he would never appear in court, and there was concern that Bouterse 
would instigate domestic unrest in order to avoid this trial. The 
trial has, however, proceeded forward without civil disruption, and 
 
 
is not expected to conclude before Suriname's May 25 elections. 
Aside from his record as the perpetrator of a military coup, a 
murder suspect, and his time as a military dictator, Bouterse was 
convicted in absentia by a Dutch court in 1999 for trafficking 474 
kilos of cocaine. 
 
 
 
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Civilian Military Relations 
 
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¶15.   (U)  Since military rule ended in Suriname, there has been a 
somewhat strained relationship between the civilian government and 
the armed forces.  In 1992, during President Venetiaan's first of 
three terms, the civilian authority took bold steps to strip the 
military of its overreaching constitutional  powers, despite strong 
protest from the military.  Venetiaan and several of his close 
associates had been detained by the military during the military 
regime.  During Venetiaan's last term, his Minister of Defense was 
disliked by many in the armed forces who perceived him as 
unresponsive to their needs.  Still, the current Minister, Ivan 
Fernald, has been more engaged with members of the armed forces. 
However, to date, he remains criticized for failing to bring more 
and much-needed resources or training. Civilian-military relations 
seems somewhat better than a few years ago, but there remains room 
for improvement. 
 
 
 
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Criminal Activity Pervasive, Just Below the Surface 
 
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¶16.   (SBU)  Although Suriname is not an openly violent society, 
the rule of law is nevertheless under threat. Suriname is a major 
transshipment point for South American cocaine en route to Europe 
and, to a lesser degree, to the United States.  The government's 
inability to control its borders and the lack of law enforcement 
presence in the largely unmonitored interior allow traffickers to 
move drug shipments via sea, river, and air with little if any 
resistance.  Suriname lacks the resources to properly equip the 
marine and air wings of its national military, which are 
responsible for protecting its borders--a mission which may be 
transferred to a yet-to-be established Coast Guard. (Note: There 
has been skepticism since 2006 of the GOS's ability to stand up a 
Coast Guard due to inadequate resources and legislation, 
complicated bureaucratic requirements, drug-related corruption, 
relative geographic isolation, and weak judicial institutions.  End 
note.)  Suriname is currently the Vice-Chair of the Inter-American 
Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD), and in May 2009, 
Suriname hosted the working group meeting on the Caribbean Basin 
Security Initiative. 
BELL