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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANILA 000405 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MTS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS KISL RP
SUBJECT: MILF LEADERS CONCERNED ABOUT PEACE TALKS, SEEK 
MORE ENGAGEMENT WITH U.S. 
 
REF: A. MANILA 350 (PEACE TALKS FACILITATOR ON INTERIM 
        AGREEMENT) 
     ¶B. MANILA 251 (PARTIES SHARE DRAFT PEACE ACCORDS) 
     ¶C. 09 MANILA 2469 (MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE) 
     ¶D. 09 MANILA 2423 (MILF WELCOMES EAP A/S CAMPBELL 
        LETTER) 
     ¶E. 09 MANILA 2198 (CHARGE DISCUSSES PEACE TERRORISM 
        WITH MILF) 
     ¶F. 09 MANILA 1575 (INFORMAL PEACE TALKS THIS WEEK) 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Leslie A. Bassett, 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) peace panel told Poloff February 24 they are concerned 
about the Philippine government's ability to negotiate an 
interim peace agreement that can satisfy the MILF's 
expectations, and asked to engage with the U.S. on a more 
formal basis.  MILF Peace Panel Chairperson Mohagher Iqbal 
and Member Michael Mastura said the MILF would attend the 
March 4 question-and-answer session in Kuala Lumpur sought by 
the Philippine government, but they remained sharply 
discouraged by the government's poor leadership and 
unconvinced the government had any new ideas to offer. 
Recalling the U.S. colonial relationship with Muslims in the 
southern Philippines, Mastura said the MILF wanted a 
"parallel dialogue" with the U.S. to regularize engagement 
with us and increase U.S. participation in the peace process, 
although he did not specify how such an arrangement might 
work.  The MILF members said that the MILF could resort to 
violence -- or "Balkanize the region" -- if forced to, but 
the MILF has shown restraint and wanted to continue to avoid 
violence.  While concerned about the course of negotiations, 
the MILF felt the International Contact Group had proven its 
usefulness.  On upcoming national elections, Mastura said the 
MILF had been unable to engage with presidential candidates, 
and believed that Senator Aquino was unable to understand the 
complexities of the situation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
MILF CONCERNED ABOUT GOVERNMENT'S SINCERITY 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Two members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) peace panel told Poloff over dinner February 24 that 
the MILF was "very unhappy" and increasingly concerned about 
the government's ability to negotiate an interim peace 
agreement because of its poor leadership and "phobic" 
unwillingness to acknowledge points from the defunct 2008 
territorial agreement.  MILF Panel Chairperson Mohagher Iqbal 
and Panel Member Michael Mastura, who invited Poloff and 
others to dinner at his private residence in Cotabato City, 
criticized the leadership of President Arroyo and government 
Peace Panel Chairperson Rafael Seguis following the 2008 
collapse of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain 
(MOA-AD).  Mastura called President Arroyo "famous" for her 
policy reversals, and assailed her shift away from more 
flexible principles espoused by Seguis' predecessors.  Seguis 
himself was "deaf," Mastura commented, adding, "We don't even 
know if he is listening," since he appeared to be texting on 
his phone during negotiations.  "We are very unhappy with our 
status," Mastura lamented, while Iqbal added that the 
government seemed to be stalling. 
 
¶3. (C) Citing another reason for MILF concern, Mastura 
cautioned that the government's "phobia" of the MOA-AD led to 
its omission of key consensus points in its comprehensive 
peace proposal (Ref B) -- a sign that the government's 
forthcoming interim proposal, anticipated in March, could 
fall far short of MILF expectations.  "The government cannot 
think out-of-the-box," Mastura said, and its simple proposals 
rely too much on existing programs, such as expanding Islamic 
banking and education.  Noting that the MILF would 
participate in a March 4 question-and-answer session with the 
Philippine government in Kuala Lumpur, Mastura emphasized 
that the MILF ultimately wanted to hear "ideas, not 
questions."  They expressed hope that Office of the 
Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP) Assistant 
Secretary Bong Montesa, absent from the January talks, would 
attend the next meeting to lend his extensive experience to 
the government panel. 
 
