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FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
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INFO WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
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RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 MANAGUA 000202 
 
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E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB ECON ETRD PGOV NU
SUBJECT: (U) NICARAGUA: LABOR MONITORING AND ENGAGEMENT WITH FREE 
TRADE 
 
REF: 09 STATE 129631; 09 MANAGUA 437 
 
¶1.  (U) As per Ref. A request, the following is U.S. Embassy 
Managua's submission regarding Labor Monitoring and Free Trade 
Agreements. 
 
 
 
¶A. Labor Issues Scene Setter: 
 
 
 
The Right of Association 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) The law provides for the right of all public and private 
sector workers, with the exception of those in the military and 
police, to form and join independent unions of their choice. 
Workers exercise this right in practice. Workers are not required 
to notify their employer or the Ministry of Labor (MITRAB) of their 
intention to organize a union. According to the latest figures, the 
country has a population of 5.7 million people, of which, 
approximately four million participate in the workforce.  MITRAB 
estimates that 180,000 workers are members of approximately 850 
trade unions. The unionized workforce represents approximately 4.5 
percent of the total workforce between 15 and 60 years old. In 
general, labor unions are allied with political parties, and clash 
with each other along party lines. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (U) The constitution recognizes the right to strike, and the 
law allows unions to conduct their activities without government 
interference. However, burdensome and lengthy labor code 
conciliation procedures impede workers' ability to call strikes. 
During a strike, employers cannot hire replacement workers. If a 
strike continues for 30 days without resolution, MITRAB has 
authority to suspend the strike and submit the matter for 
arbitration. MITRAB often declares strikes illegal, even when 
workers follow legal strike procedures.  The reality for workers in 
the private sector is that to prevent strikes employers terminate 
or otherwise separate from service those workers who they identify 
as potential activists or strong organizers.  The prevalence of 
employer-controlled unions in workplaces that also have more 
traditional unions also impacts the practical ability of private 
sector workers and unions to strike. 
 
 
 
The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) The law provides for the right to collective bargaining. A 
collective bargaining agreement cannot exceed two years and is 
automatically renewed if neither party requests its revision. The 
government protected these rights and often sought to foster 
resolution of labor conflicts through informal negotiations rather 
than formal administrative or judicial processes. Companies in 
disputes with their employees must negotiate with the employees' 
union, if one exists. By law, several unions may coexist at any one 
enterprise. The law permits management to sign collective 
bargaining agreements with each union operating at an enterprise. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (U) The penal code establishes sanctions against employers who 
violate labor rights, such as interfering with the formation of 
unions or strikebreaking. In practice, many employers in the formal 
sector continued to violate worker rights by blacklisting or firing 
union members. Employers also avoid legal penalties by organizing 
"white unions" (employer-led unions), which lack independence. 
Union leaders assert that employers and union leaders who support 
the Ortega administration often pressure workers affiliated with 
non-FSLN unions to resign and register with FSLN unions. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (U) Although employers must reinstate workers fired for union 
activity, MITRAB cannot legally order employers to rehire fired 
workers. Formal reinstatement requires a judge's order. The law 
allows employers to obtain permission from MITRAB to dismiss any 
employee, including union organizers, provided the employer agrees 
to pay double the usual severance pay. In practice, employers often 
do not reinstate workers due to weak enforcement of the law. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (U) Labor leaders complain that employers routinely violated 
collective bargaining agreements and labor laws. Through the first 
six months of 2009 (the latest statistics available) MITRAB 
conducted 3,959 inspections and issued 26 fines, including some to 
companies that operate in Free Trade Zones (FTZ). 
 
