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FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1980
INFO RUEHWH/WEST HEMIS AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1561
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000195 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR JUAN GONZALEZ, WHA 
BILL MCILHENNY, WHA/PPC 
STACIE ZERDECKI AND ALEX MCKNIGHT, EUR/WE 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USAID/LAC JANET BALLANTYNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: A/S VALENZUELA INVITES SPAIN TO TEAM UP IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
 
REF: A. MADRID 87 
     ¶B. MADRID 146 
     ¶C. MADRID 133 
     ¶D. 2009 MADRID 59 
     ¶E. MADRID 187 
     ¶F. MADRID DAO IIR 6 889 0116 10 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon, for reasons 1.4(b) a 
nd (d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  A/S Valenzuela's February 1-3 visit to 
Madrid was characterized by bilateral goodwill and mutual 
optimism for U.S.-Spanish cooperation in Latin America to 
address significant challenges in the region, not least of 
which the impact of the ongoing economic crisis and the 
after-effects of the January 12 earthquake in Haiti.  Two 
main events anchored a full program:  a bilateral meeting of 
the U.S.-Spain Latin America Working Group (LAWG) and a 
conference jointly sponsored by the Council of the Americas 
(COA) and the General Secretariat for IberoAmerica (SEGIB) on 
Strengthening Transatlantic Partnerships.  In additional 
meetings with a number of Spanish government officials, 
former government officials, EU representatives, and members 
of civil society regarding Latin America policy issues, 
Valenzuela highlighted U.S. engagement and objectives in the 
Americas, including shared interests with Spain and 
opportunities to deepen our foreign assistance cooperation to 
achieve important results.  Spanish and international media 
reported accurately and positively on Valenzuela's public 
remarks, particularly his caution that a change in EU's 
Common Position toward Cuba would not be well viewed in 
Washington.  END SUMMARY. 
 
//Touching Base with Spain// 
 
¶2.  (C) During a cordial two-hour meeting on February 1, WHA 
Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela and NSA-equivalent 
Bernardino Leon, Secretary General of the Office of the 
Presidency, discussed prospects for U.S.-Spanish cooperation 
in Latin America and Spanish priorities in the region during 
its rotating presidency of the Council of Europe (ref E). The 
two discussed recent efforts in Haiti, ongoing European trade 
ties with the region, threats to democracy in Venezuela and 
Nicaragua, and human rights in Cuba. 
 
¶3. (C) Second Vice President Maria Teresa Fernandez de la 
Vega, in what she later told the Ambassador was an excellent 
one-on-one meeting (ref B), told A/S Valenzuela on February 2 
that Spain wanted to work with the U.S. in the region.  She 
agreed that Spain and the United States should coordinate 
development assistance in the region, building in part on our 
successful joint efforts in Haiti.  She said Spain and the 
U.S. could triangulate efforts with countries such as Mexico, 
Brazil, or Chile. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Valenzuela also used his time in Madrid well to 
reconnect with others in a position to comment on Spanish 
policy in the region, including Secretary General for 
IberoAmerica Enrique Iglesias, former Spanish President 
Felipe Gonzalez, and Prince Felipe of Asturias.  All 
expressed enthusiasm for the idea of expanding bicentennial 
observations of Latin American independence to the United 
States in the next year, with the Prince and Iglesias 
professing their willingness to participate in potential 
U.S.-organized events. 
 
¶5.  (C) By contrast, former President Felipe Gonzalez, also a 
Socialist, offered Valenzuela a bleak outlook for the 
hemisphere and shared his concerns about President Zapatero's 
management of Spanish foreign policy overall, as well as the 
direction the EU was taking on immigration and other matters. 
 Gonzalez was largely in agreement with the U.S. approach to 
Latin America.  He advocated a moderate, center-line approach 
including non-confrontation with the likes of Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez.  Gonzalez was receptive to the idea of 
increased U.S. participation in the celebration of the 
bicentennials of Latin American countries' independence from 
Spain and especially enthusiastic about the idea of 
coordinating an event in New York involving former President 
Bill Clinton. 
 
//Latin America Working Group// 
 
¶6.  (C) Secretary of State for IberoAmerican Affairs Juan 
Pablo de Laiglesia hosted February 1 and set the agenda for 
 
MADRID 00000195  002 OF 004 
 
 
afternoon discussions that continued during a working lunch. 
The U.S. and Spanish delegations touched on Spanish 
priorities during its EU presidency, the impact of the 
economic crisis on Latin America as a whole, regional 
security issues including counter narcotics cooperation, 
Latin American and Caribbean regional integration, Venezuela, 
and Cuba.  A/S Valenzuela advised de Laiglesia, who has been 
outspoken about his hopes for a change in the EU's Common 
Position toward Cuba, that such a Spanish initiative would 
not be well viewed in Washington.  The afternoon meetings 
laid the groundwork for more in-depth discussions to come 
with Secretary of State for International Cooperation Soraya 
Rodriguez, and the possibility of forming sub-groups to 
implement specific projects in priority areas.  Valenzuela 
set the tone for U.S.-Spanish collaboration toward shared 
solutions to common problems, calling this an opportune 
moment for a "win-win."  He stressed that the United States 
and Spain were important partners, both of whom wanted to 
consolidate democracy and secure a better quality of life for 
Latin America. 
 
