VZCZCXRO9920
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHJM #0234/01 0401811
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 091811Z FEB 10
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7510
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 000234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, SEMEP, AND NEA/IPA; NSC FOR 
SHAPIRO/KUMAR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KISL KWBG KPAL IS
SUBJECT: FORMER PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SPEAKER 
RAWHI FATTOUH DISCUSSES INTERNAL HAMAS DYNAMICS, 
RECONCILIATION, REGIONAL SUPPORT 
 
Classified By: Consul General Daniel Rubinstein 
for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (S)  Former Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) Speaker 
(and prominent Gazan) Rawhi Fattouh described three 
generational groupings inside Hamas today, and characterized 
each as more radical than its predecessor.  The oldest 
generation consists mainly of religious leaders with little 
influence on decision-making.  Members of the second 
generation, which came of age during the First Intifada, hold 
most of the senior leadership positions in Hamas today.  The 
third generation is the most radical, and maintains ties with 
Salafist Islamist groups both inside and outside the Gaza 
Strip.  Fattouh expressed pessimism about prospects for 
intra-Palestinian reconciliation, and predicted that Hamas 
would not agree to hold national elections in the near 
future.  End Summary. 
 
Three Generations Inside Hamas 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (S)  In a January 28 meeting with Polchief, Fattouh began 
with a description of Hamas's internal dynamics.  He noted 
that the "first" or oldest generation, led by Abdel Fatah 
Dukhan, is closely associated with the regional Muslim 
Brotherhood and active in "da'wa," (preaching and 
mobilization).  This generation has little influence in 
day-to-day decision-making, he said.  More influential is the 
"second generation" of Hamas, led by Political Bureau head 
Khaled Mish'al, deposed Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, and 
"Interior Minister" Fathi Hamad.  This generation is made up 
primarily of First Intifada veterans and was responsible for 
Hamas's emergence in the 1980s as a movement with a distinct 
identity from the Muslim Brotherhood.  Finally, Fattouh said 
that a more radical third generation forms the base of 
Hamas's military wing, under the leadership of Ahmad Ja'bari 
and funded by Iran. 
 
Links Between Military Wing and Salafists 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S)  Fattouh argued that Hamas also contains within its 
ranks factions supportive of al-Qaeda globally, and locally 
sympathetic to Salafist Islamist Abdel Latif Mousa, who died 
in the course of a raid by Hamas security forces on the Rafah 
mosque he commandeered in August 2009.  Despite Hamas action 
against Mousa, Fattouh said, Ahmad Ja'bari and his 
third-generation military wing retain ties to a number of 
radical Islamist groups inside the Gaza Strip, including the 
Dughmush clan, the Army of Islam, the Popular Resistance 
Committees, and the Nasser Salah al-Din Brigade.  Fattouh 
said that no effective nationalist (as opposed to Islamist) 
competition to Hamas exists inside the Gaza Strip, claiming, 
"Other nationalist forces cannot confront Hamas because of 
its military capabilities.  Hamas has assumed total control 
in Gaza, and even Fatah has no strength to fight Hamas." 
 
Pessimistic on Reconciliation 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S)  Fattouh was pessimistic about the possibility of 
progress in Egyptian-mediated Hamas-Fatah reconciliation 
talks, which he termed a "waste of time."  He noted, "I have 
worked on reconciliation since 1994, and it never worked." 
Hamas "does not want reconciliation," he said, adding, "They 
don't believe in power-sharing, because Hamas's political 
vision precludes coexistence with others." 
 
¶5.  (S)  Fattouh was also pessimistic about the prospect that 
Hamas would agree to hold national elections.  He predicted 
that Gazans would not vote for Hamas, because the reality of 
its style of governance has been "exposed" there.  Hamas is 
in a comparatively better political position in the West 
Bank, "because people here have not lived under Hamas's 
oppressive regime," he added.  Fattouh argued that Fatah 
needed to take a hard line with Hamas, saying, "After 
succeding in the (August 2009) Sixth Party Congress, Fatah 
must stay in Gaza and fight Hamas."  He concluded, "Many in 
Fatah are alienated because they failed to prevent the Hamas 
takeover (of Gaza in 2007), but they need to get over it." 
 
Critical of Iran and Qatar; Praise for Egypt 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S)  Addressing Hamas's regional allies, Fattouh urged 
the USG to confront Qatar on the issue of its ongoing 
financial support to Hamas.  He predicted that Iran's 
 
JERUSALEM 00000234  002 OF 002 
 
 
domestic woes would not be enough to weaken its support for 
Hamas, adding that such an outcome could only be achieved 
through additional sanctions and military confrontation. 
"Islamists believe they have a divine power to face 
challenges," Fattouh opined, adding, "They must be confronted 
individually if they are to fear the consequences.  Islamists 
will not be contained by diplomacy, but by a real 
confrontation." 
 
¶7.  (S)  Fattouh said he had observed a sharpening in the 
Egyptian government's positions against Hamas of late, citing 
public statements by the GOE and construction of a steel 
barrier along part of the former Philadelphi strip between 
Gaza and the Sinai.  "They have realized how dangerous Hamas 
could be to the security of Egypt," he noted.  Fattouh 
claimed he had spoken the day before with Hamas official 
Fathi Hamad.  In their conversation, Hamad complained about 
the impact of Egyptian efforts to interdict smuggling through 
the Rafah tunnels, saying, "Mubarak's steel wall is a 
U.S.-Israeli plan." 
 
RUBINSTEIN