 
 
¶8.  (U) There are no special laws or exemptions from regular labor 
laws in the 41 FTZs. Less than 10 percent of the estimated 55,000 
FTZ workers are union members. Because a high proportion of FTZ 
unions have fewer than 50 members, many lack effective collective 
bargaining power (Ref. B). This is primarily due to the effects of 
labor law reform in 1996, when the threshold for union formation 
was modified from 50 percent of a workforce to only 20 workers. 
While this has led to the creation of more unions, these unions are 
often weak, divided, and easy to break apart by employers. Though 
the law establishes a labor court arbitration process, long delays 
and lengthy, complicated procedures have a detrimental effect on 
labor resolutions mediated by the courts. As a result, most labor 
disputes are reconciled outside of court. The International Labor 
Organization (ILO) has been working with the government and labor 
leaders in an effort to reform this process and make it more 
accessible to those who have disputes with their employers. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (U) Labor unions have continued to complain that companies 
which operate in the FTZs attempt to block unionization efforts by 
any means necessary, including by closing down operations. Also, 
they allege that when the companies close, many avoid making the 
payments as required by law. Despite the fact that the majority of 
worker complaints reported to MITRAB involve companies which 
operate in the FTZs, the government has been slow to take 
substantial action in reforming labor practices in these areas. 
However, the FTZs often represent more worker complaints and 
government inspections because the sector is easier to monitor than 
the larger informal or agricultural sectors.  In addition, the 
majority of workers' unions operate in the free trade zones, and 
therefore more complaints are registered against FTZ companies. 
 
 
 
Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor 
 
 
 
¶10.  (U) The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by 
children; however, labor advocates report that such practices 
occur. The law does not prohibit the trafficking of persons for 
forced labor. The government does not have the resources to 
effectively enforce the law or implement programs to combat forced 
labor. There are instances of forced domestic servitude, primarily 
of female minors, and of forced prostitution by minors who are 
trafficked to urban centers from other countries or from rural 
areas within the country. 
 
 
 
Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment 
 
 
 
¶11.  (U) Although the law provides for the protection of children's 
rights and prohibits any type of economic or social exploitation of 
children, child labor is a widespread problem (Ref. C). The 
government does not effectively enforce the law to protect children 
from workplace exploitation. The 2005 National Survey of Adolescent 
and Child Labor, the most recent available, estimated that there 
were approximately 239,000 working children between 5 and 17 years 
old, of whom 36 percent were less than 14 years old. The NGO Save 
the Children has noted that, although school enrollment increased 
from 2007-2008, it fell in 2009 due to the economic situation as 
well as budget cuts in education and health. Lower enrollment rates 
typically correlate with a higher incidence of child labor. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (U) The law establishes the minimum age for employment at 14 
years and limits the workday to six hours and the workweek to 30 
hours. Children between 14 and 16 years of age must have parental 
approval to work. The law prohibits teenage domestic workers from 
sleeping in the house of their employers. MITRAB is legally 
responsible for caring for those teenage domestic workers unable to 
return each evening to their families, though the law is not 
generally enforced. It is also illegal for minors to work in places 
identified by MITRAB to be harmful to their health or safety such 
as mines, garbage dumps, and night entertainment venues. However, 
children as young as 14 are allowed to work as prostitutes. 
Nicaragua does have laws against trafficking in persons, including 
minors. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (U) All employees more than 14 years old must be enrolled in 
the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute (INSS). The law also 
provides for eight-year prison terms and substantial fines for 
persons employing children in dangerous work and permits inspectors 
to close facilities employing child labor. The government does not 
provide adequate resources for MITRAB to effectively enforce the 
law except in the small formal sector. Though the annual budget for 
MITRAB was cut in 2009, the percentage of the budget allocated to 
enforcement increased by 10 percent, from approximately 18 million 
cordobas ($874,000) to 21 million cordobas ($1 million). 
 
 
 
