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OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0085/01 0401124
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 091124Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7683
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0071
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0043
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000085 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR EAP/CM 
STATE FOR AF/RSA - MAZEL, GRIESMER, BOWLES 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL EAID CN CD
SUBJECT: CHAD:  CHINESE ENGAGEMENT AND POTENTIAL AREAS FOR 
COOPERATION 
 
REF: STATE 10152 
 
¶1.  (U)  Following paras provide answers to reftel request 
for information on Chinese engagement in Chad in advance of 
the U.S-China sub-regional dialogue to be held in Washington 
March 4. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  China's major investment in Chad is in oil 
exploration and refining.  In 2008 the China National 
Petroleum Company, operating as a 60 per cent partner in a 
joint venture with the Chadian National Hydrocarbon Company 
(40 per cent), began building a refinery north of N'Djamena. 
The facility is expected to produce 20,000 barrels a day once 
it becomes fully operational.  The initiative aimed initially 
at supplying Chad's internal petroleum requirements.  In 2009 
new oil fields being developed with Chinese assistance showed 
promise of having sufficient yield that a quantity of oil is 
likely to be exported, perhaps through an existing Esso-Chad 
pipeline across Cameroon to ports on the coast.  The 
pipeline-sharing arrangement, if it comes to fruition, will 
require that the Chinese-Chadian joint venture adhere to 
Esso's high standards of environmental protection and 
financial transparency. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Chinese firms are also engaged in cement 
production, road-paving and reconstruction of Chad's National 
Assembly, destroyed in rebel attacks in 2008.  Cement workers 
are the only Chinese laborers to have been accused by local 
Chadians of exploitative practices and disregard for the 
customs of citizens dwelling near their area of operation. 
Although Chadians speak disparagingly of the quality of 
Chinese products in markets, and suspect that China is 
dumping consumer merchandise of too low a quality to attract 
current buyers in the country of origin, general attitudes 
toward the Chinese are relatively positive in Chad.  Road 
workers with Chinese firms operating in N'Djamena seem to be 
viewed with gratitude -- not surprising given the state of 
Chad's transportation network.  Chadians appear eager to 
patronize a recently-arrived team of Chinese medical experts 
(some traditional and some Western-oriented) who have set up 
shop in a Chinese-built and run hotel in N'Djamena.  Chadians 
turn out in force at the numerous Chinese restaurants here. 
President Deby uses a private room in one of N'Djamena's 
longest-established Chinese (actually Taiwan) restaurants to 
entertain state visitors. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Our current Chinese Embassy contacts are 
presentable and personable.  They speak good French, engage 
actively in P-5 initiatives, and seem not to disdain Chad for 
its many problems or to regret their lives in this rather 
austere diplomatic community.  On October 1, 2009, the 
Chinese Ambassador delivered a speech -- widely carried in 
the local media -- stating that his nation sought to move 
beyond its previous lack of transparency in assistance 
provision and to coordinate openly with other donors and with 
Chadians at all levels to ensure that Chinese investments and 
aid served Chad's needs and meshed with activities of the 
rest of the international community.  The Chinese Ambassador 
has since spoken several times with us and with French and EU 
counterparts to emphasize that he is interested in gathering 
information on what educational and health projects his 
nation could usefully undertake to complement initiatives 
already under way through the sponsorship of other donors. 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The Chinese Ambassador has made clear to us that 
his nation seeks stability and better governance in Chad -- 
two goals we share.  He has also offered that his nation 
doubts the value of democracy in Chad and elsewhere, and that 
in his view, a communist party would do Chad much good.  The 
Chinese Ambassador has expressed concern that Chadian 
elections, if not carried out in an acceptable manner, could 
provoke dissatisfaction and destablilization -- in order to 
help ensure that Chad's 2010 electoral process is credible, 
China has decided to contribute USD 250,000 to the operating 
 
NDJAMENA 00000085  002 OF 002 
 
 
budget of the Independent Electoral Commission (CENI).  The 
notion of China helping to fund an election has provoked some 
surprise, but no opposition, on the part of democratic 
representatives here. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Beyond its current projects, China seems 
interested in helping Chad with basic education, girls' 
education, scientific education, Chinese language teaching, 
and medical assistance, including in infant and maternal 
health, malaria treatment and treatment of diarrheal 
diseases.  The Chinese have also told us that they would be 
willing to help Chad's agricultural sector, but its problems 
are so numerous that they don't know where to start.  No 
current U.S.-China joint projects are under way as of yet, 
but we think there is potential in any of the areas above. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Chad has had relations variously with China and 
Taiwan over the years, and President Deby has been known to 
express nostalgia for the quality of Taiwan-made goods.  Deby 
has also referred in both more and less direct statements to 
concerns that China's long-standing close relations with 
Sudan imply that it is not a neutral player in Chad.  We do 
not share this perception.  As for Taiwan, some of its 
investors remain here in private capacities, and a Taiwan 
construction firm left as the island's legacy the one major 
bridge across the Chari River, known locally as the Taiwan 
Bridge.  (Two parallel rivers divide Chad from Cameroon, so 
the Taiwan bridge is Chad's lifeline to the most stable of 
its neighbors, and one with a coastline.) This seems not to 
bother our Chinese counterparts, who have never sought to 
engage with us on Taiwan's status, Tibet or other points of 
contention in the U.S.-China relationship. 
 
¶8.  (U) Minimize considered. 
NIGRO