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RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0029

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 HARARE 000107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/19 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON ZI
SUBJECT: Zimbabwe: Measuring Progress 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Charles Ray, Ambassador, State, EXO; REASON: 1.4(D) 
 
------------------- 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
------------------- 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) The coalition government is now one year old.  As the U.S. 
examines further engagement with Zimbabwe, post would like to 
suggest the Hague Principles agreed to in late 2007 as benchmarks 
for examining progress,  and we offer our evaluation of progress 
from that time until the present.  The Hague principles are:  1) 
Full and equal access to humanitarian assistance; 2) Commitment to 
macroeconomic stabilization in accordance with guidance from 
relevant international agencies; 3) Restoration of the rule of law, 
including enforcement of contracts, an independent judiciary, and 
respect for property rights; 4) Commitment to the democratic 
process and respect for human rights, including a commitment to 
freedom of expression, freedom of print and broadcast media, 
freedom of assembly, and freedom of association; 5) A commitment to 
timely elections held in accordance with international standards, 
and in the presence of international election observers.  It would 
be misleading, however, to look strictly at static benchmarks.  As 
Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and his party continue to tell us, 
what counts is the continued process to open democratic space in 
Zimbabwe, not day-to-day headlines that mask seemingly sustainable 
achievements.   Finally, given significant gridlock in government 
resulting from the inconvenient marriage between ZANU-PF and MDC-T 
(MDC-M's role is increasingly insignificant), real change is 
impossible until there is an election that brings a reform 
government to power.  END INTRODUCTION. 
 
 
 
--------------- 
 
Background 
 
-------------- 
 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) A group of bilateral donors and international agencies 
met in the Hague on October 2, 2007 and agreed on a 
principles-based approach to reengagement with the government of 
Zimbabwe.   At that time, SADC was facilitating talks between the 
parties regarding the holding of elections.  President Robert 
Mugabe pushed for elections in 2010.  An agreement was ultimately 
reached to hold elections in March 2008.  The run up to the 
elections was mostly free of the violence and intimidation that had 
characterized earlier elections.  With some exceptions, the MDC 
factions were allowed to campaign throughout the country and hold 
rallies.  Repressive laws, such as the Public Order and Security 
Act (POSA), were not used for the most part to stifle freedom of 
assembly.  Zimbabweans were allowed access to humanitarian 
assistance during this period.  ZANU-PF, confident of victory, 
permitted a relatively fair election, and  the result was that the 
MDC factions gained a majority in parliament, Morgan Tsvangirai won 
an official plurality of the presidential vote (ZANU-PF fraud 
likely prevented him from winning a majority) and a run off 
presidential election was set for June.  From April until the June 
27 election, ZANU-PF unleashed its repressive machinery.  Over 200 
people were killed, thousands were beaten, and political space was 
completely closed.  In June, to make its point, the government 
suspended NGO operations, curtailing the ability of many to provide 
humanitarian assistance. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Mugabe was declared the winner of the June election which 
took place even though Tsvangirai pulled out when it became evident 
a couple of weeks before that many of his supporters were afraid to 
vote.  In July 2008, SADC-sponsored negotiations between the 
parties began.  Mugabe was forced to the negotiating table for two 
reasons:  He lacked legitimacy, as even his SADC friends refused 
to recognize his victory; and the economic situation, marked by an 
inflation rate then in the billions, was unsustainable.  The Global 
Political Agreement (GPA) was reached in September, but 
ZANU-PF-sponsored violence continued during negotiations, and in 
October security forces began a series of abductions of MDC-T 
 
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officials and civil society activists, including Jestina Mukoko.  A 
number of these individuals were in custody even after the new 
government was formed in February 2009. 
 
