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R 101144Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0023
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000069 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA 
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/10 
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS NO
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN FM VISITS THE MIDDLE EAST: OSLO READOUT 
 
DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 (B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoere's meeting on the 
Middle East in Brussels (January 12) and then in the region 
(January 16-20) have led him to believe that Palestinian President 
Abbas is not in a position to move forward in the way that European 
and U.S. leaders want him to, due to internal political dynamics. 
Pressure on Abbas may make him even more recalcitrant, and the 
Norwegians counsel low-profile diplomacy.  On  the bilateral front, 
the Norwegians had productive meetings with high level Israeli 
government officials, including a good meeting with Foreign 
Minister Lieberman who proposed a list of areas of cooperation that 
both sides have agreed to work on to improve Norway-Israel 
relations.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) Deputy Chief of Mission and poloff met with MFA officials 
Jorn Gjelstad and Torunn Viste, Director and Deputy Director, 
respectively, of the MFA Middle East Section on February 8 for a 
readout of Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoere's trip to Brussels and 
then Israel.  All quotations in this cable, unless otherwise 
indicated, are of Gjelstad's words. 
 
 
 
BRUSSELS CONSENSUS: IT'S ABBAS'S MOVE 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Gjelstad said that the majority opinion in Brussels, in a 
meeting with Special Envoy Mitchell, French Foreign Minister 
Kuchner, EU Foreign Minister Ashton, Quartet Envoy Blair, Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Stoere and Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos, was 
that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has moved from his initial 
bargaining position ("which was zero") and is now ready for 
negotiations.  The general impression, Gjelstad said, was that the 
U.S. has extracted what it can from the Israelis, and it is now 
Palestinian President Abbas who has to move from his position of 
"stubbornness."  Kuchner was especially emphatic on this.  At the 
other end of the spectrum, Moratinos said that Abbas still needs 
something from the Israelis, including, perhaps, a statement from 
the U.S. that East Jerusalem should be included in negotiations. 
Moratinos said that a clearer "policy of confidence" was needed 
from the Israelis.  All agreed that Abbas needs support from Arab 
leaders if he is to take a step forward. 
 
 
 
AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE (AHLC) ISSUES 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Gjelstad said that the main Norwegian message on the AHLC 
was that public sector-led development is not sustainable. 
(Comment: emboffs have been hearing this message, along with the 
"donor fatigue" message, for over a year from various Norwegian 
interlocutors.)  Gjelstad began by saying that the work of the AHLC 
faced a great challenge in establishing the framework conditions 
for the Palestinian private sector's functioning.   Gjelstad said 
that according to Prime Minister Fayyad, there is great interest 
among investors in the region to come in and look for projects in 
Palestinian-controlled areas.  Fayyad told the GON that there is 
$1.2 billion "waiting in the Gulf states" that would be invested 
over the course of about two years, should the framework conditions 
improve.  Gjelstad said that amount would make current donor 
support seem insignificant. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) In Brussels, Tony Blair was forward looking on private 
investment, and said he would redouble efforts to remove 
economically strategic checkpoints that choke off trade.  Gjelstad 
said that development is currently totally dependent on the capital 
inflows from international donors, and local value creation was key 
to a sustainable Palestinian economy and political stability. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Gjelstad warned that European donors are cutting back their 
 
OSLO 00000069  002 OF 003 
 
 
funding, and have committed less than half of what they contributed 
in 2009: $230 million in pledges so far for 2010 versus $500 
million contributed last year.  Gjelstad interpreted this as a 
result not of the financial crisis, but of reduced faith that the 
money can have real results when there is no change in Israeli 
policy.  Summing up, Gjelstad said that the AHLC functions as a 
good preparation for capital-level political talks. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Gjelstad said that Stoere had a very interesting discussion 
in Brussels with Special Envoy Mitchell, in which the two agreed 
that there was no need for a pledging conference (especially the 
French proposal for one in Paris) absent a political breakthrough 
on the peace process.  The AHLC, they agreed, was not a pledging 
mechanism at all, but a venue to move forward on how to use the 
money already pledged.  On that basis, the next AHLC meeting would 
be in Brussels or (more likely) Madrid on the working level. 
Gjelstad put in a plea for Special Envoy Mitchell to attend, and 
said the Norwegian envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer will speak to Deputy 
Envoy Hale on this issue. 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN VIEW OF CONFLICT "CORRECTED" BY PALESTINIANS 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Gjelstad said that when Stoere went to the region and talked 
with Palestinian officials, the majority view in Brussels-that it 
was now Abbas's turn to make a move-was "corrected."  (Comment: the 
use of this word clearly indicates Gjelstad's view that Norway and 
Moratinos-not Kuchner, Ashton, and Blair-have a better 
understanding of the situation).  Gjelstad said that in the current 
environment, moving toward the negotiation table would "break 
Abbas's neck."  The Palestinians look at settlements in East 
Jerusalem as a policy of harassment, and Abbas wants a "silent 
moratorium" on expansion of already-existing settlements to create 
an atmosphere in which he can move ahead.  Incursions into the "A" 
areas and interference with well-functioning Palestinian security 
forces are humiliating and demoralizing. 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) The way forward according to the Palestinian side was 
twofold: (1) there must be a greater level of sensitivity toward 
creating an atmosphere conducive to negotiations, and (2) the terms 
of reference for the negotiations are very important and must 
include reference to the 1967 borders and the issue of East 
Jerusalem. 
 
