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DE RUEHKI #0176/01 0411920
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD2082AB TOQ5120-695)
O R 101920Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0151
INFO RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0001
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0004
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RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000176 
 
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SIPDIS 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR DURBIN'S OFFICE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OTRA PREL PGOV PHUM PREF MOPS MASS MONUC EAID ECON
EINV, CG 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL DURBIN VISIT TO THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO (FEBRUARY 15-16) 
 
¶1.   (SBU) Summary:  The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) stands 
at a crossroads in 2010, having registered progress in stabilizing 
the security situation in the volatile eastern part of the country 
in 2009, and awaiting local and national elections in 2011.  On the 
security and democratization fronts, there were optimistic signs, 
but the overall political and economic situation in the DRC remains 
fragile.  An historic rapprochement with Rwanda and improved 
relations with other erstwhile foes, Uganda and Burundi, has 
unquestionably improved regional stability.  Relations with Angola 
have deteriorated due to expulsions of each other's citizens and a 
growing dispute over oil blocks in the Atlantic Ocean.  The 
Congolese Tutsi-led rebel group, the National Congress for the 
Defense of the People (CNDP), agreed to end its military struggle 
against the government and to integrate its forces into the 
Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC).  A series of military operations - 
Umoja Wetu, Kimia II, and now Amani Leo - have targeted, with 
relative success, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDLR), a rebel group composed primarily of Rwandan Hutus, 
some of whom were remnants of the genocidaires who fled Rwanda into 
the DRC in 1994.  Some success was also registered against the 
Ugandan rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army, which has 
terrorized the DRC population in northeastern DRC for almost a 
decade.  There are, nevertheless, major unresolved issues, which 
could lead to renewed fighting, chiefly the mass return of 
Congolese refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) into 
ethnically sensitive areas, and the superficial integration of CNDP 
forces into the FARDC.  A local fishing dispute in the western 
province of Equateur in late 2009 spiraled into an armed conflict, 
provoking refugee and IDP flows.  Although the situation is now 
stabilized, it is a reminder of how weak, or even non-existent, 
state authority is throughout the DRC.  The various conflicts have 
exacerbated an already bad human rights situation, including 
rampant sexual- and gender-based violence.  President Kabila 
announced that local elections would be held in March 2011, 
followed by parliamentary and presidential elections in Autumn 
¶2011.  Kabila's party,  the People's Party for Reconstruction and 
Development (PPRD), already holds a commanding majority in both 
houses of parliament and, one year out from elections, appears 
primed to defeat an opposition that is badly divided and weak.  The 
DRC's economic outlook has changed dramatically following the 
global economic crisis, as the once robust mining sector contracted 
due to falling international commodity prices, a tightening of 
international credit, and dampened investor confidence in the 
sector.  GDP growth for 2009 is estimated at only 2.7%, 
significantly reduced form earlier projections.  Emergency donor 
assistance has stabilized the economy somewhat and the growth rate 
for 2010 is projected at 5.4%.  In December 2009, the IMF approved 
a new three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility for the DRC 
to promote stronger economic growth, reduced inflation, stronger 
public financial management, and implementation of key structural 
reforms.  The DRC's investment climate remains dismal; the World 
Bank ranked the DRC as the second most difficult country in which 
to do business in its 2010 Doing Business survey.  The largest 
investor in the mining sector, U.S. company Freeport-McMoRan, 
continues to negotiate a revised contract with the government 
following the initiation of a sector-wide review of contracts in 
¶2007.  End summary. 
 
 
 
Peace and Security in the Eastern Congo 
 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In January 2009, the DRC and Rwanda agreed to cooperate 
to combat and neutralize rebel forces in the eastern provinces of 
North Kivu and South Kivu, a source of tension between the two 
countries for over a decade, a scourge on the civilian population, 
and the primary driver of instability in the Great Lakes region. 
While there is probably no written agreement between the two 
governments, the broad outlines of the rapprochement were worked 
out between a small group on each side, and the general content 
appears clear.  Rwanda, long suspected of having supported the 
Congolese Tutsi-led rebel group, the National Congress for the 
Defense of the People (CNDP), agreed to cease its support for the 
group and to allow the CNDP force to integrate into the Congolese 
Armed Forces (FARDC).  Within the CNDP, an internal coup replaced 
flamboyant CNDP chairman/military leader Laurent Nkunda with the 
CNDP's military chief of Staff Bosco Ntaganda, who has accepted the 
agreement between the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (GDRC) and the Government of Rwanda (GOR); Nkunda would not 
accept Rwandan-Congolese rapprochement.  Rwandan authorities 
detained Nkunda when he entered Rwanda; he is under house arrest 
now in Rwanda.  The DRC has requested his extradition to face 
charges of insurrection.  In return, the DRC agreed to allow 
 
