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FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
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INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0629
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 000176 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MZ
SUBJECT: MAJOR PARTIES REVEAL PLANS AND CONCERNS 
POST-ELECTION 
 
REF: MAPUTO 175 
 
MAPUTO 00000176  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Leslie V. Rowe for reasons 1.4 (b+d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY: On February 10, Electoral Institute of 
Southern Africa (EISA) country director Miguel de Brito told 
Emboffs that the October 2009 elections were the most 
irregular and frustrating yet in Mozambique.  Challenges 
included unbalanced application of the law, "irregular" 
actions by the National Electoral Commission (CNE), and 
significant ballot spoiling by polling officials--comments 
corroborated by an EU Elections Observation report issued on 
February 16 (Ref A).  Though FRELIMO won three-quarters of 
the vote, only 45% of eligible voters went to the polls, 
leading to increased concern in the ruling party about its 
popular support.  De Brito believes that FRELIMO will make 
constitutional changes this year, but they will not likely 
include an alteration to the current presidential term limits 
of two consecutive terms, as FRELIMO continues to believe in 
the primacy of the party over the leader.  On opposition 
politics, de Brito believes RENAMO is in shambles, while the 
Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), with eight deputies 
in the National Assembly (AR), did quite well despite the 
CNE's large-scale pre-election disqualification of their 
legislative candidates.  Separate discussions with party 
representatives confirmed that the ruling party is interested 
in expanding its relationship with the Mission.  Among the 
main opposition parties, the mood in RENAMO is decidedly 
glum, contrasted by optimism in the MDM camp.  With an 
increasingly dominant ruling party, continued donor community 
support for civil society  will be necessary to preserve any 
democratic space in Mozambique for meaningful opposition 
politics.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
REVIEW OF THE "IRREGULAR" 2009 ELECTIONS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Emboff, together with visiting Mozambique Desk 
Officer Joyce Namde, met with Miguel de Brito of the 
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) on February 10 
to review the October 2009 elections.  De Brito, a seasoned 
and highly-respected political observer, said that the recent 
elections were the most irregular and frustrating yet in 
Mozambique because of the Electoral Commission's (CNE's) 
unbalanced application of the law.  EISA, said de Brito, will 
release a final assessment of the elections in March focusing 
on CNE's shortcomings and large-scale partisan ballot 
spoiling, which occurred on a level not seen since 1999.  An 
EU Election Observation Mission report released on February 
15 cited many of these same concerns (Ref A). 
 
¶3.  (C)  Responding to news that the Attorney General had 
filed criminal charges against 229 polling officials for 
willfully spoiling ballots, de Brito said that this was 
likely an effort to appease donors, however higher-ups who 
gave the orders to spoil opposition ballots would not likely 
be pursued.  De Brito commented that without donor pressure, 
the Government of Mozambique (GRM) would not challenge the 
"irregular" actions of the CNE and polling officials. 
 
------------------------------ 
FRELIMO'S PLANS FOR THE FUTURE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C)  Turning to FRELIMO, de Brito noted that the ruling 
party, despite receiving 75% of the vote in the October 
elections, feared that it was losing support in Mozambique. 
Compared to the region, Mozambique's 45% voter-turnout 
percentage was meager at best, and FRELIMO is increasingly 
concerned that a majority of eligible voters chose not to 
vote at all.  De Brito pointed out that the roughly 3 million 
votes cast in the 2009 election is only slightly more than 
the total number of members in the FRELIMO party. 
 
¶5.  (C)  De Brito believes that, despite strong ties with the 
MPLA in Angola, a donor-dependent FRELIMO fears repercussions 
from the international community if Guebuza attempts to use 
the party's super-majority in the National Assembly (AR) to 
change the constitution to allow a third consecutive 
presidential term.  He explained that FRELIMO is relatively 
thin-skinned when it comes to criticisms from donors, and 
that continued international pressure may force FRELIMO to 
look at making much-needed constitutional revisions this 
year, particularly in regards to the electoral law.  Civil 
society needs donor support for this endeavor, in particular 
 
MAPUTO 00000176  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
amending the way in which members of the CNE are appointed, 
said de Brito. 
 
¶6.  (C)  While other southern African countries exhibit 
"strong man" politics, de Brito believes that FRELIMO still 
prefers the "strong party" model, and as such will block 
Guebuza from running for a third term.  Also, de Brito 
believes that inside the party the Chissano and Graca Machel 
camps maintain sufficient strength to limit Guebuza's power. 
He believes that FRELIMO, a famously secretive organization, 
will show its cards as to who will be the presidential 
candidate in the next election cycle at the upcoming FRELIMO 
Congress, likely to take place in 2011 or 2012.  He agreed 
that the different FRELIMO camps may agree on a compromise 
candidate, but had no speculation as to who that might be. 
 
