VZCZCXRO1875
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0250/01 0551054
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 241052Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0272
INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE
SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 0006
RUZEHAA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 000250 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PGOV UNHCR PHUM MOPS CG
SUBJECT: DRC/UNHCR/RWANDA TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT: VIEW FROM THE DRC 
 
REF: KIGALI 120; 09 KINSHASA 1052 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Governments of the DRC and Rwanda, and 
UNHCR signed a long-awaited Tripartite Agreement in Kigali on 
February 17 providing a framework for the voluntary repatriation of 
Congolese refugees from Rwanda and Rwandan refugees in Congo.  For 
the Congolese refugees, the agreement will cover only those 
registered with UNHCR, some 53,632.  Between now and the next 
meeting of the Tripartite Commission in May 2010, the technical 
working group of the commission will work on the modalities of the 
return process, including verification of registrations and areas 
of return.  Organized returns could begin as early as summer 2009. 
UNHCR and both governments face significant challenges in ensuring 
a voluntary, safe, and durable repatriation of these two entrenched 
refugee populations, avoiding a precipitous return that could risk 
destabilizing return areas in North Kivu.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On February 18, UNHCR DRC Eastern Coordinator Karl 
Steinacker briefed Goma-based diplomats and MONUC officials on the 
Tripartite Agreement signed in Kigali on February 17. PRM TDY also 
met separately with UNHCR, MONUC, and GDRC officials to discuss the 
Tripartite Agreement and the refugee return process. 
 
 
 
Tripartite Agreement 
 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) UNHCR described the agreement as "very standard," in line 
with other, similar UNHCR arrangements.  Steinacker noted two 
particularly contentious aspects of the agreement negotiations: the 
scope of which Congolese refugees in Rwanda would be covered; and a 
clause calling on the Rwandan Government not to discriminate 
against returnees.  On the designation of which Congolese refugees 
would be covered by the agreement, Steinacker said most of the 
debate took place within the Congolese delegation itself, while the 
Rwandan delegation was largely silent on the issue.  The final 
consensus was that only refugees that were registered by UNHCR - 
53,632 - would be covered under the agreement.  These refugees 
reside mainly in three camps and receive formal protection and 
assistance from UNHCR.  Given tension and conflict over land in the 
primary areas of return - Masisi and Rutshuru Territories in North 
Kivu - limiting the number of Congolese who could claim benefits 
under the agreement was a crucial point.  On the second contentious 
issue, the clause on non-discriminatory policies, the Rwandan 
delegation reportedly took umbrage at this "stock" clause in the 
Tripartite Agreement.  Per Steinacker, the eventual solution was to 
phrase the clause with a positive construct, i.e., "the Government 
of Rwanda will not discriminate against repatriated refugees" 
became "the Government of Rwanda will take measures to protect the 
fundamental rights of the returnees should be treated with 
equality." 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The DRC delegation numbered nearly thirty participants, 
led by the Minister of Interior, and including the head of the 
National Refugee Council, the governors of North and South Kivu, 
the North Kivu Provincial Minister of Justice and Social 
Reinsertion, and as last minute invitees, a large complement of 
traditional chiefs from North Kivu and South Kivu.  Steinacker said 
nearly all members of the Congolese delegation intervened at 
different points, often debating more amongst themselves the 
various aspects of the agreement, rather than with their Rwandan or 
UNHCR counterparts.  In contrast, on the Rwandan side, only ten 
members were in the delegation, which through its spokesperson, 
Secretary of State Christine Nyatanyi, "spoke with one voice," 
according to Steinacker.  UNHCR had pushed to include observers 
from the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). 
However, per Steinacker, the Rwandans declined, adding that CEPGL 
participation would be welcome at subsequent meetings of the 
Tripartite Commission.  The delegation visited Gihembe refugee 
camp, where the Congolese leaders stressed to camp residents that 
"the war is over" and that it is "time to come home." 
 