//Honduras// 
 
¶7.  (C) Turning to specific countries on the LAWG agenda, 
Valenzuela updated de Laiglesia on U.S. efforts to presuure 
de facto leader Roberto Micheletti to leave power prior to 
the presidential inauguration of Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo and 
emphasized that it was vital for the international community 
to support Lobo's efforts to move Honduras out of its 
political crisis.  Valenzuela underscored that the United 
States saw Honduras as a "win" for multilateral diplomacy and 
that the coordinated international response had sent a clear 
message that the international community would not tolerate 
the unconstitutional removal of presidents from power in the 
Western Hemisphere.  De Laiglesia spoke of the need to find a 
way to defend democratic values in Honduras and conceded that 
perhaps Spain and the rest of Europe had "mismanaged" 
Honduras, by allowing the de facto government to believe that 
the international community would accept an alternative (a 
"plan B").  De Laiglesia noted President Lobo appeared to be 
working towards the conditions the United States, Spain, and 
the international community were seeking.  The European Union 
member states planned to send their ambassadors back to 
Tegucigalpa -- pending the outcome of an EU-COLAT meeting 
that Spain in its capacity as EU president was pushing for on 
February 2 -- after being represented at the inauguration at 
the Charge d'Affaires level.  De Laiglesia himself planned to 
travel to Honduras the week of February 8 in an effort to 
re-establish "normal" relations and work toward the lifting 
of sanctions imposed during the crisis.  Valenzuela added 
that the matter of greatest urgency was getting Lobo's 
cabinet ministers sworn in so that former President Zelaya 
could leave Honduras.  De Laiglesia took the position that 
the EU should characterize the situation and deliver a clear 
message that seizures of power were not to be tolerated and 
that the EU's members would not recognize the governments to 
emerge from such coups.  (Note:  Spanish Ambassador to 
Honduras Ignacio Ruperez arrived in Tegucigalpa on February 4 
after a seven-month absence, according to media reports.  End 
note.) 
//Cuba// 
¶8.  (C) Whereas NSA-equivalent Leon had advised Valenzuela he 
did not foresee a significant change in EU policy toward Cuba 
(ref E), de Laiglesia maintained that Spain was proposing to 
codify a change in the relationship that was already 
manifest, citing an increase in high-level visits and ongoing 
EU-Cuba human rights dialogue.  He held that democratic 
change would be brought about by Cubans, and said Spain had 
to be ready to act.  For that reason, Spain was keeping lines 
of communication open to the GOC, so as to avoid an emergency 
policy shift when the time came.  During Spain's EU 
presidency, its policy was to engage with all Latin American 
countries, including Cuba.  While there was more to Spanish 
and EU policy toward Latin America than Cuba alone, and he 
wished to remove the spotlight on Cuba policy, he observed 
that "some countries" thought moving from the Common Position 
to a bilateral agreement would debilitate the EU's human 
rights position toward Cuba.  De Laiglesia clarified that the 
Common Position was based on consensus and that the GOS had 
initiated a "reflection" in that context.  He described the 
exercise as a process to follow with fellow EU members. 
Valenzuela warned de Laiglesia that replacing the Common 
Position would not be well received in Washington, DC.  The 
optics of such a move, he said, could too easily be 
misconstrued as abandonment of the EU's support for human 
 
MADRID 00000195  003 OF 004 
 
 
rights. 
//Haiti// 
¶9.  (C) Valenzuela described his efforts to secure 
third-country placements for Haitian critical care patients, 
including his outreach to Cuban counterparts and information 
about Cuban medical personnel already active in Haiti.  De 
Laiglesia conveyed his appreciation to the USG for saving the 
arm of the Spanish Ambassador to Haiti, who had been injured 
in the earthquake, and informed Valenzuela that Spain's 
hospital-equipped ship Castilla was due to arrive in the 
region February 2.  Valenzuela thanked Spain for the extra 
capacity.  (Note:  The Castilla, which departed Cadiz January 
22, was anchored off Port Goave the morning of February 4, 
according to the Spanish Navy (ref F).  End note.)  Regarding 
a reconstituted MINUSTAH, de Laiglesia said Spain was 
positively inclined to accept and work within the new 
structure. 
¶10.  (C) Turning to foreign assistance coordination, 
Valenzuela observed that the January 12 earthquake had 
changed the nature of international cooperation and 
interaction with local authorities, re-aligning priorities. 
Prior to the quake, Western Hemisphere countries had 
participated in UN peacekeeping operations and there had been 
some limited Argentine-Brazilian triangulation on small 
projects.  During the subsequent emergency, stabilization, 
and construction phases, it would be important to keep Latin 
American countries at the center of assistance operations and 
to further involve CARICOM members.  De Laiglesia added that 
Haiti would have to own its own recovery process and stressed 
that even though it had been damaged, the Government of Haiti 
had to emerge stronger from the ordeal.  De Laiglesia said 
alternative energy -- a sector in which Spain had significant 
investments -- might be another positive area for 
cooperation, as with Colombian-Haitian collaboration on 
underwater electric networks. 
 