 
Rwandan forces to enter DRC territory to participate in joint 
military operations against the Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a rebel group composed of Rwandan 
Hutus, many of whom were remnants of the genocidaires who fled into 
the DRC in 1994.  The rapprochement, while still fragile, was a 
courageous political decision by DRC President Kabila, as he faced 
vocal opposition from many against improving relations with its 
eastern neighbor, which had twice invaded the Zaire/DRC since 1996. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The joint DRC-Rwandan military operations, Umoja Wetu, 
"Our Unity" in Swahili -- began in mid-January 2009 and concluded 
in March when Rwandan forces withdrew.  Umoja Wetu was followed by 
the Kimia II operation, with the DRC continuing to pursue the FDLR 
with logistical support from the United Nations Mission in Congo 
(MONUC).  The goals of the military operations were to capture or 
kill those FDLR elements that were unwilling to repatriate to 
Rwanda; dislodge the FDLR from lucrative positions controlling 
mines in the region; and to improve security for the civilian 
population.  While no one expected the operations to completely 
"eliminate" the FDLR, there were tangible results:  1,114 FDLR were 
killed and 1,522 combatants and 2,187 of their dependents were 
repatriated to Rwanda; the remaining FDLR were pushed deeper into 
the forest, away from larger population centers and major 
commercial sites, such as mines; and several hundred thousand 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were able to return to their 
homes.  However, the operations also provoked a spike in human 
rights abuses against the civilian population, both acts of 
retribution by the FDLR, as well as abuses committed by 
undisciplined FARDC elements.  As many as 1,714 civilians were 
killed as a result of the military operations.  Major human rights 
organizations, some international donors, and even some within the 
UN criticized the military operations, maintaining the suffering of 
the civilian population and newly created IDPs greatly outweighed 
any benefits. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) While the situation in Eastern DRC has arguably improved 
in the past year-and-a-half, several areas of concern remain.  If 
not managed properly, these concerns could result in another cycle 
of violence in the Kivus.  As the security situation improves, more 
IDPs have returned to their home areas, and there are credible 
reports of significant numbers of persons coming from Rwanda, 
either Congolese refugees or simple economic migrants, have crossed 
into the DRC over the past year.  As these groups return, 
long-standing tensions, which have historically provoked ethnic 
conflict over land and property, have resurfaced.  Integration of 
the CNDP and the various other rebel groups has been uneven and 
superficial in most cases.  When the CNDP decided to integrate, 
MONUC and the GDRC opted for "accelerated integration" instead of 
the more traditional integration, arguing that the political 
imperative required expeditious measures.  Today, most of the CNDP 
troops are "an army within an army," answering to the former CNDP 
military command, rather than to the FARDC command.  As these 
"integrated" CNDP FARDC forces are deployed in areas where there 
are few or no ethnic Tutsis, there have been significant instances 
of abuses against the population.  The new head of the CNDP, Bosco 
Ntaganda, is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for 
war crimes committed in 2003-2004 in Ituri District.  As a UN body, 
MONUC has conditioned its support of FARDC military operations on 
non-involvement by Bosco, although there are widespread reports of 
Bosco maintaining a prominent position in the operations.  Finally, 
the CNDP and the GDRC have not yet agreed on senior political, 
military, and administrative positions apparently promised to the 
CNDP. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  On January 1, the FARDC and MONUC began a new phase of 
military operations, Amani Leo, against the FDLR.  While the 
overall goals are similar to Kimia II and Umoja Wetu, there has 
been a slight shift in emphasis.  Most importantly, MONUC has 
conditioned its support to specific FARDC units based on human 
rights vetting and battlefield comportment.  This represents a 
reinforcement of MONUC's civilian protection mandate under the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1906.  Amani Leo also 
plans fewer, but better targeted operations against FDLR leadership 
and FDLR economic sites, working to re-establish state authority in 
areas recently taken back from the rebels. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In addition to the conflict in the Kivus, the GDRC and 
 
 
its neighbors, with logistical support from MONUC, continue to 
pursue the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group that 
has been terrorizing the civilian population in northeastern DRC 
for almost a decade.  In December 2008, the DRC, Uganda, the 
Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan launched Operation 
Lightning Thunder against the LRA.  A small group of Ugandan 
intelligence forces has remained following the end of the operation 
continuing to pursue the LRA and its messianic leader, Joseph Kony, 
with the support of MONUC under the Rudia II operations.  The 
operations have been relatively successful, scattering the LRA into 
very small bands, with many LRA elements fleeing to the CAR and 
South Sudan.  The LRA exacted terrible reprisals on the local 
population in the initial phases of the military operations, but 
the group's ability to commit large-scale abuses has been greatly 
reduced, as the group scatters and breaks into smaller units.  The 
LRA remains a regional security threat, which must be addressed by 
applying steady, targeted pressure on the leadership. 
 
