VZCZCXRO4552
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #0340/01 0471438
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 161429Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0857
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000340 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO PRM/A 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL ET ER SU DHS
SUBJECT: Potential For Refugee Resettlement From Sudan 
 
¶1.     Summary:  UNHCR and the Government of Sudan (GOS) are 
receptive to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) initiating 
operations in Sudan.  UNHCR believes U.S. resettlement would 
provide it a "strategic option" in its efforts to find durable 
solutions for the protracted refugee population in the eastern 
Sudan camps.  UNHCR is prepared to refer up to 750 individuals to 
USRAP this year and complete a multi-year group resettlement 
proposal for 11,000 refugees in late 2010 if USRAP becomes 
operational.  The GOS is willing to work with USRAP and UNHCR to 
try and resolve potential obstacles to USRAP operations such as 
visa issuances and discriminatory departure fees for refugees. 
Embassy Khartoum expressed concerns about the strain on mission 
logistics - particularly motor pool resources - in hosting a 
Department of Homeland Security/Citizens and Immigration Services 
(DHS/CIS) adjudication team for up to two weeks and highlighted the 
uncertainty of the Sudanese political landscape during the coming 
year.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2.     The Nairobi-based Refugee Coordinator visited Khartoum 
January 31 to February 3 to explore the possibility of 
re-initiating the USRAP in Sudan.  UNHCR has repeatedly urged USRAP 
to re-open its refugee resettlement program in Khartoum as part of 
its efforts to find durable solutions for refugees needing 
protection and for the protracted caseload in the eastern Sudan 
refugee camps.  (Note: USRAP suspended its operations more than ten 
years ago when DHS/CIS staff were unable to secure visas to 
adjudicate in Khartoum. End Note).  The Refugee Coordinator met 
with IOM and UNHCR representatives as well as the GOS Deputy 
Commissioner of Refugees (COR). 
 
 
 
¶3.     UNHCR-Sudan Representative Peter de Clerq confirmed that 
expanding refugee resettlement was a critical component in UNHCR's 
strategy to integrate locally the protracted refugee population in 
the twelve refugee camps in eastern Sudan.  De Clerq said about 
66,000 refugees (primarily Eritrean and Ethiopian) are living in 
the camps and they are ethnically and tribally very similar to the 
local population.  UNHCR believes that by expanding refugee 
livelihood and self-reliance programs, increasing the number of UN 
agencies and NGOs providing services in the area, and merging 
refugee and host community services, the State government and local 
communities will accept integration of the refugees.  For those 
refugees unable to be integrated, UNHCR planned submitting a three 
year group resettlement proposal for up to 11,000 refugees, but has 
not submitted the proposal as it wouldn't be credible without the 
participation of USRAP.  UNHCR's Assistant Representative, Maya 
Ameratunga, however, confirmed that if USRAP became operational, 
UNHCR would complete and submit the group proposal later this year. 
De Clerq said if USRAP became operational, UNHCR could then use 
resettlement as a "strategic option" to gain increased cooperation 
from the Government of Sudan (GOS) by demonstrating that UNHCR had 
successfully expanded international burden sharing in the plan to 
close the camps in the east. 
 
 
 
¶4.     UNHCR's Assistant Representative, Maya Ameratung, confirmed 
that UNHCR, having completed its verification exercise in the 
camps, is prepared to double its referral submissions this year, 
but doesn't have resettlement countries to accept them.  Ameratunga 
said that, in 2009, UNHCR resettled 765 refugees (459 urban-based 
and 306  camp-based) to, primarily, Canada, Sweden, and Norway 
against a plan of 1,000 refugee resettlements.  In 2010, Ameratunga 
said UNHCR had identified 6,550 refugees in need of resettlement, 
but only had a capacity of resettling 625 because of a lack of 
third country resettlement options.  Ameratunga said that with 
UNHCR's resettlement unit of three international (one in Kassala, 
two in Khartoum) and three national staff (along with one long-term 
International Catholic Migration Commission and one short-term 
Mapendo secondee), UNHCR is able to double its individual 
submissions this year and proposed submitting 750 individuals to 
USRAP and 750 individuals to its traditional resettlement partners 
in 2011.  Ameratunga, however, cautioned that UNHCR would require 
additional staff in 2011 should its group resettlement proposal be 
accepted. 
 
