VZCZCXRO4035
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0070/01 0331201
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021201Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7653
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000070 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF UN PKO CT CD
SUBJECT: MINURCAT WITHDRAWAL: NO AGREEMENT, BUT COMPROMISE 
SOLUTION STILL POSSIBLE, SAY SRSG AND GEN CAMMAERT 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 063 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 049 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 048 
 
Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
----------- 
SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The Cammaert Mission prepares to leave Chad Feb 2 
without having definite agreement from the GOC on a plan of 
withdrawal for MINURCAT that would satisfy UN goals and 
security requirements.  The GOC wants MINURCAT's military 
component out soon but would permit its civilian component to 
stay until 2011, which is unacceptable to the UN.  The UN 
wants an organized, phased withdrawal, with a timeline based 
on "benchmarks" related to the orderly "handover" of security 
and civilian responsibilities to Chadian authorities, over 12 
to 18 months.  The SRSG continues to see the possibility of a 
compromise solution to permit enough MINURCAT military to 
protect MINURCAT's civilians over an adequate withdrawal 
period because the Chadians wish to avoid an abrupt departure 
of MINURCAT. 
 
¶2.  (C) The compromise solution that Cammaert outlined and 
that the SRSG believes possible for the Chadians to accept 
would satisfy in principle both elements of the GOC's request 
for MINURCAT's withdrawal -- an actual drawdown, especially 
of MINURCAT's military strength, that conforms to UNSC 1861. 
As the action shifts to New York, it remains to be seen if 
the GOC have the political maturity and geopolitical prudence 
to grasp this "win-win" solution and justify SRSG Angelo's 
public optimism about its "flexibility."  END SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT. 
 
---------- 
MINURCAT 
WITHDRAWAL 
---------- 
 
¶3.  (C) SRSG Angelo and GEN Cammaert told Perm Five 
ambassadors February 1 that they have discussed three options 
for MINURCAT withdrawal with the GOC over the past few days. 
 
----------- 
GOC OPTIONS 
----------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Cammaert said that CONAFIT head GEN Dagache, speaking 
for the GOC, had offered up two options.  Option One would be 
for MINURCAT military component to depart Chad NLT 31 May 
2010, while MINURCAT civilian components stay in Chad until 
March 2011 or beyond. (This was the GOC's preferred option, 
Cammaert said.)  Option Two would be "immediate withdrawal" 
of all MINURCAT components from Chad NLT 31 July 2010. 
 
¶5.  (C) GEN Cammaert countered that Option One was impossible 
for the UN, because the civilian components could not stay 
after the military components departed, for security reasons 
and that Option Two was undesirable and did not conform to 
UNSC 1861, because it did not permit MINURCAT to "hand off" 
its security responsibilities to Chad security forces in any 
organized, structured manner:  Option Two would result in 
effect in a security deficit in eastern Chad. 
 
----------- 
A THIRD WAY 
----------- 
 
¶6.  (C) GEN Cammaert explained that the best way to proceed 
was either an Option Three or a modification of the GOC's 
Option Two.  Cammaert said that MINURCAT could stage an 
organized, phased withdrawal, with a timeline based not on 
fixed dates but on "benchmarks" related to the orderly 
"handover" of security responsibilities to Chadian security 
forces and of civilian responsibilities to Chad civil 
 
NDJAMENA 00000070  002 OF 002 
 
 
authorities, both based on careful analysis of the GOC's 
security and other capQities.  Such an organized, phased 
withdrawal, with a bench-mark-based timeline could be 
accomplished within 12 to 18 months, according to Cammaert. 
 
------------- 
SRSG SEES GOC 
"FLEXIBILITY" 
------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) SRSG said that he believed that the GOC understood 
that its preferred option was not possible and that the GOC 
was showing some flexibility in finding a way to maintaining 
MINURCAT's civilian activities while its military component 
drew down.  The trick, Angelo surmised, would be in some 
compromise on how many MINURCAT military would remain in Chad 
to provide security for MINURCAT's civilian components as the 
organized, phased withdrawal proceeded.  The GOC would have 
to accept a continued MINURCAT military presence if it wanted 
to retain the PKO's civilian presence over the withdrawal 
period.  SRSG said he thought that the GOC was 
"uncomfortable" with a very abrupt departure of MINURCAT and 
wanted to avoid that. 
 
------------- 
CAMMAERT TEAM 
DEPARTS FEB 2 
------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) GEN Cammaert said that his team would depart the 
night of February 2, but that he remained open to talking to 
the GOC until then.  He said that he would report his 
mission's findings to the UNSYG as soon as possible. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The compromise solution that Cammaert outlined and 
that the SRSG believes possible for the Chadians to accept 
would satisfy in principle both elements of the GOC's request 
for MINURCAT's withdrawal -- an actual drawdown, especially 
of MINURCAT's military strength, that conforms to UNSC 1861. 
As the action shifts to New York, it remains to be seen if 
the GOC have the political maturity to grasp this "win-win" 
solution and justify SRSG Angelo's public optimism about its 
"flexibility."  END COMMENT. 
 
¶10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
NIGRO