VZCZCXRO5506
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0102/01 0471854
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161854Z FEB 10 ZDK ZUI RUEHMV 6986 SVC. VOL ALL OTHERS
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7712
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NDJAMENA 000102 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SU LY CD
SUBJECT: CHAD-SUDAN:  DEBY BRIEFS GRATION ON KHARTOUM TRIP, 
MINURCAT, CHAD REBELS, JEM 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 97 
 
NDJAMENA 00000102  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'affaires a.i. Sue Bremner, for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno received S/USSES 
General Scott Gration and Embassy officials February 16 for a 
friendly and wide-ranging discussion of Chad-Sudan relations, 
including Deby's visit the previous week to Khartoum.  Deby 
expressed concern that Sudan might not in the end be in a 
position to manage anti-Chad rebels according to the recent 
Chad-Sudan agreement, whereby rebel movements were to go 
home, stay put as refugees, or choose third countries by 
February 21.  Deby advised that he and Sudan President Omar 
Al Bashir had agreed on a "hotline" arrangement for mutual 
telephonic alerts if one side felt that rebels on the other's 
territory were threatening attack.  Deby asserted that he had 
broken definitively with the JEM, and asked for U.S. help in 
pressing home the notion that transformation into a political 
entity was the only course left for the Sudan rebel movement. 
 
 
¶2.  (C)  Gration and Deby spoke about the need for political 
and economic development, and international assistance to 
that end, both in Darfur and in Eastern Chad, once stability 
returned to the region.  Gratio raised MINURCAT's mandate, 
making similar pointsto those he had deployed with Chadian 
Ministers he previous day (reftel).  Deby emphasized that 
thre was no possibility of renewing MINURCAT's curent 
mandate," but acknowledged that neither didhe intend "to 
evict the PKO in a brutal manner," hich would harm Chad's 
interests.  (FM Moussa Faki Mahamat informed Charge that he 
had presented written U.S. points on MINURCAT to Deby in a 
pre-brief following Gration's meeting with Faki February 15.) 
 On domestic matters, Gration stressed that the U.S. was 
watching Chad's electoral preparations closely, in the hope 
that votes later this year and next would give further 
evidence that Chad was making progress toward democratic 
standards.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------- 
U.S. GOALS FOR SUDAN, REGION 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  General Gration described his upcoming trip to 
Sudan, including locations in the South, stressing U.S. 
aspirations for the Sudan electoral process, for regional 
stabilization and for political development and dialogue 
throughout the nation.  He thanked President Deby and FM Faki 
for their leadership and willingness to take risks, not only 
in helping to broker improved relations between Chad and 
Sudan, but also in demonstrating commitment to the 
possibility of durable peace in the region and an end to 
human suffering in both nations affected by the Darfur 
crisis. 
 
-------------------------- 
DEBY'S MISSION TO KHARTOUM 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Deby agreed that political processes seemed to be on 
track in South Sudan, and emphasized that the time had 
clearly come to put an end to the huge waste of human and 
other capital that continued in Darfur.  Deby claimed that he 
had reached the decision to travel to Sudan February 8-9 "to 
give my brothers in Khartoum a way out" of their supposed 
previous strategy of diverting attention from Sudan-internal 
questions by pursuing regime change in Chad.  Deby indicated 
that his primary message for Al Bashir had been that Chad and 
Sudan shared strategic interests, and that they therefore had 
no reason to fight.  Chad wanted good bilateral relations 
with Sudan, said Deby, to the point where he himself had 
decided to cut the JEM loose, despite complications that 
doing so had caused within in his Zaghawa clan. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000102  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Deby described his series of meetings in Khartoum 
as generally good, adding that he believed Chad and Sudan 
were now on a productive bilateral path.  But he offered that 
political decisions still needed to be made by Khartoum with 
respect to management of remaining Chadian rebels on Sudanese 
territory.  Many agreements had been signed in the past 
between Chad and Sudan, and among the various rebel 
movements, but they had not come to fruition.  Chad had the 
political will to do its part to bring the January 15 Accord 
into being, as witnessed by its decision to break with the 
JEM.  Whether Sudan would be able to take similar action with 
Chad rebels remained to be seen -- Chad was waiting for Sudan 
to turn the page and put relations with these groups in the 
past.  Chad very much wanted the goals of the January 15 
Accord to be reached.  But vigilance would be necessary no 
matter what happened. 
 
