VZCZCXRO5781
PP RUEHBC RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKU #0140/01 0481359
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 171359Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4622
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000140 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, OSD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MARR MASS KU
SUBJECT: KUWAIT WANTS GREATER CLARITY ON IRAQ DRAW-DOWN 
REQUIREMENTS; SIGNALS DESIRE FOR SUBSTANTIALLY SMALLER 
FUTURE U.S. MILITARY FOOTPRINT 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 107 
     ¶B. 2009 KUWAIT 1036 
     ¶C. 2009 KUWAIT 1153 
     ¶D. KUWAIT 0029 
     ¶E. KUWAIT 0009 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and 
 d 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Kuwait's new military leadership -- likely with 
tacit support at the political level -- has increasingly made 
clear over recent weeks that, with the Iraq war receding into 
the past and the Iraqi government increasingly capable (and 
solvent), the large US military presence here is becoming 
burdensome.  Discussions at the January 24-26 Joint Military 
Commission (JMC) in Washington highlighted the GOK's sense 
that the US military in Kuwait has become a "heavy guest" and 
that the time has come to re-assess and re-shape our 
footprint and Kuwait's financial support for it.  GOK 
representatives at the JMC specifically requested a visit by 
CENTCOM planners by mid-April to share with the GOK CENTCOM's 
expectations of what the US military footprint during and 
after the Iraqi drawdown will entail.  With a new and 
energetic GOK military leadership now in place, Embassy 
believes it is imperative that the interagency respond to 
this request quickly and share with the GOK at least the 
broad outlines (a 75 percent solution) of what it desires 
from Kuwait in the area of logistical support both for Iraq 
withdrawal and longer term operations.  In doing so, military 
planners should be aware that Kuwait is no longer prepared to 
offer the US carte blanche in support of OIF and other 
regional security activities; it will, instead, be focused on 
downsizing and shaping the US military presence in a way that 
emphasizes the long-term defense of Kuwait -- and returns the 
defense relationship closer to the pre-OIF Intrinsic Action 
footprint.  Kuwait's political and military leadership has 
made clear that it has little enthusiasm for supporting US 
military activities in other theaters, including AFPAK. 
While the GOK is not preparing to push us out the door, it is 
signaling that it desires a smaller and more Kuwait-focused 
defense relationship.  In preparing to brief the GOK, we 
should be prepared to offer Kuwait a fairly comprehensive 
idea of future needs.  If the USG determines that it cannot 
contemplate a significant reduction in our footprint over the 
next few years or that Kuwaiti logistical support for our 
operations in AFPAK is essential to US interests, we must be 
prepared to make a strong case to senior GOK leadership, 
recognizing that will be a hard sell.  Removal of some 
bilateral irritants may help such a discussion be more 
successful. End summary. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  At the January 24-26 JMC the GOK requested a 
visit, before April 10, by a CENTCOM planning team to discuss 
Iraq drawdown and the future of the US military footprint in 
Kuwait. Post provides the following assessment of the 
political/military challenges and issues that will need to be 
addressed in any presentation to this key Gulf ally.  (Note: 
While the Kuwaiti political leadership has not yet spoken 
definitively on some of these issues, being content for the 
time being to leave these matters in mil-mil channels, we 
believe that the general thrust of what we are hearing from 
the new Kuwaiti military hierarchy (led at the Chief of Staff 
level by a well-connected member of the ruling Al Sabah 
family) likely reflects the general policy views and goals 
further up the chain.  End Note.) 
 
Briefing the Iraqi Drawdown Plan 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  Discussions at the JMC brought to the fore a 
message that the GOK has increasingly attempted to convey 
over the past year -- that the US military in Kuwait is 
becoming "a heavy guest."  GOK participants at the JMC 
requested a visit by CENTCOM planners to share with both GOK 
senior political and military leadership a comprehensive 
vision of what the USG anticipates from Kuwait by way of 
logistical support during and following the drawdown from 
Iraq.  It is understood that, with Iraqi elections scheduled 
for March and subsequent conditions in Iraq still unknown, it 
will be difficult for CENTCOM 
planners to provide a complete drawdown scenario, but Embassy 
 
KUWAIT 00000140  002 OF 004 
 
 
believes that it would be very useful if the planners' brief 
to the GOK could cover the broad parameters of our drawdown 
plan and lay out specific requests for continued support. 
(Note:  The GOK has indicated it would be happy to receive a 
"75 percent" accurate plan.  End note.)  The GOK needs to 
know what our specific intentions are and how these plans 
will impact Kuwaiti facilities and material, financial and 
personnel resources; they need to have this information, if 
not in fine detail, then at least in its general parameters. 
 
