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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000327 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG UP AZ MD RS
SUBJECT: KARASIN ON GEORGIA, NAGORNO-KARABAKH, 
TRANSNISTRIA, UKRAINE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  DFM Karasin, in a meeting with the 
Ambassador February 9, praised the Geneva Talks for 
contributing to the relative calm in Georgia, while 
criticizing the Georgians for seeking scandal, the South 
Ossetians for boycotting the Incident Response Mechanism, and 
the co-chairs for hindering small-scale progress by insisting 
on upholding principles.  Although he called the Georgian 
reintegration plan "slick", he acknowledged it showed Georgia 
was willing to talk directly with its breakaway regions over 
concrete proposals.  He described Turkey's ratification of 
the Armenia protocols as key for progress on 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and said he had urged Transnistrian leader 
Smirnov to engage on the basis of the March 2008 joint 
declaration, despite the political turmoil in Chisinau. 
Karasin worried that Yulia Tymoshenko might drag out the 
election process in Ukraine by going to court.  End Summary 
 
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Georgia 
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Geneva Talks 
------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) DFM Grigoriy Karasin told Ambassador Beyrle February 
9 that the Geneva Talks had succeeded in keeping the 
breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia more 
or less quiet.  He noted there had been no conflict-related 
casualties in the regions for nine months, in part due to the 
Russian troop presence.  He criticized Georgia's 
unwillingness to talk directly with the regions' de facto 
authorities, an attitude he called a dead end, and dismissed 
the Georgians' insistence on negotiating with Russia instead. 
 
¶3.  (C) Karasin criticized the co-chairs of the Geneva Talks 
for breaking the tempo of progress.  He condemned their 
insistence on making the Incident Prevention and Response 
Mechanisms (IPRMs) fully functional before entertaining other 
proposals.  Noting the EU's co-chairmanship of the process, 
he said he hoped to visit Brussels before the next (March 30) 
Geneva round.  He wondered what role EU High Representative 
Ashton might play in the process, especially regarding the 
future of the EU's special representative structure. 
 
¶4.  (C) Karasin insisted that new security guarantees were 
needed for the regions.  He championed Russia's proposal that 
Georgia and its regions unilaterally submit non-use of force 
agreements to the UN Security Council, with Russia, the U.S., 
and the EU acting as guarantors. 
 
IPRMs 
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¶5.  (C) Karasin acknowledged that the IPRM was not working in 
South Ossetia, due to the South Ossetians' boycott, but spoke 
out in favor of its continuation.  The Ambassador noted that 
the comparative success of the Abkhaz IPRM showed that it was 
the South Ossetians, not the Georgians, who were the problem. 
 He asked Russia to pressure Tskhinvali to reengage in the 
IPRM, and suggested no new security mechanisms or documents 
were needed until the existing ones worked.  Karasin 
indicated Moscow was willing to increase efforts to persuade 
the South Ossetians to engage, saying that any contacts 
across the administrative boundary line (ABL) were useful. 
 
¶6.  (C) Karasin praised that Russian troops and border guards 
had begun to fine and then release detained Georgians, 
without handing them over to South Ossetian authorities. 
Ambassador Beyrle suggested that direct talks between the 
Georgians and South Ossetians about incidents would be 
preferable. 
 
Tension and CBMs 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Karasin accused the GOG of using the Geneva Talks to 
stoke discord rather than seek stability and progress.  He 
claimed the information he had provided the Ambassador late 
last year about Georgian arms modernization had proved 
accurate, and that Russia had averted a Georgian provocation 
by immediately reaching out to the U.S. and EU.  He doubted 
the recent Georgian troop movements were to better protect 
Tbilisi, saying no threat emanated from the Russian troops in 
 
MOSCOW 00000327  002 OF 003 
 
 
South Ossetia. 
 
¶8.  (C) Karasin touted the expected March 1 opening of the 
Qazbegi-Larsi border checkpoint as one confidence-building 
measure (CBM), saying that only one expert meeting was needed 
to approve final documents.  He described the three direct 
charter flights between Tbilisi and Moscow as another CBM. 
He stated that border crossings along the ABLs were routine, 
with hundreds per day crossing at the Akhalgori checkpoint 
alone, and hundreds of thousands crossing the ABLs so far in 
total. 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador called for more transparency on 
Russian troop movements, arguing that the Russian base 
construction in South Ossetia not far from Tbilisi was an 
understandable source of concern for Georgia. 
 
Georgian Reintegration Plan 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Karasin described the Georgian reintegration plan as 
"slick" (khitroumniy), as it spoke of resolving the conflict 
by peaceful means while using unacceptable terms such as 
'occupation'.  Although the Abkhaz and South Ossetians did 
not even want to receive the plan, he said he saw some "small 
positive notes" in it, as the plan listed concrete ideas and 
documented the GOG's willingness to talk directly to 
Tskhinvali and Sukhumi. 
 
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Nagorno-Karabakh 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Noting his and First Deputy PM Igor Shuvalov's 
February 5 visit to Armenia, Karasin expressed concern that 
Turkey might not ratify the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement 
protocols.  If Turkey did not ratify by the end of March, the 
process would be thrown back, and the "use of force" voices 
in Baku would ascend.  The Armenians were under a lot of 
internal pressure, with Sargsian threatening to withdraw his 
signature from the protocols if the Turks did not ratify by 
the end of March. 
 
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Transnistria 
------------ 
 
¶12.  (C) Karasin said Chisinau's political disarray was no 
reason to interrupt the Transnistrian conflict settlement 
process.  Referring to his February 8 meeting with 
Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov, Karasin said he had urged 
Tiraspol to take the initiative on resolving the conflict, 
and claimed FM Lavrov had used blunt language in advising 
Smirnov to avoid separatist rhetoric at this sensitive time 
in Chisinau.  He singled out the March 2008 joint statement 
President Medvedev had brokered as a basis for further talks. 
 
¶13.  (C) Karasin reiterated Moscow's position that 
withdrawing Russian troops from Transnistria would make the 
conflict resolution harder, and said he bluntly had told 
Acting President Mihai Ghimpu in late January that his 
statements about withdrawing Russian troops were 
irresponsible.  It was necessary first to find a political 
resolution before withdrawing the peacekeepers. 
 
¶14.  (C) Karasin criticized Romania's alleged disregard for 
Moldova's territorial integrity by seeking Moldova's 
integration into Romania.  He welcomed the Ambassador's 
confirmation that the U.S. was advising Bucharest that such 
statements were unhelpful. 
 
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Ukraine 
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¶15.  (C) Karasin praised the free elections in Ukraine, but 
worried that losing candidate Yulia Tymoshenko might choose 
to go to court over the result, possibly delaying the 
inauguration of the new President to the mid-March deadline. 
He called Yatseniuk and Tigipko "fresh new faces" and 
possible candidates for Prime Minister, but sounded less 
certain that Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia, Konstantin 
Hrishchenko, might become the new Foreign Minister. 
 
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MOSCOW 00000327  003 OF 003 
 
 
Comment 
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¶16.  (C) Karasin seemed relatively positive about the Geneva 
Talks, given the ongoing lack of progress there and his 
criticism of the co-chairs, Georgians, and South Ossetians. 
Unlike a year ago, Moscow now appears ready to support the 
format for the long term, with Karasin calling the March 30 
meeting the "next of many more."  In a private aside with the 
Ambassador at the meeting's end, he confirmed his view that 
"it is time" for the South Ossetians to end their boycott of 
the IPRM. 
Beyrle