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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000338 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PTER PARM PBTS MARR MCAP MNUC
RS 
SUBJECT: GOR MILITARY DOCTRINE PRESENTS LITTLE THAT IS NEW 
 
REF: 09 MOSCOW 3138 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d), (h). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On February 5 the GOR released its new 
military doctrine.  At the same time President Medvedev also 
endorsed the unpublished document "Basic Principles of State 
Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence Up to 2020."  The 
new military doctrine, divided into four parts, is similar to 
the 2000 military doctrine.  In the new military doctrine, 
NATO enlargement and activities around the world are 
specifically named as military dangers to Russia that could 
later become military threats.  The new military doctrine, 
however, also calls for greater security cooperation with 
NATO and other international organizations.  The language on 
the use of nuclear weapons differs little from the 2000 
version, with Russia reserving the right to launch a nuclear 
first strike "when the very existence of the state is under 
threat."  The new military doctrine, however, recognizes that 
most military conflicts Russia is likely to face in the 
future will be small, conventional wars.  The doctrine 
proposed the modernization of Russia's conventional forces 
and reaffirms Russia's ties to the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization.  The document on nuclear deterrence most likely 
spells out procedures for Russia to use its nuclear weapons. 
GOR officials argued that Russia has no plans to attack other 
states, but Russia nevertheless needed its nuclear deterrent. 
 They also argued NATO should take Russia's concerns into 
account.  Experts emphasized that the new military doctrine 
contains no ground-breaking provisions, and reflects 
divisions in the GOR on what Russia's security policy should 
be.  End summary. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Doctrine's Provisions Not Groundbreaking 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) At a February 5 meeting of the permanent members of 
Russia's Security Council, President Medvedev endorsed 
Russia's new military doctrine, as well as an unpublished and 
presumably classified document entitled "Basic Principles of 
State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence Up to 2020." 
The new Russian military doctrine is divided into four parts: 
 ¶I. General Provisions, II. Military Dangers and Military 
Threats to the Russian Federation, III. Military Policy of 
the Russian Federation, and IV. Military-Economic Support for 
Defense. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Most notable in the military doctrine is that it 
explicitly names NATO's enlargement and its "desire to endow 
(its) force potential with global functions carried out in 
violation of the norms of international law" as Russia's 
"main external military danger," which could later become a 
"military threat."  Other military dangers to Russia (and 
presumably posed by NATO) include the deployment of missile 
defense (MD) systems, deployment of foreign troops in states 
neighboring Russia, and territorial claims against Russia and 
its allies (presumably a reference to Georgia's claims to 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia).  Section III.19.e, however, 
calls for closer cooperation in the field of international 
security with NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and other international 
organizations. 
 
¶4. (C) Contrary to predictions (reftel) by Security Council 
Secretary Nikolay Patrushev and others, the new military 
doctrine does not allow for preemptive nuclear strikes 
(including in local conflicts).  Instead, it downplays and 
restricts the role of nuclear weapons in Russia's security 
policy.  In contrast to the previous Russian military 
doctrine, published in 2000, which said Russia could resort 
to nuclear weapons "in situations critical for national 
security," the new military doctrine allows their use when 
"the very existence of the state is under threat," whether 
the threat is conventional or nuclear.  Under the new 
military doctrine, as in the previous version, Russia 
reserves the right to conduct the first nuclear strike in a 
conflict.  Russia also intends to modernize its nuclear 
triad.  The Russian President is responsible for deciding 
when to use nuclear weapons. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Despite all the attention paid to Russia's nuclear 
deterrent, Sections II.13-15 of the new military doctrine 
recognized that modern conflicts will be small, localized, 
hard to predict, and conventional.  The new doctrine calls 
 
MOSCOW 00000338  002 OF 003 
 
 
for Russia to have more mobile forces equipped with high-tech 
conventional weapons.  The new military doctrine also states 
that Russia considers an attack on any of its Collective 
Security Treat Organization (CSTO) allies an attack on all 
CSTO members. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Veil Partially Lifted from Nuclear Deterrence Document 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6. (C) An unnamed source from the Russian Security Council 
told local press that the main aim of the GOR's nuclear 
deterrence strategy are the prevention of aggression against 
Russia and the protection of its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.  According to the source, "Basic Principles of 
State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence Up to 2020" 
builds upon the military doctrine to define the GOR's 
position regarding nuclear deterrence and its role in 
Russia's national security.  The source also said the 
document defines the conditions under which Russia may use 
nuclear weapons.  Editor-In-Chief of the magazine National 
Defense Colonel Igor Korotchenko commented that, because of 
the short amount of time Russia would have to react to a 
nuclear attack, "the options for responses from Russian in 
each specific instance need to be determined in advance and 
regulated in detail."  He speculated that these provisions 
are probably contained in the document. 
 