¶14.  (U) Most child labor occurs in the large informal sector, 
including on coffee plantations and subsistence farms, and in 
forestry, fishing, and hunting. According to the ILO's 
International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor, children 
engage in the worst forms of child labor in plantation agriculture, 
shellfish harvesting, pumice and limestone quarrying, artisanal 
gold mining, industrial manufacturing, construction, 
commercial/retail, hospitality, and housekeeping.  Employers also 
use child laborers to cross major land borders with drugs and other 
contraband. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (U) Children working in agriculture suffer from exposure to 
the sun, extreme temperatures, humidity, and dangerous pesticides 
and other chemicals. Hundreds of children working with their 
families face exposure to sun, extreme temperatures, water 
pollution, and powerful ocean tides in harvesting black clams for 
ceviche. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (U) In 2008, the government inaugurated Programa Amor (love), 
a social welfare program headed by first lady Rosario Murillo with 
a stated goal of eradicating the worst forms of child labor. While 
there is some evidence that the program was operative in early 
2009, quantitative information regarding its effectiveness has been 
largely absent due to lack of accessibility. The government 
continues activities to incorporate working adolescents into the 
formal workforce by transferring children from the worst forms of 
child labor into non-dangerous activities. NGOs offer vocational 
training to help adolescents develop job skills for FTZ factory 
employment. Through its inspections network, MITRAB removed 51 
child workers from employment and incorporated 783 adolescents into 
the formal sector during the first six months of 2009. 
 
 
 
The Elimination of Discrimination in Respect of Employment and 
Occupation 
 
 
 
¶17.  (U) An ongoing area of employment discrimination in Nicaragua 
is based on gender.  Nicaragua still possesses a strongly 
"machista" culture, which affects Nicaraguan women's rights 
especially in the workplace.  Local magistrate Ligia Molina, during 
a Public Forum on Gender in 2009, commented that while gender-based 
discrimination has decreased within the last decade, it is still 
prevalent in Nicaragua.  On a national level, local media report 
that women still struggle for equality in education, equal 
salaries, and access to competitive job positions within the 
government and business world.  One of the most debilitating 
effects of machista culture in the development of women's labor 
equality is the persistent lack of emphasis on education for girls. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (U) The other principal area of employment discrimination is 
based upon political affiliation.  Labor activists report that more 
than 11,000 non-unionized public employees were fired in 2009 after 
rebuffing pressure to join the FSLN party, participate in political 
marches, and join the FSLN National Union of State Employees (UNE). 
The leader of the FSLN National Front of Workers (FNT), Gustavo 
Porras, told the media that he wanted to make the rival Sandinista 
Central of Workers (CST) "disappear" from state institutions, a 
sentiment which the FNT has backed up through directing illegal 
firings of a number of CST union leaders and activists. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (U) Another case of a pattern of politically-motivated firings 
carried out by large government entities occurred in February 2009, 
when the Tax Administration (DGI) fired nearly 400 employees for 
refusing to join Sandinista Leadership Councils (CLS), government 
groups dedicated to strengthening the organizational power of the 
FSLN. The DGI also failed to pay the proper severance as required 
by law. Though most of these firings have been ruled illegal by the 
courts, none of the large government entities involved have abided 
by rulings mandating payment of severance. 
 
 
 
Acceptable Conditions of Work 
 
¶20.  (U) The national Minimum Wage Law establishes a statutory 
minimum wage for nine different economic sectors and is set through 
tripartite negotiations involving business, government, and labor 
(Ref. D). The National Assembly must approve any wage increases. 
During 2009 the government increased the minimum wage by an average 
of 11 percent across all sectors. The monthly minimum wage ranged 
from 1,573 cordobas ($76) in the agricultural sector to 3,588 
cordobas ($174) in the financial sector. The highest minimum wage 
remains significantly below the MITRAB's estimated basic cost of 
goods for an urban family, which is 8,670 cordobas ($401). Also, 
the minimum wage is generally enforced only in the formal sector 
and is thus only applicable to approximately one-third of the 
population. 
 
 
 
¶21.  (U) The standard legal workweek is a maximum of 48 hours, with 
one day of rest; however, this provision is often ignored by 
employers who claimed that workers readily volunteer for extra 
hours for additional pay. While the law mandates premium pay for 
overtime and prohibits excessive compulsory overtime, these 
requirements were not always effectively enforced. 
 
 
 
¶22.  (U) The law establishes occupational health and safety 
standards, but the government does not allocate adequate staff or 
resources to enable the Office of Hygiene and Occupational Safety 
to enforce these provisions. The labor hygiene and security law 
mandates the creation of regional offices for the National Council 
of Labor Hygiene and Safety. The council is responsible for worker 
safety legislation, collaboration with other government agencies 
and civil society organizations in developing assistance programs, 
and promoting training and prevention activities. The government 
does not enforce the new law effectively. MITRAB had conducted 
1,096 health and safety inspections in the first half of 2009, the 
most recent data available. Also, 1,154 workplace accidents were 
reported in this period, a drop from 5,497 reported in the first 
half of 2008. 
 
