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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5878
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000695 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2020 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KCOR KCRM MOPS PREL PINS UK CAN AF
SUBJECT: OPERATION MOSHTARAK MOVING TO GOVERNANCE PHASE 
 
REF: A. REF: (A) 09 KABUL 4187 
     ¶B. (B) KABUL 115 
     ¶C. (C) KABUL 466 
     ¶D. (D) KABUL 543 
     ¶E. (E) KABUL 554 
     ¶F. (F) KABUL 567 
     ¶G. (G) KABUL 582 
     ¶H. (H) KABUL 590 
     ¶I. (I) KABUL 601 
     ¶J. (J) KABUL 589 
     ¶K. (K) KABUL 672 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1. (C//Rel NATO, ISAF) Summary:  Afghan and Coalition Forces 
carrying out Operation Moshtarak ("Together" in Dari) in 
Helmand Province are facing stiff challenges, but are on 
track to bring the "clearance" phase to closure.  The 
Operation's success, however, will be measured in the coming 
"hold" phase when the Afghan Government, through its 
provincial and district leaders and key ministries, works 
with local shuras to quickly establish basic government 
services and introduce an effective security apparatus. 
Politically, preventing malign actors like former provincial 
Chief of Police Abdul Rahman Jan from establishing control of 
the ANP in Nad Ali and carving out a political role for 
himself in the district, will be essential to setting the 
district on course to manage its own security.  The District 
Delivery Program (DDP) for Nad Ali is planned for roll-out 
the week of February 21, but securing competent line ministry 
officials to deploy there and in other key Helmand districts 
will remain a major challenge.  In a meeting with Ambassador 
Eikenberry and UK Charge d'Affaires Cowper-Cowles, SCR-South 
Ruggiero and RC-South Commander MG Carter (UK) both 
encouraged keeping the DDP basic service packages simple and 
sustainable.  Planning for Phase III of the operation in 
Kandahar is underway, with the Helmand operations already 
stirring political jockeying by various Kandahar 
powerbrokers.  An early security briefing, yet to be 
scheduled, for President Karzai on the Kandahar operation 
will help develop his ownership of this politically sensitive 
operation.  End Summary. 
 
Operation Moshtarak 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) Ambassador Eikenberry, UK Charge 
Sherard Cowper-Cowles, and USFOR-A MG Timothy McHale met with 
RC-South Commander Major General Nick Carter (UK) and U.S. 
Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) Frank Ruggiero at 
RC-South headquarters at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) on February 
21, to discuss the on-going Operation Moshtarak ("Together" 
in Dari) in Helmand and plans for subsequent phases of the 
operation in Kandahar.  The Operation at this stage is 
largely in Marjah, is "a war among people and therefore takes 
time," Carter said.  Carter emphasized the lead role of the 
Afghan National Army (ANA) in the fighting, which 
demonstrates its growing competence.  The ISAF-Afghan 
Coalition Forces are being very cautious, and since the large 
civilian casualty incident on day two of the operation, there 
had been almost no civilian casualties, he said.  He credited 
the "shaping" and "holding" phases of the "shape, clear, 
hold, build and transfer" strategy as the most important. 
For example, he said that the Coalition Forces had been able 
to "steal" parts of Nad Ali before the operation began as a 
result of the engagement by Nad Ali District Governor 
Habibullah with local shuras and elders. 
 
¶3. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) In those areas that have been cleared, 
the population is beginning to believe there will be change, 
Carter reported.  Some Afghan National Civil Order Police 
(ANCOP) are deploying into the cleared areas and some cash 
for work projects have begun.  Still, it will take two-three 
months of stability for local populations to begin to trust 
that these changes are real.  We should expect, too, that the 
Taliban will attempt to return to the area and test the 
Afghan Government (GIRoA).  The main fighters are now 
contained to two areas, with one expected to be secured soon 
by an ANA battalion, and the other to take more time.  He 
noted that the remaining forces include foreign fighters who 
are very professional and their sophisticated bunker network 
will take time to clear and secure. 
 
