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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4540
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RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP PRIORITY 0173
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000239 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, EAP/INR, S/CT, INL 
S/CT FOR D.MAHANTY, C. JOHN LONG 
NCTC 
NSC FOR D.WALTON 
KUALA LUMPUR FOR G.CHAPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020 
TAGS: PTER PREL PINS ASEC ID
SUBJECT: S/CT AMBASSADOR BENJAMIN ROUNDTABLE WITH REGIONAL 
DEPUTY CHIEFS OF MISSION 
 
JAKARTA 00000239  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Ted Osius for reasons 1.4(b+d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador 
Daniel Benjamin met with Deputy Chiefs of Mission from the 
Southeast Asia Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) Embassies 
on December 17, 2009 in Jakarta. The day was split between an 
internal discussion of regional counterterrorism issues, and 
an afternoon roundtable on violent extremism. 
 
¶2. (C) The meetings offered an opportunity to discuss 
counterterrorism policy and priorities, begin reassessment of 
the Regional Counterterrorism Guidance Strategy, and consider 
ways we might better counter violent extremism. Key points 
included the correlation between domestic national security 
priorities, which may differ from the U.S., and how those 
priorities effect counterterrorism engagement and assistance, 
interagency cooperation among partner nations, and 
coordination of USG counterterrorism programs. The roundtable 
on countering violent extremism focused on motivations for 
radicalism in Indonesia and avoiding complacency in the wake 
of successful Indonesian counterterrorism activities after 
the July 17 Jakarta bombings.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------- 
DCM Roundtable 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The DCMs from Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, 
Cambodia, the Philippines, and Embassy representatives from 
Australia and Singapore participated in this meeting, which 
Ambassador Benjamin opened by providing the view from 
Washington and highlighting new counterterrorism policy 
priorities.  Ambassador Benjamin noted that countering 
violent extremism is a primary component of the new 
counterterrorism strategy, although he acknowledged that much 
debate surrounds the question of how best to pursue this 
objective.  He remarked that the strategy must begin with the 
acknowledgment that any short term tactical counterterrorism 
success that undermines longer term strategic goals is 
counterproductive, and we do not want to create ten 
terrorists for every one we eliminate.  Next, working with 
our partners to increase counterterrorism capacity, whether 
through military to military programs, Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance training programs or through rule of law programs, 
will continue to be a central tenet of our counterterrorism 
strategy.  Finally, working more closely with multilateral 
institutions, especially the Counterterrorism Action Group, 
will be central to our ability to achieving the first two 
goals. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Deputy Chiefs of Mission each reviewed 
counterterrorism issues in their country, covering political 
issues, interagency cooperation at their Embassies, and local 
conditions for countering terrorism and violent extremism. 
According to the DCMs, understanding the domestic national 
security priorities of each country and how they differ from 
U.S. national security priorities is fundamental to 
understanding how committed a partner nation may be.  These 
priorities have implications for the way technical assistance 
is used, and how much political pressure is required to 
sustain interest in countering terrorism. 
 
¶5.  (C) The DCMs also suggested that conditions that inhibit 
interagency cooperation within the partner nations, both in 
the areas of information and resource sharing, can dilute 
domestic efficiency and regional cooperation.  If 
intelligence services, police, and military within one 
country do not have organic means and incentives to 
cooperate, promoting regional cooperation becomes even more 
difficult.  With this in mind, it is important to be 
cognizant of the way that our relationships and assistance 
programs can unintentionally distort our official position 
stating support for civilian control of the military or for 
the development of rule of law as fundamental in countering 
terrorism. 
 
¶6.  (C) Noting the many coordinating mechanisms and security 
programs, the DCMs voiced frustration over the lack of 
coherent coordination from Washington of security program 
development and implementation.  The number of funding 
 
