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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000701 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF
SUBJECT: ELECTORAL REFORM: DON'T COUNT ON QANOONI 
 
KABUL 00000701  001.30 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)0 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  I met with Lower House Speaker Qanooni to 
learn what Parliament's legislative priorities will be in the 
next session, to understand Speaker Qanooni's views on 
President Karzai's Presidential Decree on the Electoral Law, 
and to ask what his views were on how we could jointly 
strengthen Parliament.  Speaker Qanooni provided an overview 
of the Lower House's priorities and spoke to his desire to 
work more closely with the Embassy to make Parliament a 
stronger institution.  Most of our discussion centered on the 
Parliamentary response to the Presidential Decree and the 
larger issue of the importance of the 2010 Parliamentary 
elections to domestic audiences in both Afghanistan and the 
United States.  I offered frank comments to Speaker Qanooni 
on how Congress and the American public may view an election 
that is as flawed as the Presidential elections.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Qanooni's  Parliamentary Agenda 
- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C)  In a meeting at Qanooni's residence, he shared his 
plans to meet on February 28 with heads of the 18 Lower House 
committees to develop a strategy to handle the most serious 
problems facing the Afghan people (without specifying what 
the problems were), develop a plan to shepherd a handful of 
laws through the Lower House, and a means of monitoring and 
supervising Lower House activities and procedures. 
Responding to my comment about finding ways to buttress our 
support to Parliament, Qanooni said he felt we should consult 
more often on issues of mutual interest. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - --- 
Elections - The Main Issue at Hand 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Most of our conversation focused on a Parliamentary 
response to President Karzai's February 17 decree on the 
Electoral Law and the overarching topic of the impending 
Parliamentary elections.  In response to my question about 
his views on the decree, Qanooni allowed that certain 
provisions were good, but noted that the improvements were 
overshadowed by a number of problematic issues.  His chief 
complaint was that the absence of international participation 
in the Election Complaints Commission (ECC) will make fair 
elections problematic.  He made the point that if one person 
(in this case Karzai) appoints all members of the Independent 
Election Commission (IEC) and the ECC, the outcome of the 
parliamentary election would be determined by the government, 
not the Afghan people. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Qanooni then reprised the two sides of the debate on 
whether or not Parliament could act on the decree, asserting 
that some MPs felt the Constitution constrained Parliament 
from acting on changes to the Electoral Law during their 
final year in session, while others (including Qanooni) 
believed the Constitution permitted them to act on a 
Presidential Decree.  He said he would meet with Lower House 
committee chairs on February 28 to discuss whether or not to 
bring this decree to the Lower House for debate.  Qanooni 
supported the idea of eventually seating only Afghans on the 
IEC and the ECC, but not now.  Afghan political institutions 
are not sufficiently advanced for this move and, still for an 
interim period it is paramount that internationals 
participate in relevant Afghan institutions, he said. 
 
- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -  -  - - - - - - - 
Is Karzai Ready to Assume the Blame for Electoral Failure? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C)  I ventured that Afghanistan certainly needs 
electoral reform, but that reforms must come from Afghan 
political institutions, including from Parliament.  Noting it 
was incumbent upon Afghan political elites to remember that 
the views of both Afghans and the international community 
toward the conduct of parliamentary elections are important, 
I voiced concern that the Palace might not be paying enough 
attention to the latter.  Americans and Europeans, in good 
part, believe the building of democratic institutions is 
critical to Afghanistan's long-term stability.  Eight-plus 
years after the fall of Taliban, major setbacks in our 
efforts to establish representative government could 
dangerously erode confidence in a mission increasingly 
questioned by our people.  Further, there are risks attached 
to excluding the international community from membership in 
the ECC, participating as observers during the elections, and 
involvement in vetting candidates.  If the international 
community is prevented by the provisions of Karzai's decree 
from participating in the parliamentary elections and all 
goes well, that would be a tremendous confidence-building 
 
KABUL 00000701  002 OF 002 
 
 
success for Afghanistan.  However, this will not be the case. 
 The election process will be flawed at best, and all blame 
for failures will fall squarely on Afghan shoulders.  The 
blow to democratic Afghan institutions could be devastating. 
On the other hand, if steps are taken to restore 
international participation, we can mitigate the risks in the 
elections.  This would also provide more time for relevant 
institutions to mature for the following round of elections, 
I suggested. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
U.S. Presence Critical to Electoral Success 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C)  Agreeing with Qanooni on the need to maintain 
international participation on the ECC, I asked Qanooni if he 
knew of Kai Eide's earlier proposal to Karzai to appoint two 
internationals to the five-member ECC, a South African 
well-regarded by Nelson Mandela and either a Palestinian or 
Bangladeshi judge.  Qanooni said he was unaware of the 
suggestion.  I said placing two internationals on the ECC 
(the vote of one of whom would be required for a majority 
decision) could satisfy both the desire of Afghans to assume 
a leading role in their own electoral bodies as well as the 
desire of the international community to nurture those same 
bodies.  Also essential was continued international 
participation in the candidate-vetting process.  It would be 
worthwhile to have NATO ISAF and UNAMA to have an observer 
role.  I cautioned that these were not our demands, but 
merely our perspective on needed reforms. 
 
 
¶7.  (C)  Qanooni replied that Afghanistan needed the United 
States and that our presence was critical to the success of 
the parliamentary elections.  He said there was no reason to 
diminish international participation in the ECC and having 
three members would be best.  On the other hand, there was 
widespread support among average Afghans for Karzai's 
decision to remove all foreigners from the ECC.  Only Afghan 
political elites, noted Qanooni, saw foreign participation in 
the ECC as an important issue, and it was clear few of these 
would openly fight for their convictions. 
Disconcertingly, Qanooni followed that comment with his 
assessment that they were facing a "done deal" regarding the 
consequences of Karzai's decree on the Electoral Law, 
implying that he felt Parliament would be unable to bring 
about the adjustments to the decree that I had described.  I 
emphasized my hope that Qanooni would act decisively in the 
days to come and press for these changes, noting that 
regardless of outcomes, key IEC and ECC leaders must be named 
soon given the September 18 election date.  I reviewed with 
Qanooni his options:  accept or reject the decree in its 
entirety or consult with Karzai and argue for reforms within 
the framework of the decree. 
 
- - - - 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶8.  (C)  When invited to comment on his perspective on 
Karzai's decree, Qanooni started out strong, saying all the 
right things about the need for changes in the areas of 
international participation in the ECC, in candidate vetting, 
and participation as election observers.  Qanooni deflated, 
however, after I asked if Parliament would take action.  He 
was taken aback when I emphasized that the credibility of 
Afghanistan's parliamentary elections could affect U.S. 
public opinion; a poor outcome absent the enactment of 
specific electoral reforms could prompt Americans to question 
our mission here.  However, his perception that Karzai's 
decree was likely a "done deal" suggests Parliament may not 
be willing to force Karzai's hand on this issue.  We will 
continue to engage Parliament on electoral reform through a 
combination of Front Office and Political Section meetings 
with MPs and roundtables with parliamentarians, 
representatives from civil society, and the media.  The 
obstacle we face is that Afghan politicians know that arguing 
against "nationalization" of the elections process is a 
losing hand domestically, and that Karzai, on the other hand, 
not a state or institution builder, knows a winning hand when 
he sees one. 
RICCIARDONE