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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
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INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000702 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - ADDED SIGNATURE TO SECTION 2 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12598: DECL 02/23/2020 
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCOR PREL EAID AF
SUBJECT: GHANI SAYS STABILITY OBTAINED WITH BALLOTS, NOT BOMBS 
 
KABUL 00000702  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Francis Ricciardone; reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1. Summary: Ambassador Eikenberry met with former Finance Minister 
and presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani on February 23, 2010 to 
discuss his views on the military operation in Marjah, the plans for 
the Peace Jirga and the Kabul Conference, and other issues.  Ghani 
expressed skepticism that the coalition military effort alone would 
create lasting stability, emphasizing the need to focus instead on 
sub-national governance.  Ghani said he will support Kabul Conference 
planning by conducting a country-wide assessment to identify the 
"drivers" of instability in each district, and developing a tailored 
plan for each district to mitigate those drivers (thus mirroring our 
District Delivery Program).  Ghani described the risks associated 
with the Peace Jirga, and recommended limiting its objective to 
endorsing a few broad principles. Ghani also shared his thoughts on 
working effectively with President Karzai (keep it simple), the 
presidential decree on electoral reform that nationalizes the 
Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) (do not fight it), and other 
political issues (e.g., improving Parliament, influencing 
powerbrokers, etc.) End summary. 
It's Not About Marjah 
--------------------- 
¶2. (C) Ghani warned against focusing only on military successes, 
commenting that such operations at best provide temporary security. 
Promoting democracy and governance at the sub-national level is more 
important than bombing.  He acknowledged, however, that improved 
security is important to stability.  Ghani believes the Taliban are 
gearing up for major instability operations.  "The population is 
caught in a squeeze," he said.  "They are terrified of both the 
Taliban and the Afghan government."  One positive outcome of Marjah, 
however, is that people now take the threat of force seriously and 
they will take seriously the choice between force and reintegration, 
he stated. 
Ghani Approach to Stability: Ballots Not Bombs 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶3. (U) Ghani said he will help organize the Kabul Conference, 
currently scheduled for late May 2010.  He is unofficially 
collaborating with Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG) 
Director General Jelani Popal on sub-governance planning that is 
already underway as part of the IDLG-led District Delivery Working 
Group.  Ghani said the plan is to develop a tailored approach for 
every district in the country, starting with eight or nine districts 
in Helmand Province.  Ghani will determine what is needed to maintain 
or improve stability in each district and then create clusters of 
three to five districts.  Within these clusters, Ghani will assist 
the IDLG by mapping networks, and identifying linkages to facilitate 
service delivery, share resources, and improve governance.  (Note: 
the USG is supporting this Afghan effort through the District 
Delivery Program (DDP), which is in the final stages of refinement. 
End note.) 
¶4. (U) Ghani explained the importance of identifying young provincial 
leaders, and including their voices at the Kabul Conference.  He 
supported the Embassy effort to establish a Civil Service Institute 
in Helmand, agreeing that it will build the capacity of young leaders 
to build a qualified civil service cadre. 
¶5. (U) Ghani said his team will be 98 percent Afghan.  He requested 
Embassy assistance to obtain the services of two Afghan-Americans for 
four weeks: Mohammed Kalimi from University of California, and Tariq 
Finawi, formerly an Afghan Ministry of Finance Deputy Minister now 
working for the California Department of Agriculture. 
¶6. (U) Ghani suggested establishing bi-weekly teleconferences with 
think tanks in the U.S. (e.g., Atlantic Council, Brookings 
Institution, CSIS, USIP, and Center for New American Security). 
 
Peace Jirga: Risky But Necessary 
-------------------------------- 
¶7. (C) Ghani called the Peace Jirga planned in April "risky," on the 
grounds that it could take on too much, may not be legitimate, and 
ultimately could fail, thereby undermining reconciliation efforts. 
Recognizing that the event will proceed despite these concerns, he 
urged the USG to support it.  He cautioned against spending large 
sums on the jirga, as it will "explode." To ensure success, the 
jirga's objective must be clear.  He recommended choosing a few broad 
principles to be endorsed. Ghani said he is willing to play a role as 
the chairman, if asked by President Karzai. 
And a Few Parting Words of Advice 
--------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) Ghani shared his thoughts and advice on several political 
issues: 
-- When working with Karzai, provide limited, clear options, not 
ultimatums.  Break complex initiatives into smaller "100 day plans." 
-- Karzai believes he understands the South, but does not.  Ghani 
expressed concern that Karzai has surrounded himself with a small 
group of bad advisors. 
-- Minister of Interior Atmar is currently weak because Karzai 
humiliates him daily.  Ghani claims that Atmar wants to quit, as does 
Wardak (presumably referring to MOD Abdul Rahim Wardak, not Minister 
of Education Farouk Wardak). 
(-- On Karzai's recent controversial Electoral Complaints Commission 
decree, Ghani said that trying to get a few international members 
into the commission is "not worth the fight."  Karzai will not bend, 
and few Afghans will stand with the international community. 
 
KABUL 00000702  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
-- Former Afghan President and current powerbroker and Jamiat party 
leader Burhanuddin Rabbani's goal is to subvert the reconciliation 
process to embarrass Karzai. 
-- On influencing powerbrokers, the international community needs to 
set clear boundaries.  The first actor to violate a boundary should 
be "severely sanctioned." 
-- On the Parliament, Ghani said the problem is a lack of political 
elite.  Karzai needs to somehow identify and support the election of 
150 qualified people in the Parliament.  They will then outnumber and 
successfully outmaneuver the rest. 
-- "The U.S. should avoid praising programs or officials without 
vetting them with the local population first."  For example, Ghani 
pointed to statements of praise made for an agriculture program in 
Helmand (NFI), which he alleged was widely considered to be corrupt 
by the local population. 
-- "Do not focus on the personalities; rather, focus on strengthening 
weak institutions." 
-- "Marginalize powerbrokers over time, to allow new actors to 
emerge." 
 
EIKENBERRY