----------- 
CHAD REBELS 
----------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Chad rebels inside Sudan were not yet 
dismantled, said Deby.  Some had simply been moved from south 
to north Darfur.  They might prove very hard for Sudan to 
control, and one day they might again try to attack Chad. 
Chad wanted them to come home and join the reconciliation 
process here, in keeping with the October 2007 Sirte 
Agreement between the GoC and Chadian armed opposition.  One 
of the agreements reached in Khartoum the previous week with 
Al Bashir, said Deby, was establishment of a mechanism 
whereby either president could call the other to pass 
information about rebel movements that appeared determined to 
attack from the neighboring state.  The mechanism would allow 
for discussion and intervention before problems became severe. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Gration pointed out that only five days remained 
before the February 21 deadline for rebels to return home or 
accept refugee status.  Deby reiterated that he would welcome 
continued rebel returns to Chad, particularly returns of 
rebel commanders.  If some rebels chose to go to third 
countries, so be it -- several nations would likely make room 
for them.  Chad would rather that rebels return home or go to 
third countries than remain in Sudan, where they had received 
support and training in the past.  In particular rebel 
leaders would cause problems if permitted to remin in Sudan. 
Gration made clear that he would continue to press Sudan to 
demobilize and disarm remaining Chadian rebels by the 
February 21 deadline. 
 
--- 
JEM 
--- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Gration asked Deby whether he thought the JEM could 
be persuaded to lay down its arms and transform itself into a 
political movement.  Gration added that although he had not 
spoken with Khaili Ibrahim in some time, he would be willing 
to do so, including in N'Djamena, if an opportunity arose in 
the course of Chad's efforts to bring Khalil to the city to 
meet with Sudanese Presidential Adviser Ghazi Salahhudin. 
Gration reminded Deby that when news of JEM military activity 
in Darfur reached international ears, a portion of listeners 
automatically assumed that Chad was involved.  Some believed 
that Chad was continuing to assist the JEM. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Deby interjected, "How could this possibly be the 
case?"  Gration acknowledged that the relationship between 
Chad and the JEM was at this stage more of a perceived one 
than a current reality.  Deby pointed out that prior to 2006, 
he had not permitted either the JEM or SLA factions to enter 
Chadian territory.  "I knew that these guys would cause 
problems, and I didn't want them wandering around Chad," he 
said.  "I personally disarmed an SLM faction in Adre and gave 
the weapons back to Sudan," Deby continued, referring to an 
incident from earlier in the decade.  "I only started helping 
the JEM after N'Djamena was attacked."  Deby then recounted 
an incident from several weeks previously, which he said he 
 
NDJAMENA 00000102  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
had also told Al Bashir, where a group of wounded JEM 
fighters sought entry into Chad and were refused, with the 
exception of one individual whose life appeared to be in 
danger and who received treatment in medical facilities in 
Abeche.  Deby provided his own version of a description of 
the GoC ultimatum to JEM in mid-January, where Khalil was 
told by a variety of Chadian ministers and other 
influence-makers that he "needed to leave Chad, taking with 
him his logistic structures, vehicles, prisoners, and 
would-be government organs."  (NOTE:  Subsequent to the Deby 
meeting, Embassy received word from Chadian Ambassador to the 
U.S. Adoum Bechir that he (Bechir) had been instructed to 
"pick up" Khalil from Am Jarras and deliver him to N'Djamena, 
but Khalil in the end did not appear in Am Jarras as 
scheduled.  We will report septel if there are developments 
on this front.  END NOTE.) 
 
-------------------------- 
NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL AND 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Gration asked Deby what the international 
community could do to help with the bilateral normalization 
process, and what Deby felt might be the biggest challenge in 
implementing the January Accord.  Deby indicated that Chad 
and Sudan had a certain amount of work to do on a bilateral 
basis before determining what sort of international 
assistance might be helpful.  The two nations were capable of 
protecting their bilateral border.  Technical work was 
already under way on details for a border monitoring force, 
whose aim was to prevent any armed groups from continuing to 
travel back and forth.  The biggest challenge would be 
maintaining positive momentum -- the key would be to continue 
to hope.  The biggest risk was that the Chad rebels would 
refuse to accept reality and would try to resume attacks on 
Chad. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  In the medium term, Deby continued, Chad welcomed 
the involvement of friends in the international community, 
whom he listed as including the U.S., UN, EU and AU, among 
others.  This group could assist by helping all those on the 
Sudan side -- some of whom were not firmly committed to peace 
-- realize that the current plan was the most likely means of 
achieving regional stability, and that it therefore deserved 
full support.  The IC should also keep in mind that both 
Sudan and Chad had paid a high price in recent years, with 
the commercial sector and in some cases even governmental 
organs destroyed by fighting.  Development assistance was 
badly needed on both sides of the border. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Gration noted that many influential individuals 
were interested in encouraging stabilization in Darfur, 
including Thabo Mbeki, Ibrahim Gambari, Haile Makarios and 
others.  With Sudan's elections scheduled for April, the next 
two months would be critical if the various rebels were to be 
taken out of the equation once and for all.  A cease-fire 
would enhance local stability and would allow refugees and 
IDPs an opportunity to return home.  Returns would in the 
longer-term improve economic prospects.  The Darfur fighting 
had after all begun over resources, so economic solutions 
would be needed.  People deserved jobs, social stability, 
water, health care infrastructure, governmental structures 
and a justice system, so that they would see that their 
leadership was accountable to their wishes.  The United 
States was currently thinking about what a more stable region 
would require from the economic perspective.  We wanted 
Eastern Chad to contribute to regional stability and 
development. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Deby seized the topic, pointing out that 
developmental assistance was essential to Eastern Chad as 
well as to Darfur.  Redistribution of wealth was necessary in 
Sudan, as was power-sharing, he noted.  Both Chad and Sudan 
needed international help with reconstruction and 
infrastructure.  But economic development had to occur in 
tandem with provision of justice.  And even more basically, 
the fighting had to stop.  All sides needed to lay down their 
 
