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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000208 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 
TAGS: PGOV UP
SUBJECT: TYMOSHENKO SURGE: APPEAL OF "THE LESSER EVIL" 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) The late surge in support for PM Tymoshenko, which 
made the February 7 second round presidential election 
results closer than many observers expected, reflected more 
an anti-Yanukovych vote than a pro-Tymoshenko one. 
Yanukovych's refusal to debate Tymoshenko, over confidence 
among his supporters, and last minute "lesser of two evils" 
calculations among Orange-inclined voters worked to 
Tymoshenko's advantage.  End Summary. 
 
 
Higher Than Expected Turnout in the West 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Turnout in Western Ukraine, at 70.8% during the 
second round of Presidential voting February 7, was more than 
ten points higher than Yanukovych's senior campaign advisors 
told us they had expected.  They anticipated turnout in the 
West would go down following the first round -- but it went 
up.  In Ternopil, Yanukovych won 9,764 fewer votes than in 
round one, while Tymoshenko won 368,983 votes more than she 
had in the oblast in round one.   In Lviv, Tymoshenko 
increased her vote totals between rounds by a larger amount 
(770,877) than Yanukovych did in Donetsk (580,697), despite 
the fact that Lviv has only about half the population. 
 
¶3. (SBU) These shifts tightened the race.  Regions' pollsters 
had told us that they expected about a 12% victory margin 
(some went as high as 15%).  The worst case scenario, they 
insisted, could not be below six percent.  The final result 
turned out to be a margin of victory for Yanukovych of only 
3.5%. 
 
What Happened? 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Tymoshenko succeeded in mobilizing her Western Orange 
base between rounds, aided by Yanukovych's missteps.   The 
following issues/events during that last week helped 
encourage Orange-inclined voters to turn out: 
 
--No Show for Debate: Oleh Rybachyuk, former Head of the 
Presidential Secretariat under Yushchenko, highlighted to us 
the significance of Yanukovych's failure to appear to debate 
Tymoshenko on the Monday before the second round.  It gave 
Tymoshenko ninety minutes on national TV to point at the 
empty podium on the other side.  The empty podium, she 
stressed, epitomized that Yanukovych had nothing to offer, 
that he was afraid to confront her, and that he was the 
puppet of oligarchs.  It also, she asserted, denied voters 
the right to evaluate the candidates in direct competition 
with each other. 
 
--Overconfidence of Yanukovych team:  Political Analysts such 
as PENTA director Volodymyr Fesenko told us that the 
arrogance of the Yanukovych team incited Western Ukrainian 
voters to turn out in opposition.  Regions spokesmen were 
conducting themselves, Fesenko said, as if Yanukovych had 
already won.  They dropped their guard and let spokesmen who 
evoke "Donetsk Mafia" imagery get too much media exposure. 
Regions even let the Central Election Commission (CEC) 
Chairman from the fraudulent 2004 election appear as a 
Regions election expert.  Fesenko noted that Regions' holding 
of a concert on the Friday before the second round smacked of 
triumphalism.  (Tymoshenko, by contrast, held a prayer 
vigil.) 
 
--Last Minute Legislation in Parliament: Tymoshenko 
successfully portrayed Regions' changing of the election law 
days before the second round as reminiscent of Regions' 2004 
election manipulation.   While Tymoshenko greatly exaggerated 
the negative impact (indeed the NGO OPORA praised the law), 
her efforts to cast doubts on Regions' intentions and tactics 
appear to have worked. 
 
-Anton Chekhov a "Ukrainian poet":  Tymoshenko's campaign 
trumpeted this statement by Yanukovych to paint him as an 
ignorant fool who would embarrass Ukraine.   She poked fun in 
her speeches at other such Yanukovych-isms. 
 
--Orange Legacy: Yanukovych said he would deliver Ukraine 
from the "Orange nightmare."  Such comments served to 
motivate  disaffected Orange voters, who believe in Orange 
ideals but were fed up with Tymoshenko, to vote for her. 
 
--The Communists announced they were for Yanukovych. 
 
--In short: many disaffected but Orange-inclined voters 
 
KYIV 00000208  002 OF 002 
 
 
accepted -- as Tymoshenko urged them to accept -- the 
argument that staying home out of frustration with her was a 
vote for Yanukovych. 
 
Tymoshenko's Appeal to Western Ukraine Mindset 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (C) Head of the local NGO OPORA, Olga Ajvazovska, 
described to us the difference in mentalities between central 
Ukrainians and western Ukrainians.  Those who live in Central 
Ukraine, she said, are more pragmatic.  They were okay voting 
"against all" or staying home and felt that this was an 
appropriate way to express their displeasure with the 
failures of the Orange Revolution and, thus, Tymoshenko. 
This trend was apparent in the higher than average vote 
"against all" in Kyiv oblast, which was close to 9% (about 
11% in the city). 
 
¶6. (C) Ajvazovska characterized western Ukrainians as more 
idealistic and religious.  Tymoshenko appealed to their fears 
about Yanukovych and convinced them that staying at home or 
voting against all was tantamount to handing him the 
presidency.  In addition, Tymoshenko skillfully appealed to 
western Ukraine's religious faith.  She met with leaders of 
all faiths.  Observers on the ground reported that many Greek 
Catholic priests delivered instructions from the pulpit on 
election day (a Sunday) that incited their parishioners to go 
to the polls.  Ajvazovska believes that Yanukovych's advisors 
underestimated the depth of western Ukraine's strong sense of 
identity.  Tymoshenko's appeal to Ukrainian  symbols paid 
off. 
 
Comment: From "Our Yuliya" to "Lesser of Two Evils" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶7. (C) For many disaffected Orange voters, Tymoshenko had 
shifted in five years from being "Our Yuliya" to being "the 
lesser of two evils."   Nonetheless, a combination of 
Tymoshenko's appeals and Regions' mistakes helped encourage 
such voters to turn out.  The race could have tightened even 
further had Yushchenko not exhorted his supporters to vote 
"against all."   In the second round, Tymoshenko's revived 
her reputation as a strong finisher.  Despite the burdens of 
being sitting PM at a time of -15% GDP contraction and the 
legacy of her infighting with Yushchenko, Tymoshenko was able 
to gain ground, coming closer than many, especially in 
Regions, had expected. 
 
TEFFT