------------------------------------- 
GOR Officials Comment on the Doctrine 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Commenting on the new military doctrine, Patrushev 
said that Russia's military policies were aimed at avoiding 
an arms race and military conflicts, but added military 
policy must address the real threats Russia faces.  He argued 
that large-scale wars had become less likely, but smaller 
conflicts could break out in many regions of the world. 
Patrushev added that Russia had no plans to attack other 
states, but still needed nuclear weapons as a deterrent, 
especially because other states possessed nuclear weapons. 
He also expressed concerns that NATO enlargement posed a 
danger to Russian security. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Other GOR officials weighed in as well.  DPM Sergey 
Ivanov and Federation Council Defense and Security Committee 
Chair Viktor Ozerov commented that that new military doctrine 
differs little from the 2000 military doctrine "in terms of 
hypothetical use of nuclear weapons by Russia."  DPM Ivanov 
added that Russian generals do not wish to use nuclear 
weapons against any state.  FM Lavrov agreed with the 
military doctrine's provision that NATO's eastward 
enlargement was unacceptable to Russia.  The Security 
Council's Deputy Secretary Yuriy Baluyevskiy stated that no 
state that possesses nuclear weapons has completely ruled out 
their use.  Russia therefore "needs to guarantee its 
consistent democratic development" by maintaining its nuclear 
deterrent.  Duma International Relations Committee Chair 
Konstantin Kosachev commented that, if NATO wanted better 
relations with Russia, then it should "change its attitude" 
and take Russia's concerns regarding NATO enlargement into 
account. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
GOR Dismisses NATO Objections to Doctrine 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) On February 9 the MFA released a statement 
responding to NATO SYG Rasmussen's statements on February 6 
that objected to the new military doctrine's provisions that 
refer to NATO as a threat.  The statement dismisses SYG 
Rasmussen's objections, arguing that he "must have had little 
time" to study the new military doctrine.  The MFA statement 
points out that the new military doctrine does not list NATO 
as a threat to Russia.  The new military doctrine instead 
states NATO's enlargement and attempts to "globalize its 
functions in contravention of international law" as dangers 
to Russia. 
 
----------------------------------- 
CSTO Welcomes New Military Doctrine 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) CSTO SYG Nikolay Bordyuzha welcomed the new 
 
MOSCOW 00000338  003 OF 003 
 
 
military doctrine, saying that it reflects new realities in 
guaranteeing military security.  He drew attention to the 
fact that the new military doctrine envisages Russia's 
participation in "all entities of the CSTO collective 
security system:  the Collective Rapid Reaction Force, the 
Collective Rapid Deployment Force based in Central Asia, and 
the Peacekeeping Force."  He also hailed the new document as 
"confirming Russia's adherence to ally commitments in the 
CSTO." 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Experts Argue Doctrine Shows Bureaucratic Muddle 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶11. (C) Deputy Editor-In-Chief of Yezhednevniy Zhurnal 
Aleksandr Golts told us the new military doctrine did not 
contain much that was different from the 2000 military 
doctrine.  He characterized the new military doctrine as a 
"practically harmless" document that "was the result of 
bureaucratic infighting."  He posited that various factions 
of the GOR could not agree on what Russia's" military goals 
should be, and so a document of "15 pages filled with such 
revelations as the Volga River flowed into the Caspian Sea" 
was produced.  References to NATO in the new military 
doctrine were included so that conservative elements in the 
GOR could express their displeasure with the West.  Likewise, 
the unpublished "Basic Principles of State Policy in the 
Field of Nuclear Deterrence Up to 2020" was most likely 
issued as a sort of face-saving document for Patrushev, whose 
public predictions that the new military doctrine would allow 
for preemptive nuclear strikes did not come true, according 
to Golts. 
 
¶12. (C) Golts argued that the pace and direction of Russia's 
military reforms would not change.  He said that once 
military reforms were completed, Russia would have 87 
infantry brigades and 100 air force squadrons; not enough to 
challenge NATO.  The only conceivable major military 
challenge to Russia would come from China, he said, but 
Russia could not include this in the military doctrine 
because China and Russia were both members of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization.  At any rate, Russia would most 
likely resort to tactical nuclear weapons in a war with 
China, he argued. 
 
¶13. (C) Other experts agreed, saying the new military 
doctrine was an "exercise in public relations" designed to 
appease various factions of the Russian government.  The 
daily Moskovskiy Komsomolets agreed, arguing that the West 
should not take the new military doctrine's concerns about 
NATO too seriously.  "Political slogans are one thing, and 
life is another," it stated. 
 
¶14. (C) Head of the Center for International Security at the 
Institute of World Economics and International Relations 
Aleksey Arbatov argued that language in the new military 
doctrine regarding nuclear weapons was mild.  He said that 
despite the fact that Russia reserved the right to carry out 
a nuclear strike first, the bar has been raised so high that 
it could be called a peace doctrine. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) References to the NATO "danger," added most likely as 
a sop to the security services, do not represent a more 
aggressive stance vis-a-vis the West, but rather a 
reiteration of complaints we have heard before.  References 
to more cooperation with NATO, as well as acknowledgement 
that conflicts in the future will most likely require a 
mobile, high-tech army to fight, show that MinDef Serdyukov's 
military reforms are not in danger of cancellation.  The 
attempt to please all constituencies has resulted in a 
military doctrine that is less a doctrine than a statement of 
intentions and goals.  Russia's new military doctrine shows 
that, even in Russia, all politics is local. 
Beyrle