Drawdown of Kuwait? 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  Increasingly, GOK interlocutors have expressed 
the view that the presence of the "heavy guest" -- no longer 
needed to counter Iraqi aggression -- now risks the 
undesirable effect of provoking Iran.  (Note:  Kuwaiti 
concerns in this regard are also manifested in their failure 
to date to approve use of a medium wave 600,000 watt IBB 
radio transmitter for beaming Radio FARDA into Iran.  End 
note.)  This meme has featured prominently in the local media 
following US press accounts of USG plans to deploy additional 
Patriot batteries to Kuwait (see ref A) -- deployments for 
which formal approval had not yet been requested of the GoK. 
With the Iraqi threat receding, much of the Kuwaiti political 
and military leadership may be anxious to see the US military 
presence -- now spread across ten bases -- reduced to 
something along the lines of our pre-2003 presence, i.e. 
enough to respond to Kuwaiti defense needs, but not so much 
that Kuwait will be perceived as a potential launching pad 
for USG aggressive operations in other theaters.  That 
Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense (KMOD) Director of Operations 
Major General Abdulrahman Al-Othman asked for a list of 
planned US facility closures and a timeline to achieve them 
in his Opening JMC remarks is indicative of where the 
professional military is on this issue, and also reflects the 
attitudes of the new Chief of Staff, LTG Ahmad Al-Khalid Al 
Sabah, an influential ruling family member.  (Note:  While 
the GoK, and particularly the Kuwaiti military which must 
share its facilities with the U.S., may perceive us to be a 
"heavy guest," the reality is that the U.S. military presence 
here, while large, is all but invisible to average Kuwaitis 
given that US forces are deployed in remote locations and for 
the most part do not circulate outside the wire. In terms of 
benefit, the U.S. military estimates the direct annual 
economic impact of the U.S. military on the Kuwaiti economy 
at $6.2 billion. End note). 
 
Iraq Should Pay for Ongoing OIF Costs 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  The GoK has made clear that it is less and less 
inclined to pick up the cost for USG military operations not 
specifically intended for the defense of Kuwait.  Kuwait has 
also suggested that Iraq now has both the wealth and the 
capacity to contribute more to its own security and that, 
with the war in Iraq now an event of the past and 
reconstruction there now well under way, Iraq is increasingly 
in a position to pick up more of the financial burden 
entailed in supporting OIF that has heretofore been 
assumed by Kuwait.  In the event that USG planners 
contemplate long-term Iraq-related scenarios involving Kuwait 
-- such as the posting of a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in 
Kuwait to respond to security crises in Iraq -- these should 
be noted in the CENTCOM planners' brief; planners should also 
be prepared for stiff push-back on some of these plans. 
 
GoK not inclined to Transfer OIF support to OEF 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6.  (S/NF)  General Al-Othman and his subordinates used the 
JMC to pointedly inquire into the amount of support currently 
going to AFPAK from Kuwait.  The GoK political leadership has 
also firmly conveyed to Embassy its view that the growing 
conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan does not present a 
perceived threat to Kuwait, and that support for US military 
engagement in the AFPAK theater should not emanate from or 
otherwise involve Kuwait.  Given these views, it will be 
essential for USG planners involved in AFPAK operations to 
factor Kuwait's lack of enthusiasm for such operations into 
their calculation and, if a Kuwaiti logistics role is deemed 
essential to US interests, to build a strong argument for 
such involvement.  In all events, USG planners should not 
take for granted a smooth transition from OIF to OEF, at 
 
KUWAIT 00000140  003 OF 004 
 
 
least insofar as Kuwaiti logistical support is involved.  If 
Kuwaiti support for OEF is deemed vital, we should be 
prepared to craft a top-level diplomatic engagement strategy 
to make the case -- and be prepared for push-back. 
 
