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UNCLAS LA PAZ 000047 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EPET ENRG EINV PREL PGOV BL
SUBJECT: Bolivia: No major changes predicted in gas industry 
 
REF: 09 LA PAZ 267 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  Bolivia's natural gas production fell in 2009 due 
to reduced regional demand, dropping from 40-42 million cubic 
meters a day (Mm3/d) in 2008 to the current 33 Mm3/d.  Natural gas 
exports also fell as a percentage of the value of total exports, 
from 45 percent in 2008 to 37 percent in 2009.  Current gas 
production is divided among domestic consumption (7 Mm3/d), exports 
to Brazil (21 Mm3/d), and exports to Argentina (5 Mm3/d). 
Brazilian demand is falling, and plans for increased exports to 
Argentina remain held up because of pipeline capacity and supply 
concerns.  Bolivian reserves remain estimated to be the second 
largest in South America, at around 1.36 trillion cubic meters (48 
trillion cubic feet).   End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Bolivia's gas supply agreement with Brazil requires 
Brazil to take 24 Mm3/d or at least pay for that amount (it may 
take up to 31Mm3/d).  In 2009 Brazil averaged closer to 21 Mm3/d 
and will pay for the difference (creating a credit it can use in 
the future).  Brazil also pays extra for the liquids (petroleum) 
that come with the gas, just concluding an agreement with the GOB 
as to the cost -- approximately $100 million for 2007 and expected 
to be $300 million for 2008-2009.  Payment for 2007 has occurred, 
but payment for 2008-2009 will not happen until a separate 
agreement identifying the level of domestic demand is sorted out. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The current contract with Brazil is valid until 2019, and 
Brazilian Embassy representatives told us the contract will likely 
be renewed after that date.  Brazil believes Bolivian gas is 
convenient and remains a relatively cheap energy option.  There is 
also a political component that will ensure a continued 
relationship.  On February 3, President Lula of Brazil caused 
controversy by saying, "we will continue to buy Bolivian gas 
because we need to help our poor neighbors, because this is the 
role of a country the size of Brazil."  Bolivian Vice-President 
Garcia Linera responded by saying, "The contract requires 
obligatory compliance, independent of the ruler's goodwill, which 
we appreciate.  The contract will be fulfilled."  Still, the level 
of gas Brazil buys will depend greatly on other resources, 
including development of a recently-discovered Brazilian off-shore 
oil field. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) During a visit to Bolivia in November 2009, Spanish Repsol 
CEO Brufau committed $1.5 billion in investments over the next 5 
years to increase production at the Tarija region's Margarita field 
to 14 Mm3/d by 2013 (it currently produces 2 Mm3/d).  As of 
February 2010, however, no new investment has been made and it is 
uncertain if other investors in Margarita will also increase 
investments.  The pace of any increased production will likely 
continue to depend on how quickly the pipeline to Argentina 
increases transportation capacity.  The Spanish believe that only 
30% of the financing for the pipeline expansion has been obtained. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (U)  In January the Bolivian state hydrocarbons company, YPFB, 
announced a five-year investment plan worth $11 billion.  While 
unveiling the program, President Morales said, "I dream of having 
our state company become as important as Brazil's Petrobras or 
Venezuela's PDVSA."  French company Total also recently announced 
new investment plans, beginning with exploratory drilling (in 
conjunction with Tecpetrol of Argentina) at the Incahuasi field in 
the Caraparicito zone of Santa Cruz.  The initial investment of $70 
 
million could expand to $500 million over five years if the 
drilling is successful, potentially adding 5 Mm3/d to Bolivian 
production by 2013. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) A contract signed by Argentina and Bolivia in 2006 
committed Bolivia to steadily raise supply to Argentina, supposedly 
already reaching 27 Mm3/d.  Both Argentina and Bolivia recognize 
that this is not possible with neither paying penalties for not 
meeting the take-or-pay or deliver-or-pay clauses.  The pipeline to 
Argentina currently only has the capacity for 7 Mm3/d, and actual 
delivery is closer to 4-5 Mm3/d.  The Argentines tell us they are 
willing to take more gas, but understand that expansion of the 
pipeline needs to come first.  Bolivia must build 20 km of pipeline 
to connect the Margarita field to the main pipeline and Argentina 
must build 40km on its side to make connections to the larger 
pipelines there.  Construction has not begun on either side, 
awaiting increased certainty of supply. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In general, most investors are waiting for the new 
hydrocarbons law to provide more certainty for the sector.  Still, 
it appears the GOB is not seeking broad consultations with 
investors but is getting advice from the IDB on this and other new 
laws.  The laws are expected to lay out new investment rules for 
the sector, likely increasing the percentage of state involvement 
in any new investments.  The law will also likely raise taxes 
and/or royalties hydrocarbons companies pay.  Other than increased 
production out of Margarita by Repsol, there are no other large 
increases predicted for the near future.  Based on likely demand, 
Bolivian production is likely to stay close to 30-35 Mm3/d for the 
next 4-5 years.  The potential production capacity should remain at 
around 40-45 Mm3/d. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Bolivian state oil company, YPFB, has approached 
various donors for assistance.  The World Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands have 
formed a group to provide technical assistance to YPFB on 
restructuring.  The assistance will focus on management 
restructuring and procurement and will entail the secondment of a 
Dutch consultant (likely a retired Shell professional) to YPFB to 
assist.  This could be a good sign, signaling that YPFB recognizes 
that it does not have sufficient technical capacity and is open to 
assistance. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The GOB has also requested international assistance on 
the construction of a petrochemical facility.  The Dutch are 
providing technical assistance and the Brazilian company Braskem 
(40% owned by Odebrecht, with PetroBras holding a significant 
minority stake) is reportedly very interested in the project.  If 
the project were to occur, it would be a joint venture with a 
Bolivian state company.  The idea for this facility has been in 
discussion for 10 years, however, and it would need at least 5 
years to come to fruition.  Upon completion, this facility could 
drastically increase demand for natural gas, possible using up to 
15 Mm3/d. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The new Bolivian Hydrocarbons Minister, Fernando Vargas, 
has served on the board of YPFB for four years and is a civil 
engineer from Santa Cruz.  Vargas is not believed to have broad 
sectoral knowledge.  He is, however, very close to Vice President 
 
Garcia Linera, leading to speculation that the vice president will 
have ultimate control over this critical sector.  Vargas seems to 
also have a good relationship with Villegas, the President of YPFB. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Comment: Gas remains critical to Bolivia's fiscal and 
economic future.  Without gas revenue, Bolivia's fiscal deficit in 
2008 would have exceeded 8% of GDP.  With Brazilian demand now at 
around 21 Mm3/d and with domestic supply unlikely to rise 
dramatically, the future of the Bolivian gas market faces a 
"chicken and egg" scenario - will new production from the Margarita 
field start without the increased availability in the pipeline to 
export it to Argentina?  Many hope the new hydrocarbons law will 
reduce uncertainty and spur investment in the sector (although the 
law does not seem to be a high priority for the GOB), but 
significant increases in Bolivian production and exports are not 
likely for several years at least. 
Creamer