¶4. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) Even after the clearing operations are 
completed, a key measure of success will be freedom of 
movement between the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah and 
the district.  The Strykers have been deployed to support the 
mission, and line of sight checkpoints by the ANP are 
 
KABUL 00000695  002 OF 004 
 
 
anticipated for some time to ensure ease of travel.  Still, 
freedom of movement is not yet achieved on key routes, and 
will require adequate forces, likely from Marines currently 
in Northern Helmand.  Carter emphasized that within six 
months, there will be significant requirements for Coalition 
Forces in Helmand and he does not foresee any significant 
withdrawals of Coalition Forces in the near-term.  Ruggiero 
noted possible Iranian interest in the future Marine 
deployments into Nimroz Province, closer to the Iranian 
border than other U.S. bases, and away from population 
centers in the South.  Ambassador Eikenberry said that even 
with the current limited presence of the Marines in Nimroz, 
ensuring transparency with the Iranians through appropriate 
channels to allay Iranian suspicions and paranoia will be 
useful. 
 
District Stabilization 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) The Nad Ali stabilization plan is 
expected to be launched on February 24 by Governor Mangal and 
IDLG Director General Jelani Popal.  SCR Ruggiero said that 
planning includes deployment of District Governor Habibullah 
to Nad Ali.  Within the month, he should have six to twelve 
officials to support the basic services package.  Recruitment 
is on-going, although the Ambassador noted that the Director 
of the Civil Service Institute told him during a recent 
meeting that they are having difficulties getting the numbers 
as the entire approach to hiring civil servants to support 
on-going operations is novel.  The first 80 new recruits by 
the IDLG are being trained, he said. 
 
¶6. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) The District Delivery Program (DDP) 
is a key element of the district stabilization effort.  SCR 
Ruggiero said only about 10 districts really matter in the 
South and that they would provide an "85 percent solution." 
He and MG Carter agreed that DDP and other stabilization 
efforts need to be focused on ensuring that Nad Ali/Marjah 
and other districts have the following basic leadership and 
services: 1) a competent district governor; 2) a competent 
and untainted leader of the shura; 3) a representative shura 
that is not dominated by nor limited to one or two tribes or 
local areas; 4) a good police chief; 5) a fully manned ANP 
tashkil; 6) assignment of four-five key administrative 
positions; and 7) flexible fund disbursement and hiring 
authorities for the district governor.  They agreed with the 
Ambassador that there is a risk of creating an unsustainable 
"gold-plated" DDP and said they would keep an eye on 
"over-investing" in the districts. 
 
¶7. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) Addressing the physical structures 
in Marjah will also be important.  Despite early information 
that the structures in Marjah would be in decent shape, the 
place is "wasted" said Carter.  As a first step, they will 
need to build the incoming Deputy District Governor and his 
team an office, he said. 
 
Human Capacity Will Slow the Momentum into Central Helmand 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) MG Carter downplayed talk by some of 
using the momentum from the Marjah operations to expand 
governance and development quickly to the rest of the Central 
Helmand Valley.  The greatest challenge, he and SCR Ruggiero 
said, is that government capacity is finite.  While Governor 
Mangal is an excellent partner, his team is not large.  He 
has a capable Deputy Governor in Satar, a strategic 
communications official described as a great "spin doctor," 
an "enforcer" in Shamzai, and a capable NDS chief (with whom 
Mangal has tense relations).  Below that, they said, the 
provincial team is weak and dependent on support from the 
PRT.  This relatively thin provincial leadership in 
combination with the limited district officials and services 
will impede rapid momentum to the other districts of Central 
Helmand, they said. 
 
