VZCZCXRO3039
RR RUEHFL RUEHNP
DE RUEHMIL #0013/01 0321243
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011243Z FEB 10
FM AMCONSUL MILAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1898
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 8994
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 0242
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 0237
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MILAN 000013 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EINV ETRD ECON PGOV IT
SUBJECT: U.S. INVESTORS SPEAK OUT ON DOING BUSINESS IN ITALY 
 
REF: ROME 82 
 
This cable is Sensitive but Unclassified.  Please protect 
accordingly. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: American companies in northern Italy (which 
hosts nearly 80 percent of the country's foreign investment) 
have given us a frank view of the investment climate.  The 
major areas of concern are structural: inflexible labor 
markets, a convoluted legal framework and slow legal process, 
overregulation, and an obstructionist bureaucracy.  Italy is 
losing its appeal as an investment destination to neighbors, 
but more to rising competitors in Eastern Europe and Asia. 
The problems are not all from within Italy, though, with 
local managers complaining about poor investment 
decisionmaking in their own headquarters and aggressive 
tactics by third-country governments to promote their 
co-nationals.  In fact, most agree, Italy remains a 
relatively attractive market with a highly-skilled technical 
workforce that comes up with some of the best ideas in the 
world.  The GOI could improve the country's appeal by 
promoting this skilled workforce -- and their ideas -- and by 
offering incentives that help overcome the structural 
barriers (that all agree won't be fixed in the short run). 
Though the responsibility for structural change lies solely 
with the GOI, the lack of an effective American Chamber of 
Commerce here makes it difficult for American firms to 
present a consistent and constructive message.  End summary. 
 
Structural Problems are Severe 
 
¶2. (SBU) As part of the preparation of the 2010 Investment 
Climate Statement (reftel), we held a series of frank 
conversations with U.S. business representatives in northern 
Italy -- where about 77 percent of foreign investment 
resides.  U.S. investment in Italy, about $32 billion at the 
end of 2008, lags behind that in other Western European 
countries.  Some U.S. firms already in Italy continued to 
make new investments in 2009, while others cut back on their 
operations.  However, we saw few notable new investors enter 
the country during this troubled year.  Though the global 
economy's woes are certainly to blame for the slowdown, our 
contacts made clear that there were systemic problems here 
that make Italy a tough sell. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Companies agree that one of the worst obstacles to 
investment in Italy remains the inflexibility of the labor 
market.  Italian law and political pressure makes it 
difficult, and expensive, to lay off workers.  Investors also 
point out the challenges of dealing with bureaucratic 
lethargy and obstructionism -- both at the regional and 
national levels.  A confusing and often contradictory 
commercial legal framework (with new laws and regulations not 
always reconciled with existing ones) allows the multiple 
layers of bureaucracy wide latitude for interpretation and 
make it difficult for investors to develop a national 
strategy.  Overregulation is another area of concern to 
investors as is the slowness of the legal system and heavy 
taxation (in both cases not discriminatory against foreign 
investors, but worse than in neighboring countries). 
Finally, several firms mentioned to us shortcomings like 
insufficient infrastructure, inefficient Customs procedures, 
and a high cost of energy. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Despite the challenges, however, there is no 
consensus that Italy has a significantly worse investment 
climate than other Western European markets.  Still, the 
businesspeople told us that potential investors aren't likely 
choosing between, say, France and Italy but between Italy and 
Eastern Europe or Asia.  In conversations with Italian 
officials in the Northeast, we've heard complaints about 
Slovenia and southern Austria "stealing" away investment 
(both foreign and domestic) by offering incentives that the 
Italian government does not. 
 
A Silver Lining 
 
¶5. (SBU) When asked whether, if they had to do it all again, 
they would have invested in Italy, the responses were also 
mixed.  In general, manufacturers and high-tech firms agreed 
that they probably would have.  Service providers, 
particularly in the financial sector, thought that perhaps it 
would have been better just to sell products in Italy (as the 
market is a promising one) but to base operations outside (in 
Switzerland for instance). 
 
 
MILAN 00000013  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Indeed, the news is not all dire.  The more bullish 
manufacturers and high-tech firms laud the quality of Italy's 
technical workers and design.  They note that the pool of 
skilled, technical labor is "remarkable" here, especially 
since the shake-up over the last several years of Italy's 
homegrown IT and high-tech giants (Telecom Italia, Olivetti, 
etc.) has weakened domestic demand for such talent.  The 
small and medium-enterprise (SME) backbone of the Italian 
economy (more than 90 percent of the economy producing 85 
percent of the GDP) is a tremendous source of good ideas -- 
both for design and production.  Some point out, though, that 
while the quality and quantity of the labor force is high 
here, it is also rather expensive (though more in terms of 
benefits and taxes than in terms of actual wages).  The 
expense, combined with the overall inflexibility of the labor 
market, reduces competitiveness. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Obstacles to foreign investment do not come solely 
from within Italy, however.  Many companies mention external 
issues as well such as short-sighted decisions from their own 
U.S.-based managers who undervalue positive aspects of Italy 
in making decisions on investment and cutbacks.  This has 
become more problematic in the last year or so as U.S. 
multinationals have made wholesale cuts around the world. 
Some also note the challenges of competing with other foreign 
firms that are backed aggressively by their governments 
(China and France are the most commonly mentioned) to get the 
tastiest investment morsels -- especially those that involve 
privatization or government procurement. 
 
Comment: No Need to Fix Everything at Once 
 
¶8. (SBU) Even with the multitude of difficulties they face, 
most U.S. companies with whom we spoke remain hopeful. 
Trimming of staff or operations is tied to economic realities 
and resulting global cutbacks more than Italy-specific 
problems.  They freely admit that structural problems (labor 
market, bureaucracy, etc.) are likely unfixable in the 
short/medium term.  However, they have a number of 
shorter-term ideas for how the GOI could improve conditions 
for foreign investors.  For example, they hope that the GOI 
will do more to underwrite the SMEs and create high-tech R&D 
jobs that are the source of ideas and a top-notch labor pool. 
 They also wonder why the GOI (or regional governments) 
couldn't use incentives to offset some of the structural 
problems that make Italy a medium-risk/low-reward option. 
Though the responsibility for structural change lies solely 
with the GOI, the lack of an effective American Chamber of 
Commerce here makes it more difficult for American firms to 
present a consistent and constructive message. 
 Perez