JAKARTA 00000239  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
mechanisms, the timing of requests, and the different 
justifications needed to create sustainable and relevant 
programming is almost too complex.  Ambassador Benjamin 
remarked that while some of the difficulty is inherent in the 
funding process, the new Sub-Regional Interagency 
Coordination Group (sub-RICG), which has just been initiated, 
should be an effective tool for coordinating programs. 
Additionally, RSI Officer, Greg Chapman, would be in position 
to assist with the coordination of programs from Embassy 
Kuala Lumpur, starting with travel to each of the RSI posts 
starting soon after the new year.  Further, Embassy 
participation in the drafting of the new Regional Guidance 
Strategy would go a long way toward streamlining the 
prioritization of resource allocation in the field in the 
future.  The DCMs sought a better understanding of the R 
Bureau,s role in countering violent extremism. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Roundtable on Countering Violent Extremism 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶7. Ambassador Benjamin, the Deputy Chiefs of Mission, U.S. 
Embassy representatives from Canberra, Singapore, and 
Jakarta, S/CT Dan Mahanty, INR,s Cambria Hamburg and EAP/RSP 
officer Stuart Allan, along with International Crisis Group 
(ICG) Senior Advisor Sidney Jones, and several members of the 
Australian Mission in Jakarta, including the Deputy Head of 
Mission, joined the roundtable on countering violent 
extremism. 
 
¶8. (C) Counterparts from the Australian Embassy said that 
9/11 had changed the way they think about regional conflicts, 
such as Mindanao and the Malukus, by forcing them to consider 
the way that regional conflicts correlate to threats 
elsewhere in the longer term. 
 
¶9. (C) Having been significantly affected by every major 
terrorist attack in Indonesia, the Australians candidly 
remarked that while the timing was unpredictable, the attacks 
of July 17 themselves were not a surprising development. The 
Australians said that they were impressed in general with the 
Indonesian response to July 17, but suggested that there are 
still areas for improvement, especially with respect to 
interagency cooperation.  They expressed optimism for the new 
coordinating agency, but said they were still not sure how 
the agency would actually look once it was created. 
 
¶10. (C) The Australians noted that radical Islam in Indonesia 
defies easy categorization.  While the counterterrorism 
success of the Indonesian government seems promising, and 
while it seems that Jemaah Islamiyah and Noordin Top,s group 
are in decline, we should not mistake a calculated tactical 
decision not to use violence in the near term for a decision 
to abdicate the use of violence.  There is the possibility, 
they said, for the terrorists to get knocked down and to come 
back twice as hard.  Finally, the successful prosecution of 
terrorists has shown that a new Internal Security Act is not 
needed in Indonesia. 
 
¶11. (C) Speaking about "Life After Noordin Top", Sidney Jones 
said that the biggest original driver of jihad in Indonesia 
was the Ambon and Poso conflicts, and so the resolution of 
those conflicts could be seen as one factor in the weakening 
of JI's ability to recruit new members.  However, she said, 
we should be wary of new motivations, such as revenge for 
police success in counterterrorism activities.  She 
speculated that terrorists might target the Indonesian police 
or government in the future.  Jones also noted that attempted 
religious conversion of Muslims to Christianity should be 
seen as a key driver of radicalism in certain parts of 
Indonesia. 
 
¶12. (C) With regard to the structures of the jihadi extremist 
community, Jones maintained that there are distinct groups 
that differ in their make-up, targets, and goals.  She noted 
that the groups were fluid as members worked together and 
sometimes borrowed members, or crossed group lines, but added 
that there were also rivalries amongst the groups. Jones said 
that the apparent size and geographical breadth of Top's 
network was unknown prior to the bombings and that the 
 
JAKARTA 00000239  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
intelligence gap was therefore a concern. 
 
¶13. (C) Commenting on sources of radicalization that deserve 
future attention, Jones said that terrorist family networks 
should be considered, as well as the remaining relevance of 
critical pesantrens, which have still gone largely 
unaddressed by the Indonesian government.  Fifty or so 
JI-affiliated schools are still the most important factor in 
the threat.  She said that to date, the focus has been on the 
perpetrators of violence, not on the schools themselves, 
commenting that the Departments of Education and Religious 
Affairs had at best provided lip-service to the problem. 
 
¶14. (C) With regard to the role social media plays in 
extremist circles, Jones said that while Ambon and Poso are 
not used to cultivate recruits, popular mass media has 
highlighted the conflicts in Chechnya, Somalia, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq; one video sold in local markets in Indonesia showed 
the Abu Sayaff Group as being the one last true committed 
jihadi group left in Southeast Asia.  Jones lamented the fact 
that the government had not really sought to understand how 
jihadi publications and materials are distributed, noting 
that there are still major book launches for extremist 
literature.  Facebook sites are also starting to emerge, 
including those of released JI prisoners. 
 
¶15. (U) S/CT cleared this message. 
HUME