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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 000350 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MTS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2010 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KISL RP
SUBJECT: PEACE TALKS FACILITATOR SAYS PHILIPPINE 
GOVERNMENT, MILF INTENT ON INTERIM AGREEMENT 
 
REF: MANILA 251 (PARTIES SHARE DRAFT PEACE ACCORDS 
     BUT POSITIONS ARE FAR APART) 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Leslie A. Bassett, 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Malaysian facilitator for peace talks 
between the Philippine government and the insurgent Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) told the Charge d'Affaires 
February 18 that the parties had agreed to pursue an interim 
agreement before the end of President Arroyo's term, in lieu 
of a more extensive comprehensive pact, in an effort to 
commit the next Philippine administration to a prescribed 
course toward a negotiated peace settlement.  Facilitator 
Datuk Othman Bin Abdul Razak told the Charge there would 
still be challenges in negotiating an interim agreement, but 
the parties were intent on progress by the end of June.  The 
mechanisms supporting the peace process, notably the 
International Contact Group and the International Monitoring 
team, added value and confidence to the peace talks, Othman 
noted, although he criticized the Philippine government for 
lacking creativity.  Othman suggested the U.S., to support 
the peace process, could support the creation of a management 
institute to train future Moro leaders, and increase support 
to internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Separately, a Philippine official 
told Poloff the government received a draft interim agreement 
from the MILF outlining a path to autonomy, which the 
official described as a "creative solution" that was more 
realistic than the MILF's initial peace proposal (reftel). 
The new text provides for an MILF-led "Transition Council" 
operating over a six-year period while GRP-MILF joint teams 
negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, including 
contentious territorial and constitutional issues.  The 
official said the government seeks a meeting with the MILF 
the week of March 1 in Kuala Lumpur to ask questions about 
the draft text, and aims to formulate a counterproposal by 
the end of March.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PARTIES INTENT ON NEGOTIATING INTERIM AGREEMENT 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. (C) At a February 18 breakfast meeting with the Charge 
d'Affaires, the Malaysian facilitator for the Philippine 
government and MILF peace talks, Datuk Othman Bin Abdul 
Razak, said that the parties had agreed to pursue an interim 
agreement before the end of President Arroyo's term in an 
effort to commit the next Philippine administration to a 
prescribed course toward a negotiated peace settlement. 
While Othman acknowledged there would still be challenges in 
negotiating an interim agreement, he said he and the parties 
were nonetheless intent on achieving what progress they could 
by the end of June.  The parties had originally intended to 
meet in Kuala Lumpur the week of February 18-19, he said, but 
the MILF asked to postpone the meeting to ensure that the 
International Monitoring Team (IMT) would redeploy to 
Mindanao before the end of this month, as the MILF had 
previously demanded.  The Charge thanked Othman for his 
perseverance and creativity, noting that he played a vital 
role in helping to bring the two sides back to the 
negotiating table during a very difficult period.  The U.S. 
appreciated and supported Malaysia's role as facilitator, the 
Charge continued, and did not seek to duplicate Malaysia's 
efforts.  Othman expressed appreciation for the Charge's 
comments, and said he was uncertain what role Malaysia would 
play in peace talks after the next Philippine administration 
takes over. 
 
BINDING THE NEW PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT TO THE PROCESS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4. (C) Othman said he was seeking to "commit the next 
Philippine administration to a process" that would ensure the 
government's cooperation in peace negotiations, regardless of 
the outcome of the May national elections.  He said it was 
important to maintain the "negotiating infrastructure" that 
the parties had developed thus far, primarily the IMT and the 
International Contact Group (ICG), which were helping to 
build confidence among the parties.  The ICG, in particular, 
possessed a moral authority that both parties could respect 
-- and without which there could have been a walkout during 
the January talks.  The two parties should remain creative in 
their approaches, he said, and the international community 
should continue to support them.  The Charge noted that 
Secretary Clinton delivered a strong message of support to 
 
MANILA 00000350  002 OF 003 
 
 
the parties during her November visit to the Philippines, 
encouraging them not to miss a chance for peace. 
 
