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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7727

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF WYCOFF AND CARSON 
STATE FOR AF/C LOPEZ 
STATE FOR S/USSES GRATION 
STATE FOR DS/IP/AF MEEHAN AND ANDREWS 
STATE FOR DS/T/ATA 
STATE FOR DRL KRAMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ASEC CD
SUBJECT: LEAHY VETTING REVERSAL AGAIN PUTS USG HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS AT RISK 
 
REF: A. 09 N'DJAMENA 390 
     ¶B. 09 N'DJAMENA 433 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶C. N'DJAMENA 42 
     ¶D. 09 STATE 52763 
     ¶E. TD-314/023224-08 
 
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Sue Bremner, for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  In September 2009, via Ref A, Ambassador Nigro 
sought the AF Bureau's assistance in resolving 
intra-Departmental disputes over sectoral issues, including 
management of the Leahy vetting process, that were hindering 
progress toward broad U.S. goals in Chad: regional 
stabilization, countering violent extremism, and most 
important in the context to which the Ambassador referred at 
the time, encouraging improved governance through targeted 
police and military training in human rights standards and 
rule of law.  Following a period during which, on 
instruction, we asked the Chadian National Army to make 
repeated changes to placement in the military chain of 
command of a unit set up at USG behest to receive our 
training, we were elated that our many descriptions (Ref B 
and previous) of why training furthered U.S. goals, did not 
run counter to Leahy provisions, and should thus be permitted 
to take place without further ado seemed to be accepted by 
the Department as a whole. 
 
¶2.  (C)  We have very much looked forward to resumption not 
only of mil-to-mil training for Chadian army officers, but 
also to police training through the ATA program.  DS has 
planned five courses in the first six months of this year for 
selected Chadian law enforcement personnel, focused on rule 
of law, evidentiary law, forensic analysis, and instructor 
development.  In preparing for the training courses, we have 
coordinated closely with French Embassy colleagues, as they 
also sponsor rule of law training programs for Chadian police 
and gendarmes, and as we and they want our respective efforts 
to be mutually reinforcing. 
 
¶3.  (C)  On January 25, we sent in Ref C, with the names and 
reporting chains of a group of law enforcement officers whom 
we proposed training in evidentiary law, making clear that no 
derogatory information on any of them could be found locally. 
 Many of the names were proposed to us by the French Embassy. 
 On February 17, we received e-mail clearance from the 
Department to proceed with the training course.  DS trainers 
arrived in N'Djamena February 18, along with seven pallets of 
training equipment.  The instructors are set to begin the 
training course in evidentiary law on February 22, following 
an opening ceremony involving ranking national police 
officials and gendarmes. 
 
¶4.  (C)  We were surprised that after COB on February 19, the 
last working day before the training course is scheduled to 
begin, we received a series of e-mails from the Department 
essentially rescinding DRL's earlier clearance on the 
e-instruction to us to go ahead with the course.  DRL 
asserted that some of the individuals belonged to "units" on 
which "credible evidence of gross human rights abuses" 
existed.  Apart from the procedural problems that the 
Department's latest e-instruction poses not only for Embassy 
personnel but also for approved TDY visitors from the 
Department, we do not believe that information presented by 
DRL constitutes evidence of gross human rights violations on 
the part of the units of those of our prospective trainees 
that are in question. 
 
¶5.  (C)  DRL's stated concerns seem to center on some of the 
18 individuals in various police units reporting to the 
Chadian Interior Ministry, not on the six gendarmes who are 
also slated to take part in the February 22 training group. 
The gendarmerie reports to the Ministry of Defense; we 
believe that our previous descriptions of chains of command 
there should be sufficient to render moot any notion that 
Ministry of Defense personnel are a priori unsuitable for USG 
training by virtue of Leahy provisions.  The 18 individuals 
reporting through various chains of command to the Ministry 
of Interior consist of four immigration/border control agents 
with responsibilities for people-trafficking; three 
under-cover police inspectors who gather evidence and present 
it to uniformed police for law enforcement action; four 
forensic scientists working for the uniformed police; two 
drug enforcement agents; two members of Chad's "judiciary 
police," equivalent to French "huissiers," whose duties are 
explained in more detail below; and three uniformed police 
 