MILF PROPOSAL WOULD CREATE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
MANILA 00000405  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶4. (C) Apologizing for launching into an informal lecture, 
Mastura explained that the MILF's draft interim agreement 
would establish a "transition process" for Moro autonomy that 
the MILF and the next Philippine administration would follow. 
 The draft (Ref A) has three main components: a 
six-and-a-half year timeframe, a particular sequence of 
actions to be undertaken by each side separately or jointly, 
and three distinct periods (pre-interim, interim, and 
implementation).  (Note: Mastura did not provide the text, 
and Poloff did not reveal he had already seen it. End Note.) 
Mastura said the nature of the relationship between the 
proposed "Bangsamoro" entity and the central government was 
unclear, but could be federative, associative, or in another 
form.  In this context, the "enhanced autonomy" offered by 
the government was insufficient.  The MILF would not seek 
independence, and it eschewed the name "Bangsamoro State" in 
favor of "Bangsamoro," modeled on Kosovo's naming scheme. 
The Asia Foundation (TAF) Director Steven Rood, also at the 
dinner, noted that the most challenging aspect of the interim 
process would be passing a constitutional amendment 
permitting the creation of a Bangsamoro "Basic Law," as 
desired by the MILF. 
 
SEEKING A "PARALLEL DIALOGUE" WITH THE U.S. 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In light of the MILF's limited confidence in the 
Philippine government, Mastura said that the MILF wanted to 
regularize our engagement through a "parallel dialogue" with 
the U. S. to support the peace process and come up with new 
ideas.  He did not specify how the dialogue might work, but 
noted the dialogue would be known to the Philippine 
government and other parties.  Mastura was unable to explain, 
despite Poloff's efforts to seek clarification, if "parallel" 
meant parallel to the work of the International Contact 
Group, or to the GRP-MILF talks. 
 
¶6. (C) Along with their suggestion for a parallel dialogue, 
Iqbal and Mastura also made an impassioned plea for greater 
overall U.S. involvement.  "Listen to how we feel," Iqbal 
implored. "The Filipinos are the rulers," he continued, "and 
we (Moros) are slaves. It is a lopsided relationship." 
Because the U.S. erred in including Mindanao in Philippine 
territory when providing the Philippines with its 
independence, the U.S. "owed" the Moros its assistance. 
Official U.S. letters of support for the peace process 
notwithstanding, Mastura said, the U.S. has had no direct 
engagement in the substance of peace talks since the 
conclusion of the U.S. Institutes for Peace (USIP) programs 
several years ago.  Poloff reiterated U.S. policy as outlined 
in the November 2009 letter from EAP A/S Kurt Campbell to 
MILF Chairman Murad.  Poloff clarified that, while our USIP 
programs had concluded, U.S. engagement on the peace process 
had not.  In the years prior to the MOA-AD, senior U.S. 
officials consistently and privately engaged the most senior 
members of the Philippine government to encourage them 
forward in peace negotiations. 
 
CAUTION ABOUT MILF BACKLASH 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Demonstrating the MILF's dissatisfaction with 
negotiations, Mastura described the potential for an MILF 
backlash -- but also noted how its current posture was 
somewhat restrained.  "We can still make trouble and 
Balkanize the area," Mastura warned.  "Please do not allow us 
to do that."  While Mastura said others had urged the MILF to 
pursue political assassinations of President Arroyo's 
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and North Cotabato 
province Vice Governor Manuel Pinol, the MILF "does not 
assassinate," even if it loathes the influence of these 
individuals who "have made a career" out of opposing peace in 
Mindanao.  (Note: The flow of the conversation did not allow 
Poloff to interject and explicitly voice opposition to the 
notion of assassinations, but everyone present seemed clearly 
to understand the USG would find such acts abhorrent.  End 
Note.) 
 
¶8. (C) Iqbal said he also had doubts about the Philippine 
military's support for peace, but he and Mastura later agreed 
with Rood's assessment that military opinions toward the MILF 
had softened because of the military's increasing 
professionalization as well as its intense focus on fighting 
the Communist insurgency, trends that are analyzed in recent 
 
MANILA 00000405  003 OF 004 
 
 
and upcoming research from The Asia Foundation.  While 
describing foreign actors of the International Monitoring 
Team, Mastura said that the U.S. military was also a player 
in Mindanao, and that the Philippine military was "under" the 
U.S. military -- a perception that Poloff corrected, noting 
that U.S. forces were present only at the invitation of the 
Philippine government. 
 
MILF SUPPORTS INTERNATIONAL CONTACT GROUP 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Mastura expressed support for the role of the 
International Contact Group (ICG) GRP and said it had played 
a useful role since its inception in December.  The ICG's 
strong reaction to the government's anemic peace offer in 
January, Mastura said, could be taken as a successful example 
of the ICG's influence in the peace process.  Rood noted that 
the ICG had also "hammered" the Philippine side to take the 
MILF comprehensive peace proposal seriously. 
 