 
 
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Full and Equal Access to Humanitarian Assistance 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Continuum of humanitarian access: 
 
 
 
A)     NGO field activities banned (June-August 2008) 
 
 
 
B)      NGOs permitted to operate but closely monitored and 
controlled, and subject to threat (April-June 2008) 
 
 
 
C)      NGOs generally permitted to operate but some reports of 
disruptions, other harassment  (September 2008-present) 
 
 
 
D)     Completely unimpeded humanitarian access 
 
 
 
 ¶5.  (SBU) Although ZANU-PF continues to allege that NGOs and 
donors are involved in politics, since the lifting of the NGO ban 
in August 2008, humanitarian access to vulnerable populations has 
been generally good.  International and local NGOs have generally 
been able to move freely and deliver services unimpeded during a 
period of increased programming.  (NOTE:  There have been isolated 
reports of discrimination against MDC-T members in the distribution 
of food assistance.  END NOTE.)  Work permits and operational 
agreements have been processed.  The government has put into place 
a policy and process of donor coordination that remains slow but 
generally reflects international standards. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Organizations such as the International Organization for 
Migration and UN High Commissioner for Refugees continue to 
encounter government sensitivities regarding populations of 
displaced farm workers, and a an unknown number of undocumented 
people from other countries; most notably Malawi, but in general 
are able to gain access to them and provide assistance.  A 
significant milestone was the August 2009 Joint GOZ-Donor IDP 
assessment. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Regular crop assessments have been conducted.  Food and 
cash transfer programs during the hungry season have proceeded 
without political interference. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Ministry of Health's collaboration with the World 
Health Organization and other donors to manage H1N1 in Mutare and 
its swift response to suspected cholera cases in Chipinge in 
September reflects an improvement in delivery and transparency. 
 
 
 
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Commitment to Macroeconomic Stabilization 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
HARARE 00000107  003 OF 008 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Continuum of macroeconomic stabilization 
 
 
 
A)     Complete lack of fiscal and monetary discipline, controls on 
foreign exchange  (November 1997-January 2009) 
 
 
 
B)      Fiscal and Monetary discipline, confidence in 
sustainability of policy limited by political factors (February 
2009-present) 
 
 
 
C)      Fiscal and monetary discipline, policy commitment 
credibility 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Following hyperinflation that reached over a trillion 
percent, Zimbabwe introduced a multi-currency system at the end of 
January, 2009 and the Zimbabwe dollar almost immediately became a 
relic of the past.  The resulting end of inflation has resulted in 
a significant measure of macroeconomic stability.  Expectations of 
inflation are minimal, there is no fiscal deficit to speak of, and 
the economy is growing (though slowly) for the first time in more 
than a decade. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Macroeconomic stability is sustainable provided MDC-T 
continues to control the Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank 
of Zimbabwe is held in check and not allowed to undermine the 
banking system.  To  move beyond stabilization to recovery and 
long-term growth, Zimbabwe needs a lower risk profile (to attract 
commercial credit and investment) and multilateral concessional 
loans (to resolve the GOZ's debt crisis and put the public sector 
back on its feet).  Neither of these things will happen until new 
elections give Zimbabwe a government able to make credible policy 
commitments. 
 
 
 
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Restoration of the Rule of Law 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Continuum of Rule of Law 
 
 
 
A)     Judiciary completely compromised, political arrests 
frequent, property rights not protected (2005-May 2009) 
 
 
 
B)      Judiciary compromised but occasionally rules against the 
state, political arrests occasional, property rights not protected 
(June 2009-present) 
 
 
 
C)      Judiciary somewhat independent, infrequent political 
arrests, property rights somewhat protected 
 
 
 
D)     Independent judiciary, no political arrests, property rights 
enforced 
 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU) This is perhaps the most problematic area.  On the 
positive side, there are no political detainees, with the possible 
exception of three MDC members charged with the alleged murder of a 
 
HARARE 00000107  004 OF 008 
 
 
ZANU-PF councilor in Banket .  Politically motivated prosecutions 
have greatly decreased.  There are occasional judicial judgments 
against the State.  For example, the Supreme Court recognized that 
Jestina Mukoko had been tortured by state agents and ruled that her 
case should be stayed, effectively dismissing it.  A High Court 
Judge ruled that the Zimbabwe Minerals Development Corporation and 
its partners had illegally taken over claims in Chiadzwa belonging 
to African Consolidated Resources.  On the negative side, farm 
invasions have continued to take place, some accompanied by 
violence, and neither government ministers nor the police have made 
sufficient efforts to stop this lawlessness.  In fact, invasions 
are treated as political  rather  than legal matters.  In a similar 
vein, when the SADC Tribunal ruled against the government in a case 
brought by white commercial farmers, the  Minister of Justice, with 
typical pettifoggery, argued that Zimbabwe had not bound itself to 
the Tribunal.  Although prosecutions have declined, police continue 
to arrest demonstrators, particularly members of Women of Zimbabwe 
Arise (WOZA). 
 