¶7.  (C)  In a subsequent and largely non-substantive meeting 
with FRELIMO's spokesman, Edson Macuacua--better known as a 
party stalwart than an insightful thinker--said that in the 
upcoming five-year term, the ruling party would work for 
better governance, improvements in the rule of law, 
transparency, and accountability.  Macuacua bluntly delivered 
a message that there was great admiration for the United 
States and its people, but that critical comments by U.S. 
representatives were not appreciated.  The spokesperson went 
on to say that FRELIMO looked forward to expanding its 
relationship with the Mission.  Sticking largely to talking 
points elaborated on during President Guebuza's inauguration 
speech, Macuacua continued that FRELIMO wanted to lead a 
consolidation of democracy and peace in Mozambique, 
particularly in the political and economic areas, with an 
ultimate goal of combating poverty; while at the same time 
ensuring that there are three strong branches of government. 
 
------------------ 
RENAMO IN SHAMBLES 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C)  On traditional opposition party RENAMO, de Brito 
opined that party members' recent decision to take their 
seats in the AR against the orders of President Afonso 
Dhlakama represented the biggest challenge yet to the 
leader's authority.  De Brito believes that if Dhlakama were 
to be replaced, which is unlikely, he would be replaced by 
someone of the same generation, possibly Victor Anselmo, a 
senior parliamentarian. 
 
¶9.  (C)  On February 9, poloffs met with RENAMO 
parliamentarian Maria Ivone Soares who confirmed that the 
party is in shambles.  Soares said that there was no 
formalized plan to protest the October 2009 fraudulent 
elections by not taking RENAMO seats in the AR, so party 
members decided against the wishes of Dhlakama to take their 
places, suggesting disappointment in the election results has 
led to dissension in the ranks.  Discussing leadership, 
Soares acknowledged that there is no current plan for a Party 
Congress, the only mechanism RENAMO has to change leadership. 
 She also noted that RENAMO no longer has a shadow government 
in place.  Soares called for strong diplomatic action to 
bring attention to FRELIMO's total control of the three 
branches of the GRM.  She expressed great frustration with 
the current bleak situation in the AR, saying that even over 
the past five years when RENAMO held 90 out of 250 seats, the 
opposition party was unable to pass any laws which it had 
authored. 
 
---------------------------------- 
MDM ADOPTS A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  On February 9 emboffs met with Ismael Mussa, 
spokesperson for the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) 
and one of the party's eight representatives to the AR. 
Mussa explained that, although the newly formed party never 
expected to challenge for the presidency, it had high hopes 
of making a strong showing in the AR elections and was deeply 
disappointed by the CNE's questionable decision to disqualify 
its candidates in seven of 11 legislative districts.  He 
described an internal party struggle between those who sought 
fierce, public protest and those who ultimately prevailed, 
including Mussa, who preferred to play a participatory role 
in the legislature, building toward the 2013 municipal and 
2014 national elections.  Mussa observed that FRELIMO 
appeared to have already adopted two planks from MDM's 
platform: a greater focus on affordable building materials 
and housing, and creating a 48-month loan program to permit 
 
MAPUTO 00000176  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
educators to purchase computers. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Mussa is married to an attorney and achieved some 
renown during his previous stint in the AR, as a RENAMO 
parliamentarian, for his knowledge of Mozambican 
constitutional law.  He said MDM was both pleased and 
surprised by the party's strong appeal among urban voters and 
expected to tailor parts of its platform accordingly.  For 
example, current Mozambican law does not permit direct 
popular action, such as a referendum, and lacks a conflict of 
interest provision.  Among other possible projects, Mussa 
noted that MDM would like to see greater funding for public 
television and radio to ensure a truly independent media. 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
COMMENT: KEY FOR DONORS TO PRESS DEMOCRACY 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶12.  (C)  De Brito's insights are revealing, particularly 
with regard to FRELIMO's concerns about voter confidence in 
and donor criticisms of the ruling party.  FRELIMO hopes that 
it can rely on continued donor flows without having to 
respond to withering criticism on the democracy and 
governance front, suggesting that any backsliding on D&G by 
the donor community will lead FRELIMO to conclude that it 
need not respond to donor criticisms.   De Brito's comments 
regarding the need for a unified front in support of civil 
society to counterbalance the increasingly dominant ruling 
party are telling in that it appears that civil society is 
also under pressure to shelve its concerns about the 
election.  The respective attitudes of RENAMO and MDM show 
the trajectories of the two opposition parties.  RENAMO 
appears completely lost.  Despite MDM's upbeat attitude, 
opposition politics in Mozambique remain incredibly weak.  In 
the current five-year term, FRELIMO will likely continue to 
dominate the political landscape, particularly given its 
concerns about voter fidelity.  Whether Guebuza will succumb 
to the temptations of a third term or be held in check by 
forces within his party has yet to be determined.  The donor 
community has the challenging task of influencing FRELIMO to 
preserve a healthy democratic space in Mozambique for vibrant 
and relevant opposition politics. 
ROWE