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DE RUEHME #0634/01 0531611
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221609Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0548
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0010
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0001
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000634 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AID ECON MX
SUBJECT: The Awesome Potential of Remittances 
 
THE AWESOME POTENTIAL OF REMITTANCES 
 
 
 
¶1.      (U) Summary: Remittances to Mexico fell approximately 16% 
from 2008 to 2009. This was due primarily to the economic and 
financial crisis the U.S. experienced in 2009 that compromised 
Mexican migrants' ability to get work. Remittances from the U.S. to 
Mexico totaled US$21.28 billion in 2009 and accounted for 
approximately 27% of rural income and 19% of urban income. The IDB 
expects remittances to stabilize around US$21 billion per year. The 
use of remittances fascinates international organizations, 
governments, and development agencies, but so far there is little 
accord on the proper channeling of remittances. End summary. 
 
 
 
Remittances by the Numbers 
 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.      (U) At US$21.28 billion in 2009, remittances represent 
Mexico's second most important source of foreign exchange after oil 
exports. They provide around 27% of income on average for rural 
families and 19% of income for urban families. Largely because of 
the slump in U.S. activity in the construction and manufacturing 
industries, migrants have struggled to find work. More stringent 
laws in several states and an overall bias against hiring foreign 
labor when unemployment is so high in the U.S. have also 
contributed to a drop in income for migrants, documented and 
undocumented. Remittances received in November 2009 were the lowest 
they have been since March 2005, though the amount of money sent 
increased by around 1.3% month-on-month in December 2009. The IDB 
expects remittances to stabilize around US$21 billion per year for 
the foreseeable future, provided the U.S. job market recovers. 
 
 
 
¶3.      (U) The U.S. and Mexico began to officially track receipt 
of remittances in the mid-1990s, and since then the study of use of 
remittances has become an academic field in its own right. There is 
strong disagreement between actors on how remittances should be 
used and channeled. Some say that an extra US$20 billion should be 
used productively to support economic opportunities and 
infrastructure improvements in the migrants' own communities. 
Others say that migrants should use the money for the basics of 
consumption and household survival. 
 
 
 
Mexico's 3X1 Program 
 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.      (U) The state of Zacatecas, a major source of migrants to 
the U.S., launched a "one-for-one" (1X1) program in 1986, matching 
each peso of migrant money remitted with a peso from state funds. 
In 1991, Guerrero launched a two-for-one (2X1) program, adding 
municipal funds to the 1X1 program; Zacatecas followed with its own 
2X1 in 1992. The positive results in Guerrero and Zacatecas 
inspired the federal government to begin matching funds in those 
states in 1998, and in 2001 it launched the Citizen Initiative 
Three-For-One Program (3X1) with a nation-wide footprint through 
the Secretariat of Social Development (Sedesol). 3X1 is generally 
most active in the poorest parts of the country because those are 
the areas that send the most migrants. Most of the money coming 
into 3X1 comes from migrant clubs rather than individuals, and 
migrant clubs have a strong voice in the nature of the programs 
they sponsor. This can lead to friction between the "home town 
associations," migrant communities, and local government officials. 
 
 
 
 
¶5.      (U) Currently the 3X1 program is active in 26 states 
including Zacatecas and Guerrero, and despite the overall drop in 
remittances, 3X1 monies remained stable at around US$77 million 
between January and September 2009. In the first three quarters of 
2009, 3X1 had approved more than 2,139 projects, exceeding its 
annual goal by 42%, including: 
 
MEXICO 00000634  002 OF 003 
 
 
-          898 projects improved "urbanizaci????n" and paving; 
 
-          421 projects improved water and sanitation; 
 
-          276 projects improved educational, sport, and health 
infrastructure; 
 
-          116 projects improved electrification; 
 
-          101 projects improved productive projects; and 
 
-          60 projects improved rural roads. 
 