//Promising Prospects for Assistance Coordination// 
 
¶11. (SBU) For her part, Soraya Rodriguez said during a 
90-minute meeting on February 2 it would be "stupendous" to 
work with the United States on two to three priority areas, 
emphasizing quality over quantity.  She suggested focusing on 
certain lines of cooperation assistance in states that were 
weakened or fragile but not failed.  The GOS offered to 
propose the formation of a technical working group to decide 
on a jointly administered project, to be followed by an 
invitation to Washington. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Rodriguez and her staff expressed great interest in 
the upcoming visit of AID Administrator Shah during the 
February 17-18 EU Development Ministers, meetings outside 
Madrid.  The GOS had been communicating with the interim 
administrator and looked forward to a full day of engagement. 
 The GOS especially hoped to make progress at the ministerial 
in the agriculture and food security sectors -- not just 
creating another "fund." 
¶13. (SBU) Having confirmed Spanish political will, Valenzuela 
reiterated that improving cooperation would strengthen all 
partners, and detailed possible concrete steps to advance the 
idea of a jointly administered trial project.  He  proposed 
the formation of a Senior Level Working Group on Trilateral 
Assistance, as a subset of the LAWG, that would meet in 
Washington within 90 days of the USAID Administrator's visit 
to Spain.  Possible agenda topics, he suggested, might 
include a presentation on U.S. foreign assistance priorities 
in the hemisphere, as well as a consideration of countries 
and sectors for trilateral cooperation.  Rodriguez suggested 
the GOS present the idea of another, more technical working 
group to AID Administrator Shah, and then accept his 
invitation to Washington.  Both sides agreed the September 
2010 review in New York of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) offered an opportunity to evaluate U.S.-Spanish 
progress in Latin America and to set further concrete U.S.-EU 
goals for implementation by 2015 or thereabouts.  Valenzuela 
told Rodriguez a concentration on Central America would be 
well placed. 
//Explaining U.S. Policy// 
 
¶14. (SBU) At a pre-conference dinner hosted the evening of 
February 1 by the COA/SEGIB organizers and attended by some 
35 business executives and government officials including the 
Ambassador, Valenzuela outlined the new approach to U.S. 
policy in Latin America.  He spoke of the basis for U.S. 
partnership and leadership in the region as threefold:  1) 
opportunity and the search for competitiveness; 2) citizen 
 
MADRID 00000195  004 OF 004 
 
 
security and the rule of law; and 3) strengthening capacity 
and guarding against the breakdown of democracy.  He 
described examples of U.S. and regional initiatives in 
support of each and shared insights based on his travel to 
Honduras for the January 28 inauguration of President Lobo. 
That evening and on the margins of the February 2 conference, 
Valenzuela had side meetings with a number of individuals, 
including PRISA Group CEO and founding editor of Spain's 
leading daily El Pais Juan Luis Cebrian and Javier Santiso, 
Director of the OECD Emerging Markets Network, who also 
presented at the COA-SEGIB conference. 
 
//Positive Press Play// 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Valenzuela's visit got excellent media coverage at 
a critical time not only for U.S. relations with Latin 
America but also in the midst of the much publicized decision 
(ref C) of President Obama not to attend the U.S.-EU Summit 
planned for the end of May.  In an exclusive TV interview on 
the margins of the COA-SEGIB conference, Valenzuela told CNN 
Plus about Haiti that "from great tragedies come great 
opportunities."  He underscored the importance of building a 
new and better future for Haiti.  He acknowledged that he had 
almost canceled his trip to Madrid in order to work on the 
Haitian disaster response, but said it was important for him 
to come to Madrid to discuss our efforts.  Asked by a 
reporter from Spain's leading left-of center independent 
daily El Pais about the U.S.-EU Summit "snub," Valenzuela 
stressed the importance of Spain and Europe to the United 
States as evidenced by his own presence in Madrid.  Wire 
service EFE and Europa Press both headlined Valenzuela's 
positive comments about the return to democracy in Honduras 
("the necessary direction" for re-entry into the OAS), 
whereas conservative Spanish media highlighted his saying the 
United States would not view positively a change in the EU's 
Common Position toward Cuba. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Spanish views continue to resonate with 
USG views and Spain remains interested in working with us in 
Latin America.  A/S Valenzuela's meeting with political 
power-hitter Soraya Rodriguez -- who had been unable to meet 
with his predecessors either in New York or in Madrid (ref D) 
-- made significant progress toward coordination of U.S. and 
Spanish foreign assistance in Central America.  Spain has 
stepped up to provide significant humanitarian assistance to 
Haiti since the earthquake, and will be key to coordinating 
ongoing reconstruction efforts during its EU presidency.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
¶17.  (U) A/S Valenzuela cleared this cable. 
CHACON