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DE RUEHHK #0333/01 0570914
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FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9728
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 000333 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM HK
SUBJECT: UPON THIS ROCK: HONG KONG RULE OF LAW REMAINS 
SOLID (PART I) 
 
REF: (A) HONG KONG 101 (B) 09 HONG KONG 1742 (C) 09 
     HONG KONG 483 
 
Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher Marut for reasons 1.4( 
b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Hong Kong legal professionals 
judged Hong Kong's rule of law remains both independent and, 
more importantly, sufficiently well-designed that few 
opportunities exist for external tampering.  They believed 
Beijing recognizes the singular role rule of law plays in 
Hong Kong, and would therefore hesitate to interfere.  No one 
could recall a case involving either pressure on a judge to 
rule in a particular way or on legal professionals to avoid 
certain clients or cases.  A scholar suggested the other 
threat to rule of law would be if political activists decided 
judicial remedies were no longer a viable means of checking 
the government, leading them to resort to extra-legal means 
of addressing their grievances.  We judge such an eventuality 
as extremely unlikely at present, and unlikely ever to win 
public support.  End summary and comment. 
 
------------ 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Perhaps the single strongest -- and most essential -- 
pillar of the "one country, two systems" framework is Hong 
Kong's independent judiciary.  Rule of law remains akin to a 
secular religion in Hong Kong.  The occasion of Andrew Li 
Kwok-nang opening his final Legal Year as Chief Justice (CJ) 
of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) prompted us to 
review with some of the major players their assessment of the 
state of legal and judicial independence in Hong Kong. 
Justices, practitioners and professors all generally believe 
this institution remains strong and vital.  Part I of this 
report presents our assessment that, at present and for the 
foreseeable future, Hong Kong's legal system is 
institutionally and culturally resistant to external 
pressure.  Part II (septel) will deal with the state of Hong 
Kong's legal culture and its links to the larger common law 
community. 
 
¶3. (C)  We spoke with: CFA Permanent Justice Kemal Bokhary, 
Hong Kong University Law School Dean Johannes Chan Man-mun, 
Law Society (represents solicitors) President Wong Kwai-huen, 
and Bar Association (represents barristers) Chairman Russell 
Coleman SC.  We also spoke with Democratic Party founder 
Martin Lee Chu-ming, who ranks second on the Bar 
Association's seniority list.  All save Lee felt the 
institutions of rule of law in Hong Kong were strong, and 
even Lee could not point to a specific instance of a lawyer 
or judicial official bowing to external pressure. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Effective Law Amidst Defective Democracy 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Justice Bokhary asked rhetorically how rule of law 
could flourish absent democratic government, a question 
particularly important given that the actions and legislation 
of Hong Kong's largely non-elected government are nonetheless 
subject to judicial review under the Basic Law and the Hong 
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.  Bokhary noted three 
requirements: (1) A qualified, independent legal profession, 
which should be supported by (2) a good academy (Bokhary here 
cited HKU Law School Dean Chan specifically), and enjoy (3) 
the respect of the public.  Our contacts all regarded these 
conditions as having been met in Hong Kong. 
 
¶5. (C) Hong Kong's bench and bar enjoy respect across the 
political spectrum, and the judiciary trumps both the 
executive and the legislature in polled assessments of public 
trust.  Much of the credit goes to CJ Li himself, who took 
steps large (using his extensive contacts at the Bar to 
recruit top legal talent to the bench) and small (insisting 
judges and counsel continue to appear in court resplendent in 
full wig-and-gown regalia) to strengthen and preserve Hong 
Kong's common law tradition. 
 
----------------------- 
Tamper-Resistant Design 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The first potential vulnerability we suggested to our 
interlocutors was political manipulation of the judicial 
appointments process.  The two points at which the succession 
process for CJ Li -- or any other high-level judicial 
nomination in future -- could conceivably encounter tampering 
are in the nomination process and the "endorsement" by the 
 
HONG KONG 00000333  002 OF 003 
 
 
Legislative Council (LegCo).  Our contacts assessed both the 
possibility and feasibility of skewing either process as 
slim.  They took pains to note the apolitical nature of the 
process, drawing a respectful (if pointed) contrast with 
judicial nominations in the United States. 
 
¶7. (C) In accordance with Article 88 of the Basic Law, 
"judges...shall be appointed by the Chief Executive (CE) on 
the recommendation of an independent commission composed of 
local judges, persons from the legal profession, and eminent 
persons from other sectors."  Said commission is convened 
under the Judicial Officers' Recommendation Commission 
Ordinance, and is comprised of the CFA Chief Justice (ex 
officio Chairman), the Secretary of Justice (currently Wong 
Yan-lung, SC, also ex officio), two judges, a representative 
each from the Bar Association and Law Society, and three "lay 
members" "who are not, in the opinion of the Chief Executive, 
connected in any way with the practice of law."  The 
Ordinance requires the CE to solicit nominations from the Bar 
Association and the Law Society for their respective seats, 
but does not obligate him to accept the recommendations 
(though in practice we expect he would). 
 
¶8. (C) Operationally, assuming the professional 
representatives and the judges are reckoned as putting the 
institution first (a solid bet in Hong Kong at present), the 
only way for the CE to influence the nomination process would 
be through the three "lay members."  Even then, three votes 
are enough to scuttle a nomination, but not enough to push a 
particular name forward. 
 
¶9. (C) While we do not see scope for the CE appointing 
someone not recommended by the commission, whether the CE can 
legally reject the commission's nominee and request a second 
recommendation is unclear.  As reported ref B, Civic Party 
Legal Functional Constituency legislator Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee 
believed the "shall be appointed" language in BL 88 meant the 
CE was obligated to appoint whomever the commission 
recommended, an obligation which to our eye is not so 
iron-clad from the wording.  Whatever his power in theory, 
however, no one with whom we spoke expressed any expectation 
other than that the single name proposed by the commission 
would be duly nominated by the CE. 
 
