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RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000216 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/RSP AND H 
H PASS TO JANNUZI AND LUSE 
NSC PASS TO DWALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR AMGT ASEAN XC ID
SUBJECT: CPR ASSERTS ITS ROLE IN ASEAN 
 
JAKARTA 00000216  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Counselor Peter Haas for reasons 1.4( 
b&d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The newly-installed ASEAN Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (CPR) in Jakarta is working to 
define a policy and programmatic role that satisfies 
member-states' capitals desire for oversight of the ASEAN 
Secretariat (ASEC) while increasing ASEAN efficiency by 
concentrating more decision-making authority in Jakarta.  The 
CPR's goal of rationalizing ASEC operations, as explained to 
the U.S. Resident Representative for ASEAN Affairs (poloff), 
will be critical for ASEC to cope with a mounting workload 
and resolve a chronic lack of capacity.  Some ASEC officials, 
meanwhile, perceive the CPR as an added bureaucratic layer 
that lacks authority and which will further slow 
decision-making in ASEAN.  How the three-way battle for 
authority among the CPR, ASEC and ASEAN capitals resolves 
itself will affect not just the efficiency and efficacy of 
U.S. engagement with ASEAN, but also the degree to which 
ASEAN can succeed in pursuing its stated objective of 
preeminence in Asia's emerging regional architecture.  Both 
the CPR and ASEC have welcomed increased U.S. attention to 
ASEAN, and both are seeking to leverage it to enhance their 
own roles in ASEAN decision making.  End summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2. (U)  Article 12 of the Charter of the Association for 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which came into force in 
December, 2008, calls for each of ASEAN's 10 member-states to 
appoint an Ambassador-level Permanent Representative (PR) to 
be based in Jakarta, collectively called the CPR.  As defined 
in the Charter, the CPR's role includes supporting ASEC work, 
coordinating between ASEC and the "National Secretariats" 
based in each ASEAN capital, and facilitating ASEAN 
cooperation with external dialogue partners such as the 
United States. 
 
¶3. (C) Some ASEAN countries are further along in breaking out 
the PR position than others.  The Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam have each assigned PRs to ASEAN with 
their own staffs and separate office spaces.  Smaller ASEAN 
member-states such as Burma, Cambodia, and Laos are still 
represented at ASEAN by their bilateral Ambassadors to 
Indonesia.  Indonesia, ASEAN's most populous state and home 
to ASEC, has recalled its Ambassador to Cambodia, Mr. Ngurah 
Swajaya, to fill its PR slot.  He will start in April, and 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry (KEMLU) contacts say that they 
are busy looking for premises for Indonesia's Permanent 
Mission. 
 
NOT THE EU 
---------- 
 
¶4. (C) The ASEAN PRs with whom poloff spoke were quick to 
emphasize the incremental nature of the CPR effort to 
concentrate ASEAN decision-making authority in Jakarta. 
Singaporean PR Ambassador TK Lim said that policy is not part 
of the CPR mandate, and will still be driven by ASEAN 
capitals at the Senior Officials (SOM) and Senior Economic 
Officials (SEOM) levels.  Thai PR Ambassador Manasvi 
Sirsodapol explained that since the SOM and SEOM mechanisms 
predated the CPR, they still constitute the critical 
reporting layer between ASEAN and line agencies back in ASEAN 
capitals.  PR Manasvi hoped, however, that ASEAN-related 
communication would start to be routed through the CPR. 
"Otherwise the CPR will never assume full authority," he 
said. Vietnamese PR Ambassador Vu Dang Dzung predicted that 
 
JAKARTA 00000216  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
in the future the CPR would play a "critical" role in ASEAN 
decision-making, but that the PRs were proceeding 
"step-by-step" and learning from the EU example. 
 
¶5. (C) Longtime ASEC official Dhannan Sunoto assessed that 
the CPR would not evolve to acquire an EU-style mandate.  He 
expressed skepticism about the CPR role, asserting that it 
simply added a new layer of bureaucracy to the existing 
Foreign Minister-, SOM-, and Director General-level 
mechanisms.  He also expressed doubt that the PRs were the 
"right" ambassadors, noting their relatively junior levels 
and administrative backgrounds.  (Comment: Singapore's PR Lim 
is former Ambassador to Vietnam; Vietnam's Vu was Deputy 
Chief of Mission in Washington; Thailand's PR Manasvi is a 
multilateral affairs expert with experience working at the UN 
in New York and Geneva, and was recently DDG of the Thai 
Foreign Ministry's ASEAN Affairs Division; the Philippines' 
Orly Mercado, with whom we have not yet met, is a former 
Defense Secretary.  End comment.) 
 
OVERSIGHT AND OVERHAUL? 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Both the PRs and ASEC staff noted that ASEC's current 
structure is not equipped to deal with the demands currently 
being placed upon it.  ASEC's Dhannan noted that ASEAN now 
convenes approximately 800 meetings per year around the 
region.  Vietnam's PR Vu noted that there were plenty of 
ASEAN programs in place, but that implementation was lacking, 
leading to Vietnam's tagline for its current ASEAN 
Chairmanship - "from Vision to Action". 
 
¶7. (C) ASEC reorganized itself around the three traditional 
pillars, or "communities" -- the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC), ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC), and 
ASEAN Sociocultural Community (ASSC) -- and added a fourth 
pillar, the Corporate and Community Affairs Directorate, to 
unify messaging across all sectors.  Recruiting staff at the 
middle levels has been difficult, with many key positions in 
the new structure left vacant.  Poloff asked Philippines 
Deputy PR Tess  Daza if current ASEAN member-states' 
contributions were sufficient to fund new positions.  She 
replied that the CPR now conducts a quarterly ASEC budget 
review, and the most recent review found that ASEC was only 
able to execute 70% of its budget last year, with much of the 
surplus left from unfilled positions.  Daza assgined blame to 
a bottleneck in ASEC's application review and a lack of 
qualified candidates, but ASEC staff have complained that 
salary offers for mid-level officials are not competitive 
enough to attract good candidates. 
 