 
 
¶14.  (C) The biggest obstacles to Rule of Law are institutional. 
Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa is close to Mugabe and is a 
political partisan rather than an independent lawyer.  Similarly, 
the Attorney General carries ZANU-PF's water.  He has been 
responsible, albeit with guidance from Chinamasa and others, for 
political prosecutions.  He is personally prosecuting Roy Bennett 
in a case where there is clearly insufficient evidence; Mugabe has 
made it clear Bennett cannot be sworn in as deputy minister of 
agriculture unless and until he is acquitted.  The Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court is a Mugabe acolyte who replaced the former chief 
justice after he was forced to resign in 2001 by war veterans who 
threatened him and by Chinamasa who said he could not guarantee his 
safety.  Most judges are compromised by having received farms from 
the government.  Police independence supposedly depends on 
oversight from the Ministry of Home Affairs.  But this ministry, 
which has ZANU-PF and MDC-T co-ministers, is heavily influenced by 
the ZANU-PF minister and ZANU-PF bureaucracy, including the 
permanent secretary.  And the commissioner of police, who is 
supposed to report to the Ministry, does not.  He sits on the Joint 
Operations Committee, which formulates and implements policy, with 
leaders of the military who are loyal to Mugabe.  The military is a 
power unto itself, and is not subject to civilian control, other 
than perhaps to Mugabe.  The military was responsible for a rash of 
killings and beatings in the Chiadzwa diamond fields in 2008 and 
¶2009. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (C) Until the top officials charged with justice and law and 
order responsibilities are replaced, and there is a commitment to a 
credible and internationally recognized legal framework, it is 
unlikely that we will see much additional progress in Rule of Law. 
And it is unlikely these officials will change until there is a new 
government.  (COMMENT:  A budgetary process that allows adequate 
compensation for judges, according to Finance Minister Biti in a 
conversation with a visiting CODEL, would also aid in 
re-establishing the independence and credibility of the judiciary. 
Currently, when lawyers are appointed to the bench, they suffer a 
decline in income that makes them susceptible to bribes and 
coercion.  END COMMENT)  The National Security Council, whose 
membership includes the president, prime minister, and service 
chiefs, met for only the second time this month since the formation 
of the government.  As noted the JOC continues to function, and 
there is no evidence that transparent civilian control of the 
military will occur any time soon.  With respect to land reform, 
nobody, including the MDC, has called for a reversal.  But it is 
evident that land reform has benefitted primarily high-level 
ZANU-PF and military officials, and not those for whom it was 
intended.  The GPA calls for a land audit as a prerequisite to 
eliminating multiple farm ownerships and more equitable 
distribution.  So far, ZANU-PF has obstructed efforts for an audit, 
either on the basis that there is no money to fund it, or with the 
fatuous argument, made by the Minister of Agriculture to the 
Ambassador (Ref), that until sanctions are lifted land inputs are 
unavailable, land cannot be developed to its potential, and it is 
therefore impossible to assess its true value for purposes of an 
audit. 
 
HARARE 00000107  005 OF 008 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
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Commitment to the Democratic Process and Human Rights 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
----- 
 
 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Continuum of human rights 
 
 
 
A)     Ruling party holds on to power at all costs, human rights 
ignored, national independent media restricted, international 
journalists banned (2002-September 2008) 
 
 
 
B)      Ruling party negotiates potentially significant power 
sharing, human rights ignored, national independent media 
restricted, international journalists banned (September 
2008-February 2009) 
 
 
 
C)      Ruling party enters into coalition government, cedes 
positions but holds on to power, human rights violations continue 
but become less frequent, national independent media restricted, 
some international journalists permitted to return (February 
2009-present) 
 
 
 
D)     Coalition government functioning with imperfect but 
significant power sharing, few human rights violations, some 
prosecutions of violators, new media authority authorizes 
independent media (possible to achieve in short term) 
 
