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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000326 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM KNNP ENRG PK IN NSC
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE DISCUSSIONS 
IN MUMBAI 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 02398 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 00205 
 
Classified By: POL Minister Counselor Uzra Zeya for Reasons 1.4 (B) and 
 (D). 
 
¶1. C) SUMMARY:  U.S. and Indian interagency delegations met 
on the margins of the Civil Nuclear Energy Working Group 
(CNEWG) meeting in Mumbai Feb 3-4 to discuss collaboration on 
a Nuclear Security Center of Excellence (COE).  Continuing 
discussions on proposals that had been tabled previously, the 
Indians outlined an Indian Center that contained elements of 
both proposals.  Under the Indian proposal, U.S. involvement 
in the center would be to promote best practices for 
regulatory and physical security of existing nuclear 
processes and materials.  India's proposal focused on setting 
up a research and development center dedicated to the 
world-wide deployment of technologies based on a purportedly 
proliferation-resistant thorium fuel cycle. It also contained 
some elements related to the physical security of facilities. 
 The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) chair noted that the 
creation of their center was an Indian initiative that would 
not depend on U.S. involvement, underscoring that they 
envisioned the establishment of a sustainable institution 
rather than a medium-term cooperative project.  DAE welcomed 
U.S. and IAEA participation on an international advisory 
panel, but did not further elaborate on a U.S. role.  Though 
the Indian proposal did not fully meet the U.S vision for a 
COE, it demonstrated initiative and a welcome openness to 
serious engagement with the United States on cooperative 
nuclear security training and research programs.  Both 
delegations agreed to look for ways to work together on 
elements common to both proposals.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Two Visions for a Center of Excellence 
- - - 
 
¶2. (C) An interagency delegation, led by the National 
Security Council, met on the margins of the Civil Nuclear 
Working Group (CNWG) in Mumbai February 4 to discuss 
possibilities for collaboration on a U.S.-India Center of 
Excellence for Nuclear Security (COE).  The Indian 
delegation, led by Dr. Ravi Grover of the Department of 
Atomic Energy (DAE), also included Amandeep Singh Gill, 
Director of the Ministry of External Affairs' Disarmament and 
International Security Affairs Division. The U.S. proposal 
envisioned a focus on best practices and training on physical 
security, targeting an international audience of operators, 
regulators, security management, inspectors and response 
force personnel.  The aim was to announce the intention to 
collaborate on such a center with the Indian Government at 
the Nuclear Security Summit April 10-11 in Washington.  The 
Indian initiative, titled "Center of Excellence for Worldwide 
Deployment of Nuclear Energy," represented a different vision 
emphasizing instead the promotion of purportedly 
proliferation-resistant thorium fuel cycles with a strong 
emphasis on research and development. 
 
India's Vision:  Worldwide Deployment Center 
- - - 
 
¶3. (C) The Worldwide Deployment Center described by DAE would 
comprise four schools.  The main school would be dedicated to 
the design and analysis of nuclear energy systems to promote 
the worldwide deployment of thorium-based reactors which they 
claimed would be intrinsically proliferation resistant.  The 
focus on proliferation-proof thorium fuel plays to India's 
long-term leadership aspiration regarding thorium.  When 
questioned on the matter, however, Dr. Grover accepted the 
center could consider "other proposed systems."  The 
remaining three schools would have a component base for 
training and research on nuclear security including 
simulation, physical security, radiation measurement, 
protection devices, and radiation technology applications. 
These issues have some overlap with the topic areas of the 
proposed U.S. COE.  Discussion of engagement on these issues 
was a new and welcome development, a change from India's 
prior resistance to discussing collaboration on training and 
research. 
 
¶4. (C) Grover emphasized that sustainability was the "key" to 
the Worldwide Deployment Center.  He underscored the priority 
DAE placed on creating a center that could attract 
top-quality researchers who would not see a posting to the 
center as a dead-end job.  DAE had a vision of a composite 
 
NEW DELHI 00000326  002 OF 002 
 
 
center that could be a fertile think-tank about more than 
just nuclear security. Grover underscored that the Deployment 
Center would be an Indian government body, staffed by the 
DAE, whose primary focus was research and development.  The 
Center would include visiting scientists, scholars and an 
international advisory board, including U.S. and IAEA 
representatives, to consult on programs and training 
curricula.  However, how this international participation 
would work in practice was left unclear in the discussion. 
Cooperation Apart from Thorium 
- - - 
 
¶5. (C) The U.S. delegation stressed that the United States 
did not support thorium research, nor could U.S. involvement 
be construed as an endorsement of the commercial promotion of 
thorium-based reactors.  In response, Grover implied that the 
DAE already had the funding it needed to establish such a 
center and was in the process of scouting land near Delhi on 
which to locate the center.  In a later off-line discussion, 
DISA Director Gill suggested that the money for the 
Deployment Center was not in place, leaving a door open for 
possible collaboration.  Grover seemed open to collaboration 
on training conducted at the center even if the United States 
was not involved in the main thorium component of the center. 
The U.S. delegation promised to develop U.S. views on the 
thorium focus of the center, although it was not part of the 
original COE vision and the commercial deployment and 
promotion aspects of the program could likely not be endorsed 
by the United States. 
 
¶6. (C) The U.S. delegation representative from the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission noted that the Indian proposal made no 
mention of the role of regulation in nuclear security. 
Grover made clear that Indian regulators had not been 
consulted about the COE, but offered to inquire whether 
regulatory issues might be included in the curriculum.  The 
DAE planned to announce the construction of the center at the 
Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in April and asked that the 
U.S. welcome the announcement.  In a sidebar discussion U.S. 
delegation representatives underscored that in addition to 
potential concerns about the thorium component of the 
proposal, the project title "Worldwide Deployment" could be 
problematic in the context of the Nuclear Security Summit. 
 
Meeting with Rao 
- - - 
 
¶7.  (C) In subsequent meetings on the sidelines of the 
Sous-Sherpa Summit in the Hague February 12-13, the 
President's Nuclear Security Summit Sherpa Gary Samore held a 
bilateral meeting with Foreign Secretary Rao in which the 
Indians continued their productive and helpful partnership on 
these issues.  In their discussion, FS Rao  helpfully 
referred to the proposed center as a "National Nuclear 
Center" rather than a "Worldwide Deployment" center. 
Recognizing that it would be India's center, the U.S. 
delegation again raised its concern about the research and 
development piece of the center being too narrowly focused on 
thorium, and suggested that India would attract a larger and 
potentially higher caliber of scientists it were more 
expansive.  Rao underscored that India would like to announce 
the Center during the Summit and then work with the United 
States on details for the collaboration in advance of 
President Obama's visit to India.  In a separate conversation 
at the Hague, DISA Director Gill, stated that India would 
provide the U.S. with an updated proposal based on these 
discussions. 
ROEMER