VZCZCXRO7400
RR RUEHDBU RUEHSL
DE RUEHKV #0193/01 0361122
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051122Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9277
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000193 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB AND EEB/OMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2030 
TAGS: EFIN ECON ENRG PGOV UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE'S DEPUTY PM ON MONEY LAUNDERING, 
ELECTIONS, IMF 
 
REF: KYIV 192 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  In a broad-ranging discussion with the 
Ambassador on February 2, Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister 
Nemyrya expressed concern about Ukraine being designated as a 
high-risk country at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
plenary meeting in Abu Dhabi in mid-February.  Nemyrya also 
raised concerns about moves to change the presidential 
election law that, in Nemyrya's view,  could disadvantage 
Prime Minister Tymoshenko.  If elected, Tymoshenko would seek 
to form a new coalition in the parliament without calling 
parliamentary elections, Nemyrya stated, giving the new 
government eighteen months to work on reforms before 2012 
parliamentary campaigns kicked off.  Tymoshenko would also 
work quickly to bring the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
back to Ukraine.  Nemyrya appeared open to examining the need 
for a feasibility study before announcing a tender for 
Ukraine's planned nuclear fuel fabrication plant.  The 
Ambassador also urged Ukraine to make a decision on the 
removal of highly enriched uranium by the end of March. 
End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Money Laundering: Ukraine Looking for More Time 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2.  (C) Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister Hryhoriy Nemyrya 
requested to see the Ambassador on February 2 to express 
concern about the mid-February FATF plenary session in Abu 
Dhabi, at which Ukraine would likely be named a high-risk 
country with regards to money laundering. Nemyrya asked for 
an additional six months to make changes to Ukraine's money 
laundering regime to bring it into compliance with FATF 
standards.  Nemyrya stated that Prime Minister Tymoshenko and 
her government had worked hard to address deficiencies in 
Ukraine's money laundering regime, but that their efforts 
were blocked by the opposition as a result of the upcoming 
presidential election.  He said that the GOU was willing to 
issue a letter of commitment to implement reform, including 
revisions to money laundering legislation.  Nemyrya also 
offered to head Ukraine's delegation to Abu Dhabi if it would 
help show political commitment and result in a postponement 
of the decision to list Ukraine. The GOU would continue to 
make every effort to push legislative changes through the 
parliament in advance of the Abu Dhabi meetings; however, 
Nemyrya acknowledged that the short timeframe and upcoming 
presidential elections made it difficult to predict whether 
there would be positive results in the near term. 
 
¶3. (C) Nemyrya also stated that Prime Minister Tymoshenko 
intended to resume efforts to finalize the draft Criminal 
Procedure Code and the new draft Law on the Procuracy.  This 
would be one of the first tasks after the elections, he said. 
Both of these efforts would bring needed reform to the 
criminal justice system. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Concern About Attempts to Change Election Laws 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4.  (C) Turning to the February 7 presidential elections, 
Nemyrya raised concerns about attempts by opposition Party of 
Regions parliamentarians to pass amendments to the election 
law.  (Note: Ukraine's parliament voted in favor of election 
law changes the next day, February 3, and President 
Yushchenko has signed it into law (reftel).)  Nemyrya argued 
that Party of Regions-supported changes would disadvantage 
Tymoshenko in the presidential elections on February 7. 
Nemyrya stressed that Tymoshenko, herself, had no plans to 
disrupt the election process in any way because election 
fraud would contravene her personal, very strongly-held, 
values.  Nemyrya urged the international community to be 
vigilant against last-minute attempts to change the rules 
that would favor opposition leader Victor Yanukovych. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Tymoshenko: Prefers to Form a New Coalition 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Tymoshenko would not seek early parliamentary 
elections if she won the presidency and would prefer to form 
a new governing coalition, according to Nemyrya.  The 
 
KYIV 00000193  002 OF 003 
 
 
government would then have at least eighteen months to work 
on the reform agenda before pre-election campaigning for the 
2012 parliamentary elections started up.  Tymoshenko saw this 
as the best scenario for the country, Nemyrya stated. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
IMF: Meetings with Strauss-Kahn in Davos 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) On the sidelines of World Economic Forum meetings in 
Davos, Nemyrya said he explored options with IMF Managing 
Director Strauss-Kahn for gaining access to reserves held by 
the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU).  The NBU continued to 
resist transferring money to the government, according to 
Nemyrya.  As a result, the GOU needed to again ask for IMF 
intervention. Nemyrya had asked Strauss-Kahn to either: 1) 
issue an IMF press statement referring to its decision of 
December 30 to allow the NBU to lower its net international 
reserve floor by $2 b; 2) send a letter to NBU chairman 
Volodymyr Stelmakh urging cooperation with the GOU; or 3) 
make a phone call to Stelmakh to urge cooperation. 
 
¶7. (C) Nemyrya reaffirmed that Tymoshenko was interested in 
moving forward with the IMF and economic reform as soon as 
possible after the elections.  He was optimistic that an IMF 
technical team would travel to Ukraine immediately after the 
election to work with the Ministry of Finance and complete 
the third review of the IMF program.  Nemyrya argued that the 
IMF should drop its demand that Ukraine pass a 2010 budget 
before the IMF would release the next tranche of funding.  He 
argued that submitting a 2010 budget to parliament showed 
sufficient political intent and should be enough to satisfy 
the IMF.  Nemyrya conceded that Ukraine may need to ask for 
additional funds beyond the $16.4 billion envisioned by the 
current program from the IMF.  However, Nemyrya was confident 
that resumption of IMF lending would unlock other funds, for 
example from the European Union. 
 
------------------------------ 
Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador shared concerns about the tender 
process for Ukraine's planned nuclear fuel fabrication plant 
and urged the GOU to consider doing a feasibility study 
before reissuing the tender. Problems with the most recent 
tender draft, which had appeared on the Ministry of Energy 
and Fuel website but had not yet been issued formally, 
included: requirements for full scope supply; requirements to 
guarantee financing; and language regarding operating 
experience and licensing that work against Westinghouse and 
do not include attention to fuel economies or the importance 
of diversification. The Ambassador reported that Westinghouse 
would be unlikely to bid the deal if the conditions of the 
tender were not adjusted.  Nemyrya said he had not been 
familiar with Westinghouse,s reaction, but he welcomed the 
information and would take it into consideration. 
 
--- 
HEU 
--- 
 
¶9. (C) The Ambassador suggested that it would be important to 
have a decision on the issue of highly enriched uranium by 
the end of March, allowing for removal from Ukraine by the 
end of 2010.  It would be good news to take to the nuclear 
security conference in Washington in April as well.  Nemyrya 
did not have a substantive response but in turn noted that 
Ukraine was being helpful on other issues important to the 
USG. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Nemyrya was subdued during the meeting and appeared 
genuinely concerned about Tymoshenko's chances of winning the 
presidential elections.  He wanted to send the message that 
Tymoshenko and her government had worked hard, including in 
the area of money laundering, but that they had been blocked 
at every turn in recent months by the opposition.  In our 
assessment, it remains unlikely that the government will be 
able to push through any final reforms until after the new 
president and ruling coalition are in place. 
 
KYIV 00000193  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
TEFFT