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PP RUEHDBU RUEHSL
DE RUEHKV #0246/01 0481600
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171600Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9336
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000246 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FM POROSHENKO 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Foreign Minister Poroshenko embraced President-elect 
Yanukovych and distanced himself from PM Tymoshenko in a 
February 12 meeting with the Ambassador.  Poroshenko 
criticized Tymoshenko's unwillingness to concede the election 
and her denigration of the work of international election 
observers.  This had damaged Ukraine's image.  Poroshenko 
appealed for a senior U.S. delegation at Yanukovych's 
inauguration.  He said Yanukovych planned to make his first 
trip as President to Brussels to play against his pro-Russia 
stereotype.  President Obama's call of congratulations made a 
major positive impression on Yanukovych.  End Summary. 
 
President's Phone Call/Nuclear Security Summit 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador called on Foreign Minister Petro Poroshenko 
February 12.  Poroshenko had met earlier that day with Viktor 
Yanukovych, who was "elated" by President Obama's February 11 
phone call of congratulations.  Poroshenko said the 
President's call sent an important message to Yanukovych -- 
and also to Tymoshenko.  It had helped foster stability in an 
uncertain post-election environment.  Alluding to Tymoshenko, 
Poroshenko condemned "politicians who apply unacceptable 
methods" to undermine elections.   The essential thing was to 
support democracy, as President Obama had done with his call. 
 Poroshenko added that he had "tried to deliver such 
messages" himself. 
 
¶3. (C) Poroshenko noted that he had prepared Yanukovych's 
talking points for the call.  He was pleased Yanukovych had 
used the points highlighting the importance of nuclear 
non-proliferation with President Obama.  He briefed 
Yanukovych on the priority the U.S. had placed on working 
with the GOU to eliminate HEU that remains in Ukraine. 
Poroshenko agreed that April's Nuclear Security Summit, 
coming shortly after Yanukovych's inauguration, offered the 
chance to move the HEU issue forward.  Ukraine would be open 
to receiving a team from the U.S. to brief on the issue, he 
affirmed. 
 
¶4. (C)  Poroshenko pledged that MFA would dedicate itself to 
making sure Yanukovych's inauguration (since scheduled for 
February 25) was a success.  Poroshenko appealed for a 
high-level U.S. delegation, preferably led by Secretary 
Clinton.  He recalled how he had raised the issue weeks 
before in a side meeting with the Secretary in London. 
 
 
International Observers 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Poroshenko praised the work of international election 
observers and stressed that he had made a point of meeting 
with them during the election campaign.  He said Tymoshenko 
later criticized him privately for his embrace of the 
observers, saying that it had undercut her allegations of 
fraud.   Poroshenko disagreed.   Ukraine, he insisted, should 
be proud of the fact that so many observers had positive 
reports on the election; it reflected well on Ukraine. 
Poroshenko concurred with the Ambassador's assessment of the 
constructive role that ODIHR's Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini 
had played. 
 
This is not 2004.... 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Noting his prominent role in the Orange camp in 2004, 
Poroshenko said that Yanukovych's election this year was 
consistent with the fundamental goals of the Orange 
Revolution: free and transparent elections and the peaceful 
transition of power.  To be consistent with 2004, Tymoshenko 
needs to accept the result.  However, she is not consistent. 
In 2004, the Orange side used exit polling to show that the 
Central Election Commission's numbers were fraudulent.  This 
year, when all exit polls give the victory to Yanukovych, 
Tymoshenko rejects exit polls as invalid. 
 
 
¶7. (C) What is really happening, Poroshenko said he suspects, 
is that Tymoshenko is using the court challenges as a power 
play to keep her coalition together and allow her to remain 
in office as PM.  Poroshenko had favored last year the idea 
of a Regions-Tymoshenko Bloc unity coalition.  However, given 
hostilities and mistrust on both sides, he did not see this 
happening now. 
 
First Trip: Brussels 
 
KYIV 00000246  002 OF 002 
 
 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Poroshenko said Yanukovych had agreed with his 
suggestion that Yanukovych play against type and make his 
first foreign visit to Brussels.  Yanukovych should make 
clear that he too seeks to secure an Association Agreement 
with the EU, including a Free Trade Agreement and clear 
membership perspective.   Yanukovych would also underline the 
importance of liberalization of the visa regime with Europe. 
To keep him on the right track, Yanukovych needs "encouraging 
messages" from Europe, Poroshenko said.  Sarkozy's letter of 
congratulations had struck such a tone. 
 
NATO, Security Guarantees 
------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Yanukovych does not want to talk about NATO membership 
now but is open to enhancing Ukraine's cooperation with NATO, 
Poroshenko said.  He urged the U.S. not to read too much into 
language in Yanukovych's speeches favorable to Medvedev's 
proposal for new security architecture.  Yanukovych will be 
open to discussing Russia's ideas but this does not mean 
Yanukovych will favor changing the architecture.  NATO 
membership remains an aspiration, albeit a distant one, 
Poroshenko insisted. 
 
¶10. (C) Poroshenko asserted that Ukraine would continue its 
quest for security guarantees.   Ukraine's goal would be to 
make the 1994 Budapest Memorandum legally binding, with all 
nuclear powers guaranteeing Ukraine's security.  Poroshenko 
stressed that the focus would be on multilateral guarantees, 
and not on a bilateral guarantee from the U.S. 
 
New Coalition? 
-------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Poroshenko mentioned his connections to the "Our 
Ukraine" bloc in the Rada.  Party of Regions is working hard 
to entice the Our Ukraine-People's Self Defense (OU-PSD) 
faction to break from Tymoshenko's coalition.  From a foreign 
policy standpoint, Poroshenko contended that it would be good 
to have OU-PSD in coalition with Regions.  It would help 
guide Regions to a more pro-Europe, pro-Euro-Atlantic 
orientation. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) Poroshenko sought to use the meeting to highlight his 
closeness (or what he portrayed as closeness) to Yanukovych. 
He gave no signal that he planned to step down soon as FM; 
indeed, quite the opposite.  While Poroshenko remains on the 
short list for prospective FMs under Yanukovych, other names 
figure more prominently.   Ukraine's former FM and Ambassador 
to the U.S. and current Ambassador to Russia, Konstantin 
Gryshchenko, is the name senior Regions contacts mention to 
us most often. 
TEFFT