VZCZCXRO4102
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKU #0137/01 0470646
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160646Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4617
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000137 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ARP, NEA/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KU
SUBJECT: MOVING TO THE PRESSURE TRACK ON IRAN: KUWAITIS 
VIEW RUSSIAN SUPPORT AS KEY 
 
REF: A. STATE 9124 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 95 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 104 
 
Classified By: DCM Tom Williams for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1.    (U)  This is an action message for the Department, 
please see paragraph X. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary: Ambassador reviewed February 10 developments 
in US Iran policy with FM Dr. Shaykh Mohammed Al Sabah, 
taking the opportunity to note USG concerns about recent 
high-level Kuwait-Iran exchanges and provocative public 
remarks by the Iranian ambassador here.  The FM said Kuwait 
has twin goals in its Iran policy - to deliver the GCC 
message on the necessity of an IAEA-compliant, peaceful 
nuclear program, and to maintain its friendship with a much 
larger and more powerful neighbor.  Dr. Mohammed suggested 
that the United States had not spoken clearly enough - to 
Iran and the region - on whether we are prepared ultimately 
to do whatever it takes to prevent Tehran's acquisition of a 
nuclear weapons capability, but he acknowledged that a 
reported toughening of Russia's position in support of new 
sanctions, if confirmed, could be game-changing.  Also 
discussed was pending Kuwaiti assistance to the Palestinian 
Authority, Yemen, the future US military footprint in Kuwait, 
and terror financing legislation currently before the 
National Assembly.  End Summary. 
 
 
IRAN:  Kuwait's twin (if contradictory) Iran policy goals 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2. (C)  Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, drew from ref a 
points in discussing evolving U.S. strategy towards Iran, 
noting our intention to move with the international community 
towards a "pressure" track given Iranian recalcitrance. 
(Note: PolCouns also raised ref A points during a January 31 
meeting at MFA, reported ref B.  End Note.) In that context, 
she noted recent high-level bilateral visits between Iran and 
Kuwait had drawn attention and concern in Washington - what 
was the goal of Kuwait's engagement and could the FM confirm 
reports that the Amir planned to visit Tehran later in the 
Spring?  Dr. Mohammed responded by saying Kuwait has twin 
goals in its dealings with Iran:  to deliver the 
international community's message (and that of the GCC) 
regarding the necessity of IAEA compliance and pursuit of a 
peaceful nuclear program, and to maintain Kuwait's friendship 
with Tehran since Kuwait "cannot afford to have Iran as an 
enemy."  Regarding an Amiri visit to Tehran, the FM was 
vague, saying only that such a trip (despite considerable 
recent press coverage quoting Iranian sources, including the 
Iranian Ambassador here, as saying such a trip would happen 
soon) had been "talked about for ten years." 
 
¶3. (C)  The Ambassador asked if there was consensus within 
the GCC on Iran such that a coherent "message" could be 
delivered?  Dr. Mohammed agreed there was a lack of unity. 
Kuwait favored pursuing a GCC "critical dialogue" with Iran, 
something that the UAE and Saudi Arabia had not yet accepted 
and perhaps the timing was not yet right.  DCM noted the 
history of such dialogues was not particularly bright -- the 
Europeans could probably provide input regarding the marginal 
utility of their own "critical dialogue" on human rights with 
Iran - a process that yielded few positive results. 
Ambassador asked whether recent Iranian delegations had 
dangled trade carrots (as Parliament Speaker Al-Khorafi had 
commented privately), including press reports of a possible 
joint Kuwaiti-Iranian airline intended to help evade future, 
tougher sanctions; such efforts should be considered 
carefully given the potential to fall afoul of future "smart 
sanctions." 
 
IRAN:  It's not the audience, it's the message 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4. (C)  The Ambassador solicited Dr. Mohammed's views on 
current Iran policy, noting recent press neuralgia (ref C) - 
and private kvetching from senior Kuwaitis, including 
Parliament Speaker Jassem Al-Khorafi - regarding the US 
approach, including suggestions the US is not talking to the 
right Iranians.  The FM said the issue from a Kuwaiti 
perspective wasn't the medium - with governments friendly to 
the US encircling Iran, and two military conflicts in 
adjoining states - Afghanistan and Iraq - the US had numerous 
channels, including intelligence and military conduits, to 
engage the Iranians, and if all else failed there was always 
the Swiss interests section.   Of greater concern was the 
 
KUWAIT 00000137  002 OF 003 
 
 
message being delivered and how it might be interpreted by 
the regime.  The US extending the hand of friendship to Iran 
- is this viewed as a sign of weakness, perhaps a tacit green 
light for Tehran to continue on its 
present course?  At the same time, a tougher US line - 
including any comments on human rights or in support of the 
opposition -- allowed the regime to continue to use the 
American bogeyman as its "get out of jail free" card:  they 
simply tell their domestic audience that the issue isn't the 
international community and the IAEA, but rather the US and 
its implacable refusal to accept the Iranian revolution. 
 