MILF THOUGHTS ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Responding to Poloff's question about MILF 
interaction with presidential candidates, Mastura noted that 
the MILF had not reached out to any of the candidates to 
lobby them on the peace process because none of the 
candidates appeared to take the issue seriously.  As per 
stated MILF policy, the group did not expressly support or 
oppose political candidates.   However, Mastura recounted one 
exchange he had with a member of Senator Benigno "Nonoy" 
Aquino's campaign, who asked if the Senator should have a 
policy on the peace process.  Unimpressed, Mastura replied, 
"It's too complicated for Senator Aquino to understand." 
 
TERRORISM 
--------- 
 
¶11. (C) During the discussion of U.S. policy toward the MILF, 
Poloff highlighted the point in the letters from both A/S 
Campbell and then-A/S Kelly that the MILF needed to sever any 
ties to terrorists.  Mastura did not respond to Poloff's 
comment.  However, earlier in the conversation Mastura 
dismissively pointed out that the U.S. seemed to always raise 
the issue of terrorism, which he said was not relevant to the 
peace process. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) Mastura's and Iqbal's forceful statements -- the most 
heated language we have heard in recent months -- demonstrate 
that the MILF continues to view itself as the principal 
victim in its quest for Moro autonomy, wronged by the U.S. 
and history at the moment of Philippine independence, and 
struggling to reassert itself ever since in a region that has 
become home to increasing numbers of Christian migrants and 
that remains dominated by powerful Muslim clans.  The MILF 
has previously sought U.S. intervention in the peace process, 
but was unable to articulate that vision to senior U.S. 
officials during several meetings in 2009 when they discussed 
the U.S. role (Refs D, E, F ).  While likely intended to 
increase pressure on the Philippine government, the MILF's 
new idea for a "parallel dialogue" could also be an attempt 
to create a counterbalance to the ICG, whose state members 
have no historical connection to the Moros and may therefore 
be perceived as inclined to side with the Philippine 
government.  Post aims to explore the MILF's concept for 
"parallel dialogue," although we believe the timing is not 
right to establish any new mechanism. 
 
¶13. (C) Given its popularity among the Moros of central and 
western Mindanao, the MILF may increasingly position itself 
as an antidote to the mix of money, violence, and clan power 
that has saddled development in the region and led to the 
November 23 massacre of 57 civilians in Maguindanao province, 
which eyewitnesses blame on the Ampatuan clan (Ref C).  From 
this viewpoint, the autonomy sought by the MILF not only 
returns to the Moros their ancestral homeland, but also 
enables them to transition away from the region's broken 
political culture.  At present, however, we have no basis to 
believe that the MILF would prove more capable than its 
predecessors of governing well.  End Comment. 
 
 
MANILA 00000405  004 OF 004 
 
 
ATMOSPHERICS AND BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Mastura was pleased to invite guests into his large 
but not ostentatious Cotabato City home, which he proudly 
noted abuts a madrasah that he established many years ago 
with funds the Brunei government had allocated for mosque 
construction.  "We had enough mosques," Mastura said, so he 
told Brunei officials to build a school.  The Islamic school, 
he noted, teaches all subjects, including English, science, 
and math.  (Mastura and his wife lamented the declining 
number of skilled English speakers in Mindanao.)  Burnishing 
his liberal credentials, Mastura said that he and his wife 
used to drink alcohol but had to give it up when conservative 
Muslims criticized them for it.  Still, they did not feel out 
of place in the MILF: "Our (MILF) ideology is Islamic, but we 
are not ideologized." He continued, "There is a streak of 
liberalism in us (the MILF)."  Mrs. Mastura, who does not 
wear a headscarf, did not participate in the substantive 
meeting but was present and opinionated at the casual dinner 
discussion.  Mastura and Iqbal, fluent in English, both 
appeared comfortable with her presence in this setting.  The 
Masturas said they have hosted many dinners with other 
foreigners, including Steve Rood, at their home. 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
------------ 
 
¶15. (SBU) The following people participated in the February 
24 dinner and follow-on meeting: 
 
Michael Pignatello, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy Manila 
Mohagher Iqbal, MILF Peace Panel Chairman 
Michael Mastura, MILF Peace Panel Member 
Mike Marasigan, MILF Peace Panel Secretariat Member 
Steven Rood, The Asia Foundation Country Representative for 
the Philippines 
Thomas Parks, The Asia Foundation Regional Director for 
Conflict and Governance (Bangkok office) 
Abhoud Linga, Director, Institute of Bangsamoro Studies 
 
BASSETT