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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KOLKATA 000029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/INSB, SRAP, EAP/CM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/26/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IN BG AF
SUBJECT: INDIA'S NEXT TOP GENERAL OFFERS POSSIBLE COUNTERINSURGENCY 
INSIGHTS FOR AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 334 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Matthew Asada, A/Consul General. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 11 meeting, India's departing 
Eastern Commander and next Chief of Army Staff, LTG V.K. Singh, 
discussed India's success with its ongoing northeast 
counterinsurgency operations, improved security with Bangladesh, 
the military's take on the Maoist/Naxal threat and the 
India-China border in Arunachal Pradesh.  While stressing that 
there is no "one-size-fits-all" counterinsurgency strategy, he 
conveyed his personal, unofficial view that the Indian Army's 
experience in reintegrating northeast insurgents may be of some 
value to the international community as it examines 
counterinsurgent reintegration in Afghanistan.  Given his 
personal experiences with the Eastern Command, as its commander 
and as one of its officer in the 1971 India-Pakistan War, 
India's next top general may place more emphasis on India's 
eastern border than some of his predecessors.  He continues to 
speak fondly of his time at the U.S. Army War College in 
Carlisle and welcomes closer U.S.-India strategic cooperation. 
 
Eastern Command's Counterinsurgency Focus: Insights for 
Afghanistan 
 
¶2. (C) On February 11 the Consul General paid a 45-minute 
courtesy call on the current Eastern Commander and India's next 
Chief of Army Staff, LTG V.K. Singh.  One of six geographic Army 
commands, the Eastern Command located in Kolkata in historic 
Fort William is responsible for defending northeast and eastern 
India, including the strategic Siliguri corridor, from external 
or secessionist threats.  The Eastern Command has extensive 
counterinsurgency experience with ongoing campaigns in Assam, 
Nagaland and Manipur.  Singh was keen to emphasize the 
importance of coordinated military and political operations, and 
local cultural expertise to the success of his counterinsurgency 
campaigns.  According to him, military operations have prompted 
insurgent groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam 
(ULFA) or Karbilongri North Liberation Front (KNLF) to come to 
the negotiations table (on the day of the meeting almost 400 
KNLF militia surrendered to the military).  He underlined the 
importance of successful reintegration programs.  While 
stressing that there is no "one-size-fits-all" counterinsurgency 
strategy, he conveyed his personal, unofficial view that the 
Indian Army's experience in reintegrating northeast insurgents 
may be of some value to the international community as it 
examines counterinsurgent reintegration in Afghanistan. 
 
Positive Impacts of improved India-Bangladesh Relations 
 
¶3. (C) He confirmed that improved India-Bangladesh 
counterterrorism cooperation was having a positive impact on 
India's ongoing counter-insurgency operations in the area.  He 
noted an improvement in military-military ties (he had visited 
Dhaka last year), but according to him they had always been 
good.  He complimented Bangladesh's interim military government 
on managing a successful return to civilian elected rule in 2008 
- as he remarked a "quite unusual feat in this part of the 
world." 
 
Maoist/Naxal Threat - Law and Order, Not Secessionist 
 
¶4. (C) He reiterated the official position that since the 
Maoist/Naxal threat was "not secessionist, but rather one of law 
and order" the police and state governments, and not the 
military, bore the responsibility for addressing the challenge. 
The military could, and is, working on a limited basis with the 
police in an advisory or training capacity, but they are not 
involved in active, kinetic operations.  However, the military 
is monitoring the threat to ensure that it does not get out of 
hand.  He advised against any overt U.S. assistance in this 
domestic, internal matter. 
 
Chinese Protests Over Arunachal Pradesh - Not So Subtle Reminder 
from India's Neighbor 
 
¶5. (C) While dismissing media hype over alleged Chinese border 
incursions into the Indian border state of Arunachal Pradesh, he 
acknowledged differences between the two countries on the 
matter.  While more reserved on the sensitive topic, he 
hypothesized three areas of potential future conflict between 
 
KOLKATA 00000029  002 OF 002 
 
 
China and India: clash of actual "hard" interests (border, 
water, energy), regional ambitions, and global alliances.  He 
interpreted Chinese protests over Arunachal Pradesh as a 
not-so-subtle Chinese reminder to India of its presence in the 
neighborhood and concern over improving U.S.-India relations in 
light of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. 
 
Comment 
 
¶6. (C) Singh, while generally friendly and open, was unusually 
candid for a man in uniform (he spoke without a note taker).  It 
is unlikely that he will be as accessible or free to speak in 
his new position.  He has a genuine soft spot for the Eastern 
Command, given his experiences as its commander and as one of 
its officer in the 1971 India-Pakistan War.  This may translate 
into India's next top general placing more emphasis on India's 
eastern border than some of his predecessors, although Pakistan 
will continue to preoccupy the military establishment.  His 
comments regarding Indian expertise in counterinsurgency 
warfare, and the importance of reintegration, may signal an 
opportunity to engage with the Government of India on the 
lessons learned from the northeast and what they might mean for 
Afghan reintegration.  While the Government of India continues 
to be skeptical regarding reintegration (Reftel), this may be an 
opening for discussions and engagement.  He continues to speak 
fondly of his time at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle and 
welcomes closer U.S.-India strategic cooperation. 
PAYNE