Dealing with the "ARJ" Factor 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C//Rel NATO, ISAF) Carter and Ruggiero both emphasized 
that ensuring strong leadership of the ANP is the most 
important factor in ensuring the long-term stability of Nad 
Ali/Marjah.  "Getting the police right is essential to 
getting out," Carter said.  Of greatest concern are perceived 
efforts by Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ), the former Helmand 
provincial police chief, to install one of his people as 
police chief and effectively control the ANP in the district. 
 (Note: Nad Ali district native ARJ was removed from his 
position in 2006 after pressure from the UK as a result of 
 
KABUL 00000695  003 OF 004 
 
 
his corrupt practices and incompetence.  As police chief, he 
also used his position to promote loyal acolytes from within 
his Noorzai tribe, many of whom remain in place today. End 
Note.) 
 
¶10. (C//Rel NATO, ISAF) ARJ is chairing a local 34-man 
informal shura that is not representative of the interests of 
Marjah locals, Carter said.  The ARJ-led shura has been 
stymied to date in its efforts to vet the ANA and Coalition 
rules of engagement through the shura and to select the ANCOP 
Commander, but ARJ's leadership of the shura has locals 
terrified that he will be part of final political solution, 
Carter said.  Carter and Ruggiero requested assistance in 
engaging with President Karzai and other key players in Kabul 
to prevent a scenario that places the powerbrokers in control 
of the ANP and other positions of leadership.  Ambassador 
Eikenberry agreed on the importance of preventing ARJ and 
former Helmand Governor and current Senator Sher Mohammad 
Akhunzada (SMA) from being empowered by the clearing 
operations, because they are in part the reason we are in the 
fight we are today and would undermine rather than advance 
any long-term political solution in Nad Ali/Marjah. 
Cowper-Cowles agreed on the need to have alternatives to SMA 
and ARJ, but also said that any approach that completely 
sidelines the Noorzai would be unworkable given their links 
to Karzai. 
 
A Strategy for Sidelining the Power Brokers 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C//Rel NATO, ISAF) Carter and Ruggiero outlined their 
plan to develop a political engagement strategy for dealing 
with powerbrokers.  Similar to their recent efforts with Col. 
Razziq in Spin Boldak (Ref J), they will develop "redlines" 
relating to NATO/ISAF and U.S. interests vis-a-vis these 
powerbrokers, articulate these requirements to these key 
powerbrokers, and apply consequences if these lines are 
crossed.  Additionally, by laying out these requirements, 
intelligence collectors will have a focus; Kabul-based 
embassies will have better clarity on these actors when 
engaging with senior GIRoA officials; and these guidelines 
will provide officers with something tangible to push at the 
tactical level.  Ambassador Eikenberry expressed concern 
about the impact of our expanded presence in inadvertently 
supporting powerbrokers.  As transactional relationships 
build up to provide life support to our personnel, the 
beneficiaries are often the powerbrokers.  For example, 
USFOR-A, the U.S. Embassy, and Allies often cannot easily 
identify which Afghan leaders are actually benefiting from 
our huge amounts of spending in the country, although serious 
efforts are underway to gain clarity. 
 
Preparing for Phase III of Operation Moshtarak: Kandahar 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶12. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) Preparations for future operations in 
Kandahar are underway, but Ruggiero and Carter said they 
expect this phase to be much trickier on the political level. 
 Kandahar is "everything" to Karzai and his allies, and his 
buy-in will be critical.  On the political level, Ruggiero 
noted that "Governor Weesa is not Mangal," and it will be 
more difficult to find a political partner like Mangal in 
Kandahar given the role of Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK) and other 
powerbrokers in the province.  Carter said he expects a 
security delegation led by Governor Weesa to travel to Kabul 
soon to brief Karzai in a general way on the objectives of 
the operation in order to get him to take more ownership. 
Kandahar PRT Deputy Director Bill Harris noted that the 
Helmand operations are stirring up debate in Kandahar, and 
contrary to expectations that the Taliban will "contest their 
hometown," there is a growing sense that many Kandaharis want 
to work out a political solution. 
 