 
 
 ¶7.  (SBU) MONUC remains an indispensible player in the 
stabilization and democracy-building of the entire DRC.  With a 
force of approximately 20,000, it is the largest UN peacekeeping 
operation in the world, with a budget of around $1 billion, 
one-third of which the U.S. finances.  MONUC has frequently been 
criticized from different quarters:  the GDRC had used MONUC as a 
scapegoat for its inability to subdue the CNDP and restore statue 
authority in eastern DRC; various NGOs and humanitarian actors have 
criticized MONUC for being complacent and not active enough in 
ensuring that the FARDC does not commit human rights abuses. 
Despite its size, MONUC is seriously understaffed to carry out its 
mandate in a country the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi 
River.  President Kabila has asked MONUC to initiate negotiations 
with the GDRC on a drawdown and an eventual withdrawal.  Most 
observers doubt the GDRC will insist on a rapid withdrawal, 
content, instead, to be able to present a timetable by the 50th 
anniversary celebrations of independence on June 30.  In addition 
to MONUC's peacekeeping functions, it is also tasked with election 
support, institution capacity building, rule of law development, 
and monitoring the human rights situation. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The conflicts in the East have aggravated a worrying 
trend towards the collapse of state authority throughout the 
country.  While this phenomenon receives international scrutiny in 
the East, most parts of the state have ceased to function normally 
throughout the country.  The education, judiciary, and health 
systems have collapsed, with services dependent on under the table 
payments.  Corruption is pervasive, following decades of state 
sanction and the government's inability to provide basic services. 
Without regular salaries, the security forces have turned to small- 
(and large-scale) extortion.  In a situation where society is 
"broken," many donors have targeted security sector reform (SSR 
--military, justice, and police) as the most pressing area in need 
of assistance. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) In October/November 2009, a seemingly local fishing 
dispute in the western province of Equateur erupted into serious 
conflict, a good example of the state's inability to respond to 
fundamental security concerns.  The dispute escalated to the point 
where the FARDC deployed a specially-trained battalion and MONUC 
sent critical reinforcements to pacify the area.  Eventually, the 
situation stabilized, but more than 107,000 and 18,000 refugees 
fled into the neighboring Republic of Congo and the CAR, 
respectively, with another 60,000 internally displaced.  While the 
dispute clearly began at a local level, there are indications that 
national and international opponents of the DRC regime attempted to 
manipulate the situation to their advantage. 
 
 
 
Regional Relations 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In addition to its rapprochement with Rwanda in 2009, 
the GDRC also normalized relations with its other eastern 
neighbors, Uganda and Burundi.  As with Rwanda, the DRC exchanged 
ambassadors with both countries.  There was also progress on the 
economic front, as the DRC and Uganda agreed to liberalize border 
crossing hours.  A dormant regional economic organization, the 
Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) showed 
 
 
signs of re-invigoration, as its members (the DRC, Rwanda, and 
Burundi) became more active in the organization's work. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The DRC assumed the chairmanship of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) in September 2009, hosting the SADC 
Summit in Kinshasa, the first significant international or regional 
conference in Kinshasa since the 1980s.  Also in September 2009, 
President Kabila was re-elected to the chairmanship of the Economic 
Community of Central African States (CEEAC).  However, President 
Kabila has not attended recent African Union summits or the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Relations with Angola have been uneasy over the past 
year due to several factors.  While Angola has periodically 
expelled DRC residents living illegally in Angola over the years, 
Luanda accelerated deportations in late summer 2009, expelling as 
many as 50,000 Congolese between July-October 2009.  According to 
reports, some of the Congolese were subjected to abuse, including 
theft, expropriation of property, physical violence and rape.  In 
response, the GDRC expelled approximately 40,000 Angolans living in 
the DRC.  Many of these Angolans had refugee status dating back 
from the period of armed conflict in Angola.  Perhaps more 
controversial, the two countries have become involved in a dispute 
over rights to off-shore oil fields.  The GDRC has claimed that a 
new interpretation on how to delineate the continental shelf 
entitles it to blocks that are currently under Angolan control. 
The DRC has presented its case to the UN, while Angola has also 
decided to seek international arbitration to resolve the 
disagreement.  While it is encouraging that the dispute remains in 
the legal realm, it has unquestionably negatively affected 
DRC-Angolan relations. 
 