(equivalent to "beat cops" in U.S. parlance).  All 18 of 
these individuals and their chains of command have as their 
broad mandate enforcing Chad's Civil and Penal Codes, French 
colonial-era documents whose laws closely resemble those of 
France.  None are charged with managing the Chadian armed 
rebellion or individuals considered sympathetic to it -- 
these tasks fall to the DGSSIE, ANS and Chadian National 
Army. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ref D, from May 2009, states that "Past vetting has 
revealed credible allegations against, for example, the 
Police Intelligence and Immigration Police."  We assume that 
this statement makes reference to Chad's under-cover police 
and to its border control agents.  As specific evidence of 
wrongdoing on the part of the under-cover police, DRL's 
e-mail offers Ref E, although our reading of that item 
suggests that the entities accused of human rights violations 
were in fact the DGSSIE and ANS, "intelligence" bodies 
properly defined, not connected with the Chadian police, and 
as noted above generally charged with managing Chadian rebels 
and those associated with them -- who are, as pointed out in 
our Human Rights Report, sometimes subjected to extrajudicial 
detention and ill treatment. 
 
¶7.  (C)  DRL's e-mail refers to claims by local human rights 
groups, which we have included in our Human Rights Report, 
that secret detention facilities exist under the control of 
"immigration police."  The Koro Toro facility, said to be 
managed by highly-placed individuals in the Ministry of 
Interior but not/not under control of Chad's 
immigration/border control service, is indeed a blot on 
Chad's human rights record, and one that the Chadian media 
and even its Justice Ministry are trying to close.  Detainees 
at the facility generally consist of those suspected of 
having ties to armed opposition groups and rebel military 
forces outside Chad.  These individuals are usually the 
charges of the DGSSIE and ANS, although under-cover police 
sometimes gather information on them and provide it to 
others, and "judicial police" sometimes serve them with 
papers.  Post knows of no evidence that Chad's 
immigration/border control agents, as distinct from the 
DGSSIE, ANS, and elements of the ANT patrolling near the 
border with Sudan looking for armed rebels, are responsible 
for managing secret detention facilities. 
 
¶8.  (C)  As for the judiciary police, this force's mandate 
resembles that of "huissiers" in the French system and 
bailiffs in the British one.  Judicial police study evidence 
gathered by other forces, make sure that it meets standards 
of law, serve papers to those suspected of crimes, and 
sometimes question suspects in connection with specific 
pieces of evidence.  By law, they may only detain individuals 
for three days -- so it is likely that even if they 
collaborate with groups known to violate suspects'/prisoners' 
rights, they are not primary actors in this regard.  DRL has 
included in our Human Rights Report a claim by a local human 
rights organization that a Chadian individual suspected of 
rebel sympathies was "detained without charge" by the 
"judicial police."  Apart from the fact that the individual 
has now been set free for lack of evidence, we feel it is 
important to point out that he was held beyond the three days 
permitted to the judicial police by others in Chad's 
extensive law enforcement network, not by the judicial police. 
 
¶9.  (C)  The large number of law enforcement entities in Chad 
obviously bespeaks suspicion of the Chadian population on the 
part of "authorities."  Individuals in uniform are known to 
commit abuses against citizens on a regular basis.  The 
segment of Chadian society that is most deficient in its 
understanding of human rights standards and rule of law is 
the uniformed sector writ large, both the military and law 
enforcement officials.  This is precisely the reason for 
which we propose to engage with some of the more progressive 
elements in this sector.  We want to give contacts whom our 
international partners believe are worth cultivating the 
tools to encourage their fellows to adhere to higher human 
rights standards in performance of duties.  We want to become 
directly involved once again, after too long a hiatus, in 
encouragement of rule of law through direct action in 
addition to exhortation.  We gain national credibility by 
doing so. 
 
¶10.  (C)  We do not believe we have been presented with 
convincing arguments as to why we should take the highly 
unusual and visible step of canceling a long-planned training 
initiative.  Nor do we believe we have been given an 
 
instruction that takes into account the practicalities of our 
situation this weekend.  If Department as a whole wants us to 
cancel the training or withdraw invitations for some 
participants, we request instruction laying out what benefit 
will accrue to the USG in our undertaking this course of 
action, and including talking points for use with Chadian 
officials making clear what the rationale is for specifying 
it. 
BREMNER