VZCZCXRO2000
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHHK #0267/01 0430746
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120746Z FEB 10
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9618
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0318
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0773
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0012
RUCOWCY/COGARD AMR NEW YORK NY PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0038
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 000267 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/CM 
STATE ALSO FOR PM/PPA 
TREASURY FOR OFAC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHSA ATRN EWWT PREL KPIR KCRM IMO DA UK BA
SO, CH, HK 
SUBJECT: HONG KONG SHIP OWNERS WELCOME PLA TROOPS ON 
MERCHANT SHIPS; WORRY ABOUT RANSOM BAN 
 
REF: 09 HONG KONG 2136 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: China's People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) Navy forces currently deployed in the 
waters off East Africa to counter Somali maritime pirate 
attacks have reportedly offered troops to merchant ships from 
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.  The Hong Kong Ship Owners 
Association (HKSOA) has welcomed this initiative but remains 
opposed to the use of civilian armed guards.  Separately, 
HKSOA has joined the London-based International Chamber of 
Shipping (ICS) in raising concerns over a rumored U.S. ban on 
ransom payments.  Post would appreciate any information on 
this rumored ban.  Paragraph 7 contains ICS' recent letter on 
this matter.  END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST 
 
¶2. (SBU) During a February 10 meeting with EconOff, HKSOA 
Managing Director Arthur Bowring shared that PLA naval 
warships on counter-piracy operations off the Somali Coast 
have been routinely offering up special forces units to serve 
aboard commercial ships from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. 
PLA officers and the ship's captain would make arrangements 
on site, whereby troops could be stationed aboard more 
vulnerable ships during runs through the Gulf of Aden (GOA) 
and the Somali Basin (SB).  Bowring knew neither the number 
nor the flag-state of the vessels that had allowed Chinese 
troops aboard.  He added that the industry welcomed this type 
of military initiative, and it was not unique to the PLA. 
Other international naval forces in the region offered 
similar support to merchant ships from their flag-states, he 
confirmed. 
 
¶3. (SBU) While the industry supported military deployments to 
protect cargo ships, Bowring reiterated HKSOA's strong 
opposition to the employment of armed private security guards 
to protect commercial shipping.  Civilian guards would only 
lead to unnecessary escalation of violence on both sides, as 
civilian "mercenaries" were not bound by UN-style rules of 
engagement, he said. 
 
¶4. (SBU) As a representative for some of the region's largest 
ship owners and ship management companies, Bowring said the 
HKSOA regularly received business proposals from private 
individuals and security firms eager to take the fight to the 
pirates, for a profit.  The HKSOA did not endorse these 
proposals but instead encouraged the use of industry's Best 
Management Practices (BMP) to deter piracy (reftel). 
However, "the HKSOA cannot forbid ship owners from doing what 
they deemed best," Bowring recognized.  (Note: Hong Kong's 
strict statutory controls on firearms' registration and 
licensing extend over its shipping registry.  This constrains 
the decision for a civilian guard force on Hong Kong-flagged 
vessels.  End Note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Bowring lamented that the international community's 
reluctance to respond more decisively to piracy in the GOA 
and SB could potentially encourage hijacking and kidnapping 
elsewhere.  Attacks had already been reported almost 1,000 
nautical miles from the coast of Somalia, and pirates 
continued to develop new tactics, now launching smaller 
attack skiffs from larger mother ships on the high seas.  The 
protection of sea trade from piracy was a clear and 
legitimate responsibility for governments under the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.  It was particularly 
upsetting when the main focus of some senior politicians 
seemed limited to objections to ransom payments, he added. 
 
Potential U.S. Ban on Payment of Ransoms to Pirates 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ship owners were highly concerned over rumors that 
the U.S. government was contemplating prohibiting ransom 
payments to pirates, Bowring said.  Specifically, in addition 
to banning ransom payments, the measure would also impose 
 
HONG KONG 00000267  002 OF 003 
 
 
sanctions on companies that violated the ruling, including 
non-U.S. companies.  Bowring stated this would do little to 
safeguard sea trade and seafarers' well-being.  He shared a 
February 3 letter from the International Chamber of Shipping 
to the Chairman of the Consultative Shipping Group that 
expressed these concerns: 
 
¶7. (U) Begin Text: 
 
From: 
Mr. Simon Bennett 
Secretary, International Chamber of Shipping 
12 Carthusian Street London EC1M 6EZ 
Tel 44 20 7417 8844  Fax 44 20 7417 8877 
ics@marisec.org www. marisec.org  www.shippingfacts.com 
 
To: 
Mr. Andreas Nordseth 
Chairman, Consultative Shipping Group 
C/O Danish Maritime Authority 
Versmundsgade 38C  DK-2100 Copenhagen 
 
At the request of the ICS Executive Committee, which met this 
week, we are contacting you, in your capacity as CSG 
Chairman, on a most serious matter of great concern to our 
member national shipowners' associations.  This relates to 
reports that the United States may be considering some kind 
of ban on the payment of ransoms for the release of seafarers 
held hostage by Somali pirates.  Moreover, it is understood 
that any such ban might apply to non-US companies and that 
penalties could be imposed when the ship of a company, that 
is known to have paid a ransom, visits a US port, or by 
applying sanctions against a shipping company's offices in 
the US. 
 
We understand the mechanism for doing this would be the 
Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) which, we are 
informed, amended its regulations last November, possibly 
(though we cannot confirm this) with such an action in mind. 
While exact information about who might be driving any 
decision about a ban is hard to come by, we believe it is 
being led by the State Department.  (The OFAC regulations 
apparently require decisions to be made by the Secretary of 
State in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security 
and the Attorney General.) 
 
Our first request is that, through the Cotton Club, and as 
matter of some urgency, the CSG collects any information it 
can about the truth behind any proposal for a ban, and the 
likely timing of any such decision, in order that we can 
determine how collectively we might resist it. 
 
Our second request is that Cotton Club members might be 
encouraged to begin raising the concerns of the international 
community to officials in the relevant departments, and that 
this topic should be a subject of discussion at the next CSG 
meeting in Korea. 
 
While the shipping industry will develop its arguments 
depending on the detail of whatever may be eventually 
proposed by the United States, in the first instance we wish 
to raise the following serious concerns about any potential 
ban on ransom payments: 
 
- The first is humanitarian.  What else are shipowners meant 
to do when the seafarers they employ, and to whom they have a 
duty of care, are taken hostage, often for months at a time, 
in appalling conditions, with their lives at serious risk, 
and with no hope of rescue by their governments? 
 
- If such a ban were implemented, what would happen to those 
seafarers who are currently being held hostage (typically, at 
any one time, about 250 seafarers are being held by pirates)? 
 
HONG KONG 00000267  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
- If such a ban were implemented, it has to be understood the 
likely result would be that the majority of shipowners would 
avoid the Gulf of Aden, the Suez Canal and north west Indian 
Ocean altogether (most large ships would divert around the 
Cape of Good Hope).  Many ships' crews would also be likely 
to refuse to sail in the danger area (which covers well over 
a million square miles).  This would clearly have a 
significant affect on the flow of a large proportion of 
international trade, and send a signal to the effect that the 
international community has been unable to prevent the 
creation by the pirates of a huge 'no go' area in a region of 
great strategic importance. 
 
- Finally, it is worth reiterating that there is absolutely 
no evidence (so far as we are aware) of any links between the 
pirates, who are criminal opportunists, and terrorism. 
 
Your assistance in finding out more and taking up our 
concerns on this most serious matter will be very much 
appreciated. 
 
End text. 
 
MARUT