 
 
Elections and Democracy 
 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU) President Kabila has announced that the long-delayed 
local elections will now take place in March 2011, followed by 
presidential and parliamentary elections in Autumn 2011.  If this 
holds, it will be an important barometer of democratic development 
in the DRC, as local elections aim to solidify democracy at the 
grassroots level and the parliamentary and presidential elections 
will be the first since 2006, when President Kabila defeated 
Jean-Pierre Bemba, head of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo 
(MLC) in the second round of voting.  Kabila's party, the People's 
Party for Reconstruction and Development (PPRD), controls a 
significant majority in both the National Assembly and Senate 
thanks to a coalition with various other parties.  The main 
opposition parties appear weak in the run-up to the 2011 elections. 
The MLC is split and its leader, Bemba, is awaiting trial at the 
ICC for war crimes.  Etienne Tshisikedi, a historical opponent to 
the Mobutu regime, is in Brussels in poor health; his party, the 
Union for Development and Social Progress (UDPS) is also divided 
into several factions.  The one individual, who many analysts 
believe could have challenged Kabila in 2011, former National 
Assembly President Vital Kamerhe, has been sidelined by the PPRD. 
Some have characterized Kamerhe's resignation as assembly president 
as a deliberate attempt by the presidency to weaken the 
parliamentary branch.  Others defended Kamerhe's removal as a 
legitimate move, done in accordance with the Constitution and with 
internal PPRD procedures.    A similar divide erupted in the 
judiciary sector following Kabila's dismissal of several hundred 
judges in 2009.  Critics charged the presidency with attempting to 
neuter the judiciary branch by appointing politically like-minded 
judges to the bench.  Supporters noted that the dismissals were 
part of the president's "Zero Tolerance" campaign against 
corruption. 
 
 
 
Human Rights Issues 
 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Human rights abuses remain a concern throughout the DRC, 
not just in the conflict zones.  Corruption, lack of state 
authority, and a cycle of impunity fuel these abuses.  Payment is 
often expected for police to pursue a case and for judges to 
prosecute.  Even if a perpetrator is successfully prosecuted, 
 
 
prison security is virtually non-existent and prison conditions are 
abysmal.  Child prostitution is not uncommon and children are often 
forced to work in difficult situations, including in mines. 
International attention has focused on the alarming incidence of 
sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV) committed in the conflict 
zones of Eastern DRC.  Armed militias, but also elements of the 
FARDC and Congolese National Police, regularly use SGBV to 
intimidate and to carry out reprisals against the civilian 
population.  High-level visits, including Secretary Clinton's visit 
in August, have helped raise awareness of the need to fight this 
scourge.  SGBV remains a serious problem in non-conflict areas, as 
well, with civilians, as opposed to security forces, committing 
approximately 75% of SGBV crimes in these areas.  To  effectively 
combat SGBV, the DRC and the international community must embark on 
a holistic approach emphasizing treatment, education, building 
judicial capacity, reducing corruption, training and disciplining 
security forces, and, most importantly, ending the cycle of 
impunity so prevalent in Congolese society. 
 
 
 
Economic Overview and Recent Developments 
 
 
 