NDJAMENA 00000102  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
arms and engage in dialogue.  The international community 
should make this point as widely as possible.  The United 
States should press the GoS to negotiate with all rebel 
movements, especially JEM, in order to facilitate successful 
conclusion of the DOha process and addrss the rights of the 
people of Darfur. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Deby announced that he was skeptical of the Doha 
process, in part because all the players on theC(TQ!Ge(9>B 
Qocess with its political opposition and conveyed 
U.S. appreciation for the efforts that Chad was making on the 
electoral front.  We wanted the Chadian people "to have a 
genuine voice," and for elections to move Chad in the 
direction of democracy, he emphasized.  In Darfur, some armed 
movements were not currently permitted by the Sudan 
constitution to take part in the upcoming electoral process, 
but we were working with the GoS to see if constitutional 
changes might be possible to allow rebel leaders to become 
part of the government -- assuming that peace prevailed. 
Deby avowed that constitutional change would not be a high 
price for Sudan to pay for peace. 
 
-------- 
MINURCAT 
-------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  Gration raised the issue of MINURCAT's future, 
along the lines he had used with Chadian ministers a day 
previously, stressing that Chad's generally improving 
international image -- based on the many right steps the 
nation was taking -- would suffer if it were perceived as 
being preemptory with the UN. 
 
¶17.  (C)  Deby, who laughed when the subject came up, said 
that MINURCAT as it had originally been conceived had a 
limited mandate, up on March 15.  This had been the case with 
EUFOR a year previously.  As had been the case with EUFOR, 
when MINURCAT's mandate was up, it could not be renewed. 
This said, Chad was flexible in discussing the PKO's future, 
and very much wanted a political-level team from the UN to 
visit Chad to discuss next steps.  MINURCAT had a number of 
initiatives under way, including training the DIS, that Chad 
wanted to continue.  Chad did not intend to "evict MINURCAT 
in a brutal manner."  A troop draw-down schedule would need 
to be determined, in consultation with the UN.  MINURCAT's 
civilian projects in the East needed to be completed. 
MINURCAT had not been operationally effective from the 
military standpoint, but this did not mean that Chad wanted 
nothing further to do with the UN.  Chad was ready to discuss 
and negotiate, with the caveat that MINURCAT should not 
attempt to get involved in the Chad-Sudan normalization 
process. 
 
¶18.  (C)  (NOTE:  Prior to the meeting with Deby, FM Faki 
told Charge that he had passed the U.S. written points on 
MINURCAT to President Deby the day before, following his own 
meeting with Gration.  Faki said that Deby's comments to 
Gration would be made in light of the U.S. position contained 
in the points.  Subsequent to the meeting with Deby, Gration 
gave a brief read-out of the state of play to Rima Saleh, 
Acting MINURCAT SRSG.  Charge will brief Saleh in more detail 
February 17, including to A/S Carson's telcall with Deby and 
to AF efforts to reach out to the UN leadership.  END NOTE.) 
 
---------- 
 
NDJAMENA 00000102  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶19.  (SBU)  Gration reiterated that the U.S. very much wanted 
Deby to be successful in his efforts with Sudan and 
domestically in Chad.  We wanted Chad-Sudan bilateral 
dialogue to succeed, to see JEM at the negotiating table, to 
see the Chadian rebels disarmed and dismantled, and to help 
contribute to lasting peace in the region.  Deby thanked 
Gration for U.S. interest and willingness to be a part of a 
durable solution to the Darfur crisis. 
 
¶20.  (U) Minimize considered. 
BREMNER