KINSHASA 00000250  002 OF 004 
 
 
Return process 
 
-------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) On timelines, the technical working group of the 
commission will work for the next two months on modalities of 
return, including identification of areas of return, methods of 
return, assistance packages for returnees, return infrastructure 
(e.g. transit centers), etc.  There will then be a formal meeting 
in May of the Tripartite Technical Committee to finalize these 
arrangements.  With time allotted for the construction of transit 
center facilities and other assistance arrangements, UNHCR Goma 
estimated facilitated returns could begin as early as July 2010. 
Steinacker noted that the Rwandan delegation provided UNHCR a list 
of some 8,000 Congolese refugees who were ready to return as soon 
as possible.  Given the complexity and political sensitivity of the 
caseload and the significant work involved in identifying areas of 
return and ensuring the returnees' acceptance in these areas, 
Steinacker, when pressed for an overall timeline for the return 
operation, commented that "at best, it would muddle along for at 
least two years." 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) To assess whether areas of return in DRC can be declared 
safe, and to work on community reconciliation in areas of return a 
two-tiered committee system is being developed by the GDRC, UNHCR, 
and MONUC at the Groupement (Comite Locale Permanent de 
Conciliation - CLPC) and the Provincial (Comite Provinciale de 
Gestion de Retour - CPGR) levels.  Local authorities, civil 
society, traditional chiefs, IDP representatives and UN officials 
will be members.  Upon recommendation of the CLPC, the Ministre de 
l'Administration Territoriale (of each Province) will declare a 
particular Groupement to be safe for the return of IDPs, displaced 
returnees and the facilitated/promoted repatriation of refugees. 
If the area is declared unsafe by the committee, UNHCR will not 
facilitate return.  The CLPCs, the establishment of which is 
included in a clause of the GDRC-CNDP March 23 Agreement, may also 
have a role in identifying which refugees are eligible for return 
to certain areas, although the modalities of this identification 
process have yet to be determined.  Referring to these resources as 
"embryonic," Steinacker made a pitch to the donor community to 
support these committee mechanisms which UNHCR and MONUC officials 
see as key to ensuring a peaceful return process.  In advance of 
the returns, and as part of ongoing IDP operations, UNHCR has 
expanded its presence in areas of potential return, with new 
offices in Masisi and Kitchanga.  In addition, UNHCR is recruiting 
national UN Volunteer staff to be deployed to support the CLPCs, as 
technical advisors, but in part in an effort to thwart manipulation 
of the CLPC process by the CNDP.  Financing for the committees and 
support staff will be through a $2 million allocation from the UN 
Peace-building Fund. 
 
 
 
Risk 
 
----- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) UNHCR Goma's presentation to Goma diplomats was rather 
sanguine, noting that the agency was working with the MONUC 
stabilization team to "manage the risk" of returns, but sounding no 
dire warnings of impending instability due to return operations. 
However, in private discussions with PRM TDY officer, UNHCR staff 
admitted much more concern about the potential for violence 
stemming from refugee returns.  Recognizing that the CNDP had much 
invested in the return to bolster its constituency in the Kivus, a 
senior UNHCR official said the agency was worried about the 
potential for violence stemming from an acceleration of the process 
by either the CNDP or the Government of Rwanda.  The official said 
that it would be very easy for indigenous groups opposed to the 
return to "stage a small massacre" to terrorize Congolese Tutsis 
into staying in camps.  When asked what UNHCR could do to prevent 
such attacks, the official said that the process hinges on the 
CLPCs, who will be key to ensure local buy-in of the process, and 
critically, to determine which areas are safe for return.  But it 
remains to be seen how the guarantors of the return process could 
 
