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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4444
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP PRIORITY 0169
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000171 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, EAP/INR, S/CT, INL 
S/CT FOR D.MAHANTY, C. JOHN LONG 
NCTC 
NSC FOR D.WALTON 
KUALA LUMPUR FOR G.CHAPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 
TAGS: PTER PREL PINS ASEC ID
SUBJECT: S/CT AMB BENJAMIN BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH GOI 
OFFICIALS 
 
JAKARTA 00000171  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy POL/C Daniel A. Rochman, reasons 1.4 (b+d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Secretary's Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism (S/CT), Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, 
conducted meetings with Indonesian officials on 
counterterrorism issues and cooperation in Jakarta on 
December 16.  Ambassador Benjamin's interlocutors said the 
proposed GOI interagency Counterterrorism Coordinating Body 
is expected to focus on broadly facilitating interagency 
cooperation and policy, with GOI agencies remaining 
responsible for their individual CT activities.  The GOI 
recently established a taskforce to finalize a new 
counterterrorism finance law and steer it through the 
legislature by the end of 2010.  GOI officials highlighted 
successful regional CT cooperation, but noted porous borders 
remain an issue. The GOI hopes for increased sharing of U.S. 
and other countries' of intelligence related to UNSCR 1267 
listings. High appreciation for DS-ATA assistance in 
developing the Indonesian National Police's Special 
Detachment 88 was among the other topics discussed during the 
day-long series of meetings.  END SUMMARY. 
 
COORDINATING MINISTRY OUTLINED NATIONAL PRIORITIES 
 
¶2. (C) Officials with the Counterterrorism Coordinating Desk 
at the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and 
Security Affairs--the GOI's overall CT policy body--briefed 
Ambassador Benjamin on Indonesia's anti-terror priorities. 
Ambassador Rhousdy Soeriaatmadja, the Desk's Director for 
International Cooperation, underscored that CT challenges 
remain despite recent successes against the perpetrators of 
the July 17 bombings.  To address these challenges, the GOI 
was committed to taking terrorists off the streets and to 
undertaking what Soeriaatmadja called a "soft approach" to 
countering extremist messages.  The Coordinating Ministry was 
working with the Department of Religious Affairs and other 
GOI entities to develop methods of delegitimizing extremist 
groups' appeals to religion.  One approach involved using 
traditional cultural performances like wayang (shadow 
puppets) to reach young people. 
 
¶3. (C) The United States had learned that a broad spectrum of 
anti-terror measures was important, Ambassador Benjamin 
explained.  Too much reliance on hard-power approaches risked 
driving more people toward extremist groups.  The USG, 
Ambassador Benjamin noted, was keen to learn about 
Indonesia's experiences on this front and hoped to 
incorporate some of the GOI's best practices into the U.S. 
approach.  However, he cautioned, a soft approach alone would 
not be effective. 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador Benjamin noted that the deradicalization 
approach illustrated the importance of coordinating CT 
efforts across multiple government agencies and asked about 
the status of GOI plans to establish a counterterrorism body. 
 Ambassador Soeriaatmadja explained that President Yudhoyono 
had committed to do this during his first one hundred days in 
office.  The CT body would not be a new entity but rather an 
upgrading of the existing CT Desk augmented with additional 
personnel, resources and authority.  The CT body would focus 
on facilitating interagency cooperation on a broad strategic 
and policy level.  Individual GOI agencies and departments 
would remain responsible for the planning and conduct of 
their own CT activities. 
 
¶5. (C) Turning to terrorism finance, Ambassador Benjamin 
asked about the status of pending new legislation on the 
matter.  He underscored that funding was a key element for 
terrorist operations and pointed to the need to address 
emerging areas like bulk cash smuggling.  Ambassador 
Soeriaatmadja agreed that these were important areas and said 
that the GOI had already established a taskforce to finalize 
the new CT finance law and move it through the legislature by 
the end of 2010.  He noted that attempts to regulate 
nonprofit organizations that might divert money to extremist 
groups would be difficult.  Indonesian law gave NGOs wide 
latitude in the conduct of their own affairs--a consequence 
of democratic reforms following decades of authoritarian rule 
when the government tightly controlled such things.  As an 
alternative the GOI was encouraging nonprofit organizations 
 