 
 
E)      GPA fully implemented with real power sharing, and the 
potential for periodic transfer of power based on free and fair 
elections, constitutional revision on track with popular 
participation, no impunity for human rights violators, freedom of 
print and broadcast media 
 
 
 
¶17.   (SBU) Political violence has greatly decreased since the 
signing of the GPA, and in particular during the last year.  There 
is less political intimidation, although we continue to receive 
reports from some rural areas that ZANU-PF supporters are exerting 
pressure on villagers to support the party's position in the 
constitutional process.  Although  POSA, which has been used to 
restrict freedom of assembly, has not been repealed, political 
space has increased.  MDC-T has held rallies around the country and 
has traveled to areas it could not have a couple of years ago. 
(NOTE:  We have reports from several areas of MDC-T members being 
arrested, and quickly released, for trying to organize in 
connection with the constitutional process.  They were not abused 
and it is unlikely the State will prosecute them.  Additionally, 
efforts by a theatre group to perform a play promoting national 
reconciliation were obstructed by ZANU-PF authorities in some 
venues in Mashonaland.  END NOTE.)  An MDC-T MP has introduced a 
bill in Parliament to repeal POSA.  Although passage of the bill is 
unlikely given Mugabe's veto power, the fact of its introduction is 
an important step. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (SBU)  Weekly independent newspapers continue to publish and 
international news organizations such as the BBC and Al Jazeera 
have been allowed to operate openly, even after broadcasting 
reports critical of ZANU-PF.  A Media Commission that will inter 
alia license print media has been formed but not yet officially 
established.  The functioning of the Commission and licensing of 
independent daily papers would be important steps in establishing 
freedom of expression.   There is considerable criticism of ZANU-PF 
in the independent Zimbabwean press, although the recent defamation 
 
HARARE 00000107  006 OF 008 
 
 
charges brought against distributors of the Zimbabwean for 
allegedly falsely reporting on a meeting involving ZANU-PF 
strongman Emmerson Mnangagwa demonstrate limitations on freedom of 
the press. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Parliament, which until 2008, was mostly a rubber stamp 
for Mugabe, has a fragile MDC majority and has begun to operate in 
an independent and sometimes bipartisan way.  Co-chairs from the 
three political parties head the process to draft a new 
constitution.  Parliamentary committees have begun to exercise 
oversight functions.  For example, the Portfolio Committee on Mines 
and Energy, chaired by a ZANU-PF MP, has been calling witnesses to 
investigate government actions in Chiadzwa. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
------------------------ 
 
Commitment to Elections Held in Accordance with International 
Standards 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶22.  (SBU) Continuum of commitment to elections 
 
 
 
A)     Elections stolen blatantly, including through violence and 
intimidation (2002, June 2008) 
 
 
 
B)      Election results manipulated but not successfully stolen 
(March 2008) 
 
 
 
C)      Independent election committee named (could be achieved 
soon) 
 
 
 
D)     Voter rolls audited and cleansed 
 
 
 
E)      Unfettered voter education permitted 
 
 
 
F)      International election observers invited 
 
 
 
G)     Free and fair elections held 
 
 
 
¶20.  (SBU) According to the GPA, a new constitution was to be 
drafted and submitted to a referendum within 18 months of the 
formation of the government (February 2009).  Although not 
specified in the GPA, it was understood that elections would take 
place after the adoption of the new constitution which would 
presumably address the timing and process of new elections.  The 
constitutional process is proceeding fitfully and behind schedule, 
but it is proceeding. 
 
 
 
¶21.  (SBU) More important than scheduling elections are 
institutions and an environment that will permit fair elections. 
An important step would be the establishment of an independent 
electoral commission to set the ground rules and ensure that NGOs 
can freely participate in voter education.  The leaders of the 
parties have agreed on members of the Electoral Commission and 
 
HARARE 00000107  007 OF 008 
 
 
reportedly on the chair, an independent Zimbabwean judge now 
working in Namibia.  The Commission has not yet, however been 
officially announced.  Another important step would be the revision 
and cleansing of the voter rolls.   The long-serving Registrar of 
Voters is a ZANU-PF stalwart who cannot be expected to assist in 
such efforts.   Finally, the presence of international election 
observers, before, during, and after the election, is essential. 
 