KINSHASA 00000250  003 OF 004 
 
 
prevent manipulation of the CLPCs, many of whom will operate in 
CNDP strongholds.  A UNHCR official candidly said that that the 
Congolese delegation had signed the Tripartite "for the gallery" 
and that much of the refugee return process was "out of the 
government's control" - overseen by the CNDP parallel 
administration, which the official suggested would become even more 
entrenched following the recent GDRC cabinet reshuffle which 
excluded the CNDP. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The specter of the return of the Congolese Tutsis has 
already led to instability in certain communities, notably in 
Walikale and southern Lubero, where in October 2009 residents 
attacked UNHCR offices causing the evacuation of the agency from 
its field office (Note:  According to UNHCR, there are only 800 
refugees in Rwanda who are from Lubero and 600 from Walikale.  Part 
of the intense reaction in these areas was due to a confusing map 
that circulated widely confusing IDP and refugee return numbers, 
implying that thousands of Congolese refugees would return to the 
two territories.  End note).  With the signing of the Tripartite, 
rumors spread of impending demonstrations in Lubero, although none 
have yet occurred.  Potential spoilers to a peaceful refugee return 
process also include the "unofficial/undocumented" returnees (or 
migrant Rwandans or a mixture thereof) that have been entering DRC 
from Rwanda since 2009 (ref B), as well as other spontaneous 
returnees, including some 400 households of Congolese refugees that 
have come back to Rutshuru from asylum in Uganda (where no 
Tripartite has been signed).  In response to a question about 
managing the risk of the return operation, Steinacker suggested 
that the international community could and should play a helpful 
role by conveying a clear message to both the DRC and Rwandan 
Governments that, while the opportunity has come for return, the 
operation should not be rushed, nor disrupted by manipulation of 
the process. 
 
 
 
Rwandan refugees 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) While the Congolese return attracts most attention, and 
indeed was the dominant element of UNHCR's presentation and ensuing 
discussions of the Tripartite Agreement, the return of Rwandan 
refugees from Congo is equally, if not more complex and difficult. 
This is because of the difficulty in identifying this caseload, 
many of whom remember little of Rwanda, and have only tentative 
links to their "homeland."  PRM TDY has spoken with multiple 
Rwandan refugees over the past several weeks at transit centers in 
Bukavu and in Goma, who had left Rwanda following the genocide as 
children, integrated in Congo either with Congolese or Rwandan 
families (including FDLR), but who had recently been separated via 
military operations against the FDLR.  These refugees - in limbo at 
transit centers where they did not leave, fearing the reaction of 
local populations - knew no home in Rwanda, and were not allowed by 
the DRC authorities to remain in Congo.  These returns have been 
occurring for years (9,019 returned in 2009), and thus the 
Tripartite represents only a formalization of the movement, which 
has been ongoing for years.  A key development will be whether the 
technical committees work out a system of formal local integration 
within the DRC for this caseload (Note:  This question will be 
linked to, but separate from, whether FDLR combatants can be 
relocated within DRC rather than return to Rwanda.  End note). 
UNHCR recognizes that the transit centers, which are intended to be 
temporary and limit refugees' freedom of movement, are not a good 
solution, but claim to have little choice until Rwandan and DRC 
authorities change their positions on these difficult cases. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Comment:  In discussions, UNHCR officials have 
oscillated between optimism - based on hopes for the nascent 
Congolese structures being put in place to address return issues - 
and pessimism - based on a realistic assessment of the political 
dynamics in return areas that are admittedly "out of UNHCR's 
control."  UNHCR and the MONUC Stabilization Team have drafted a 
strategy document on the Return, Reconciliation, and Reintegration 
of IDPs and Refugees in Eastern DRC as part of the overall UN 
Security and Stabilization Support Strategy.  Working closely with 
 
KINSHASA 00000250  004 OF 004 
 
 
the GDRC on the implementation of the strategy, the UN system will 
need to be well-supported financially to ensure the implementation 
of the plan to address outstanding issues of citizenship, land 
access, conflict mediation, shelter assistance and peaceful 
coexistence.  While a massive, precipitous return of the official 
refugee population seems unlikely, undocumented "unofficial" 
returns have continued in recent months, and there exists a real 
possibility that the process could accelerate.  The real potential 
for significant violence and instability due to a poorly managed 
return operation demands close attention to and support of the 
actors:  MONUC, UNHCR, and the new committee structures overseeing 
the fragile process.  It is important that the USG continue to 
support voluntary return in safety and dignity, which in this case 
means slow and steady.  As a first step, this message should be 
sent clearly to all parties with a stake in controlling the pace of 
returns, including the GDRC and GOR, as well as CNDP officials. 
End comment. 
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