JAKARTA 00000171  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
and NGOs to draft a voluntary code of conduct to ensure that 
funds are not diverted for extremist purposes. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TERRORIST-PROSECUTING TASK FORCE OUTLINED 
PENDING CASES 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ambassador Benjamin met with prosecutors from the 
Attorney General's Task Force on Transnational Crime and 
Terrorism (Satgas).  Since its 2006 inception, this 
USG-funded task force has successfully prosecuted 64 
terrorists, including 43 Jemaah Islamiyah members, as well as 
over 100 other transnational crimes.  Senior prosecutor 
Laksmi Rohmulyati and task force members outlined the task 
force operation and described the terrorism and terrorism 
financing cases against some of the 14 defendants under 
prosecution for involvement for the July 17 Ritz Carlton and 
J.W. Marriott bombings.  Laksmi said that the July 17 bombing 
cases will be particularly challenging because the terrorists 
most directly involved in the bombings were killed, and the 
evidence against the remaining defendants was largely 
circumstantial. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Satgas prosecutors reported an increasing level 
of public support for terrorism prosecutions.  The USG funds 
that has supported Satgas over the past three years will 
shortly run out, and additional funding will be requested to 
support the task force's new prosecutions, including two new 
terrorism financing cases. 
 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERROR FINANCE LAW PENDING IN 
PARLIAMENT 
 
¶8. (SBU) Ambassador Benjamin also met with Yunus Husein, Head 
of the Indonesian Financial Intelligence Unit (PPATK) to 
express ongoing U.S. support for GOI efforts to strengthen 
Indonesia's anti-money laundering/counterterrorism financing 
(AML/CTF) regime.  Husein discussed PPATK's work and the role 
that they played in terrorist financing investigations, which 
entailed the collection of suspicious transaction reports 
which are referred as appropriate to the police for further 
investigation.  Husein noted that a new law on terrorist 
financing is being finalized for submission to Parliament. 
Husein opined that Parliament understands the terrorism 
threat and he anticipated no difficulties in gaining 
parliamentary approval of the legislation.  However, Husein 
also noted that new AML legislation had been pending in 
Parliament since 2006. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Regarding potential use of non-profits for terrorism 
financing, Husein said Indonesia was completing a survey of 
non-profits as a first step toward regulation.  Husein noted 
that PPATK recently co-sponsored a program on the 
investigation and prosecution of terrorism financing with 
DOJ/OPDAT, and expressed interest in co-sponsoring additional 
programs in Sulawesi, Bali, and Central Java. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HIGHLIGHTED REGIONAL CONCERNS 
 
¶10. (C) Regional CT cooperation is good although porous 
borders remain a concern, according to officials at the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU).  DEPLU's Acting 
Director for International Security Fikri Cassidy told 
Ambassador Benjamin that Indonesian officials coordinated 
well with their counterparts in neighboring countries on CT 
matters.  The main challenge on this front remained the 
region's porous borders.  Indonesian authorities did not have 
sufficient personnel or resources to secure the country's 
extensive land and sea borders although information sharing 
with Malaysia and the Philippines was helping address the 
situation. 
 
¶11. (C) Cassidy also pointed to Indonesian concerns regarding 
illegal migrants.  (Note:  In recent months, Indonesian 
authorities had intercepted groups of illegal migrants from 
Afghanistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka.  Most appear to have been 
destined for other countries in the region.)  GOI officials 
were worried at their relatively weak ability to screen 
arriving migrants for possible members of extremist groups. 
 
¶12. (C) Also addressing regional cooperation, Ambassador 
 
JAKARTA 00000171  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Benjamin underscored President Obama's commitment to 
multilateral counterterrorism efforts.  The USG was committed 
to working on CT matters within the UN as well as with 
regional organizations like ASEAN.  As part of that effort, 
we hoped to strengthen the UN Counterterrorism Executive 
Directorate (CTED) and the Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) 
and reinvigorate the UNSCR 1267 sanctions process. 
Ambassador Benjamin explained that the USG sought to bring 
more non-UNSC member states into UN CT activities. 
 
¶13. (C) Cassidy said Indonesia supported this more 
transparent and inclusive approach.  As a non-UNSC member 
that is deeply concerned about terrorism, Indonesia wants to 
play a role.  Cassidy pointed particularly to some 
difficulties involved in listing individuals and 
organizations subject to sanctions under UNSCR 1267.  He 
explained that the provision of names without additional 
background information and documents made enforcement 
difficult.  The GOI hoped that the USG and others would 
provide more intelligence data on individuals listed under 
USNCR 1267 to Indonesia and other countries responsible for 
enforcing those sanctions.  Ambassador Benjamin said that the 
United States has encouraged our partners to provide such 
information when listing individuals under 1267.  The USG 
would continue to look for ways to work with countries on 
this matter. 
 