"Clarifying the DCA" 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S/NF)  Though often caveated as a desire to "clarify" 
the terms of the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) -- an 
agreement under which the US military has enjoyed 
considerable freedom of action since 1991 -- the GoK clearly 
wishes to re-interpret the applicability of many of its 
provisions -- and perhaps renegotiate the text, in pursuit of 
an outcome that will be much less favorable to US military 
flexibility and focused more clearly on support for what 
Kuwait sees as necessary for its defense.  One senior Kuwaiti 
military officer at the JMC, speaking frankly, observed that 
under the "regional security" rubric of the DCA, "you could 
put a man on the moon and charge us for that."  US civilian 
and military planners clearly need to begin thinking now 
about the shape of a descoped DCA when it comes up for 
renewal in 2011, with the likely outcome that we will be 
operating in a more restrictive environment. 
 
Bilateral Irritants 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (S/NF)  We should acknowledge up front that for Kuwait -- 
on military matters as all else -- the bottom-line is the 
bottom line.  A nation of traders and savvy investors is 
looking to the future with the desire to reduce outlays for 
support of the U.S. military here, and to shrink and refocus 
what is present and supported here to more clearly meet 
Kuwait's perceived security needs.  As we gear up to 
negotiate our future military footprint with the GOK, 
however, it is useful to bear in mind certain irritants that, 
if corrected, could help improve -- at least marginally -- 
the climate for our bilateral dialogue.  One of these is the 
sense among many in the Kuwaiti military that their U.S. 
counterparts take Kuwaiti support for granted and, thus, fail 
to engage them.  As General Al-Othman complained at the JMC, 
"senior US officials rarely stop to engage with Kuwaiti 
leadership" (including senior US generals).  Absent dialogue 
and regular engagement, the sense of many Kuwaitis that they 
are being imposed upon has begun to fester; some serious and 
frank senior dialogue, if sustained, could help alleviate 
this complaint.  A second ongoing Kuwaiti grievance which, 
while not yet in the public eye, has been a source of 
irritation to the Kuwaiti military, is US failure, thus far, 
to fulfill a perceived promise to remove depleted uranium 
(DU) residues from a Kuwaiti training site. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF)  As mentioned above, a recent New York Times story 
"outing" US-Kuwaiti plans to site additional Patriot missile 
units in Kuwait caught the GOK off guard and fueled public 
speculation that the US is using Kuwaiti territory to prepare 
for hostilities with Iran -- and raising public anxiety that 
in a conflict between Iran and Israel or the U.S., Kuwait 
will be caught in the cross-fire.  An ongoing dispute with 
Kuwait Ports Authority over the assessment of fees on 
military cargoes -- some of which are clearly not intended 
for the security of Kuwait -- has also irritated the Kuwaiti 
military.  Many Kuwaitis also feel that their country's 
generous support for OIF has not resulted in progress on a 
number of important Kuwait-Iraq issues, such as official 
Iraqi acceptance of the UNSCR 833 border demarcation, the 
removal of encroaching farmers, and a return of Kuwaiti 
archives and the missing, and these failures have led some to 
wonder about the value of the OIF "blank check military 
policy" engagement -- particularly when they perceive U.S. 
officials as waffling on UNSCR 833 by talking about "boundary 
compromises" or "mutually agreed technical adjustments to 
boundaries."  Finally, we cannot ignore the ongoing legal 
case against Agility, the Kuwaiti-owned logistics company, 
whose stock is owned by many of Kuwait's top leaders.  As a 
result of the suit brought by the USG, Agility has lost over 
one billion USD in market capitalization and the dented stock 
portfolios of a number of senior Kuwaitis can contribute 
nothing positive to future discussion on mil-mil cooperation 
and support. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
KUWAIT 00000140  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S/NF)  Despite a clear Kuwaiti preference for a speedy 
downsizing of US forces in Kuwait commensurate with and 
parallel to our drawdown in Iraq, we believe that Kuwait 
desires to maintain a robust long-term military partnership 
with the United States.  The present DCA, signed just after 
the 1991 liberation of Kuwait, is highly favorable towards 
USG interests; pending "clarifications" of some of its tenets 
may mean a less favorable product, but not an unfavorable 
one.  In this context, we must be prepared to make specific 
requests of the GoK that demonstrate a commitment to the 
security of the country.  Despite Kuwaiti reservations about 
maintaining a large footprint here, should it be deemed 
imperative that the GoK provide AFPAK support given the 
signals of reluctance we have already received in this 
regard, the interagency should be prepared to engage at the 
highest political levels here to make that case -- and even 
then we must flag that there is no guarantee that such an 
approach will achieve all our desired ends.  End comment. 
 
 
********************************************* ********* 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at: 
 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it 
********************************************* ********* 
JONES