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DE RUEHNE #0242/01 0361003
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O 051003Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9406
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0275
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6618
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1849
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000242 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN/RA FOR KATHERINE CROFT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PARM PREL MCTRE KSCA ETTC IN IR SY
SUBJECT: INDIAN RESPONSE TO ONWARD PROLIFERATION CASES, 
EXPORT CONTROLS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 116165 
 
Classified By: A/POL Les Viguerie for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. Two officials in the Ministry of External 
Affairs (MEA) Office of Disarmament and International 
Security Affairs (DISA) gave us a verbal response February 3 
to the outstanding onward proliferation cases (reftel) raised 
during the November 2009 Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD). 
While insisting on a written response may create further 
challenges for India's bureaucracy, a future SSD may want to 
explore creating a more formalized mechanism or process for 
responding to onward proliferation cases.  They also shared 
the same Indian response to the export controls roadmap 
provided to the Department January 30.  Indian officials have 
expressed their hope for a response in time for the High 
Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) meeting tentatively 
scheduled for mid-March.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Indian Response to Export Controls Roadmap 
- - - 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a meeting February 3, Ministry of External 
Affairs Technology Unit Director Sandeep Arya and Disarmament 
and International Security Affairs (DISA) Deputy Secretary 
Vipul shared a nonpaper response to the export controls 
roadmap that General Jones passed to National Security 
Advisor Narayanan in November 2009.  (Note:  The nonpaper is 
identical to the paper the Indian Embassy in Washington 
passed to Assistant Secretary Blake January 30. End Note.) 
Vipul was keen to gauge USG initial response to the nonpaper, 
but understood that the Indian proposal was complex and that 
a formal response could take time.  (Note:  Indian 
participants at the Civil Nuclear Energy Working Group 
(CNEWG) underway in Mumbai expressed their hope of receiving 
a response in time for the High Technology Cooperation Group 
(HTCG) meeting tentatively scheduled for mid-March.  End 
Note.) 
 
Response to Outstanding Onward Proliferation Cases 
- - - 
 
¶3. (S) Arya gave a verbal response to the outstanding onward 
proliferation cases (ref A) discussed on the margins of the 
November 2009 meeting of the Strategic Security Dialogue 
(SSD). Of the 13 outstanding cases the Government considered 
four officially closed and two ongoing.  Arya explained that 
the seven remaining onward proliferation cases were either 
very old or had been raised before he took responsibility for 
this portfolio just over a year ago.  His files and inquiries 
with other ministries did not turned up information on these 
cases, and he thus considered them closed.  He said he would 
be willing to examine the cases if new information is 
available. 
 
¶4. (S) The Indian Government considers the following cases 
closed: 
 
¶I.  Goal Scientific Glass Works Pvt Ltd. and Garg Scientific 
Glass Industries (glass reactor equipment):  This case 
concerning transfers of glass reactor equipment to Syria was 
first raised in December 2008.  Arya explained that both 
companies have ceased their contact with the prospective 
Syrian buyer. 
 
II.  Nickunj Eximp Enterprises (graphite):  This case 
concerning the sale of graphite blocks to Iran and was first 
raised in October 2007.  Following a judicial process, a 
court ruled against the firm, resulting in the confiscation 
of the nuclear-grade graphite, which remains in the 
possession of the Indian government.  The company and its 
director were also reportedly fined.  The case is closed, 
though Arya said he could not guarantee the firm would not 
appeal. 
 
III.  Premier Explosives Ltd. and Rajasthan Explosives and 
Chemicals Ltd. (explosive detonators):  First raised in 
January 2009, this case concerned the sale of two million 
explosive detonators reportedly controlled under the 
Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List to Syria's Industrial 
Establishment of Defense.  The Indian government found that 
 
NEW DELHI 00000242  002 OF 002 
 
 
the particular detonator chords sold fell outside the range 
of diameter and capacity for chords controlled by the 
Wassenaar Arrangement, and thus no violation took place. 
 
IV.  Ordnance Factory Board and MKU Pvt. Ltd. (explosive 
nitroamine RDX):  This 2009 case involved the possible sale 
of 500 tons of explosive nitroamine RDX to Syria.  The 
supplier, a public sector entity, reportedly decided against 
the sale when it was made aware that it would be contrary to 
India's export control policies.  Arya explained that 
conventional explosives in India are manufactured by public 
sector entities, which are required to seek permission from 
the Ministry of Defense (MOD) prior to the sale of ordnance 
to foreign governments or buyers.  In this case, the firm 
learned through the normal process that the sale would be 
contrary to India,s export control policies and terminated 
the sale.  Arya speculated that the USG may have learned of 
the possible sale before the firm sought the MOD's approval. 
 
¶5. (S) The following cases are active and pending: 
 
¶I.  High Pressure Gauges:  Arya did not mention the case by 
name, but appeared to refer to the case of the Hind High 
Vacuum Company (sample capacitance diaphragm gauge).  Arya 
said the gauges appeared routine rather than the very high or 
very low pressure gauges covered under any control lists, but 
this remained to be confirmed. (Note:  According to Ref A, 
the issue related not to gauge-type but to the Iranian buyer, 
which is an entity designated under UN Security Council 
Resolution 1747 for its involvement in Iran's nuclear 
program.  End Note.) 
 
II.  Sale of Aluminum Powder to Iran:  Arya did not mention 
the firm by name, but appeared to refer to the case of Sri 
Kaliswari Metal Powders Ltd., an Indian firm that was 
negotiating  with Iran's SARA Company for the sale of 50 
metric tons of powder suitable for use in the production of 
solid rocket propellant.  Arya noted that there is a wide 
range of quality of aluminum powder.  He said the "spherical 
powder," which is used in propellants, is controlled by the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but that the powder 
in this case appeared to be "atomized powder" not controlled 
under the MTCR.  Arya stressed that this was a provisional 
assessment and the case was not yet closed. 
 
No Written Responses 
- - - 
 
¶6. (S) PolOff reminded Arya that the U.S. delegation to the 
Strategic Security Dialogue had requested responses on onward 
proliferation cases in writing.  Arya replied that the Indian 
government took seriously its commitment to prevent onward 
proliferation and viewed such informal information exchanges 
as an important part of our bilateral relationship, but he 
explained that he would not be authorized to share more 
formal, written responses unless the government established a 
more formal mechanism to share such information.  Absent 
that, the government considered a verbal response the 
appropriate mechanism. 
 
¶7. (S) Comment:  Insisting on written responses absent a 
formal mechanism would be a highly cumbersome process in 
India's bureaucracy and might slow down the response 
mechanism even further.  Establishing a formal mechanism 
could be a useful agenda item for the next meeting of the 
Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD).  In the mean time, we may 
get more traction on onward proliferation cases if we 
accompany demarches on new cases with a running list of cases 
we consider outstanding, including any additional information 
on outstanding cases that may have come to light.  End 
Comment. 
 
 
ROEMER