¶13. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) In a subsequent meeting with Task 
Force Kandahar and the Representative of Canada in Kandahar 
(RoCK) Ben Rowswell, MG Carter and SCR Ruggiero highlighted 
the ANA's development, noting that all but one Kandak is 
Level One and that AWOL rate is 17 percent, which is 
considerably lower than many other provinces.  The ANP "fill 
level" is about 60 to 70 percent and its provincial 
leadership is strong.  Still, the role of AWK is insidious; 
he stymied a recent effort to remove the corrupt Panjwa'i 
district police chief, suggesting that he has alternate lines 
of control over the ANP.  On the governance side, SCR 
Ruggiero noted that the DDP and other district stabilization 
initiatives will swing quickly from Nad Ali to Kandahar City. 
 Harris added that districts in Kandahar are much more 
permissive than Helmand and could receive basic service 
delivery today, e.g. under DDP, perhaps obviating the need 
 
KABUL 00000695  004 OF 004 
 
 
for fighting altogether. 
 
¶14. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) Ruggiero, Carter, and Harris 
emphasized the need to support power generation to Kandahar 
City.  Ambassador Eikenberry pressed them to be realistic 
about how they invest development resources, and told them 
focus on finishing Kajaki and hooking it up to Kandahar 
rather than seeking interim investments in fuel purchases and 
large generator farms.  Additional major investments are not 
presently on the table, he said.  To invest USD 200 million 
to provide electricity on a temporary basis to a Kandahar 
City under the grip of a quasi-crime syndicate is not 
prudent, nor a good use of limited development dollars, 
Ambassador Eikenberry said. 
 
Structural Changes 
------------------ 
 
¶15. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) To support the large-scale 
operations in Helmand and Kandahar, ISAF is expected to 
create a new Regional Command-Southwest, which will be led by 
the two-star Marine Commander and cover Helmand and Nimroz 
Provinces.  Current planning is to stand this command up by 
August 1.  To complement this structure, Ambassador 
Eikenberry told Ruggiero to continue his efforts to work with 
USFOR-A to requisition a "civilian platform" and appropriate 
staff to support the effort.  To address UK concerns about 
competing senior civilians in Helmand Province, the 
Ambassador directed that the platform establish an office for 
the UK PRT Director, who could travel regularly to the 
platform.  If the UK has the desire and capability to support 
the Platform, our Senior Civilian Representative would be 
prepared to serve as the UK PRT Director's deputy for 
purposes of over-all civilian coordination in Helmand. 
 
¶16. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) In Kandahar, Kandahar PRT (KPRT) 
currently reports to Task Force Kandahar, which has limited 
the focus of the KPRT.  To fix this problem, Canada's field 
representation is prepared to have KPRT report to the SCR and 
the RC-South Commander, Rowswell said.  Per Ref K, Canadian 
Ambassador Crosbie made a similar commitment to Ambassador 
Eikenberry the previous day.  Similar to the structures in 
Helmand, KPRT would thereby support both Task Forces in 
Kandahar ) TFK and Task Force Stryker.  Rowswell said the 
priority of KPRT will be to support Phase III of Operation 
Moshtarak. 
 
Comment 
------ 
 
¶17. (C//Rel NATO, ISAF) Operation Moshtarak in Nad Ali/Marjah 
is the first step in a longer campaign to expand security and 
governance across the South.  Getting the governance and 
security elements right will be an important indicator of 
whether the GIRoA is truly on a new path to establishing a 
competent, albeit basic, presence in the wake of our military 
operations or whether this is yet another clearing operation 
that fails to bring real change in governance and support for 
the local Afghans behind it.  Our efforts to help sideline 
malign actors, prevent the ANP from being co-opted by local 
powerbrokers as we develop its capabilities, and support the 
provision of basic but appreciable government services will 
be essential elements of a successful strategy.  However, our 
success will ultimately depend on President Karzai's having a 
similar vision, and he will be under considerable pressure to 
support malign actors like SMA, ARJ, AWK, and others in 
Helmand and Kandahar whose interests lie in maintaining 
parallel governance structures and biased tribal ties in lieu 
of a more representative GIRoA presence. 
RICCIARDONE