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C O N F I D E N T I A L LJUBLJANA 000032 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/CE 
OSD FOR DASD TOWNSEND 
EUCOM FOR AMBASSADOR CANAVAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020 
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO AF SI
SUBJECT: INVESTING IN AN ALLY: SUPPORT FOR SLOVENIA'S 
EXPANDED MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. LJUBLJANA 0001 
     ¶B. LJUBLJANA 0027 
     ¶C. LJUBLJANA-EUR/CE E-MAIL JAN 15 AND SUBSEQUENT 
     ¶D. LETTER FROM SLOVENIAN SHAPE NMR TO US NMR 8 JAN 10 
 
Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request; please see paragraph six. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY.  Slovenia is at a crucial tipping point in 
terms of its international engagement.  If the country is to 
successfully deploy an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team 
(OMLT) in Afghanistan this year, as it has committed itself 
to do,  it will itself require some mentoring as well as a 
modest investment of U.S. political and logistical support. 
Embassy Ljubljana's Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) is 
leading the effort to get the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) 
the armored vehicles it needs and to lash up the SAF with the 
Colorado National Guard for what will initially be a joint 
mission (ref A).  Our Public Affairs Office is working 
closely with its counterparts in the Ministries of Defense 
and Foreign Affairs to help the government shape its message 
to a still-skeptical Slovenian public and parliament (ref B). 
Most recently, Slovenia has requested U.S. assistance to 
facilitate the Prime Minister's travel to Afghanistan in 
March (refs C & D).  The Prime Minister's trip is critical to 
his efforts to ensure public and parliamentary support for 
Slovenia's first mission "outside the wire" in Afghanistan, 
and to our efforts to encourage Slovenia to play a more 
active role internationally.  We ask the Department to 
initiate a request for DoD airlift support based on the 
justification in paras 3-5 below.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (C) On January 23, Foreign Minister Zbogar reiterated ref 
D request to the Charge' d'Affaires.  Zbogar noted that Pahor 
faced calls for withdrawal from Afghanistan by prominent MPs 
representing two of his government's junior coalition 
partners, LDS and Zares, and implied that this sentiment was 
widespread within the rank and file of both parties.  The FM 
argued forcefully that Pahor's trip to Afghanistan was 
essential in order for the PM to face down opposition to the 
OMLT within his own coalition government.  Pahor must also 
rebut criticism from the news media that Slovenia is asking 
its soldiers to take on a more dangerous mission while no 
Slovenian leader has ever set foot in Afghanistan.  The 
request for U.S. support to travel to Afghanistan was not 
made lightly, Zbogar said; it is critical to Pahor's ability 
to lead on this issue.  Defense Minister Jelusic confirmed 
this on January 28, expressing concern about the government's 
ability to maintain support for the OMLT if Pahor is not able 
to offer parliament a first-hand assessment of the situation 
on the ground in Afghanistan. 
 
¶4. (C) Embassy Ljubljana strongly supports the Slovenian 
request.  With the deployment of an OMLT, the number of 
Slovenian soldiers in Afghanistan will increase by almost 50 
percent to approximately 100 soldiers, this from a country 
with a population of only two million.  More importantly, 
Slovenia will deploy the OMLT without functional caveats for 
the first time in its history.  Putting their troops in 
harm's way on behalf of NATO is a huge leap for this insular 
little country.  It symbolizes the acceptance of shared 
responsibility and shared risk in a nation that has, since 
independence in 1991, been slow to throw off the lingering 
vestiges of Yugoslav non-alignment and venture beyond its 
comfortable cocoon of domestic prosperity.  With our support, 
Slovenia could eventually become another Denmark: a small 
European ally that plays a disproportionately large role 
internationally.  Absent our support, they are more likely to 
drift toward Austrian-style complacency.  The Prime 
Minister's travel to Afghanistan will shore up this support 
and create momentum for further international engagement. 
 
¶5. (C) Slovenia currently has approximately six percent of 
its military deployed abroad on international missions, with 
the largest contingents in Kosovo (395 soldiers) and 
Afghanistan (69 soldiers).  Within the MOD and SAF, there are 
scores of IMET graduates at all levels, from the CHOD on 
down, who gained both the strategic vision and tactical 
skills necessary for this deployment during IMET and other 
 
bilateral training.  They and their colleagues welcome the 
opportunity to take on a more challenging mission in ISAF. 
Once the OMLT deployment is accepted by the public, we see 
opportunities for Slovenia to further increase its 
contribution to ISAF by, for example, deploying its 
state-of-the-art NATO-certified field hospital.  At a 
minimum, the lifting of caveats will push all levels of the 
government to articulate publicly, for the first time, why 
Slovenia should accept certain risks on behalf of a larger 
international cause.  Pahor's trip to Afghanistan -- the 
first ever by a Slovenian head of government -- is  critical 
in this regard.  With minimal investment on our part, we can 
build on the current momentum to ensure that Slovenia,s 
engagement in Afghanistan -- and in NATO operations generally 
-- becomes self-sustaining. 
 
¶6. (C) ACTION REQUEST:  Please initiate a "Request for 
Assistance for Non-reimbursable Round-trip Travel" for 
Slovenian Prime Minister Borut Pahor and Defense Minister 
Ljubica Jelusic from Ljubljana, Slovenia, to Afghanistan for 
a three-day period in March 2010 to be determined by the 
availability of USAF assets and in consultation with the 
Government of Slovenia.  In addition to the Minister of 
Defense, Pahor will be accompanied by 2-4 Slovenian officials 
and at least one journalist.  Charge' d'Affaires requests 
permission to accompany the Prime Minister.  DATT and/or ODC 
Chief will accompany the MOD. 
 
¶7. (C)  Following is the text of the request from the 
Slovenian National Military Representative at SHAPE to the 
U.S. NMR, dated 8 January 2010: 
 
"In order to gain better political and public support on our 
common efforts in Afghanistan, SVN is planning a visit of the 
Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense with the 
delegation (together 5 to 10 persons) to Afghanistan.  The 
PM's plan is to visit Afghan President Karzai, COMISAF, COM 
RC West and SVN contingent in Herat.  The visit is planned 
for a period between 1st and 13th of February in duration of 
three days (Note: MOD informed us on January 29 that the 
visit had been postponed until March.  End Note.).  USA NMR 
is kindly requested for support to provide air transportation 
from Europe to Afghanistan (Kabul or Herat) and back to 
Europe.  SVN delegation will not require any additional 
security arrangements." 
 
¶8. (C) MOD Jelusic subsequently informed CDA that the Prime 
Minister wished to delay his requested travel until March to 
allow more time for planning and owing to the postponement of 
the Afghan elections.  The Prime Minister's office has 
promised to provide us ASAP with at least two sets of dates 
during which he would be able to travel. 
FREDEN