¶14. (C) Ambassador Benjamin asked about GOI efforts to 
monitor Indonesian students who might be exposed to extremist 
influences in the Middle East or South Asia.  Cassidy 
responded that the GOI was increasingly concerned about the 
matter.  The Indonesian Embassy in Yemen had recently flagged 
the possibility that Indonesian students were picking up 
radical ideas from institutions there.  Pakistan was also an 
area of concern and Cassidy said that the GOI had difficulty 
even keeping track of how many Indonesian students had gone 
there to study.  Further complicating the matter, the 
Indonesian government received little information from other 
governments about the activities of Indonesian students in 
their countries.  As a result, the GOI directed its main 
efforts at monitoring students for potential radical 
activities after they returned to Indonesia. 
 
POLICE EXPLAINED THEIR APPROACH 
 
¶15. (C) Brigadier General Tito Karnavian, head of anti-terror 
unit Detachment 88, briefed Ambassador Benjamin on police 
activities.  He praised Diplomatic Security's Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance Program (ATA) training and assistance and said it 
was critical to building Detachment 88's capabilities. 
Ambassador Benjamin said that such assistance was a key USG 
priority and that we looked forward to doing more work with 
Detachment 88. 
 
¶16. (C) Echoing CT Desk officials, Tito said that the police 
also focused on both hard and soft approaches to 
counterterrorism.  While Detachment 88 had primary 
responsibility for the surveillance and arrest of terrorist 
suspects, the organization also sought to undermine the 
extremist message by delegitimizing religious justifications 
for violence.  (Note:  Tito is conducting research for a 
Ph.D. on this subject.)  Tito underscored that Detachment 88 
was coordinating its efforts on this front with other GOI 
entities as part of a whole of government approach. 
 
¶17. (C) Tito described the radicalization process in 
Indonesia as having two primary roads: attraction to other 
global and regional events, e.g. jihadists traveling to 
Afghanistan and also to fight in the Ambon and Maluku 
conflicts, and secondly the ability of the Ustads (Islamic 
teachers) in Java to compel groups of impressionable young 
people to violence. 
 
¶18. (C) Tito said that the first priority in Indonesian 
counter-radicalization policy is to prevent the spread of 
radical beliefs in a sort of "containment" strategy.  The 
second priority is the rehabilitation programs. 
He compared the radicalization process as similar to vectors 
in biology, i.e., a virus spread by agents. The Ustads 
represents the vector, which means that the police must focus 
 
JAKARTA 00000171  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
on areas where they intend to spread, for example one 
pesantren or another. Tito lamented the fact that the 
ministries of religion and education are not adequately 
responding to the threat.  He also said that working with 
interfaith dialogues or with mainstream communities is not 
effective.  Tito said that the proposed GOI Coordinating CT 
body should have the lead on both soft and hard GOI efforts 
to counter terrorism and radicalization, and the ability to 
both identify the drivers of extremism and to address them. 
¶19. (C) BG Tito also explained proposed changes to Detachment 
88's organization and command structure.  Currently, the 
unit's personnel are distributed throughout the country where 
they serve under the operational command of regional police 
officials.  The exact distribution of Detachment 88 personnel 
is not fixed but rather continually adjusted in response to 
assessments of the terrorist threat.  While this arrangement 
provided flexibility, Tito explained that it also complicated 
efforts to coordinate CT activities.  Because Detachment 88 
personnel reported to local police commanders, the unit's 
headquarters had an imperfect picture of all activities. 
This stove-piped reporting created friction between the 
locals and DET-88 HQ, and also made it difficult for police 
terrorism analysts to identify patterns of extremist behavior 
or connections between extremist groups in different parts of 
the country.  In response, Tito planned to bring Detachment 
88 officers under more centralized control.  While they would 
still coordinate with local commanders in the field, 
Detachment 88 personnel would report primarily to, and 
receive orders from, the detachment headquarters. 
 
¶20. (C) Tito said he was concerned that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
may be learning how to avoid detection, and may be able to 
regenerate without being noticed. He said that JI has 
developed and is utilizing sophisticated e-mail encryption 
methods to avoid police detection. 
 
¶21. (U) S/CT cleared this message. 
OSIUS