IRAN:  US also disturbed by messaging; Russian support for 
pressure track would be "game-changer" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (C)  The Ambassador responded clearly that the US would 
continue to speak out about human rights issues globally and 
said our messaging with Iran was mindful of the importance of 
distinguishing the regime-and in particular the increasingly 
dominant role played by the Revolutionary Guards in all 
aspects of Iranian life - from the Iranian people.  The U.S. 
is concerned by recent statements attributed to the Iranian 
Ambassador here, including his comment to the press that Iran 
would not need to attack US military facilities here because 
US warships in the Gulf would provide ample targets.  Such 
statements, if confirmed, were provocative and should be 
aggressively discouraged by the GoK - the Ambassador laid 
down the marker that those that perceive the US to be 
stretched or pinned down should remind themselves of the huge 
reservoir of human and industrial resources that the United 
States - a nation of over 300 million citizens and the 
largest economy on the planet - continues to have at its 
disposal. 
 
¶6. (C)  The FM commented that CENTCOM Commander Petraeus' 
public remarks about the US military having plans to attack 
Iran were also provocative, observing that at the end of the 
day, governments in the region are asking themselves what the 
bottom-line of US policy is:  with think-tanks in DC 
suggesting Iranian behavior might actually be more 
responsible after acquisition of a nuclear weapons 
capability, are we all simply going through the motions here? 
 The Ambassador distinguished between the preparation of 
contingency plans - to which General Petraeus had clearly 
referred - and the issuance of threats, and stated that no 
one should misjudge the seriousness of our concerns regarding 
a radical government that uses surrogates and proxies to 
achieve its goals; our tactics with regard to approach should 
not be confused with the ultimate intent of our strategy. 
Dr. Mohammed commented that he had been struck by the 
President's recent optimism regarding the Russian position on 
Iran, observing that if Moscow is really on board for tougher 
sanctions, that would be game-changing and create a 
completely different dynamic 
for Iran.  The Ambassador said she would seek further details 
from Washington with regard to our assessment of Moscow's 
position. 
 
Footprint, Yemen, Palestinian Aid 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  The Ambassador reviewed for the FM the outcome of the 
last Joint Military Commission meeting held in late January 
in Washington, commenting that the Kuwaiti military appeared 
set in their desire to see a smaller and much more narrowly 
focused US military presence here in future, and that we were 
witnessing efforts to change the rules of the game that had 
heretofore applied to OIF, such as in a desire to charge port 
fees for ships carrying US military cargo; here the approach 
should be that we stick with the arrangements previously 
agreed for OIF until the withdrawal of US combat forces.  Did 
this apparent Kuwaiti military perspective reflect the views 
of Kuwaiti policy-makers because we have not yet heard this 
from the senior leadership? (Note:   Dr. Mohammed did not 
respond directly, but on the margins of the meeting indicated 
a desire to meet privately with the Ambassador to discuss 
this and other issues.  End note.) 
 
 
¶8.  (C)  On Yemen, the FM said Kuwait would participate in 
the "Friends of Yemen" group via the Kuwait Investment 
Authority, saying the top concern was addressing the 
perception in Yemen of widespread governmental graft and 
corruption.  Asked if there would be a separate Kuwait-hosted 
GCC meeting on Yemen in the Spring, the FM implied that no 
special session would be called, but that the issue would 
figure prominently at the regularly schedule mid-year Foreign 
 
KUWAIT 00000137  003 OF 003 
 
 
Ministerial. 
 
¶9.  (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question noting the 
return of the debts bill to the Parliament, Dr. Mohammed 
confirmed the GoK still intends to provide $50 million in 
budgetary support for the PA via the World Bank Trust Fund, 
but said such action could not be completed until the 
parliament had an up or down vote on the returned bill (Note: 
 likely in early March at the earliest.  End note.).  The 
Ambassador urged the GoK to act quickly given the enormous 
needs of the PA and in order to support both Abu Mazen and 
Salam Fayyad while establishing the infrastructure that could 
sustain a viable Palestinian State in anticipation of a 
successful outcome of direct negotiations.  The FM observed 
that the GoK had good relations with Abu Mazen and thought 
highly of Fayyad, but remarked with a shrug that when the 
former and HAMAS leader Khalid Misha'al had visited Kuwait 
recently, each had blamed the other  for failure to make 
progress on Palestinian reconciliation. 
 
TF legislation, Trip to the US 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C)  The Ambassador remarked on recent passage by Yemen 
of terrorist financing legislation, making Kuwait now the 
lone hold-out in the Arabian Peninsula - a fact that would 
likely be noted unfavorably during the upcoming FATF Mutual 
Review.  Legislation to criminalize terror financing has been 
drafted, but the Ambassador commented that the Parliamentary 
Speaker had indicated the GoK had not communicated to the 
parliament that this was a priority or even a goal for the 
current legislative session, something 
the Ambassador asked the Gok to take up and correct. 
Finally, the FM noted his desire to travel to Washington in 
the May-June timeframe to "coordinate on GCC policy" and said 
he would welcome suggestions on timing and meetings. 
 
Action Request 
-------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Post would appreciate any additional information 
with regard to our assessment of Russia's position on Iran 
that we may share with the FM. 
 
********************************************* ********* 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at: 
 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it 
********************************************* ********* 
JONES