 
 
Criticism of 3X1 
 
---------------- 
 
¶6.      (U) Many actors in the study and management of remittances 
criticize programs like 3X1. They say migrant money is private 
money and should not be considered another source of public 
resources. In effect, 3X1 can give the GOM a 25% discount on 
services it should be providing anyway when it contributes to 
projects like building roads, improving drainage and sanitation 
systems, and restoring health and educational facilities. Critics 
claim that massive out-migration is the result of a deeply flawed 
job market and that the GOM should not punish migrants twice: once 
by forcing them from their families and homeland, and again by 
usurping the money they earned elsewhere. Salaries that become 
remittances are usually taxed in the U.S. whether the workers are 
documented or not, so more government intrusion in Mexico is 
unjust. On the other hand, others say that 3X1's non-infrastructure 
programs can be quite beneficial to migrant-sending communities. In 
Zacatecas in 2009, for example, several people received student 
scholarships through contributions from 3X1; other projects created 
multi-use rooms for communities. 
 
 
 
Harnessing Wealth and Supporting Entrepreneurs 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7.      (U) Approximately 86% of money received from migrants is 
spent on immediate consumption within the family. The remaining 14% 
is often put into informal savings (mattresses and socks) or, in a 
good scenario, into a microfinance organization, credit union, or 
other non-bank financial institution. Unfortunately, according to 
contacts at the Inter-American Development Bank, very often the 
depositor (usually the wife or mother of a migrant) does not feel 
authorized to risk the money in an investment project. Thus credit 
unions and lending organizations, which need to lend around 70% of 
their capital, cannot survive in the areas where they were 
introduced. Additionally, consumer protection organizations like 
PROFECO and CONDUSEF must provide better and more active services. 
In response to the regulation gap, USAID provides technical 
assistance to establish guidelines for regulatory oversight of 
microfinance institutions to the Mexican Banking and Securities 
Commission. Currently around 20% of Mexicans have access to the 
internet, and functional literacy is lower than average among the 
poor and isolated. Watchdog groups must consider means besides 
cutting edge technology to communicate their warnings. 
 
 
 
¶8.      (U) Econoff contacts recommended improved banking services, 
business incubation, increased access to a variety of traditional 
and non-traditional export markets, and a market-oriented - as 
opposed to economic development - approach to lending. In terms of 
agriculture, where most holdings produce only for family 
consumption and where many farms lie fallow due to the absence of 
the men who worked them prior to migrating, investment by the GOM 
and recipients of remittances in export farming infrastructure, 
such as greenhouses and agriculture extension support of export 
crops, is one manner of harnessing remittances and involving the 
GOM in a fully positive way. Another way the GOM could help 
recipients of remittances channel the money into productive 
purposes is to provide market research into tourist spending on 
 
MEXICO 00000634  003 OF 003 
 
 
indigenous-chic products that could be made in communities that 
send migrants with small, targeted investments of remittances. 
(Note:  Most social programs in Mexico lack a market component. For 
these suggested programs to be successful, the government would 
have to address that component. End Note) 
 
 
 
¶9.      (U) Although including all actors in economic development 
schemes is important for success, econoff contacts warned against 
too heavy involvement of municipal officials. As at all levels of 
government, elected officials only serve a single term: in all 
states except Coahuila (where they serve four years), municipal 
officials serve three years. While term limits prevents 
dynasty-like control over local governments, it also reduces the 
accountability of municipal officials and increases their 
incentives to maximize personal gains while in office. 
Municipalities are often the first level of barriers to 
entrepreneurs. Officials generally have between eight and ten years 
of formal education, and programs that rely too heavily on them 
risk elite capture. 
 
 
 
¶10.     (U) Comment: The drop in remittances in 2009 is newsworthy 
and important because it strongly impacts the ability of Mexico's 
poor to consume at their usual level and will thus impact the 
recovery of domestic demand. As the U.S. job market recovers, 
however, remittances are expected to stabilize around US$21 billion 
per year. Remittances can provide the poor with capital and a 
credit history, and they can be part of the impetus to improve 
socioeconomic conditions. There is a strong and important role for 
the market, specifically banks, to play in the improvement of 
services available to the poor and marginalized; the GOM will also 
need to participate to regulate the market and prevent crises of 
confidence like those that have occurred in the past. Mexico needs 
to pair its programs for channeling remittances with both improved 
financial education and market institution outreach to reduce risk 
aversion and reduced barriers to entry to improve poor people's 
ability to participate in the formal sector. The country's strong 
focus on community-driven development might also turn problematic 
as the market, the only real driver in the current political 
economy, notoriously favors positive deviant individuals. 
FEELEY