CRITICIZING PHILIPPINES FOR ITS LACK OF INITIATIVE 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (C) While pleased that the parties were continuing to 
engage each other, Othman nonetheless criticized the 
Philippine government for its lack of initiative on peace 
talks and in resolving the internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) situation in Mindanao.  The government, he said, 
demonstrated a lack of creativity in negotiations and was not 
interested in learning from other peace processes, unlike the 
MILF, which had learned much from the Northern Ireland 
example.  The U.S., he suggested, could help the Philippine 
government be more flexible and creative in negotiations. 
Othman further criticized the Philippine government for 
neglecting the needs of the remaining IDPs in Mindanao, many 
of whom still had no livelihoods to return to.  The Charge 
said that the U.S. remained concerned about IDPs, and would 
look at ways to augment existing U.S. relief programs. 
 
SEEKING U.S. SUPPORT FOR TRAINING CENTER 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Asked how the U.S. might provide additional support to 
the peace process, Othman suggested that the U.S. could 
"build capacity" by helping to create a leadership and 
management institute for future Moro leaders, a concept he 
said President Arroyo had promised but failed to support, and 
that he had pitched unsuccessfully to the international donor 
community.  Capacity-building should be in parallel to peace 
negotiations, he said, to avoid the mistakes made in the late 
1990s by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) when 
Governor Nur Misuari led the Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao.  The MNLF had failed to govern properly, Othman 
said, and Misuari neglected his governance duties. 
 
MILF PROPOSES AN INTERIM AGREEMENT 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In a separate February 18 meeting with Poloff, 
Philippine Peace Panel Director Ryan Sullivan said the 
government received and was reviewing a draft interim 
agreement from the MILF.  (He provided the text, which we 
have scanned and emailed to EAP/MTS.)  The draft text 
outlined a three-phase path to Moro autonomy through a 
pre-interim period, an interim period, and an implementation 
period.  The text provides for the creation of an MILF-led 
"Transition Council" that would operate over six-and-a-half 
years and exercise its authority through executive bodies 
with administrative powers on education and culture, social 
welfare and health, agriculture and agrarian infrastructure, 
public works and transportation, as well as trade, industry, 
and taxation.  A separate set of GRP-MILF "priority joint 
task teams" would simultaneously negotiate the components of 
a comprehensive peace agreement, including the contentious 
issues of territory, resources, finances, and constitutional 
reform -- in effect outsourcing the most difficult subjects 
to technical teams.  The MILF's draft text would commit the 
government to move toward amending the Philippine 
Constitution, but stops short of requiring this -- a 
modification of the MILF's earlier position, likely intended 
to address GRP concerns about circumventing constitutional 
processes (reftel).  The draft text also calls for the U.S., 
the EU, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and other 
unspecified countries to participate in an Independent 
Assessment Evaluation Mission to monitor implementation of 
the interim agreement. 
 
GRP TO REVIEW MILF'S "REALISTIC" PROPOSAL 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Sullivan said the government was seeking a meeting 
with the MILF the week of March 1 in Kuala Lumpur to ask 
about the MILF's draft text, and would aim to formulate a 
counterproposal by the end of March.  Sullivan described the 
MILF proposal as a "creative solution" more based in reality 
than the MILF's detailed proposal in January for a 
comprehensive compact.  The government was particularly 
pleased to see the MILF drop its outright demand for 
constitutional reform to establish a federal/state 
relationship with the new autonomous region, although 
Sullivan said that the GRP would still aim to pass 
constitutional reforms by the end of the six-year interim 
period.  With regard to the governance of the autonomous 
 
MANILA 00000350  003 OF 003 
 
 
region, Sullivan also noted that the MILF would not require 
elections for a Bangsamoro Assembly until the implementation 
period (although this is not explicitly described in the 
MILF's draft text).  The MILF would have governing authority 
for "essential responsibilities" during the interim period, 
Sullivan said, at which time it would likely bring in outside 
experts to help it manage the region's affairs. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Othman's determined effort to keep negotiations moving 
forward -- which he said he would continue right up until the 
new Philippine administration takes over -- appears to have 
helped the parties' sustain their interest in negotiation. 
Visibly tired and mumbling, Othman did not come across as 
decidedly optimistic or pessimistic about the peace talks in 
the coming months.  Instead, through his soft-spoken manner, 
he seemed resigned to the prospect that, despite difficulties 
and uncertainty, he would remain closely engaged in moving 
the parties toward a substantive interim agreement, which 
they appeared intent on negotiating. 
BASSETT