 
 
¶23.  (U) The law provides workers with the right to remove 
themselves from dangerous workplace situations without jeopardizing 
continued employment, but many workers are unaware of this right 
due to the lack of dissemination of information by the government. 
 
 
 
¶24.  (U) The point of contact for FTA labor matters at MITRAB is 
Dr. Jose Malespin, General Secretary.  Other key organizations 
involved in labor rights issues in Nicaragua are the International 
Labor Organization (ILO), human rights NGOs such as the Permanent 
Committee on Human Rights (CPDH) and the Nicaraguan Center for 
Human Rights (CENIDH), and the Labor Committee at the Superior 
Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP). 
 
 
 
¶B. Strategy Recommendations: 
 
 
 
Labor Code Reform for Employment Stability 
 
 
 
¶25.  (U) Labor rights advocates, union leaders and employers have 
complained that the MITRAB is often inflexible in its 
interpretation of the existing labor code, often to the detriment 
of preserving employment.  In fact, unions within the FTZs recently 
signed a tripartite agreement to interpret the labor code in a way 
that would improve job security while respecting labor rights. 
Reforms include changing the bi-yearly minimum salary adjustment 
process to a single-year review; increasing work-hour flexibility 
to allow for 4 x 4 shifts popular in assembly plants; and allowing 
vacation rules to be more flexible for workers and employers. 
 
 
 
Labor Courts Reform and Anti-Corruption 
 
 
 
¶26.  (U) Unions and labor rights advocates all decry the lack of 
labor justice for Nicaragua's workers.  The current case backlog 
and long conciliation procedures are only part of the problem. 
Labor advocates believe that a program to reform the courts and 
conciliation procedures to increase efficiency would improve the 
situation.  Fundamentally, the rampant corruption within the 
Nicaraguan judicial system need to be addressed before real, 
sustainable change can occur. 
 
 
 
Improve Employer Compliance 
 
 
 
¶27.  (U) When a company suddenly closes, it often has not set aside 
sufficient funds to liquidate its workers' claims and pay their 
severances.  The law makes it difficult for workers to get redress, 
especially when foreign owners are involved.  Labor rights 
advocates recommend reforming the labor laws to require employers 
to contribute to an "escrow" account that would be released only 
after all worker liabilities were settled.  Alternatively, labor 
rights advocates recommend reforming labor laws to immediately 
confiscate equipment of companies that close, and use the proceeds 
from the sale of equipment to settle workers' claims. 
 
 
 
Improving Worker Productivity & Developing National Certification 
 
 
 
¶28.  (U) Labor rights advocates have repeatedly stressed the need 
to improve worker productivity through better education and skills 
development (both professional and personal).  They note that most 
Nicaraguan workers do not complete the 3rd grade, and that they 
often have not developed the basic work habits (for example, 
getting to work on time and making arrangements for child care 
during work hours).  They recommend that the GON improve and expand 
the national system of vocational institutes for students, as well 
as a national certification process for technical vocations. 
Nicaragua currently does not have a national certification process 
for electricians, carpenters, plumbers, mechanics, etc.  Such a 
system would improve consumer confidence, as well as the 
employability of many workers.  The need for specialized skills 
increases as many unskilled agricultural jobs are being lost to 
automation. 
 
 
 
Labor Education and National Training Institute Reform 
 
 
 
¶29.  (U) Labor leaders have called for increased labor rights 
education, including the development of a "labor rights" curriculum 
that could be included in the public school system and vocational 
institutes.  The labor rights curriculum should include teaching 
Nicaraguan students their fundamental rights as well as the role of 
the government in defending those rights. 
 
