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RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
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S E C R E T PANAMA 000061 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/09 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC SNAR PINR KCRM PM CASC
SUBJECT: Alleged Kidnap Plot Shows Intel Chief's Hostile Intent, 
Serious GOP Security Flaws 
 
REF: PANAMA 39; 2009 PANAMA 881; 2009 PANAMA 817; 2009 PANAMA 777 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: David Gilmour, Deputy Chief of Mission, State, EXEC; 
REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (S//NF) Summary: The head of Panama's intelligence service, 
Olmedo Alfaro, has again demonstrated his anti-U.S. bias in his 
handling of an alleged kidnapping attempt against President Ricardo 
Martinelli.  Although Martinelli requested the Embassy's help in 
the investigation, Alfaro refused assistance from our law 
enforcement and intel team.  We later learned that Alfaro 
complained to Martinelli that the USG had provided no help. 
Embassy Panama believes the alleged plot was a hoax, but the 
episode did expose vulnerabilities in the GOP's VIP protective 
service and provided an opening for Alfaro to reengage Israeli 
security consultants to advise the GOP.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶2. (S//NF) President Martinelli called Ambassador on January 14 to 
tell her of a conversation between former State WHA Assistant 
Secretary Roger Noriega and Panamanian ambassador to Washington 
Jaime Aleman.  According to Martinelli, Noriega told Aleman that 
the Venezuelan government was planning to assassinate Martinelli, 
in a plot directed by GOV intel chief Hugo Carvajal.  Martinelli 
asked for the Embassy's assistance in providing any information 
that might corroborate Noriega's story.  The Ambassador tasked our 
law enforcement and intelligence team to check.  While no evidence 
of any plot was found, the law enforcement team found significant 
derogatory information on Pedro Ruiz Martin Olivares, whose name 
had been provided to RSA by Alfaro.  We shared the information and 
provided a photo of Martin Olivares so that Panamanian authorities 
could either deny him entry or put him under surveillance.  When 
the president called the Ambassador again the evening of January 
14, she advised him that the name check indicated Martin Olivares 
was a seriously bad actor.  Martinelli asked repeatedly for advice 
on whether the GOP should deny entry to Martin Olivares or put him 
under surveillance.  The Ambassador explained that there were pros 
and cons to each course of action, and suggested that the 
president's security experts should weigh in before he made a 
decision. 
 
 
 
¶3. (S//NF) At the same time that the info on Martin Olivares was 
passed to Martinelli, RSA chief relayed an offer to Alfaro from DEA 
to make available the Matador wiretap capability to assist in the 
investigation.  Over the next several days, RSA chief and LEGATT 
were in regular contact with Alfaro and repeatedly offered 
assistance, including wiretaps.  In each case, Alfaro said he had 
the investigation under control and did not need any assistance. 
 
 
 
¶4. (S//NF) On January 17, Alfaro informed RSA chief that the GOP 
had apprehended three suspects: Isaac Polanco, a U.S. citizen from 
Puerto Rico resident in Panama; Javier Guzman, a member of the 
GOP's Institutional Protection Service (SPI) assigned to 
Martinelli's security detail; and Benjamin Guzman, brother of 
Javier.  Alfaro believed that Polanco had possibly been a DEA 
source, and contacted RSA chief who relayed the information to our 
law enforcement team.  DEA and ICE officers advised that Polanco is 
known locally as an information peddler.  He has had limited 
contact with the ICE vetted unit, but has never worked as a source 
for DEA or ICE.  RSA chief passed that information to Alfaro. 
Alfaro also believed that Polanco intended to kidnap Martinelli and 
sell him to the FARC, who would demand a $10 million ransom. 
 
 
¶5. (S//NF) After extensive questioning of Polanco and the Guzman 
brothers, Alfaro told RSA chief that all three suspects had 
confessed, and Alfaro believed the plot was a hoax.  According to 
Alfaro, Polanco had concocted the story of a plot and recruited the 
Guzmans, and then had offered to sell information about the alleged 
plot to the Panamanian intel service.  Embassy law enforcement 
officers believe the story tracks with what we know of Polanco's 
style of operation, and we agree that it was almost certainly a 
hoax. 
 
 
 
¶6. (S//NF) Despite the hoax, it appears true that Polanco was able 
to recruit Javier Guzman, a member of Martinelli's security detail, 
to participate in a plot that Guzman believed was real.  This 
reveals a serious vulnerability in the GOP's ability to protect 
senior officials.  According to press reports, Guzman's salary was 
$390/month, the typical starting pay for a Panamanian policeman. 
 
 
 
¶7. (S//NF) Meanwhile, Martin Olivares, the subject of the original 
name check, never appeared at any Panamanian port of entry. 
 
 
 
¶8. (S//NF) On February 2, Vice President Varela told Ambassador 
that Alfaro had complained to Martinelli that the Embassy had not 
provided any help in the kidnap investigations.  Alfaro believed 
this demonstrated that the USG is not a reliable security partner. 
As a result, Varela said, Alfaro had moved to bring in Israeli 
security consulting firm Global CST to advise on setting up a new 
protective detail for Martinelli.  Senior GOP leaders had 
previously engaged Global CST in  late 2009 to conduct a security 
study, but disengaged from the company after being advised of the 
USG's experience with Global CST in Colombia and Ecuador (ref B). 
 
 
 
¶9. (S//NF) Comment: From the very first time Ambassador met with 
Martinelli in early 2009, he displayed an obsessive concern with 
being the target of a kidnapping.  When Martinelli and his advisors 
began lobbying the Embassy in July 2009 for help in setting up a 
wiretap operation, the Martinelli kidnap scenario was a recurring 
theme.  Curiously, Martinelli and his security experts seem not to 
realize that Panama City is full of super-wealthy businessmen who 
provide ample targets for potential kidnappings, and any of them 
would be far easier to abduct and ransom than a head of state who 
possesses a multi-layered security apparatus.  Alfaro has cleverly 
used this episode to feed Martinelli's natural paranoia, throwing 
in additional creative elements like a fabricated FARC threat. 
Martinelli and Alfaro meet every morning, and by all accounts are 
consumed with plots and threats both real and imagined.  One source 
told us recently that Alfaro has tapped Martinelli's phone, and 
another source informed us that Martinelli has appointed a new 
number-two at the intel service to keep tabs on Alfaro.  At the 
same time, Embassy law enforcement officers have detected several 
instances of surveillance (ref A) which they believe to be the work 
of the CSPDN intel service.  Alfaro is increasingly open about his 
agenda to replace U.S. law enforcement and security support with 
Israelis and others, which not only poses specific threats to our 
extensive law enforcement work here, but also bodes ill for 
Panamanians' expectations of effective GOP action against 
skyrocketing crime. 
STEPHENSON