¶15.  (U) Despite enormous natural resource wealth, the DRC remains 
one of the poorest countries in the world, with an annual GDP per 
capita of only $171. Following decades of economic mismanagement 
under the Mobutu regime, the GDRC initiated a series of economic 
reforms in 2001 that aimed to stabilize the macroeconomic 
environment and promote economic growth. These reforms, accompanied 
by the re-engagement of the Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank 
and IMF) in 2002 resulted in significant improvements to the 
economic environment: inflation was reduced from 501% in 2001 to 
approximately 27.6% in 2008 (though rising to over 50% in 2009 as a 
result of the global financial crisis), positive economic growth 
resumed, and the currency stabilized.  While the DRC had fallen out 
of compliance with its formal IMF program (Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility, PRGF) in 2006 due to fiscal slippages and 
inadequate progress on structural measures, the DRC did maintain a 
non-disbursing IMF Staff Monitored Program (SMP).  In early 2008, 
the GDRC and China concluded a $9.2 billion 
minerals-for-infrastructure agreement.  The agreement was amended 
in late 2009 to address donor concerns over the agreement's debt 
sustainability; the agreement now includes a $3.2 billion minerals 
component and $3 billion in infrastructure projects. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (U) The DRC's economic environment changed dramatically 
beginning in late 2008 and throughout 2009 as the country was 
significantly and negatively impacted by the global financial 
crisis.  The once robust mining sector significantly contracted 
during late 2008 and early 2009 due to falling international 
commodities prices, a tightening of international credit and 
dampened investor confidence in the sector. GDP growth for 2009 is 
estimated at only 2.7 percent, a significant reduction from earlier 
projections.  By early 2009, the DRC was facing a serious fiscal 
and monetary crisis, with international reserves near zero and the 
exchange rate rapidly deteriorating.  The international community 
responded quickly to the DRC's deteriorating economic situation by 
providing emergency financial assistance, including by the IMF 
($200 million), the World Bank ($100 million), and the African 
Development Bank ($97 million).  The EU and Belgium also provided 
emergency assistance.  This assistance helped stabilize the economy 
and ensure the continuation of basic services.  With the support of 
international emergency assistance and improved prices for key 
export commodities, the DRC's macroeconomic situation has 
stabilized and the economy has begun to recover.  GDP growth for 
2010 is projected by the IMF at 5.4%.  The IMF's Executive Board 
approved a new three-year PRGF in December 2009 which focuses on 
promoting stronger economic growth, reducing inflation, 
strengthening public financial management,  and implementing key 
structural reforms.  The PRGF also paves the way for potential debt 
relief as early as May/June 2010 if the DRC can successfully meet 
triggers under the PRGF necessary to reach HIPC (Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries) completion point.  The DRC's external debt totals 
approximately $13 billion, with the United States serving as the 
DRC's largest bilateral creditor. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Better management of the mining sector, improved public 
financial management, including enhanced revenue generation and 
collection, and an improved investment climate (the World Bank 
 
 
 
ranked the DRC as the second most difficult country in world to do 
business in 2010; it was ranked dead-last in both 2008 and 2009 on 
the Doing Business rankings) remain key for the country's long-term 
economic development.  The GDRC has taken some positive steps in 
these areas, but progress in many areas has been slow.  A review of 
61 mining sector contracts initiated in 2007, for example, has yet 
to be fully completed, with the largest foreign investor in the 
sector, U.S. company Freeport-McMoRan, continuing negotiations with 
the GDRC on its contract.  U.S. investment in the DRC remains small 
and largely focused in the mining sector. 
 
U.S. Assistance 
 
 
 
¶18.  (U) The USAID budget request for assistance to the DRC for 
Fiscal Year 2011 is $213 million.  U.S. assistance in the DRC is 
focused on establishing a culture of democratic and accountable 
governance, promoting respect for human rights, and fostering broad 
economic development.  The assistance is divided into four broad 
categories:  Peace and Security; Governing Justly and 
Democratically; Investing in People; and Economic Growth. 
Activities in the Peace and Security area include supporting the 
GDRC's stabilization and recovery program; strengthening law 
enforcement through police training;  and promoting the 
professionalization of the Congolese military, including support to 
develop a professional light infantry battalion that respects human 
rights norms.  In the Governing Justly and Democratically basket, 
USG assistance aims to support the development of core transparent 
and accountable governance institutions; strengthen judicial 
independence; promote civic participation in the political and 
decision-making processes; and support provincial and local 
autonomy.  Investing in People concentrates on assistance in the 
critical areas of health needs (tuberculosis, malaria, HIV/AIDS 
through PEPFAR, maternal child health, and family planning); and 
assistance to support water and sanitation activities.  Economic 
growth assistance focuses on promoting agricultural productivity 
and processing, and to increase the productivity of the DRC's 
human, capital and natural resources, with an emphasis as well on 
market efficiency and competitiveness. 
 
 
 
Bilateral Relations 
 
 
 
¶19.  (SBU) U.S.-DRC relations received a boost following Secretary 
Clinton's visit to the DRC August 10-11, 2009.  In addition to 
meeting with senior DRC leaders, including President Kabila, the 
Secretary met with civil society and non-governmental actors in 
Kinshasa and in the eastern DRC.  The visit resulted in a U.S. 
Government commitment to explore ways in which it might be able to 
assist the DRC in five key areas:  economic governance, corruption, 
SGBV, SSR, and agricultural productivity.  U.S. teams in these five 
areas have visited the DRC to assess the situation.  The teams will 
present recommendations, which will eventually be presented to the 
GDRC. 
GARVELINK