 
 
¶30.  (U) Labor leader have also recommended reforming the National 
Technological Institute (INATEC), a GON entity dedicated to 
training workers.  INATEC is currently controlled by FSLN/FNT 
leader Damas Vargas and receives 2% of each worker's gross salary; 
however, the institution is grossly inefficient.  INATEC allegedly 
spends 66% on administrative costs and has only 33% left to perform 
its core mission.  In addition, INATEC is limited to the Pacific 
side of Nicaragua.  The Atlantic Coast is an area with high 
unemployment and no real government training programs. 
 
 
 
Eliminating Gender Discrimination in the Workplace 
 
 
 
¶31.  (U) Eliminating gender discrimination from the workplace is a 
long-term challenge in Nicaragua.  On factory floors within the 
FTZs, most of the employees are women, and almost all of the 
managers are men.  A similar dynamic is also observed in the public 
sector.  This is most likely due to lack of access to higher 
education for girls, leaving many women in unskilled positions.  A 
public awareness campaign to promote the benefits of girls' 
education could help slowly transform cultural attitudes that leave 
women with fewer employment options.  Programs to increase 
awareness of gender discrimination in the workplace are still 
needed.  Another recommendation from women's groups is offering 
more scholarships for women to attend vocational training programs, 
entrepreneur workshops, and management certification programs. 
 
 
 
Strengthening Labor Unions and  Leadership 
 
 
 
¶32.  (U) The 1996 Labor Reform that changed the rules to allow for 
unions to organize with only 20 members has had the unintended 
effect of dividing and conquering organized labor in Nicaragua, 
which is currently fragmented and weak.  Union leaders believe that 
if this law were repealed, it would immediately strengthen the 
bargaining power of unions in collective agreements and make it 
more difficult for employer-created "white" unions to derail the 
bargaining process. 
 
 
 
¶33.  (U) Another identified need is providing training programs for 
union leaders.  Often, Nicaraguan union leaders are more concerned 
with politics than defending workers' interests.   Any training 
that reinforces the purposes of unions and the proper role of union 
leaders could help strengthen the labor movement in Nicaragua. 
 
 
 
Addressing Child Labor 
 
 
 
¶34.  (U) Existing child labor programs in Nicaragua are not 
sufficient to eliminate this pervasive problem, and MITRAB lacks 
the resources (financial and personnel) to effectively inspect and 
monitor/assess the problem.  Experts in the field recommend that 
eliminating child labor requires changing fundamental public 
attitudes about it, helping parents to value education for their 
children over the immediate economic benefits of having them work 
to support the family.  In certain sectors, such as coffee, the 
approach should be two-fold: (1) a continuous in-country public 
awareness campaign that is pro-education and against child labor, 
including a hotline to anonymously report abuses, and (2) an 
external international campaign to coffee consumers to prefer 
"child-labor free" coffee. 
 
 
 
Improving MITRAB Inspections 
 
 
 
¶35.  (U) Labor leaders report that MITRAB is arbitrary and 
ineffective, and often loses sight of the right to work (by 
maintaining conditions which foster economic growth) as one of the 
most fundamental of labor rights.  Training for MITRAB leaders to 
help them effectively carry out the law in an impartial way would 
potentially improve the institution. 
 
 
 
Cohesive, Comprehensive USG Strategy 
 
 
 
¶36.  (U) There is an assortment of labor programs currently 
underway in Nicaragua funded by the USG.  These programs focus on 
completely different sectors and regions, each with a unique 
purpose.  Sometimes there is overlap and redundancy between 
programs.  The attached documents summarize ongoing labor programs 
in Nicaragua operated by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), and U.S. 
Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 
(DRL).  It is recommended that DOL, DRL and USAID work together to 
create a comprehensive and cohesive approach to addressing labor 
issues in Nicaragua going forward. 
 
 
 
 
 
¶C. Cooperation Needs: 
 
 
 
GON-USG Cooperation Challenging 
 
 
 
¶37.  (U) The return of President Daniel Ortega and the FSLN party 
to the executive branch has complicated bilateral cooperation, 
including on labor-related programs funded by the USG.  The Ortega 
government is sharply critical of the United States and cooperation 
is becoming increasingly difficult for embassy officials even on 
routine issues.  Meanwhile, budget cuts to MITRAB prevent it from 
pursuing institutional development and reforms without the 
assistance of outside donors.  DOL, DRL or USAID-hired contractors, 
who bring financial resources and new programs to improve MITRAB, 
are able to have an amicable relationship with the ministry, while 
embassy officials are rebuffed or ignored when completing routine 
program oversight and reporting requirements. 
 