 
 
PRESSURE ON ABBAS WON'T WORK 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) After meeting with Prime Minister Fayyad, Stoere's view, 
according to Gjelstad, was that the more public pressure there is 
on Abbas to approach the negotiating table, the more he will 
resist, as he cannot politically survive the impression of weakness 
that caving to that pressure would create.  In fact, resisting the 
pressure actually helps his political standing.  While the chasm 
between the Israeli and Palestinian positions has narrowed 
somewhat, the bridge offered to Abbas is neither wide nor strong 
enough for him to politically cross.  Gjelstad emphasized, 
therefore, that the only way to work these issues is through 
low-profile, quiet diplomacy.  He said that Special Envoy Mitchell 
agrees, and that there is a limited window of opportunity in the 
coming weeks. 
 
 
 
PRODUCTIVE BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS 
 
 
 
¶11. (U) While in Israel, Stoere met with Deputy Prime Minister Dan 
 
OSLO 00000069  003 OF 003 
 
 
Meridor, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, Defense Minister Ehud 
Barak, President Shimon Peres, and opposition Kadima party leader 
Tzipora Livni. 
 
 
 
¶12. (C) Lieberman pointedly refused to answer any questions about 
whether he could support a two state solution.  Other than that, 
the meeting was very positive from the Norwegian side.  FM 
Lieberman presented FM Stoere with a list of areas of cooperation 
that Norway and Israel could work upon.  (Comment: Embassy Oslo has 
heard both from the MFA and from the Israeli embassy multiple times 
in the past year that the two countries' relations suffer from a 
meager number of bilateral issues that would give substance to the 
relationship.)  Lieberman's list included the negotiation and 
conclusion of an MOU on Research and Development cooperation, an 
expansion of cultural cooperation, cooperation on the relocation of 
the Israeli embassy in Oslo, and cooperation on OECD membership for 
Israel. 
 
 
 
¶13. (C) On the R&D MOU, which Gjelstad characterized as the most 
important of the issues, there is a state-to-state and a 
ministry-to-ministry option, the latter of which Gjelstad implied 
was more likely to be politically possible in Norway.  The MOU 
would likely cover four or five areas, including renewable energy, 
desalination of water, medical and biotech research, and other 
environmental technologies.  All of the issues have  importance for 
the whole Middle East region, said Gjelstad, and some areas of 
cooperation could eventually pull in Jordan and other regional 
players. 
 
 
 
¶14. (C) On the issue of cultural exchange, Gjelstad admitted that 
the bilateral nature of the discussion was something of a fig 
leaf-the real issue is not of getting Norwegian cultural 
representatives to Israel, as plenty go already.  The real issue is 
the difficulty of getting Israelis in front of Norwegian audiences 
of any type.  Norwegian institutions, Gjelstad said, often insist 
that if an Israeli visits, a Palestinian must visit, thereby 
putting every educational, artistic, or cultural exchange into a 
"peace context."  (Comment: Post finds this to be a telling 
commentary on the narrow view many Norwegians have of Israel, and 
of the politicization of the very concept of "Israel" in Norway. 
Post believes that educational and cultural decision makers in 
Norway are afraid of criticism or controversy if they invite an 
Israeli to speak without counterbalancing his or her appearance 
with a Palestinian.) 
 
 
 
¶15. (C) Kadima leader Livni was clear that she wants a two state 
solution, which she sees as the only option.  According to 
Gjelstad, she likened failing to openly pursue a two state solution 
to "sitting on a volcano."  Livni said that her Kadima party was 
ready to fill the gap in a coalition government should there be a 
shift, and said that she doesn't think the negotiation of a two 
state solution is possible within the current coalition. 
 
 
 
¶16. (C) In a separate meeting with Ambassador and DCM on another 
subject February 8, MFA Director General for UN, Peace, and 
Humanitarian Affairs Geir Pedersen, who also accompanied FM Stoere, 
said that Israelis of all persuasions had expressed that Netanyahu 
had genuinely shifted his position and that now was the time to 
begin talks.  He expressed the belief that the Israeli PM now 
accepted the "two state solution."  Pedersen also indicated support 
for Special Envoy Mitchell's proposal to begin "proximity talks" 
between the Arabs and Palestinians. 
WHITE