VZCZCXRO1385
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHLI #0065/01 0421137
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111137Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8113
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 000065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020 
TAGS: PTER KCRM PREL PGOV PO
SUBJECT: ETA SAFEHOUSE FOUND IN PORTUGAL 
 
Classified By: Poleconoff Mario Fernandez, reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary.  The February 5 discovery by the Portuguese 
National Guard Police of an ETA safe house in a town north of 
Lisbon where significant amounts of explosives and weapons 
were found has put Portuguese authorities on alert.  The two 
individuals who rented the house disappeared and are on the 
run.  The find follows the January 9 arrest by Portuguese 
authorities of two other ETA members who had fled Spain in a 
stolen police car.  The two suspects are currently detained 
in a high security prison in Lisbon awaiting extradition to 
Spain.  Spanish authorities had speculated that ETA could be 
trying to move some of its operations to Portugal from France 
following a crackdown by French authorities, but Portuguese 
authorities had dismissed the speculation.  The discovery 
makes clear that ETA is indeed seeking to establish 
alternative bases in Portugal, requiring increased vigilance 
from, and better coordination among, Portuguese law 
enforcement authorities, as well as enhanced information 
sharing with their Spanish counterparts.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) On January 9, following what they called "spectacular 
coordination" between Portuguese and Spanish authorities, the 
Portuguese National Guard (GNR) arrested two ETA suspects in 
northern Portugal.  The suspects, Garikoilz Garcia Arrieta 
and Iratxe Yanez Ortiz de Barron, had fled Spain into 
Portugal in a stolen police car after the vehicle they were 
driving raised suspicions at a Spanish checkpoint.  The 
vehicle was found to be transporting explosives, weapons, 
light sensors, various antennas, movement sensors, other 
electronic material, and assorted false documents.  Following 
pre-established "transborder" procedures, Spanish authorities 
immediately contacted Portuguese law enforcement, who 
detained the suspects in northern Portugal an hour later. 
The suspects, who were considered dangerous, were taken to 
the Monsanto high-security prison, in Lisbon.  After 
examining materials seized in the January 9 arrests, Spanish 
authorities concluded that the two were seeking to assemble 
bombs that would be used for attacks in Spain. Previous 
investigations concluded that ETA's leadership had given 
instructions for the creation of a base in Portugal. Since 
2002, authorities have learned of several instances that 
suggest ETA presence in Portugal. 
 
¶3. (U) At a hearing January 11, Arrieta was charged with auto 
theft and terrorism while Ortiz de Barron was charged with 
forging documents and supporting ETA's terror campaign. 
Portuguese judicial authorities quickly determined, however, 
that the suspects should be tried in Spain, rather than 
Portugal.  The Spanish government announced January 15 that 
the extradition process was underway, demonstrating what a 
Spanish official called "nimble" judicial cooperation between 
the two Iberian states.  Following talks with Portuguese 
Justice Minister Alberto Martins, the Spanish Justice 
Minister said Portugal was processing a European arrest 
warrant issued in Spain.  Portuguese Interior Minister Rui 
Pereira and Spanish counterpart Alfredo Rubalcaba met January 
21 to discuss extradition to Spain as quickly as possible, 
noting that the process had to "respect procedures of the 
Portuguese judicial system."  Pereira and Rubalcaba, meeting 
on the margins of an EU ministerial, reportedly also turned 
their attention to cross-border cooperation to combat 
terrorism, and Rubalcaba thanked his counterpart for the 
support of Portugal's security services. 
 
¶4. (U) At the time of the arrests January 9, Portuguese 
authorities denied knowledge of ETA hideouts in Portugal. 
Portuguese Justice Minister Martins said January 10 that 
Portugal "does not have information or suspicion" regarding 
ETA bases in Portugal.  Spanish authorities, however, had 
speculated such existed, explaining that ETA could be moving 
some of its operations to Portugal following a crackdown in 
France.  Rubalcaba said ETA "was preparing the creation of a 
logistical base in Portugal" and "not one, but several 
attacks."  Julio Pereira, the chief of Portugal's 
intelligence services, dismissed as "speculation" the 
possibility of ETA having a base in Portugal. Nonetheless, 
sources from the Judiciary Police and the secret services 
admitted that, in view of tighter control in France, ETA 
could be trying to move operations into Portugal. 
 
¶5. (C) According to press reports, the Portuguese National 
Guard (GNR) found the safe house in Obidos, about 60 miles 
north of Lisbon, on February 5, after a landlord complained 
that tenants had disappeared without paying the rent.  Our 
police contacts assure us, however, that the GNR was alerted 
by an off-duty policeman who entered the house after seeing 
the front door wide open.  Inside, authorities discovered a 
huge cache of explosive materials and devices.  Contacts 
close to the investigation told us on February 8 that the GNR 
also found grocery store receipts for materials, and after 
 
LISBON 00000065  002 OF 002 
 
 
looking at store video of the purchasers, were able to 
establish their identities, as well as their connection to 
documents found in the vehicle abandoned by ETA suspects 
January 9.  Of greater concern, the GNR found maps of several 
locations in Spain, which they speculated could be safe 
houses or targets.  That information has been turned over to 
Spain.  Spanish authorities said that two, Andoni 
Zengotitabengoa Fernandez and Oier Gomez, were believed to 
have rented the house and were wanted in Spain. 
 
¶6. (C) The case has raised concerns regarding internal law 
enforcement coordination, as the GNR reportedly did not 
coordinate the investigation with their Judicial Police 
counterparts.  While major cities in Portugal have their own 
local police force, rural towns are served by the national 
GNR.  Investigations must be turned over to the Judicial 
Police, who serve a function analogous to the FBI and are 
responsible for all criminal investigations.  This 
contretemps has created tensions between the GNR and the 
Judicial Police.  In the same vein, it turned out that 
Spanish intelligence service had been investigating possible 
ETA hideouts inside Portugal without coordinating with 
Portuguese intelligence, despite a protocol signed by the two 
countries to work together on terrorist investigations. 
 
¶7. (C) Portuguese authorities now claim to be working in 
concert with their Spanish counterparts and "following every 
possible lead" to apprehend the two suspected ETA terrorists. 
Meanwhile, a representative of Portugal's Terrorism 
Monitoring Center backtracked on previous assertions and 
admitted to the press that "it is possible that Portugal is 
ETA's main logistical base today," while the press is openly 
speculating that ETA may have chosen Portugal because the 
country may not be as strict in monitoring explosives as 
France or Spain.  Contacts in the National Police (PSP) until 
responsible for explosives enforcement tell us that while 
Portugal has adequate standards for the licensing and storage 
of explosives, resale of residual amounts is largely 
unregulated.  Thus, construction companies can legally 
purchase large quantities of explosives for specific project 
and resell left over amounts. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: The discovery of the safe house in Portugal 
establishes several things:  first, despite denials by 
Portuguese authorities, ETA has established a presence in 
Portugal.  Given the 750-mile border that Portugal shares 
with Spain, it makes sense that ETA would establish such 
bases.  Second, successfully identifying these threats will 
require enhanced coordination among Portuguese law 
enforcement agencies.  Finally, Spain and Portugal will have 
to coordinate more closely, particularly in sharing 
information, something law enforcement agencies -- even when 
agencies belong to the same government -- sometimes have 
trouble doing. 
 
 
For more reporting from Embassy Lisbon and information about Portugal, 
please see our Intelink site: 
 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/portal:port ugal 
BALLARD