 
 
Towards a Cohesive, Comprehensive USG Strategy 
 
 
 
¶38.  (U) With the hodgepodge of USG-funded labor programs currently 
underway in Nicaragua, future cooperation with the GON would 
improve if there was a comprehensive and cohesive strategy for US 
labor policy. Instead of trying a shotgun approach to solving all 
of the labor issues in country, we should focus on the top two or 
three problems where we can make a substantial difference.  MITRAB 
may even engage with the USG about this, under the right 
circumstances. 
 
 
 
Better Work - A Model for Cooperation 
 
 
 
¶39.  (U) Department of Labor ILAB Deputy Undersecretary Sandra 
Polaski visited Nicaragua from January 17th to the 19th, exploring 
the possibility of implementing the ILO's Better Work program here 
as a pilot project for expanding it to all of the CAFTA-DR 
countries.  Polaski and the ILO representatives were well received 
by labor unions, private sector representatives, and GON officials. 
The Better Work program might be an ideal strategy to align 
business, labor, and government interests in Nicaragua in way that 
can meaningfully improve both labor conditions and economic 
competitiveness in Nicaragua's apparel section.  Viewed as an ILO 
program more than a USG one, Better Work may not meet with as much 
GON resistance as we have seen in other cooperative programs. 
 
 
 
Labor Code Reform for Employment Stability 
 
 
 
¶40.  (U) DOL labor experts could assist a recent effort led by the 
ILO to facilitate legislation to reform Nicaragua's labor code to 
better harmonize the global labor market. 
 
 
 
Labor Courts Reform & Anti-Corruption 
 
 
 
¶41.  (U) USG-funded anti-corruption programs in addition to current 
labor justice programs may be effective. 
 
 
 
Improve Employer Compliance 
 
 
 
¶42.  (U) DOL could work with MITRAB to help US-owned companies 
already established in country, and those seeking to do business in 
Nicaragua, to better understand the labor law and their obligations 
to workers, should their businesses close. 
 
 
 
Improving Worker Productivity & Developing National Certification 
 
 
 
¶43.  (U) In connection with the Better Work program, DOL/ILO 
working with MITRAB could develop a series of "telenovelas" TV 
programs that show how workers demonstrate good work habits with 
real life situations  (for example, getting to work on time and 
making arrangements for child care during work hours). 
 
 
 
¶44.  (U) USG funding could help reform INATEC or launch a national 
system of vocational institutes for students, as well as a national 
certification process for technical vocations such as electricians, 
carpenters, plumbers, mechanics, etc. 
 
 
 
Labor Education and Reforming National Training Institute 
 
 
 
¶45.  (U) DOL working with MITRAB and the Ministry of Education 
could develop a "labor rights" curriculum for the public school 
system and vocational institutes that teach the fundamental labor 
rights as well as the role of the government in defending those 
rights.   INATEC could also be revitalized through this USG-funded 
worker education initiative. 
 
 
 
Eliminating Gender Discrimination in the Workplace 
 
 
 
¶46.  (U) DOL could expand existing programs to increase awareness 
of gender discrimination in the workplace and explore offer 
scholarships for women to attend vocational training programs, 
entrepreneur workshops, and management certification programs under 
a worker education initiative.  In addition, the DOL could work 
with existing women's rights NGOs to add a labor rights component 
to their work. 
 
 
 
Strengthening Labor Unions & Leadership 
 
 
 
¶47.  (U) Repealing the 1996 Labor Reforms that weakened unions may 
be outside the scope of a USG-funded project.  However, providing 
training programs for union leaders that reinforces the purposes of 
unions and the proper role of union leaders could be appropriately 
launched. 
 
 
 
Addressing Child Labor 
 
 
 
¶48.  (U) A USG-funded program that promotes education and makes it 
easier to report child labor abuses thro