 
 
¶5.     IOM's Chief of Mission, Jill Helke, said that IOM would be 
severely stretched to support USRAP should it initiate operations 
in Sudan.  IOM's resettlement team currently consists of one 
Khartoum-based logistics staff who liaises with UNHCR to transport 
refugees and who completes airline bookings as needed for other 
resettlement countries. Helke, however, felt that IOM would be able 
to transfer logistics staff from other programs to the USRAP 
 
NAIROBI 00000340  002 OF 002 
 
 
program should USRAP become operational.  Helke also expressed 
concern about IOM's capacity to support USRAP medical requirement 
for departing refugees.  She noted that the Norwegians planned to 
use a GOS hospital in Kassala to screen departing refugees and 
proposed that IOM's Africa Medical Chief conduct an assessment to 
determine if the facility could be used for USRAP departures as 
well.  Helke confirmed that IOM does not have a base of operations 
in the eastern camps nor a transit center to house refuges for the 
five day medical observation period before departures, but could 
establish either, if necessary.  Helke warned that while obtaining 
visas for expats is difficult, IOM has been able to secure GOS 
travel permits and exit permits for departing refugees without a 
great deal of difficulty. Finally, Helke cautioned that the GOS 
sporadically "beats IOM with a stick" over its Chad program and 
uses brinkmanship as its primary negotiating strategy. 
 
 
 
¶6.     The Refugee Coordinator and post's Political Officer met 
with the Sudanese Deputy Commissioner of Refugees (COR), Abdullah 
Sulieman, along with UNHCR's Ameratunga to review USRAP's interest 
in re-initiating resettlement operations in Sudan.  The COR Deputy 
Commissioner confirmed the GOS saw expanding resettlement as a 
humanitarian priority for refugees in Sudan and welcomed USRAP's 
interest in initiating operations.  Acknowledging that "something 
went wrong" when CIS was refused visas several years ago, Mr. 
Sulieman suggested that if COR was aware that a visa request was 
being made it could help facilitate visa issuance or, at least, be 
in a position to explain why visas were refused.  The Refugee 
Coordinator explained the stages of USRAP processing highlighting 
that USRAP would opt to go slow to build confidence, but would 
likely more than double refugee resettlement out of Sudan if the 
program were to be established. 
 
 
 
¶7.     The Refugee Coordinator highlighted that a potential barrier 
to USRAP operations in Sudan was the GOS $250/refugee exit fee 
which the Deputy Commissioner promised to review with UNHCR to 
bring more in line with other exit fees (Note: UNHCR said it is 
already negotiating with COR to make the fees less discriminatory 
towards departing refugees. End Note).  The Refugee Coordinator 
also highlighted the usual practice of DHS/CIS operating in a U.S. 
cleared non-embassy environment to adjudicate refugee claims and 
the possible need for USRAP's IOM and OPE partners to travel 
frequently to the camps to pre-screen and complete medicals, 
respectively. The Deputy Director said COR appreciated these needs 
and would cooperate to help locate a suitable building as well as 
to issue travel permits as needed.  Finally, managing expectations 
to discourage USRAP resettlement operations being a "pull factor" 
was discussed with COR and UNHCR agreeing to finalize long-delayed 
plans to register the urban Khartoum refugee population in order to 
complete the verification exercise of the Sudan refugee population 
from which appropriate resettlement candidates could be drawn. 
 
 
 
¶8.     Discussions with Embassy Khartoum's RSO and Pol Chief 
highlighted logistical challenges in supporting an extended DHS/CIS 
staff presence in Khartoum.  The RSO noted that mid-March was the 
target date for moving to a new embassy building (NOB) further from 
the center of Khartoum where the current embassy is located. The 
RSO also noted that Khartoum would most likely be the only 
acceptable DHS/CIS adjudication site due to the difficulty of 
obtaining travel permits and the lack of infrastructure outside of 
Khartoum. He speculated that GOS security services would most 
likely assist with identifying a suitable location, and that he 
would support a site located at a GOS compound in or near a 
military or police base that could provide suitable protection and 
crowd control.  Both the RSO and Vice Consul confirmed that while 
four to five consular section windows may not be utilized in the 
NOB (NIV operations will begin in Khartoum in April with NIV 
operations scheduled to begin in one or two years), neither would 
support refugee adjudications on embassy grounds.  The Pol Chief 
also noted that current mission policy requiring all embassy 
movements be in armored vehicles severely strains the embassy motor 
pool.  She expressed concern about the embassy's ability to support 
the daily transportation needs of a two week circuit ride of eight 
to twelve DHS/CIS agents while simultaneously meeting the needs of 
embassy staff and the embassy's many visitors.  Finally, the Pol 
Chief highlighted the challenging political landscape expected in 
Sudan over the next twelve months with Presidential elections in 
April and a potentially volatile referendum to determining Sudan's 
unity scheduled for January 2011. 
RANNEBERGER