¶8. (C) Singaporean ASEAN Mission First Secretary Winston Goh 
admitted that the establishment of the CPR was putting more 
demands on ASEC, but he said that ASEAN member-states had a 
duty to ensure that ASEAN and ASEC are "rules-based" 
organizations.  He said that the CPR's oversight efforts 
aimed to put systems in place to ensure ASEC efficiency and 
accountability, including by instituting CPR working groups 
such as the "Budget Subcommittee" and "Development 
Cooperation Subcommittee" to conduct periodic meetings with 
relevant ASEC divisions.  This year ASEC would undergo its 
first-ever "Tier One External Audit", Goh added.  Poloff 
asked whether some might perceive these CPR efforts as aiming 
to constrict ASEC activity, especially in light of ASEAN 
member-states' hesitancy to commit greater funding to ASEAN. 
Goh replied that on the contrary the goal was to rationalize 
the organization to lay a better foundation for an expanded 
role.  PR Vu from Vietnam echoed this sentiment, saying that 
the CPR was trying to make ASEC both more efficient and more 
 
JAKARTA 00000216  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
effective. 
 
¶9. (C) The CPR has evinced particular interest in inserting 
itself into ASEAN dialogue with its donors and dialogue 
partners.  Deputy PR Daza of the Philippines, the U.S.' ASEAN 
"country coordinator" this year, asserted that the CPR would 
assume the Director General-level function in coordinating 
with ASEAN dialogue partners, and said that ASEAN workplans 
with all dialogue partners now required CPR approval. 
(Comment: If ASEC and the CPR no longer needed to consult 
ASEAN capitals on workplans with dialogue partners, this 
would successfully concentrate an important ASEAN 
programmatic component in Jakarta.  The Philippines will 
convene a DG-level "working group" between the CPR and the 
USG in Jakarta on March 17.  End comment.) 
 
¶10. (C) Australian Embassy Political and Economic Minister 
Counselor Michael Bliss and AusAID's Jennifer Hoverman 
commented to poloff that CPR and ASEC were both trying to 
define their authorities, and that ASEC was feeling chastened 
by the CPR's placement.  According to Hoverman, ASEC was 
receiving mixed messages from member-states on whether it was 
supposed to engage in policy and analysis or just to be a 
facilitating body.  She commented that the CPR's increased 
level of interest in ASEC's work could prove crippling to an 
organization already debilitated by an excessive focus on 
process.  Moreover, according to Hoverman, some ASEAN 
member-states were more supportive of ASEC than others, with 
Singapore and Malaysia in the former camp, and the 
Philippines being an outspoken critic.  The Australians 
believed that Indonesia's role would be critical to how the 
CPR-ASEC dynamic played out, and were eagerly awaiting the 
arrival of Indonesia's PR-designate. 
 
COMMENT: WELCOMING THE U.S. 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Both the CPR and ASEC have welcomed our intention to 
open a Permanent Mission and send a resident Ambassador to 
ASEAN.  ASEC's Dhannan opined that U.S. and ASEAN strategic 
interests with ASEAN "overlap 85%" and that every ASEAN 
member, including Burma, are pleased with what they perceive 
as a renewal in U.S. interest in ASEAN.  Having an Ambassador 
to ASEAN would "give a face" to U.S.-ASEAN cooperation, 
according to Dhannan, and would get us away from a 
"hit-and-run" relationship managed primarily by consultants 
and based on money.  Vietnam's PR Vu called the United States 
"ASEAN's most important partner" and said he saw increased 
U.S. engagement as not just an opportunity for AEAN but also 
for Vietnamm as it holds ASEAN's rotting chair this year. 
 
¶12. (C) Both the CPR and SEC will seek to leverage the 
presence of dialogu partners' Jakarta-based representatives 
to ASEA to gain the upper hand in the ongoing struggle fo 
authority.  We have beeen impressed by the apparnt 
 
seriousness of purpose of the ASEAN PRs here, and agree with 
their basic assessment that ASEC would benefit from more 
organizational guidance.  A strengthening of CPR 
decision-making authority would dovetail with our own efforts 
to push ASEAN-specific work out to the region. 
 
¶13. (C) Based on comments we have heard from ASEC staff, 
morale is flagging as the workload is increasing, and the CPR 
is adding to that.  The question is to what end: if the CPR 
pursues its oversight role without formulating a concomitant 
growth plan, including consideration of changing ASEAN's 
rigid funding structure, then suspicions will grow that the 
CPR has been put in place to stymie ASEC rather than to 
foster it.  We and other like-minded dialogue partners also 
 
JAKARTA 00000216  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
suspect that increased CPR attention also has something to do 
with reservations about the dynamic leadership of ASEAN 
Secretary-General, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, who has been an 
energetic champion of both ASEC centrality and the "ASEAN 
brand". 
 
¶14. (C) If U.S. policy is to support ASEAN integration and 
community-building efforts, then our ASEAN programs and 
policies need both to support Dr. Surin's efforts and bolster 
CPR authority vis-a-vis the ASEAN capitals.  The rapid 
nomination and confirmation of a resident U.S. Ambassador to 
ASEAN will help.  For the time being, we should give the CPR 
the benefit of the doubt and utilize it as a key ASEAN 
interlocutor and channel.  End Comment. 
 
¶15. (C) This message was sent by the Resident Representative 
of the Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs. 
 
HUME