¶10. (C) Article 90 of the Basic Law adds the additional step 
of "endorsement" by the Legislative Council of nominations 
for CFA justices and for the Chief Judge of the High Court. 
While this might also serve as a venue for politicking, a 
suggestion by Civic Party legislators Audrey Eu Yuet-mee and 
Ronny Tong Ka-wah that Li's successor face a U.S.-style 
confirmation hearing was quickly and firmly smacked down by 
the profession and their fellow Civic Margaret Ng (ref B). 
Ng told us LegCo should normally make an up-or-down vote, 
with the "down" coming only in the unusual circumstance of 
some flaw in the nomination process. 
 
----------------- 
External Pressure 
----------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Assuming as noted above that Beijing cannot easily 
intervene in the judicial nominations process via the Hong 
Kong government, the two means it might employ to interfere 
in Hong Kong's legal system would be interpretation of the 
Basic Law or by bringing pressure to bear on judges or legal 
professionals.  Although the Basic Law of Hong Kong (and, for 
that matter, Macau) is "constitutional" to the extent that it 
is a standard by which the Court of Final Appeal conducts 
judicial review of government actions, it does not possess 
"original" authority.  Special Administrative Regions (SARs) 
exist owing to a section of the PRC constitution authorizing 
the government to establish them, and then specific 
legislation passed by the National People's Congress (NPC) 
creating each SAR.  The NPC Standing Committee (NPC/SC) has 
the final authority to interpret the Basic Law of a SAR. 
(Comment: This fact has been stressed in recent years by PRC 
leaders including NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo.  The Basic Law 
could more accurately be seen as the charter of the SAR 
which, like the Letters Patent which established the Crown 
Colony of Hong Kong, can be changed by the sovereign state. 
End comment.) 
 
¶12. (C) To date, there has been only one interpretation of 
the Basic Law made in reference to a court decision.  The 
NPC/SC's June 1999 interpretation overturned a ruling by the 
CFA in "Ng Ka Ling and others v. Director of Immigration" 
that would have granted "right of abode" to possibly hundreds 
of thousands of children of Mainland parents who subsequently 
acquired Hong Kong residence.  It bears noting that the 
interpretation came at the request of the Hong Kong SAR 
 
HONG KONG 00000333  003 OF 003 
 
 
government (which feared an economically unsustainable influx 
of Mainland immigrants) despite signals that the central 
government preferred not to become involved.  Putting aside 
the specifics of the "right of abode" issue, the 
interpretation was seen by many observers as a severe (some 
feared, a mortal) blow to the independence of the Hong Kong 
judiciary.  The extent to which the interpretation 
represented a line drawn by the NPC and tacitly acknowledged 
by the Li court is difficult to determine: while the NPC/SC 
has not intervened in any subsequent court decisions, no one 
has suggested the court is any less willing to rule against 
the government in judicial review cases. 
 
¶13. (C) Only Martin Lee suggested that there were judges who 
might be influenced by Beijing.  He told us he thought there 
were a small number of judges traveling regularly to the 
Mainland who might be subjected either to pressure or 
attempts at influence.  That said, even he admitted he had no 
specific cause for concern at the current time.  None of our 
other contacts believed Beijing had attempted to pressure 
judges to make particular decisions. 
 
¶14. (C) We put to our contacts the idea that Beijing might 
put pressure on lawyers by intimating they could lose 
profitable Mainland business should they take particular 
cases or clients.  Neither the Law Society's Wong nor the Bar 
Association's Coleman believed practitioners had come under 
such pressure.  In part, this may be because Hong Kong legal 
professionals cannot at present practice law on the Mainland 
(although they can gain the right to practice by sitting the 
PRC Bar Exam) and thus have no real business to lose.  This 
situation may change should the Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement be expanded to grant recognition on the Mainland 
to Hong Kong legal credentials, but neither Coleman nor Wong 
seemed concerned.  Even then, Wong suggested, the potential 
for influence would be limited: the firms keenest to enter 
the China market were probably already the most pro-China, 
and therefore already avoided controversial clients. 
 
--------------------- 
Potential for Erosion 
--------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) The final potential threat to Hong Kong's rule of law 
system would be erosion, by which we mean a degradation in 
the quality or integrity of Hong Kong's bench and bar.  As 
noted above, all the key players remain fiercely committed to 
maintaining the integrity of the profession and the 
judiciary, free from external political influence.  The issue 
of Hong Kong's ability to produce the same caliber of legal 
professionals it currently enjoys will be discussed in Part 
II of the report; suffice it to say here our contacts did not 
express concerns.  Part II will also discuss Hong Kong's 
substantial efforts to maintain its role as an active member 
of the international common law community. 
 
¶16. (C) HKU Law School Dean Chan suggested a different kind 
of erosion: that the public, particularly the radical wing of 
the activist community, might lose faith in judicial remedies 
to address their complaints.  Judicial review can stop the 
government from executing specific policies, but cannot 
change the (currently unrepresentative) structure of the SAR 
government.  Chan fears that, if the courts are no longer 
seen as useful, activists might resort to other, potentially 
violent, means of redress.  (Comment: Hong Kong radicals like 
the League of Social Democrats have "pushed the envelope" for 
years, and certain elements in the "post-1980s" movement seem 
inclined to push it further (see ref A).  However, no one has 
suggested opposing Hong Kong's judicial system, which is 
currently the strongest institution protecting the rights 
enjoyed by citizens.  While we do not rule out a radical 
fringe taking this step, we expect the resulting condemnation 
by the general public would be swift and sharp.  End comment.) 
MARUT