VZCZCXRO1132
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0182/01 0420925
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110925Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4462
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0010
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS COLL
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3124
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6032
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 3711
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5445
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000182 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, STAS, OES/STC, S/ECC, OES/EGC, AND 
R/ECA 
DEPT PASS TO OSTP Jason Rao 
NSC for Pradeep Ramamurthy 
BANGKOK FOR RDM/A 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TSPL TBIO EAID KGHG ID
SUBJECT: Health Cooperation-No Agreement to Launch 
U.S.-Indonesia Joint Program 
 
REF:  A) Jakarta 175 
      B) EAP/MTS-Embassy Jakarta email 02/03/10 
 
¶1.  (U) This message is Sensitive But Unclassified. 
Please handle accordingly. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  After three days of intense 
discussions, U.S. and Indonesian negotiators could not 
reach agreement on the creation of the Indonesia- 
United States Center for Biomedical and Public Health 
Research (IUC).  The USG accommodated GOI concerns 
regarding civilian control of the IUC and showed 
considerable flexibility on a range of other issues. 
However, GOI negotiators operated under instructions 
that precluded agreement in a number of key areas, 
including control of USG resources and personnel, 
privileges and immunities, the scope of the IUC's work, 
intellectual property rights and related issues. 
While we have requested ministerial level calls in an 
effort to break the impasse, we must begin preliminary 
steps to shut down the existing U.S. Navy laboratory 
in Jakarta.  This step is a significant setback for 
our health cooperation and could harm other elements 
of our Comprehensive Partnership.  However, we will 
work to minimize the damage, especially in light of 
the President's upcoming visit.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DIPLOMATIC FULL COURT PRESS 
 
¶3.  (SBU) An interagency USG team visited Jakarta 
February 8-10 for negotiations aimed at establishing 
the Indonesia-United States Center for Biomedical and 
Public Health Research (IUC).  The IUC would replace 
an existing U.S. Navy research laboratory (NAMRU-2) 
that had become the subject of considerable domestic 
controversy.  Former Health Minister Siti Fadillah 
Supari-long an opponent of NAMRU-2-agreed in September 
2009 to pursue the IUC as a possible new mechanism for 
our bilateral health cooperation.  Our efforts took on 
added urgency when the GOI agreed to extend the visas 
of current NAMRU-2 personnel until March 15 but made 
clear that it could offer no further extensions. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) We have engaged the GOI at all levels in an 
effort to make the IUC a reality.  Ambassador Hume has 
pressed the matter in meetings with several key 
Cabinet officials.  On the last day of the recent 
negotiating round, visiting PACOM Commander Admiral 
Willard raised the subject with President Yudhoyono. 
At every turn, we underscored to the Indonesian side 
that continued U.S. Navy presence was critical to the 
IUC's success because no other USG agency had the 
resources and personnel to replace the Navy 
contribution.   We also made clear our willingness to 
make every possible accommodation in order to assuage 
Indonesian political sensitivities. 
 
FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT VISIONS 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Using the USG draft Memorandum of 
Understanding (Ref B), USG negotiators worked with an 
interagency GOI team in an effort to narrow our 
differences.  Initial discussions focused on the need 
to provide the GOI with political cover for the 
continued presence of U.S. Navy personnel.  The USG 
agreed to a civilian-led structure that provided for 
joint decision making on all IUC research activities. 
We also accepted Indonesian proposals to remove any 
text that suggested that the IUC was a continuation of 
NAMRU-2 under a new name. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) As negotiations proceeded, however, it 
became clear that the Indonesian side held a 
fundamentally different vision of the IUC from the USG. 
 
JAKARTA 00000182  002 OF 003 
 
 
We had proposed a collaborative framework where each 
government contributed personnel and resources to work 
on joint projects of mutual benefit.  Indonesian 
officials envisioned the IUC as an institution with a 
distinct legal personality and which would control 
personnel and resources provided by both governments. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Successive Indonesian counter drafts of the 
IUC MOU continued to include language that the USG 
could not accept.  At the conclusion of three days of 
negotiations, we remained far apart on several red 
line issues: 
 
--Control of Resources and Personnel:  GOI negotiators 
insisted on a management structure that gave IUC 
leadership, including a proposed Indonesian-national 
director, control over USG resources.  The Indonesians 
also insisted on prohibiting U.S. Military personnel 
from participating in the IUC. 
 
--Privileges and Immunities:  The Indonesian side 
refused to grant USG personnel participating in the 
IUC privileges and immunities equivalent to 
Administrative and Technical Staff under the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 
 
--Scope of the IUC's Work:  Indonesian officials had 
urged that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control be the 
lead agency on the USG side.  However, they sought to 
restrict the IUC's activities in such a way that 
excluded most of the CDC's core activities.  This 
included proscribing surveillance, applied 
epidemiology and other public health activities.  GOI 
negotiators explained that some Indonesians, 
especially in the legislature, would view such 
activities as a violation of Indonesian sovereignty. 
 
--Intellectual Property Rights and Related Issues: 
The Indonesian side insisted on the inclusion of an 
annex covering the protection of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge that the USG could not accept. 
They also pressed for language that would have 
implications for ongoing multilateral negotiations on 
intellectual property rights and sample sharing.  We 
accepted language pledging to adhere to Indonesian 
laws on these matters as well as international 
agreements to which both countries were parties. 
However, we could not accept the GOI's other 
provisions. 
 
--Adherence to Indonesian Government Policies: 
Indonesian negotiators insisted on language that 
obligated U.S. participants in the IUC to follow 
Indonesian government policies.  While the USG 
accepted the need to follow Indonesian laws and 
regulations, the concept of policies remained too 
vague, and too easily changed, to accept.  In addition, 
the GOI could not accept our requirement that the 
agreement explicitly state that applicable U.S. laws 
and regulations must be followed. 
 
WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 
 
¶8.  (SBU) We have requested that Secretary Clinton 
call Foreign Minister Natalegawa and that Secretary 
Sebelius call Health Minister Endang in an effort to 
break the impasse (Ref A).  The Charge has also 
discussed USG redline issues with the President's key 
foreign affairs advisor.  The Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DEPLU) has informed us via diplomatic note 
that NAMRU-2 must be closed by March 15.  Given that 
fact, we must begin the final shutdown of the 
laboratory's operations.  We have already moved high- 
value equipment from the current NAMRU-2 facility 
 
JAKARTA 00000182  003 OF 003 
 
 
(located on a Ministry of Health compound) to the 
Embassy warehouse.  We are also beginning to move 
other equipment from NAMRU-2 and will terminate NAMRU 
FSN employees consistent with Indonesian labor laws. 
Per the expired 1970 MOU on NAMRU, all fixed equipment 
and biological specimens will remain GOI property. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Failure to reach agreement on the IUC is a 
significant setback for our health cooperation with 
Indonesia.  Additionally, GOI positions during the IUC 
negotiations may pose problems for other areas of 
cooperation, such as the Science and Technology 
Agreement.  While we will work to close NAMRU-2 as 
quietly as possible, some negative publicity may occur. 
Mission recommends that USG agencies currently engaged 
in health cooperation with Indonesia maintain their 
ongoing programs.  This will help minimize the impact 
of the IUC impasse on other areas of our health 
relationship.  We will continue to look for additional 
ways to minimize the damage this matter causes for 
other bilateral issues, especially in light of the 
President's upcoming visit.  Mission has transmitted 
proposed press guidance on this matter to the 
Department via email. 
 
OSIUS