 
 
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MDC-T's View 
 
----------------- 
 
 
 
¶23.  (C) The U.S. and other Western countries tend to look at 
benchmarks, or single events, as signs of progress.  MDC-T is 
concerned less with events than what it sees as a continuing 
process of change.  Therefore, while it believes the GPA is 
deadlocked-Mugabe and ZANU-PF refuse to appoint governors and 
remove Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor Gideon Gono and Attorney 
General Johannes Tomana-MDC-T leaders in government are able to use 
their positions to generate incremental change.   Tsvangirai is 
prime minister and, although his powers are limited, he represents 
MDC-T and reform-minded Zimbabweans on the world stage.  MDC-T and 
MDC-M have half the ministries, including the all-important finance 
ministry.  Gono's wings have been clipped and the economy 
stabilized.  In general MDC-T believes that the process is 
irreversible-and the longer it can influence the GOZ from the 
inside, the more likely democratic gains will persist (COMMENT: 
While it is possible that Tsvangirai's view that the process is 
irreversible might be somewhat naC/ve, it does appear sustainable. 
END COMMENT). 
 
 
 
¶24.  (C) MDC-T's strategy is thus  two-pronged.  It will declare 
GPA negotiations deadlocked and push for elections.  Realizing this 
depends on ZANU-PF taking the same position-under the current 
Constitution elections would not be held until 2013-and that 
elections may not take place in the near term, MDC-T will seek 
additional Western assistance, and seek progress in reengagement 
with international  financial institutions (IFIs).  Accordingly, 
MDC-T Minister of Finance Tendai Biti, MDC-T Minister of 
Constitutional Affairs Eric Matinenga, and MDC-M Minister of 
Education David Coltart, in recent visits to the U.S. have noted 
progress made under the coalition government.  MDC-T believes that 
Zimbabwe's economy cannot grow significantly without Western and 
IFI assistance.  If the economy improves, in MDC-T's opinion, it 
will get the credit; if it does not, ZANU-PF will blame MDC-T. 
 
 
 
------------------ 
 
On the Ground 
 
------------------ 
 
 
 
¶25.  (SBU) After the 2008 electoral violence and political 
uncertainty, and with continuing economic instability marked by 
hyper inflation, the formation of the coalition government was 
widely supported by the Zimbabwean people.  The large decline in 
violence has been particularly welcomed, although, as noted, 
ZANU-PF machinery is still in place and there is fear it could be 
reactivated.  In Harare and other cities, goods are once again 
available in stores (although many cannot afford them), gas is 
available, and there has been a noticeable increase in traffic. 
Unemployment remains incredibly high and unfulfilled expectations 
of higher wages by civil servants have resulted in a strike.  But 
there is still an energy in urban areas that was not present a year 
ago, and a sense that people are better off. 
 
 
 
¶26.  (SBU) The economic buzz does not exist in rural areas. 
 
HARARE 00000107  008 OF 008 
 
 
Schools are not functioning, and there is a lack of cash to buy 
whatever goods are available.  There is a feeling that things are 
better, however, if only because the threat of violence has greatly 
diminished. 
 
 
 
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COMMENT 
 
------------- 
 
 
 
¶27.  (C) The GPA continues to be a focus of attention among 
Zimbabwe watchers, and Gideon Gono and Roy Bennett-and to a lesser 
extent Tomana-have become familiar names, symbolic of the deadlock. 
But to focus only on them would be to lose sight of the progress 
that has been made on the humanitarian, economic, and political 
fronts, particularly since March 2008, and in the words of Finance 
Minister Biti, to divert energy from the strategic picture.  And we 
believe we will continue to see more, albeit slow and fitful, 
change.  Fundamental, institutional change, however, will be 
dependent on two things:  new elections that result in a government 
dedicated to reform -- the earliest that could happen would be 
2011, but it is likely elections will not take place until 2012 or 
2013 -- and the development of enduring institutional structures 
that are the true underpinnings of a representative democratic 
society.  END COMMENT. 
RAY